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“Graspings: wholes and not wholes, convergent divergent, consonant 
dissonant, from all things one and from one thing all” 
Heraclitus, CXXIV 
 
 “The first form of intellectual activity is active, practical thinking.  
This thinking that is directed toward reality” 
Vygotsky (1987[1999]:63) 
 
 “[M]eaning is pure relation” 
Voloshinov (1930[1973]:28) 
 
“Cognition with respect to books and to other people’s words and  
cognition inside one’s head belong to the same sphere of reality” 
 (ibid.:34) 
 
 “[A]ll culture is participatory first”  
Howard (in: Owens 2013:x–x) 
 
 “To those who wish and know how to think participatively” 
Bakhtin (1993[1999]:19) 
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PREFACE 
I recall a rather precise moment years past, when, during one of those characte-
ristically morose and rainy Estonian autumn evenings, I was sitting in front of 
my desktop. I had just finished viewing a local television broadcast of Lost. 
Now, it is obviously impossible to recall every tiny detail involved, but the 
show had likely ended with one of those nail-biting “cliffhangers” and out of 
nowhere I got the urge to check on the Internet. I wanted to see what other 
people were saying happened. And down the proverbial rabbit hole I went, 
readily “immersed” into a “world” I didn’t previously know even existed. 
This dissertation, whether you presently hold it in your hand or engage with 
it by some digital means, is not about Lost, though. Or it is, indeed, by way of 
its spectre haunting whatever “complex TV” ensued. But less for the reason of 
there being considerable publications on Lost, and more due to certain strategic 
choices, the present dissertation centers on the Internet reception of Breaking 
Bad. It speaks of how these aforementioned other people engage with by 
making sense of the other (kind of) people. It is about the meaningful inter-
sections of humanly occurrences on the “small screen” and behind it, as it were. 
It is about characters taken as persons. Narrative persons. It is about real 
persons’ spirited quest in scrutinizing narrative persons, in hypothesizing and 
assuming about them, and, in so doing, actively construing their “intentional 
Other.” It is about lives that are observed, first perhaps from a distance, but 
thereafter—as the “narrative” unravels—ever more intimately. And ultimately, it 
is about analyst’s active role in this ’mess of living.’ It is about interpreting how 
people construe and become absorbed by “the lives of Others”—although ones 
considered normatively “unreal.” Or so the wisdom of scholarly convention 
decrees, at least. 
 
 
in Tartu,  
August 2016 
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INTRODUCTION 
i Reflections on narrative research as pluralist enterprise: 
or, an attempt to rectify the “dialogue of the deaf” (Ryan1) 
 
“The beginning and the end are shared in the circumference of a circle” 
– Heraclitus, XCIX 
 
”Theory should agree with reality” 
– G.. Prince, “Classical and/or Postclassical Narratology” (2008), p. 122 
 
In my Master’s thesis (Sorokin 2010a), I endeavored, on the one hand,—
through the examination of the fieldwork diaries of renowned Estonian folklo-
rist Mall Hiiemäe—to “see” people behind the (descriptive) texts, i.e., to convey 
meta-level “storyteller constructs” (ibid.:5,14; cf., Titon 2003:79). On the other, 
by adapting Mikhail Bakhtin’s dialogic-contextualist approach, I focused on 
archived lore (transcriptions), contending that oral storytellers, in conveying 
their own “voice,” also become bearers of other “voices,” implicit within situat-
ed storytelling acts. My present dissertation extends this approach to digital 
storytelling, where my now widened theoretical focus is indebted to of the volu-
minous literature in folkloristics zooming in on the “heteroglotted” concerns on 
context, thick corpus, multiform plot and the storytelling event I found 
accommodating at the time (op. cit.:17–29; Bauman 1986; Ben-Amos 1971, 
1993; Young 1985; Duranti 1986; Georges 1969, 1980; Hufford 1995; Honko 
(Ed., 2000); see also, Schieffelin 1980, 1985). 
Moreover, speaking of broadening horizons, Bakhtin’s early influence 
spurred me to observe “individual” disciplines first and foremost as “voices,” 
academic ‘timbres’ that can be fine-tuned to resonate in (at least approximate) 
harmony—not without care and considerable (and perhaps, overtly idealistic) 
effort, of course. Herewith it is unfeasible not to echo (nor not to be inspired by) 
transdisciplinary narratologist David Herman, who—almost two decades ago—
sounded one of his many proverbial rallying calls against the salience of “over-
compartmentaliz[ation]” in narrative research. Namely, Herman accentuated the 
necessity for “regrounding2” of and “a major rethinking of thinking” in the field 
of narratology (ibid.:303–305; cf., Herman 2006, 2010, 2011, 2013; Fludernik 
2005:37, Cit. in: Alber and Fludernik 2010:4–5). Herman goes to fuse the lega-
cy of Vygotsky’s socio(cultural)-historical approach with compatible currents in 
contemporary cognitive science, developmental psychology, post-Cartesian (and 
or anti-representationalist) approaches to mind and narrative (see, e.g., Herman 
                                                            
1  See, Ryan, “Story/Worlds/Media” (Storyworlds Across Media, 2014), p. 27. 
2  Entailing amongst others “a more extensive integration of concepts and methods from 
other fields” (Herman 2003a:303). 
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2011; Hutto 2013)3, and more. As observed in the introduction to the edited vol-
ume Postclassical Narratology, Approaches and Analyses by Jan Alber and 
Monika Fludernik, Herman—the very pioneer of the postclassical ‘turn’—“used 
the term narratology ‘quite broadly, in a way that makes it more or less inter-
changeable with narrative studies’,” or even, with “narrative analysis,” per se 
(Herman 1999, Cit. in: Alber and Fludernik 2010:2; see also, ibid.:23; Prince 
2008:115ff., esp. 120; Herman 1997). More concisely put: comparative to, 
whilst also expanding on, the classical narratology,4 
 
postclassical narratology also asks other questions: about the narrative structure 
and the semiotic form, about their interaction with knowledge of the real world, 
about the function and not only the functioning of narrative […] about narrative 
as a process and production and not simply a product, about the influence of 
context and means of expression on the responses of the receiver […] It 
[postclassical narratology—S.S.] is itself plural. (op. cit.:116,117; emphases 
added; cf., Shuman and Hasan-Rokem 2012:59)5 
 
Now, Herman’s own specific brand of “regrounding” established itself bearing 
on the “socially situated” practices whereby human cognition—real or “fictio-
nalized” notwithstanding—becomes scrutinized as “supra- or transindividual 
activity distributed across groups functioning in specific context, rather than as 
a wholly internal process unfolding within the minds of solitary, autonomous, 
and desituated cognizers” (Herman 2003a:304; emphasis added; see also, Her-
man 2010 passim).6 Herman’s fundamental postulates of 1999 resonate with 
Alan Palmer’s dissertation on The Presentation of Mind in Narrative Fiction.7 
Building on Vygotsky, Voloshinov, and others, Palmer anticipated Herman’s 
initiative in what he later referenced as an “externalist perspective on the mind” 
                                                            
3  For further polemics on this (with explicit focus on narrative “character“), see, x passim, 
and esp. chapter 1. For closing overview and discussion, see Conclusion. 
4  As observed by Amy Shuman and Galit Hasan-Rokem (2012:58), latter, in turn, 
emerging on the “main theoretical basis” laid by Propp’s morphology of the Russian 
folktale. 
5  Cf., Alber and Fludernik noting “contextual versions of postclassical narratology,” e.g., 
diverse body of non-literary and transmedial narrative resources as distinct focalities, 
especially backlit by the “narrative turn” in human sciences in general, and in reception-in-
clined analyses, in particular. Alber and Fludernik ultimately summarize context-sensitivity 
as being at the pulsating core of “all narratology nowadays” (Alber and Fludernik 2010:3; 
esp. 5-6,9,22). See also, Prince (2008:121) on the significance of the “’voice’ of the 
receiver” in “contextually situated practices.”  
6  An apt corollary is proposed in the field of futures studies where narrative is viewed 
outright as something generative and common—a Vygotskyian “zone of proximal develop-
ment” (see, Jarva 2014:1ff.). Relatedly, in the Preface to Thought and Language, Alex 
Kozulin, explaining Vygotsky’s differential of sense (dependent on context) and meaning 
(reflecting generalized concept(s), conveys that “[m]eaning is only one of the zones of sense, 
the most stable and precise zone” (Kozulin 1985[1986]:xxxvii; emphasis added). 
7  http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.286608 (Accessed: 14.03.2017) 
15 
(Palmer 2014).8 Such a turn ‘outward,’ pursuing the ideas of both narratologist 
scholars and their followers, comprehensively validates the scientific acknow-
ledgement of “everyday life peoples’” reliance on 
 
[n]arrative … as a powerful and basic tool for thinking [being hence observed as 
a pervasive] communicative practice across so many settings [and] deep-roote[d] 
in a variety of human practices (Herman 2003a:303–304; emphases added; see 
further in, x-xi; cf., interactional approach to narrative analysis vis-à-vis personal 
(life) stories wherein narrative’s utilized as “cultural resource for negotiating 
meaning,” Shuman 2012:125,126ff.) 
 
Herman set forth some grand claims (although what “revolution,” to borrow his 
own framing device from 2003, wouldn’t stand—or fall—on them?), elabo-
rating on them further, a decade later, in his inspiring Storytelling and the 
Sciences of Mind (Herman 2013). Similarly, Palmer’s work has pursued pole-
mics probably most conclusively displayed by thought-provoking discussions in 
the special issue of Style (Palmer; Herman; Hutto, et al. 2011). 
However, the discipline of folkloristics, having had its sharp eye on popular 
practices of lore “making” from time immemorial, could be seized here as 
corresponding to narratology’s diverse impulses toward hybridizing and ex-
panding across various fields of expertise, as discussed previously; at least inso-
far as the creative narrative practices in contemporary digital environments sig-
naling the “everyday” are concerned. Hence, from folkloristics’ side such 
bidirectional complementarity becomes further qualified by Simon J. Bronner’s 
argument of “cognitive basis” (Bronner 2011:399). Conceiving of the Internet 
as “social conduit” betokening various “divisions and binaries,” e.g., persistent 
struggle between “the folk” and “the official,” Bronner outlines an environment 
innately attuned to underscore the ‘mutability’ in and diversity of “living tradi-
tions” (Howard and Blank 2013:8ff.; McNeill 2013:80–81). Accordingly, 
technological innovations insisting on “bottom-up” social platforms, begetting 
’open sourced’ functionality necessarily pave way to “alternative authority” 
(Howard 2008b) or “distributed authorship” (Foley 2012; see, xi-xii, for discus-
sion). In effect, the Internet becomes “an expanding folkloric thoroughfare,” 
and, as Simon J. Bronner points out, initial appeal to the Internet’s “’folk’ 
character” didn’t at all come from folklorists, but Web 2.0 developers. Hence, 
“folksonomy,” a folk-taxonomy hybrid, came to signify “emic, or user-generat-
ed, practice” of collaborative creation (Bronner 2011:402,406; cf., Noyes 2012, 
2016) (for more on notions such as “collaborative,” see below). 
Consequently, popular online practices remain anchored in, whilst signifi-
cantly re-shaping, the classical notion of folk group (i.e., “producers” of lore) 
outlined by Alan Dundes: “any group of people whatsoever who share at least 
one common factor” (Dundes 1965:2, Cit. in, McNeill 2013:4; cf., Pilt 
                                                            
8  For concluding treatment of particular polemics, that is, the engagement with “narrative 
characters,” and how the terminological framework established in present dissertation could 
contribute, see Conclusion. For the “alternative” approach itself, see, xi passim, and chapter 1.  
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2014:22). As folklorist Lynn McNeill explains, a digital folk group not only 
“bridge[s]” participants (regardless of time and space, strictly speaking; cf., 
Page 2012), but fashions in doing so its own cultural varieties, expectations and 
tacit rule sets. McNeill points to, say, tone-adjusting “text-based ‘gestures’” 
(i.e., frowny versus smiley face), requiring explanation for the “uninitiated” as 
well as the rising discourse of “memes” (McNeill 2013:82–85; cf., Arpo 
2001:26; see also, Pilt 2014: 29–32,42). My own emphasis going forward shall 
be on “narrative culture,” taken broadly, i.e., overlapping discussion environ-
ments for Breaking Bad, predicated on a kind of “vernacular creativity”—itself 
necessitating further original terminology which emphasize eschewing the ordi-
nary means of hierarchization and labeling in favor of explicating the pro-
cess9—readily inclined for impending expressional cues which may remain of 
negligible quality lest an observer has crossed narrative-historical knowledge 
threshold of a particular sort. Expressive ambivalence, compression limited to 
sentence or mere word, and other creative uses of language may beget an assort-
ment of respondent-dependent attunements. For instance, an analyst unfamiliar 
with the original material (a serialized televisual narrative) may find herself 
amidst, to paraphrase literary classics, “tongues signifying nothing.” Mean-
while, “acafans” (fan-academics) might observe the formation of subtly 
wrought narrative-historically sensitive commentary texts that underscore the 
development and alteration of communal senses in real time (see, x, xii, chap-
ter 3, 3.4–3.5).  
As such, although Dundes’ definition remains agreeable for “the digital age,” 
distinct changes in ‘base structures’ constituting our being as (digi-)social have 
nonetheless called for outlining an “alternative grammar” (Hafstein 2014; see, 
xii, for discussion) as well as setting forth 
 
new challenges … to the assumptions of folklore as face-to-face communication 
and its social basis. Theories of communication and new philosophies with key-
words of convergence, hybridity, and networking followed to account for post-
industrial phenomena of mass-mediated culture and the role of mobile individual 
agency in self-actualization and new forms of social belonging. (Bronner 
2017:14–15; cf., Howard 2015)     
 
It is the purpose of later sections (x, xi, passim) of present Introduction to en-
large upon such a particular Dundesian “common factor,” namely that of a co-
elaborative “narrative culture,” arguably affiliating participants through dis-
tributed sense-making by way of “vernacular creativity” (see, x-xii). These core 
ideas, however, scaffolded on longitudinal examination of computer-mediated 
communication (CMC) conveying digitalized social experience of serialized 
television watching (Breaking Bad) in general, and of “character engagement” 
in particular, become even further reinforced were we to note that one of the 
first folkloristic works concerning Internet (and its vernacular) was, in fact, 
                                                            
9  For “norms” (esp. academical evaluations of popular practices) are latter’s antithesis, its 
restrainers and mounters.  
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Nancy Baym’s article in the Journal of Folklore Research (Baym 1993) on 
online communities “forming around TV shows” (Howard 2015:247). More-
over, as if anticipating my upcoming nod to the motif of “water cooler talks,” 
Robert Glenn Howard throws into sharp relief the artificiality of the digital/non-
digital polarization from the explicit “everyday life” perspective, suggesting 
that 
 
our digital networks are not fundamentally separate from our daily lives … The 
internet is no longer “new media.” It is no longer extraordinary. Today, the Inter-
net is mundane. Just like communicating face-to-face, there is no question that 
there is “folklore online” because “online” is just another way we communicate 
… Now that the Internet is mundane, researching it is even more important. No 
longer a passing fad or minor sub-cultural phenomenon, in its mundanity, the 
Internet’s power is expansive. (Howard 2015:248; emphasis added; see also, 
Blank 2009, Ben-Amos 1971) 
 
As previously implied, present dissertation aims to qualify such “power” fore-
most through narrative as a practical tool (for thinking and expressing), insti-
gating a kind of “vernacular creativity,” predicated on the discussional format of 
blogs and forums and hence providing a glimpse of a distinct “praxis of the 
everyday” (Wulff 1996a). That is, I will concentrate on a “power” which, as 
shall be contended, manifests as a dynamic complex of correspondences, as 
‘folded’ agencies within the storytelling eventness (see, xi-xii).  
Consequently, I take the previous rough outline of coinciding demurrals and 
positive anxieties to vindicate my assumption that both narratology and 
folkloristics are crucial disciplinary  ‘timbres’ channeling what’s perhaps most 
accurately framed as an multidisciplinary study. For I aim to seek active 
‘thought cohesions’ between film/television studies, social, media, (post-cogni-
tivist) ecological, and common sense/folk psychology; between aesthetics, phe-
nomenology, enactivist philosophy of mind, and literary theory; between dis-
course analysis, modal logics, natural language algorithms, “Big Data” mining; 
and more. Clearly, all three chapters, taken in unison, indeed underline an ‘ex-
treme’ aspiration toward a potential transdisciplinary outcome as highlighted by 
the development and application of theoretical framework. Ultimately, though, 
the evaluation whether there were difficulties in “synthesizing results linked to 
different horizons” (Prince 2008:120) is the readers’ task.  
As a means of illumination, then, the present sub-section of this Introduction 
ruminates on the path taken, hoping to sketch the dissertation’s “socially 
meaningful” objective, multi- and transdisciplinarily (but also interdisci-
plinarily) speaking. To that end, I am going to further focus on key “angle[s] of 
entry” (Young 1986:ix) validating the necessity for an experimental synthesis. 
Before I can proceed, however, I first have to clarify two issues.  
Firstly, speaking in purely empirical terms the present dissertation displays a 
qualitative shift from the scholarly-mediated collections of oral lore into unme-
diated (“natural”) ‘digi-lore’ emerging within and across digital environment(s). 
This variation of “mundane” lore fashions a particular cross-sectional archive 
18 
par excellence—an objective chronicle conserving the criss-crossing interstices 
of narrations (cf., see discussion on this, vis-à-vis Booth 2009, 2010, below) for 
which analyst becomes unintrusive, explanatory editor (see, xii). Narrowing yet 
further down, I could say that where once, say, television’s significance as a 
(form of) social experience became expressed by the staple phrase of workplace 
“water cooler” talks (see, Simons 2015:221)—hence corresponding to height-
ened interest in diverse real life cultural practices with regard to “mass media” 
(e.g., Dégh 1994)—CMC has afforded such shared experience a considerable 
enlargement and prolongation. As I will suggest (x-xi), in digital environments 
“narrative cultures” unravel freely and or due to top-down constraints, charac-
terized by multifarious means of sense-making and storytelling wherein narra-
tive becomes deployed as the central practical tool in a creative co-elaboration 
of common sense.  
Present dissertation’s argument builds upon these aforementioned elemen-
tary baselines by proposing a theoretical framework with a distinct emphasis on 
how it actually works; that is, how people perceive—and, crucially, expressively 
articulate this perception of—(other) people “behind” the televisual serials10 
(with a close sample analysis of Breaking Bad’s discussions in multiple simulta-
neous digital environments). Consequently, insofar as “narrative” is utilized as a 
tool for sense-making, such experience befalls a co-elaborative ‘eventness’ in 
and across digital “sites of engagement.”  
Secondly, when speaking of televisual narratives grounding “social experi-
ence,” much of the pioneering, influential and admired work in consolidating 
television (which, for a long period, was back-seated for its “cultural” and or 
“artistic” merits, or rather, lack thereof) and narrative research—elaborating 
here on the cognitivist approach of film theorist David Bordwell—originates 
from Jason Mittell. While undoubtedly a path breaking enterprise, Mittell’s re-
liance in outlining his persuasive “complex TV” approach, however, runs at 
least a partial risk of subduing the concordant intricacy subscribable to popular 
sense-making. Although work on audience activity makes up a solid portion of 
Mittell’s oeuvre, the overarching rhetorical strategy deployed, e.g, in his work 
on wikis, especially Lostpedia for Lost fandom (see, Mittell 2009, 2013) on the 
one hand opts for (analytical) generalizations over close readings and the emi-
nence of specific loci (like user-run wikis) over a more distributed perspective 
on the eventness of/across digital environments. On the other, popular sense-
making appears as something necessarily observed only in abstract “online 
anonymous qualitative surveys” (e.g., Gray and Mittell 2007, regarding Lost’s 
spoilers). Consequently, (i) the spotlight seems to be fixated on classical narra-
tologist analyses—“strategies of storytelling” in (Mittell 2014; see also, Allrath 
and Gymnich (eds) (2005) and—of the authorial narrative (or, unambiguously 
delineated objects of analysis, e.g., the wiki framework); (ii) whereas popular 
sentiment—the common sense-making—remains regulated through desituated 
                                                            
10  Cf., “people behind the texts” Titon (2003:79). 
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“surveys,” indicating (signs of) reluctance to explicitly outline the complexity in 
such dynamics (cf., Prince 2008:121–122). 
In effect, the not-so-simple issue of data transparency is where this disserta-
tion may crucially contribute. The commentary sections of television criticism 
blogs or the thematical threads on user-run forums, laying the empirical ground-
work for current study, consistently “produce” approximately tens of thousands 
of individual texts per week throughout the airing of some popular serial narra-
tive such as Breaking Bad. Presumably, though, the sheer magnitude of such 
quantity has caused in interested researchers a kind of Schrödinger’s cat reflex. 
In a seemingly conclusive endeavor to only provide compressed and/or perfunc-
tory account of “complex sense-making,” however, without actually showing 
(and untangling) its natural occurrence, these kinds of perspectives hazard de-
scribing the woods for the trees, and, at its worst, may even subjugate popular 
sense-making practices to the heretofore ‘order of things,’ thus inadvertently 
enforcing old conventions. Hence, my emphasis on distributed sense-making 
(cf., see xii-xiii, chapter 2; the original analytical notion of text makers’ 
world) clearly distinguishes inherent tensions, relations and analyst’s ”editorial” 
role in conveying them, as fundamental ingredients insofar as narrative uptake 
and subsequent sense-making are not so much determined, but conveying 
‘points of tension’—discourses instigated by ambient flux, one might say. The 
“open source” process of sense-making, I am going to maintain, betokens a 
‘leveling’ quality of correspondence between the “agents” involved—hence 
there are contributions into, not strict constraints to, the creative activities 
taking place. 
Taken broadly, similar criticisms can also be applied to specifically “lo-
calized” areas of academic interest such as, but not limited to, “hypertext fic-
tion” and “fanfiction.” As opposed to distributed “sites of engagement” high-
lighting co-elaborative creativity, here the “localization” in the sense of produc-
tion is either being condensed onto one “site” and its technical options, as in 
case of fanfictions, personal blogs, or wikis; or concentrated on one authored 
entity, either “collective,” “collaborative,” or individual (with “end-user,” i.e., 
reader ‘continuing’), as in case of digital fiction. Put differently, lesser stock is 
seemingly put in how the above forms come to be, or rather, what are the inter-
nal emergent dynamics as-they-happen, as opposed to conventionalization of 
yet new forms (subsumed under the catchy heading of ‘New Media’).11 In short, 
the principle of analytical abstraction subsists on the process of the doers, as it 
were, whilst simultaneously being dangerously far removed from it. In other 
words, the poetics of (para)social perception appears lost in the shuffle in favor 
of highlighting the poetics of the narrative form being perceived. However, the 
former conceivably ascends to a more prominent position in poetics of folklore 
as “creative communication,” explained by Amy Shuman and Galit Hasan-
Rokem as “basically a contingent theory of folklore [where] [p]oetics will be 
                                                            
11  Cf., M-L. Ryan’s suggestion that, as far as digital fiction is concerned, academic interest 
overweighs popular one. For further criticism on the notion of “new media,” however, see 
Lunenfeld (1999[2001]:xvi).  
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understood as the total body of values predicating expressive modes of culture 
created in various media12 by individual authors, artists and performers inter-
acting with values and norms collectively accepted and processually shaped 
through shared forms of [communicative practices]” (Shuman and Hasan-
Rokem 2012:55ff.; esp. 61–62,64; emphases added).  
Given the layout described above, it becomes especially crucial to expound 
on the impetus afforded by narratology and folkloristics in shaping my trans-
disciplinary objective for both disciplines are taken as proverbial ‘springboards’ 
scaffolding the ‘thought cohesions’ attempted throughout. As such, reflective 
overview and discussion on the study of storytelling and narrative within the 
paradigms of digital folkloristics and narratology, respectively, appears espe-
cially crucial. In what follows, my concentration will be lastly limited to a kind 
of cross-section of junctions and interlocks, a precisely concentrated ‘synopsis’ 
necessarily drawing together particular “macro” notions underscoring present 
dissertation—even if, perhaps, only implicitly so.  
In her Taleworlds and Storyrealms, phenomenological folklorist and narra-
tive scholar Katherine Galloway Young writes: 
 
The first question in presenting a body of work is where to cut in … A cut is an 
angle of entry. Wherever I enter, from there, a universe unfolds itself. In that 
sense, my angle of entry is my point of view. A universe cut into has an 
orientation. (Young 1986:ix) 
 
The “orientation” subsequently sketched knowingly embraces (and attempts to 
explicate) the “Heraclitian flux” (ibid.:x) of popular storytelling. Herewith 
narratology and folkloristics, although perhaps with differing attunements and 
contrasting aims that might splice apart, should not, I would suggest, cut across. 
In other words, the foundational role both folkloristics and narratology share in 
making sense of the sense-makings of the variegated nature of human expe-
rience has to be clearly accentuated and embraced. 
However, the suggested polemical themes are still cast unjustifiably generi-
cally, to be sure. Indeed, they might gain further amplification (and under-
standing) through interdisciplinary descriptors on the practices of storytelling 
and sense-making, i.e., through potential “angles of entry,” conveying particular 
’junctions and interlocks.’ On the one hand, the widespread notions delimiting 
agentic dynamics (collective, collaborative (or, co-constructive), participatory, 
and narractive) I have hence cherry-picked to convey a necessary common 
ground in scaffolding my adapted notion of co-elaborative (see, cf., Détienne et 
al. 2012:3512ff.). On the other, my particular treatment of latter notion (and its 
outgrowth in narrcept (see, xiii, and chapter 1) serves to validate multidiscipli-
nary approach with a prospective transdisciplinary outcome. Insofar as much of 
                                                            
12  Shuman and Hasan-Rokem explicitly distinguish “material, ritual as well as verbal 
media,” but I see of no reason why the popular creative practices conveyed through CMC 
should’t be included at the very least as sub-set of “material media” (ibid.:56), insofar as the 
the distinct kind of experientiality its usage conveys is concerned. 
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the terminological polemics becomes steadily outlined in later sections and 
chapters, however, I will currently limit myself to being as concise as possible. 
To begin with, the usage of “collective” when speaking of communal activi-
ties, especially those availed by digital social media environment and its pre-
cursors (Usenet news groups, cf., e.g., Lavery 1995b and Jenkins 1995, on Twin 
Peaks fandoms; IRC chat rooms, Google discussion groups, etc.), can be traced 
back to the widely-held and influential notion “collective intelligence” (Lévy 
1997, 2003, 2013). Becoming further popularized by Steven Johnson’s Emer-
gence (Johnson 2001), it seemingly also hit the right note with fandom studies 
and more (see, e.g., Jenkins 2002; Duda 2014; Tronstad 2014; for preliminary 
discussion and criticisms, see below; for more, see, xii).  
Building on the previous discussion of Mittell’s work on “complex” TV, I 
will take as my starting point narratologist Ruth Page’s and hypertext fiction 
theorist/author Scott Rettberg’s approach to collaborative “authorships” and 
“fictions” (Page 2012; Rettberg 2011, 2014; see also, Rettberg 2015a, b). Here, 
the notions of co-construction and collaboration converge into a specific collec-
tive action producing plethora of loosely interconnected or single narrative texts 
(Page 2012:117ff.). Moreover, such specificity is underpinned by a predeter-
mined constrained interactive environment and or known creative agents (e.g., a 
restricted number of authorial figures, like with hypertext novel The Unknown 
(Rettberg 2014:78); or top-down “[launched] experiment in collaborative 
writing” with its pre-given ‘start-up’ sentence (op. cit.:119), like Page’s case 
study of A Million Penguins ”wikinovel”). Protagonize, Page’s subsequent 
examination, a “creative writing community [for] amateur writers,” only 
furthers the seeming reliance on the conditioned settings (and agents) (ibid.: 
120–122).  
Meanwhile, in contradistinction to the above, Page’s earlier differential of 
“dialogic co-tellership” is characterized by diffusion which—insofar as Page’s 
mention of “separate forum posts, blog posts, and comments” (ibid.:117) lets 
on—could be conceived more as a popular, albeit “messier” practice. As ex-
plained later, however, comments on, say, the multiform plots of the “wiki-
novel” have an ancillary function for the narratives insofar as “detached arte-
facts” become through comments being “retrospective evaluations” and 
“prospective suggestions” useful for the authors’ (see, ibid.:122–124). Although 
a promising clarification, introducing a division between “authors” and “con-
tributors” seemingly neutralizes “natural” distributed storytelling; that is, 
evaluative “normalizations” run the risk of being enforced from without. As 
such, both scholars, in their own ways, echo Mittell in opting to expound on the 
top-down, guided process, viewing a “communit[y] of tellers [=authors]” 
(ibid.:118), either on- or offline, through the conventional lense of (i) a central 
delineated object (be it in substance or loci), whilst (ii) enforcing, ironically, a 
(re-)distribution of roles.  
Promptly put, the above signals an attempt to ‘format’ the living storytelling, 
subordinate it to the relations, externally validated; of setting up, or more per-
haps more to the point, of distributing hierarchy (furthered by explicit labeling 
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of “narrative identities” (see, ibid.:125–134) where it might not even be neces-
sarily, lest we really are to speak of collaborative storytelling. In other words, 
tailored choices for analyses, such as previously outlined, hazard to present 
controlled creative procedures, even if nominally highlighting the “distributed 
process of storytelling” (ibid.), as symbolic for and hence eclipsing the potential 
analytical value of analogous popular practices which might, on an opposing 
note, be characteristically antiauthorial (Hafstein 2014) whilst also, im-
portantly, not foregoing but highlighting internalized and intertwined points of 
tensions, to boot (see, xii). However, such examples unfortunately appear ex-
cluded wholesale from Rettberg’s entry on “collaborative narrative” in The 
Johns Hopkins Guide to Digital Media (eds., M.-L. Ryan, et al., 2014). 
In associating above discussion on “collaborative” practices—particularly 
the enticing conceptualizing power underscoring the user-made “archives”—
and fan fiction studies, new media theorist Paul Booth’s trendsetting Digital 
Fandom and earlier work can be instructive (Booth 2009, 2010). Approaching 
user-created wikis (Heroespedia, Lostpedia) as a Derridean “architonic texts,” 
Booth develops the notion of “narractivity,” a “communal interactive action” 
whereby knowledgeable “fan-scholars” (recalling Mittell’s usage) “create 
knowledge about a [narrative] text” (ibid.:104–105). In etching out a kind of 
archive(d) historiography, in Derridaian sense, such wikis—Booth maintains—
become more than a sum of their parts, “not just a thing but a process, [where 
archive is] not just a device for reproduced information but for production it-
self” (ibid.:108). To a specific extent, Booth’s theorizing can be viewed as 
looming on my own for we are both concerned with a narrative creation process 
with historicist underpinnings. However, though massively elaborating on, say, 
Mittell’s (and Gray’s) preceding work and anticipating Page’s in significant 
ways, Booth, too, remains inevitably stuck on two significant reductionist 
strategies I aim to overcome. Firstly and most importantly, Booth’s is fixated on 
a singular environment of “knowledge creation” (or, at best, on a comparative 
analysis of two), whereas my purpose is to find the ways of conceptualization 
that would match the storytelling processes in their simultaneous multiplicity 
(developments across separate blog and forum environments at the same time). 
Secondly, and I think no less importantly, while I am sympathetic to the 
observation of “scholarly fans,” I nevertheless feel it undercutting the parti-
cularity of popular practices by enforcing, however gently, the perusal through 
the binary lenses of the old.   
Now, in comparison, fan fiction—as elaborated on by Hellekson (2014), 
Hellekson and Busse (2006), with pioneering work laid by e.g., Hills (2002) and 
Jenkins (1992)—has always been wary on such (external) binary impulses, 
whereas in favor of emphasizing, in principle, the bottom-up “amateur13 text 
creation,” challenging the ‘official’ (Hellekson 2014:188,190). Nonetheless, the 
extent and relevance of the notion of “collective” in fan fiction studies is 
                                                            
13  Here, “amateur” should be taken to mean practices emerging from the everyday online, 
pace pre-developed “communities” for the express purpose of “creative writing.“ 
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disconcerting. For, later in this Introduction, I intend to examine a potential 
position my dissertation might take within the context of fan studies—whilst 
also explaining how my conceptualization of co-elaboration principally di-
verges from the bias on “collective” in this particular field of research—I feel it 
suffice to note for now that within the area of fandom studies, the foothold of 
the “collective” has not gone completely unchallenged either, however. For in-
stance, the idea of “participatory process,” or “processurality” may accord well 
with tendencies accentuated in my work (Thomas 2011:208–209,214–216; em-
phasis added; cf., Ensslin 2007:37; see also, Thomas 2010:145–14614). Here, 
“the participatory” can be seen as diminishing the perceived value of the 
“collective intelligence,” whilst promoting socio-individual agencies at work 
(however, see, xii, for further discussion). As it stands, the popular approach 
underpinning folkloristics may permit a versatile balance with regards to narra-
tology’s indisputably necessary reliance and persistence on authority and form, 
even if its “postclassical” phase makes significant headway in counterpoising, 
to recall Prince’s phrasing, “narrative as a process and production and not 
simply a product” (Prince 2008:116). 
 
 
x Additional navigational notes: narrative  
as a tool for/in “narrative cultures”  
In her article published in Narrative Culture, Cristina Bacchilega writes: “[W]e 
live by stories and in stories […] stories matter” (Bacchilega 2015:28–29).15 
Indeed, ours is an era of increased “storyfication” and narrativization (cf., 
though, Mäkelä et al. 2017–201816). Internet is an excellent case in point. From 
a web page providing built-in design to “storify17” one’s tweets or “twitterfic-
tion as an emerging narrative form” (Thomas 2014), to Internet memes con-
sidered “meaningful [multiparticipant] discourse” (Nowak 2016; cf., Bronner 
                                                            
14  It should be noted here that under the auspieces of my approach, any usages of 
“participatory” have to be distinguished from “participatory responses,” viz. “mental 
products of readers’ participation in the narrative” (e.g., Polichak and Gerrig 2002; Green 
and Strange and Brock (eds) (2002). I will keep this particular polemics as a ’tie-in’ between 
Introduction and Conclusion, revisiting given issues in the latter, whereas especially chapter 
1 is set to establish the core of my (counter-)arguments on the matter. 
15  See also, Grishakova and Sorokin (2016:544ff.), “ubiquitousness of narrative” thesis; 
also, narratives as “ubiquitous elements of communication,” Longo (2016, esp. 8-11). For 
the criticism on the “ubiquity of narrative,” see Skalin (2008b:9,12). See also, however, 
Grishakova (2008) and Rossholm (2008) in the same edited volume. 
16 https://www.academia.edu/31590000/Dangers_of_Narrative_Contemporary_Story-
Critical_Narratology_2017-2018. The dangers inherent in uncritically ’idealizing’ narratives 
and various forms of (socio-cultural) narrations is a timely topic, indeed. Although my work 
touches upon these perils only in passing and, at best, very tangentially, there are certainly 
issues raised which could, if developed and scrutinized further, conceivably contribute to the 
project of “story-critical narratology” (ibid.). Some potentialities are suggested in the 
Conclusion. 
17  See, https://storify.com/  
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2017, McNeill 2013) on the backdrop of hashtag culture and “like economy”18; 
from proliferating political idioms such as “control the narrative”19 or top-down 
classificators such as “conspiracy theories20,” to Facebook self-building by 
intentionally creating a parochial “village” space thereof (Smith 2015)—the 
varied strategies of narrative- and sense-making appear omnidirectional. 
For instance, “digital enclaves” (cf., Howard 2011) can be highlighted as 
resonating in as well as becoming piecemeal “legitimized” by the “mainstream” 
discourse(-making). This, in turn, undercuts the conventional circumventions 
running the risk of positioning some of the peoples’ voices as belonging into 
“marginal” or “alternative spaces” (see, Husting and Orr 2007). Wherein do 
above tendencies position narrative, though? Although its “formal” borders and 
conventional “authority” may be fluctuating, open to disputes, and increasingly 
sublimated to “popular” control, narrative itself—as a cultural tool for acting, 
utilized to make sense of one’s immediate surroundings in whatever form—ap-
pears as something inescapable. 
In “perceiv[ing] what is in the world as it relates to us” (E.J.Gibson and Pick 
2003:24), narrative can be bestowed a practical function (effort for an objecto-
historical “reason explanation” through “intentional,” “relationalist” (usage of) 
language (Hutto 2013:590–591,598–601,602n5; Turvey and Carello 1981:313–
314, esp. 317–318; see also, Locatelli and Wilson (forthcoming21). In our ex-
ploratory ”information pickup” we actively “seek” information from the “fur-
nished surfaces” afforded by the adjoining ambient ‘flux’ (Anderson 1996: 
130,136; E.J.Gibson and Pick 2003:15,18–21,24–25). Scrutinizing and elabo-
rating on information received—including person perception—yields develop-
ment of increasingly complex construals, predictions, organizing principles et 
cetera (i.e., we are perceptually immersed in active learning).22 
In “[p]erceiving [as] an event” (ibid.), then—although perhaps sporadically 
and or dictated by necessity—narrative undergirds our “graspings,” our per-
ceptual, intentional “doings.23” Promptly, narrative proclivity may (tacitly) assu-
me environmental characteristics, taken broadly (see, xi passim, and chapter 1, 
for discussion on my original notion of realitization). In applying Vygotsky’s 
phrasing, narrative engenders “social attitude” and, being predicated on 
                                                            
18 Cf., Gerlitz and Helmond (2013); Carter (2013[2014]).  
19 https://www.google.ee/search?q=%22control+the+narrative%22&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-
8&gws_rd=cr&ei=NpSNV-T9IcbVsAGnoafIBw (Accessed: 19.07.2016). Social media can 
also introduce dangerous pitfalls, esp. with regard to online political “spaces,” see, e.g., 
Fenton and Barassi (2011). 
20  E.g., Campion-Vincent (2005). 
21 https://www.academia.edu/29758410/Introduction_Perception_Without_Representation 
(Accessed: 12.02.2017).  
 22  Cf., “cognitive niche construction,” (e.g., Bardone 2011; Bertolotti and Magnani 2016; 
Bardone and Magnani 2007) 
23  As philosophers of mind Shaun Gallagher and Micah Allen acutely write, “perception is 
not just for recognition or identification [nor] just for action [but] also reward-oriented, 
hedonic, aesthetic, and affective in the broadest sense—and in ways that suggest that we 
may enjoy (and seek) perceptual surprise” (Gallagher and Allen 2016:11). 
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“socially meaningful actions” and “social character of meaning,” conveys a co-
elaboratively communicated common interest (Vygotsky 1930[1978]:25–30,37, 
86,9024). In the present dissertation, such tendency becomes highlighted by and 
through the original notions of narrcept (narrative+percept) and beacon (see, 
xii, chapter 1–2). Anthropologist Cathrine Hasse, in her recent An Anthro-
pology of Learning: On Nested Frictions in Cultural Ecologies (Hasse 2015) 
puts the outline conveyed above perhaps in most acute terms: 
 
If  Vygotsky underlines how thinking is completed in words, we may enhance the 
perspective to all kinds of materials in our surroundings that anchor and 
communicate meaning in constant flux. Our collective consciousness25 makes 
use of these thinking tools and their anchors in both the material stick and the 
word stick. The sign thus plays a double function in internal mediation: It is used 
for communication and it is a generalization, and the two aspects are connected 
as communication built on generalization. (ibid.:86; emphasis in original; under-
lining added) 
 
In other words, narrative insists on evolving into a “fact of the environment and 
a fact of behavior” (cf., Gibson 1986[2015]:121; Good 2007:280). It at once 
provides resources for as well as develops, challenges, alters, and ‘channels’ our 
surroundings26, even though our sensibilities may object to such usage of “fact” 
due to its exorbitant “definitiveness.” Nevertheless, we’ve entered an age, after 
all, have we not, where diverse postmodernist relativism has vindicated objec-
tivism; where indeed utterances and “material of the word” (Voloshinov 
1930[1973]:19,24; Hasse 2015:85) (which might have hitherto had agreed upon 
“meanings”) emerge as constantly (re)negotiated, “made.” Indeed, weren’t we 
once forewarned that both facts and reality could be invented, to boot (see, 
Schmidt 1989; cf., Parenti 1986)?27 Consequently, to contest the overwhelming-
                                                            
24  Vygotsky [1934]1986, 1987[1999]; cf. Vygotsky 1925[1979]; Herman 2003d, 
2006:358ff., 2009, 2013; Bakhtin 1981, 1984; Bruner 1991; Voloshinov 1930[1973]:25-28; 
Wertsch 1991[1993]:18ff., 1998:73ff.; Lloyd and Fernyhough (eds) (1999); cf., Voloshinov 
1927[1976a], 1927[1976b]); Gibson 1986[2015]. For the development of Gibsonian 
perspective for the “non-mentalistic conception” of perception and cognition of the social 
world, signaling “shift of focus” from the individual to the distributed as the “unit of 
analysis,” see also, e.g., Good (2007, esp. 269-274 and 284-286) for an extended overview 
discussion underpinning various points considered in chapter 1.  
25  Note here that, following Vygotsky, Hasse importantly calls for a distinction: “The social 
is always present, whereas the collective is a special case” (ibid.; emphasis added). See also, 
ibid.:97, where “virtual space” among the varieties of human social organizing is 
acknowledged.  
26  Becoming a tool enabling to “verbalize  perception” (see, Vygotsky 1930[1978]:32-33) 
and develop our “verbal thinking” (see, Haase 2015:85). Cf., “inner sign” can become “outer 
sign,” for “[i]ntrospection itself, then, has an expressive character“; “social situation” is 
inextricably tied to, and orients, the inner sign(s); there’s an “evaluative (emotive) 
correspondence”  (Voloshinov 1930[1973]:36-38; emphasis in original). 
27  Cf., Grishakova and Sorokin (2016:554).  
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ness of narrative in such times and under such terms seems bizarre, if not 
altogether absurd.  
Hence, whereas the quintessence of the present dissertation indisputably is 
(about) people, it is perhaps more to the point to emphasize that the guiding 
objective herewith lies in how it is about them, how it explicates their ‘narrative 
toolings’; and how, therefore, it cautiously advocates for potentially revisionist 
theoretical models, specifically fine-tuned to arbitrate the popular senses. At this 
point we can turn to critically-renowned serialized television narrative (such as 
Breaking Bad) and its discussive reverberations on the Internet.  
 
 
xi Why Breaking Bad: synopsis and the shaping of the 
arguments “underneath” 
As the “litmus test” in explicating the precise narrative workings of said 
“popular,” I have chosen the popular and critical favorite American television 
serial28 Breaking Bad (2008–2013, AMC network)29 which was hailed through-
out its persistence primarily as a complex character study. Such complexity 
ultimately afforded the show a spot amongst a number of signature narratives of 
the “golden age” that “televised the revolution” (Sepinwall 2012) such as The 
Sopranos, The Wire, Deadwood, Mad Men, Lost, or Rectify. More importantly, 
however, Breaking Bad adjoined a particular register that had long started to 
change how intensively these kinds of narratives, and the characters thereof 
especially, were talked of and about, respectively, with the pioneering effort—
laying the foundation for the format later adapted and developed by weekly 
critics/reviewers such as Alan Sepinwall, Maureen Ryan, and others—made by 
the user-run recap blog Television Without Pity with accompanying bulletin 
board forum for further discussions.30 Renowned television writers anticipated 
such necessity and demand in advance, however. In Alan Sepinwall’s The Re-
volution Was Televised. The Cops, Crooks, Slingers and Slayers Who Changed 
TV Drama Forever (Sepinwall 201231), David Chase, the creator of epochal The 
Sopranos, recounts: “I was never surprised watching hour-long TV. And I never 
saw anyone on there who behaved like real human beings” (ibid.:34; emphasis 
added). As he explained later on, changing the conversation, as it were, was his 
signature objective for Chase endeavored to “get into more detail,” to really 
                                                            
28  With “serial,” I am following the distinction between continual (i.e., characterized by 
serial storytelling) and episodic televisual narrative. Whereas the latter may have 
consecutive sub-plots, they are secondary to the formularic content reinvented for every new 
episode (i.e., compare Breaking Bad and CSI). For one of the earliest definitions, see, e.g., 
Geraghty (1981); Also see, Mittell (2011: http://www.electronicbookreview.com/thread/ 
firstperson/serial; Accessed: 17.12.2016); Jones (2005[2010]:682-683).   
29  For a variety of recent theoretical perspectives on Breaking Bad, see, e.g., edited 
volumes by Koepsell and Arp (2012), Pierson (2014), Blevins and Wood (2015). 
30  For some research on  the subject, see e.g., Gray (2005), Andrejevic (2008), and Stilwell 
(2003).  
31  Complemented print published in 2015. 
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zoom in on the “very little small things about people” viewers encounter on 
screen (ibid.:313).  
Breaking Bad adds to the above with gusto, telling a realistic and exceptio-
nally engaging tale about human pride, of how the achievement of criminal 
power doesn’t “merely” corrupt, but also amplifies one’s “inner demons,” 
unveiling and reverting personal repressions and failures. Serial’s protagonist is 
an initially law-abiding though submissive and humble family man Walter 
White, a local high school chemistry teacher who earns extra income working in 
a car wash. During a casual doctor’s visit, however, he’s given a warning of his 
impending death—a late stage cancer, perhaps a year left. Consequently, this 
kind of tragic upheaval forces him to utilize extreme measures to assure  
his family’s monetary security. Being a brilliant chemist, he starts up a 
methamphetamine (“crystal meth”) lab by partnering up with his former student 
Jesse. At first, Walter had even calculated a precise sum of money which should 
be sufficient. Indeed, everything might have started relatively innocently, for 
Walter was first captivated by the science accompanying the “production 
process” (he aimed to produce the scientifically purest meth possible.) He didn’t 
really second guess the consequences, though. However, with time, Walter 
predictably developed an increasing taste for the power he wielded. After all, he 
becomes the widely known Heisenberg, revered and feared in equal measure. 
However, all this ensued in increasingly violent clashes with competing drug 
traffickers and kingpins, culminating, later on, with major bosses such as local 
mafia figure Gus Fring for whom Walt and Jesse ended up working. Ultimately, 
the aforementioned factored into a complex web of interrelations that stimulated 
a variety of monstrous events throughout. Indeed, Breaking Bad stayed true to 
its creator Vince Gillian’s initial pitch to AMC: “[t]his is a story about a man 
who transforms himself from Mr. Chips into Scarface.“32 
In a memorable scene from one of serial’s key episodes, protagonist Walter 
White channels Heisenberg and, being in utter disbelief of having ever run for 
his life, tells patronizingly to his wife, Skyler: “I am the one who knocks!” 
Now, inspired by this scene as well as taking into account previous bird’s eye 
view summary, one could inquire: who “knocks” and, who ‘does’ the “knock-
ing”? Such question can harbor two meanings. On the surface, it operates as a 
reminder of and homage to that pivotal scene, producing a line of dialogue 
which shortly made it to Urban Dictionary.33 To wit, a literal reading (i.e., keep-
ing in mind the ultimately grim resolution of Breaking Bad’s narrative) suggests 
Walter of having been anything but a “knocker,” as explicitly spelled out by 
serial’s penultimate episode’s title, “Ozymandias.”34 This dissertation, however, 
doesn’t venture into the “poetics” of “complex TV” for it has been done very 
                                                            
32 https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2012/may/19/vince-gilligan-breaking-bad 
(Accessed: 19.09.2016) 
33 http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=i%20am%20the%20one%20who% 
20knocks (Accessed: 10.07.2016) 
34  http://www.poetryfoundation.org/resources/learning/core-poems/detail/46565 (Accessed: 
9.07.2016) 
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effectively, distinctively and intensively elsewhere (see, Mittell 2015,2012/ 
2013; Vaage 2016; cf., Kroener 2013), and even in other languages (cf., Urbano 
and Meimaridis 2014). Therefore, the “knocking” scene may serve—under-
neath—as an allegory of the parasocial relation that viewers develop with 
characters: in both cases, the attribution of agency remains ambiguous. In 
accentuating intentional and sovereign agencies (both real and “fictional”), this 
dissertation proceeds to maintain that characters as “reasoning agents” un-
doubtedly do “knock.” It is more difficult to define who “does” the “knocking,” 
however. Consequently, my argument is that the discussive vernacular 
characteristic to TV discussion blogs and forums as “sites of engagement” 
(Norris and Jones 2005) is contingent on the (para)social bond viewers develop 
with what I am terming narrative persons (NPs). Moreover, such contention 
betokens an underpinned “secondary,” indirect ‘materiality’ consolidating “real” 
social interaction and the engagement with “fictive characters”; a particular 
form of (interactive) engagement conceivable as an interaction-in-development. 
Ecological film theorist Joseph D. Anderson’s explanation might be useful here: 
 
The perceptual and cognitive activity involved in film viewing is the same 
activity we human beings engage in when interacting with the world at large. As 
such, that activity must be viewed from the perspective of our ecological 
relationship with that world, our active search for meaningful patterns in an 
overdetermined environment35, and our simultaneous perception of possibilities 
for action (i.e., affordances) in that world […] We must perceive meanings in 
relation to someone, to a character in the movie who inhabits the fictional world 
of the movie, who is subject to its constraints and affordances. (Anderson 
1996:136–137; emphasis added; cf., Cutting 2005) 
  
What I am trying to get at then, and will touch upon below, whilst going to 
further expand on it in the Conclusion is that viewers’ making sense of NPs 
does not fundamentally differ in its articulative process. Drawing on Peter Na-
váez’s observation, of central importance here is “the expressive use of 
communication media, mass produced goods, and mass-mediated texts in small 
group contexts” (Naváez 1992:20; Cit in: Koven 2003:187; emphasis added; cf., 
Naváez 1987:38). Conceivably, such phrasing carries correspondence between 
folklore “proper” and popular culture. Hence, I would like to supplement this 
contention by maintaining its persistence on (residual) “real life” legacy, with 
(tacit) continuance afforded by “ordinary,” “commonsense”—what could be 
called the “materiality” of language underwriting such expressive continuum.36 
As indicated by academic literature drawing on participatory media (e.g., 
Plantinga 2011; Giles 2010), such set of characteristics could be ascribed to 
widely used explanatory-expressive terms such as “tangibility,” “familiarity,” 
“proximity,” or “secret friends” (chapter 1, 1.1 passim; Fernyhough, Cit in: Lea 
                                                            
35  For the strict explication for the Gibsonian understanding of the “inexaustible 
information” thesis, cf., Mace (1986:150); cf., chapter 1, 1.1. 
36  See, cf., McDonald, H., “Wittgenstein, Narrative Theory, and Cultural Studies” (Telos: 
Critical Theory of the Contemporary, 2001(121). pp. 19,21-22,26-28,30-31. 
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2017). Ultimately, such rendition of “secondary” materiality can correspond to 
Ong’s plea for “secondary orality,” for the material social relationships and 
interaction proper, especially, become cast through the prism of the “para-
social,” whereby the social bond (the “relation”/“interaction”/”intersubjective”) 
becomes moulded by and within narrative as the tool for “doing,” underscored 
by “distributed creativity37” (Glăvenau 2014). 
Now, if to claim that participants’ comprehensive articulation of tangibility, 
as it were (developed through the core principle of realitization), exerts funda-
mental narrativity, then how does it occur? I would assert that the afore-
mentioned actively material socialization inherent to language underpins a ver-
nacular (of creative third person-inclined imagination) predisposed for potential 
“insider” shorthands and other features unbeknownst and negligible, lest ob-
server’s narrative-historical knowledge threshold suffices (see, xii; cf., the 
Reidian approach to direct realism and ordinary language philosophy; cf., 
McDonald 2001:29).  
As digital folklorist Robert Glenn Howard further elucidates and present 
Introduction builds on later, “the definitive trait of [such a] vernacular is its dis-
tinction from the institutional … [it] emerges in specific network locations as a 
communal invocation of alternate authority” (Howard 2008b:192; emphases 
added).38 Such a becoming discourse world, as I will reference its “macro-level” 
(see, xiii; the notion of beacon, chapter 2), accentuates “the vast interconnected 
web of everyday communication we enact together to create our shared sense of 
the world” (in, Owens 201339; emphasis added). Such “vast” quality splinters 
into “different vernacular webs we each engage” (ibid.). Importantly, the crea-
tive capacity of such a vernacular becomes hereby—by my argument—“tooled” 
after and through narrative, predicated on its socio-practical function; in a par-
ticular kind of manifestations of cultural “nesting” (cf., Hasse 2015:91) or “sites 
of engagement,” accentuating our “ordinary language descriptions of expe-
rience” (Turvey 1997[2003]:433ff.) 
Consequently, my intention going forward is to lay theoretical scaffolding 
for the kind of interaction-in-development ‘moulded’ on the real noted above, as 
pertaining to the “screen characters,” as evidenced by, but not limited to, Break-
ing Bad’s long-term Internet discussions (Sorokin 2013a, b, 2016a, b; 2017a, b; 
and see esp., chapter 1, 1.3; cf., 1.2.1). In addition to aforementioned, intro-
                                                            
37  The concept recently coined in the noteworthy work of Romanian cultural psychologist 
Vlad Petre Glăveanu (Glăveanu 2014), who writes of a “new way of thinking that [does not] 
attribute creativity to person or culture, but distributes it in the relational space between them 
[...] creativity as an [interactive, self-producing] action in and on the world,” excluding 
individualism, but not the individual(s) (ibid.:2,9). 
38  Note that Howard’s usage of “authority” correlates with my empirical observations and 
suggested underlying terminology for interrogating the inherent dialectical tension shaping 
the poles of “popular” and “expert” (see, xiii; Howard 2008a:492; cf., Howard 2013; see 
also. “folklore as a culture of contestation,” Lombardi-Satriani 1974). 
39  http://blogs.loc.gov/thesignal/2013/02/born-digital-folklore-and-the-vernacular-web-an-
interview-with-robert-glenn-howard/ (Accessed: 9.02.2017). 
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ducing the concept of “vernacular creativity”40 enables to discern a particular 
kind of communicative conduit for prosaic41, communal “narrative culture.” In 
fact, both the latter notion as well as "vernacular creativity," when taken in 
unison, can be seen as circumscribing a more contemporary dimension for folk-
lorist Sylvia Grider’s invigorating concept of “narraform” (Grinder 1981). As 
per Grider’s suggestion, media “narraform” is a novel transitory “hybrid” in 
storytelling practice, rising at the creative intersections of experience (of mass 
media narrative on, say, supernatural) and traditional (oral) means of sense 
making, respectively. Asserts Grinder: “the media provide the content, and oral 
tradition provides the situations and format for the performance” (see, Grider 
1981:125–126,131; for examples, cf., ibid.:128–129; Also, cf., Grider 1973; 
Koven 2003). Further maintained in qualifying the notion is that “narraforms 
are part of a thematic continuum with the stories that have gone before and that 
follow during the communal performance” (Grider 1981:130). Presumably, the 
aforementioned arguments can only be strengthened once the empirical focus 
shifts specifically to the contemporary digital vernacular.  
Consequently, it can be maintained that typifying such developmental, 
“loose,” or “open-ended” narratives within a digital “narrative culture” of a par-
ticular sort is a strictly bottom-up “knowledge co-elaboration,” or ”emerging 
co-creation[al] relations” of “user-creators,” if to use the phrasing suggested by 
new media technology and market theorists John Banks and Sal Humphreys in 
“The Labor of User Co-Creators” (Banks and Humphreys 2008:407,409ff.).42 
Clearly, within the framework of the increasingly habitual digitally mediated 
communication space the previously discussed ideas are thrown into particu-
larly sharp relief (Détienne et al. 2012:3512ff.; cf., Morzolph and Bendix 
2014:2,4–5,8; Bacchilega 2015:27–28).  
In her Beyond the Box: television and internet, media scholar Ross terms the 
kind of television viewers I am focusing on as “tele-participants,” invited to 
“engage further … beyond the boundaries of the original story” with their 
                                                            
40  I am indebted to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Ülo Valk for drawing my attention to the 
potential applicability of “vernacular creativity” for the present dissertation. Henry Jenkins’ 
notion of “convergence culture” also resonates here though with distinct reservations with 
regard to latter’s emphasis on “collective intelligence” (see, i, but esp., xii). Nevertheless, 
Jenkins’ convergence culture also emphasizes the “[intersection of] grassroots and corporate 
media ... where the power of media producer and the power of the media consumer interact 
in unpredictable ways [...] convergence describe[s] ... cultural [and] social changes 
depending on who’s speaking and what they think they are talking about” (Jenkins 2006:2-3; 
emphasis added). From the angle of refreshing literary thought, cf., “prosaics of process” 
(Morson 2013:50ff.; cf., Morson and Emerson 1990); Also, in tracing  the historical genesis 
of similar ideas, see, speech “performances” or “interchanges,” Voloshinov 1930[1973]:19-
20). 
41  Cf., “the ’eventness’ of life” (Stetsenko 2007:753); the “immediate social event of 
communication,” Voloshinov 1930[1973]:47). Also, cf., Stetsenko (2017). 
42  Cf.,  “situated interpretative labor” (Fish 1989[1995]:8). 
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voices, too, “becom[ing] a part of the narrative mix” (Ross 2008:173–174).43 As 
I am arguing, the viewers of Breaking Bad participate co-elaboratively in per-
ceiving at and in conversing about NPs as Others44, by whose lives they become 
(gradually) absorbed (contra “in”) (Sorokin 2016b, 2017a, b). Drawing on 
Maureen Ryan—a TV critic for Chicago Tribune at the time—Ross observes 
that “online [criticism] venues” (e.g., blogs, online columns) have essentially 
become the focused mantle pieces conveying “expectations of an immersive 
television experience” (op. cit.:177,212). In other words, discussion makes the 
(televisual) experience—grants it a “multisocial” (cf., Hills 2016:463ff.) value 
dimension—or at the very least, supplements it in very significant ways.  
Consequently, however, the conventionalized and quite firm-footed men-
talistic-representational conceptions such as “simulation” (e.g., Goldman), 
                                                            
43  It has to be noted for the sake of clarity that although Ross' notion of “beyond the 
boundaries“—whilst tackling the reception of Lost—appears to explicitly (though not 
univocially) focus on the extradiegetic designs (novels and video games produced) in 
considering the ways this kind of participatory surplus prolongs the so-called immersive 
effect, Ross also writes at length of the effects the original television airing begets on the 
audience (esp. see, ibid.: 204ff.). Hence, I am construing the idea of “beyond the 
boundaries” to also include post-watch sense-making, expressed in the format of blog/forum 
commentaries. 
44  Herewith, I would like to take a moment to acknowledge the root qualification 
underlying my usage of “Other.” At this time of horrific socio-cultural reaction sweeping 
across the “enlightened culture” of “the first world,” I feel it only proper to do so. 
Consequently, my usage sympathizes with the critique of reductionist “Othering,” as 
conveyed  by notion of “subaltern” and the dichotomy of “us-and-them,” respectively (see, 
Said 1978[2003]; Gramsci 1985). Hence, my treatment of the notion inspires, although 
under auspieces of “fiction,” to emphasize inclusion over exclusion, communal interrelation 
over ostracizion and marginalization, sovereignity over assimilation into a homogenous 
whole (for in-depth discussion on the interconnections between creativity, authority rights 
and the “subaltern,” however, see, Hafstein 2014:11ff., esp. 23–25; Howard 2008a:493-494). 
Specifically, I am subscribing to the view that “simulation[ist] [accounts of human 
experience] involv[e] an ineliminably ego-centered element that is atypical of our experience 
of fiction” (Meskin and Weinberg 2003:18). Hence, my reading bears on “third-personal 
prediction and explanation” about the historically conditioned “Others” (and their minds; cf., 
see, Hutto 2013:598-600), i.e., here, the authorial narrative is re-conceived to ’stream’ the 
“peoples’ narratives” (Goldie 2004). Ultimately, aforementioned necessitates “alternative” 
theorizing in an attempt to do justice to the “prosaic everyday.” My usages of “Other,” then, 
whereever you will spot them—even though concerning narrative persons—are impelled by 
the tacit participatory process of realitization that naturalizes and hence, is set to undermine 
“mimesis“—an artifically induced first-person imperiative and implied superiority—as a de 
facto primary (and or academically ordained) “mode” of character-reception (cf., Hafstein 
2014:35-36). Likewise, what Hafstein references throughout his timely and necessary article 
as “creative agency,” I will take up in the due time (see, xii), by attempting to correlate two 
significantly intertwined intersections that the utilization of realitization establishes: (i) 
(academic) analyst and commentators/participants (the “popular“) vis-a-vis the question of 
mediation; and (ii) “critical audience” (something akin to overtly critical “fans“) and 
“authorial” origin narrative vis-a-vis the dialectical tension coloring the ’pitch’ of former’s 
sense-making process. (Cf., Bacchilega 2015:41-42n13.; Cf., Hafstein 2004)  
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“transportation” (e.g., Gerrig), and “immersion” (Ryan)45—frequently utilized to 
outline “fictional” experiential engagements—may prove to be insufficient 
experience markers (cf., Conclusion). For the noted concepts—much indebted to 
the presumptive dichotomies of fiction/non-fiction (and author/narrator)—hazard 
to “etherealize language[, ]conjur[ing] a picture of fictional reading practices such 
that when one picks up a novel, one performs a phenomenological reduction or 
epoché, in which the ‘real world’ is bracketed to enable one to plunge into an 
other, fictional world” (McDonald 2001:40–41; emphasis in original). However, 
approaching “fictional” experience comparably to a “controlled experiment [in] 
‘the laboratory’ of imagination” may itself prove illusory and detached from the 
reality of praxis. Perhaps at issue here, then, is not at all what Sarah Worth has 
called the “false dichotomy” (Worth 2004:455), i.e., “the truth or falsity of 
fiction”; but rather, a kind of “‘reality’” (McDonald 2001: 41,44), facilitating the 
perception of “fictional Others” who become acknowledged as sovereign 
(narrative) persons (cf., see in-depth discussion in, chapter 1, 1.6).  
However, arguably, the focal significance of “human interest” comes struc-
tured into the narrative content. This can suggest, in effect, that the top-down 
polarization, based as it is on presumptive “truth” conditions, may itself be an 
obfuscating artifice. Put differently, directly paralleling the good and the ill of 
real life socalizing, relationships develop vis-à-vis ‘fiction,’ too; specifically 
because, “[t]o an important extent the flickering images are apprehended as 
people” (Caughey 1984:36,40; emphasis in original; cf., ibid.:70; cf., also see, 
Batty 2014). “[O]ne simply begins reading [or watching—S.S.] and the ‘pre-
tense’ which one adopts of taking seriously what one reads requires no effort at 
all. It is precisely because one takes it seriously that one continues reading” (op. 
cit.:40,42; emphasis in original, underlining added).  
Comparatively, yet other notions pertaining to the contemporary discourse 
on character engagement, such as “identification” and “empathy,” can be hereby 
introduced from the calibrated position sympathetic to the ecological, non-men-
talistic conceptualization of perception—eschewing “intermediary concepts and 
representations” (E.J.Gibson and Pick 2003:18)—with their validity re-inte-
grated (see, chapter 1, 1.5–1.5.3). “[T]o say ’the mind has a conception (or a 
thought, or an idea) of an object (or a quality of an object)’ is a mere pleonasm, 
a redundant expression ultimately equivalent to saying that ’the mind conceives 
of an object (or quality of an object)’“46  
                                                            
45  Each, to a different degree, indepted to the “the I,” i.e., the first-person superiority in 
thinking and, crucially, articulating the thought about, “the Other,” taken broadly; as opposed 
to building a stance on taking the latter as a perceived sovereign (something acknowledged 
by the third-person perspective). In fact, in contemporary philosophy of film, “realist” 
stances, even if only outwardly such, still get labeled “controversal.” See, e.g., Wilson 
(2016:57ff.) and the “imagined seeing” thesis, following Murray Smith’s arguments, 
corroborated by reference to Richard Wollheim (for my critique and enlarged discussion on 
Smith’s work, see, chapter 1, 1.6).  
46  Parts confined between apostrophes come from Reid. T. An Inquiry into the Human Mind, 
as Quoted in: Grandi, G. B. “Introduction” (Thomas Reid. Selected Philosophical Writings, 
2012). p. 13, emphasis added. See also, ibid.:8ff., esp. 14-15. Cf., Reid (1819:306–307). 
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Building on these previous ideas, it can be maintained that as a counterpoint 
to the classical computational approach on cognition (viz. mental representa-
tions corresponding to ideations of objects or states of affairs47), a variety of 
non-mentalistic approaches (e.g., enactivism, process philosophy, embodied 
cognition) foreground the perceptual system-environment “coupling” wherein 
narrative could arguably operate as an exploratory, interpretative-orientational 
tool, teasing out sociocultural ’fits’ (see, Grishakova and Sorokin 2016:545, 
547–550).  
As I’ll further elaborate in chapter 1, such implications for theorizing 
engagement with fiction in general and with character in particular derive from 
the working hypothesis that popular interpretative designs on “fictional” Others 
stem from the perceived autonomy (sovereignty) afforded to them. Third-person 
stance, henceforth established, stands in contradistinction to the proposition of 
reacting on representations “in the laboratory of imagination” (McDonald), i.e., 
the first-person stance. However, the former stance does not argue for the al-
together elimination of representational strategies. At times, their use value 
(say, in cases of “self-implication” (Kuiken et al. 2004) could well be invalu-
able. In similar vein, the argument presented does not imply the wholesale non-
existence of representational construals. First and foremost, the fundamental 
question of causality becomes asserted. For commonsensical (and or direct per-
ception) stance inherently disputes skepticism about the existence of the “out-
side world”—it skips “intermediary concepts and representations” (E.J.Gibson 
and Pick). Yet, such stance does not preclude nor exactly deny the necessity of 
“construals” or “scenarios,” taken broadly. Only the order (or hierarchy, if you 
will) of relevance becomes disputed. Following this, the presumption that 
explication is strictly, exclusively and always dependent on representationalist 
formulations can appear premature. Rather, it could be insisted that “natural” 
sensation preceds, whilst “constant[ly] conjunct[t]” with, conception[s] and be-
lief[s], i.e., the acts of perception (the direct conceivings-of) (Grandi 2012:16). 
Drawing from this, we could argue that if “human interest” presented in 
various narrative content is indisputable and that if humans are inherently 
‘keyed’ to other humans48; it stands to reason that not all potential formats of 
popular narrative engagement optimally leverage from the internalist 
presuppositions on the “theory of the mind.” Therefore, specifically for present 
purposes, on the level of Internet discussion—impelled by shared common-
sensical strategies for context-sensitive, predictive and anticipative everyday 
reasoning for plausibility (cf., Smorti 2008:225ff., esp. 231–232)—the inquiry 
of, say, “what would I do were I Walter” could be seen to lose some of its 
conventionally valued theoretical heft vis-a-vis the backbone of the “creative 
vernacular,” as outlined at the start of the current sub-section. Namely, in online 
communal space, the former statement could arguably lead to low degree of 
                                                            
47  Cf., e.g., from the perspective of discourse psychology, see, Kintsch (1998), Graesser 
and Olde and Klettke (2002). 
48  Although not exclusively so. As Heider and Simmel’s study established, the reasoning in 
“human” terms can, if enabled, expand quite widely indeed (see, Heider and Simmel 1944).   
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interest and intensity, specifically in Internet co-elaborative sense-making situa-
tions (for close sample analyses, see, chapter 3, 3.4–3.5; for brief descriptive 
introductory analysis, see, however, xiii). Indeed, as Andrea Smorti observes, 
“[human beings,] in building world[s,] actually buil[d] a new version of worlds 
previously built by others” (ibid.:226; emphasis added; cf., Grider 1981).49  
Consequently, in chapter 2, an interpretation framework of theorizing in-
clined to cultivate specifically analytical-methodological elaboration on “world-
building” is proposed (see, chapter 3, 3.4–3.5, for its practical advancement). 
Given choice builds on implications noted above with regard to seeming 
assumption that present work might advocate for the wholesale nonexistence of 
representational construals. For, explicitly on the level of analysis, in “making 
sense of” sense-makers’ expressive commonsensical stance on character, repre-
sentational construals (e.g., “worlds”) contrariwise become useful practical 
tools for elucidating such popular praxis. Indeed, how else would the develop-
ment of analytical groupings off of popular articulation be even possible?   
Therefore, in order to propose an “alternative” account, viz. viewers’ “every-
day commonsensical” interaction-in-development ‘with’ narrative persons—
based on real time natural situatedness mediated by specific conversational 
Internet resources (blogs, forums)—I introduce the concept of realitization. 
The given concept is suggested to highlight the narrative ‘tooling’ of language, 
‘shaping’ latter’s creative impulses, as a popular (bottom-up) initial phase of 
recognition (i.e., narrative persons (NPs) acknowledged as commonsensically 
real and sovereign). Anchoring the “Carry-Over Model” (COM) framework de-
veloped in chapter 1, realitization is operative when participants utilize their 
creative vernacular and: 
1. scrutinize the “intentional fields” of the NPs (intentionale Feld) (Wulff 
2006)—viz. their “life histories” and relational surroundings—driven by inten-
tion of getting their stories “just right” by, therefore, invariably ’sieving’ the 
dominant authorial storytelling (i.e., the text makers’ worlds; see, chapter II, 
2.3.1) for any potential transgressions, 
1a. aspire to spot and “fix” ostensible inconsistencies and perceived disrup-
tions, attempting to maximize context-sensitive “explanatory coherence” 
(Thagard 2000) by attending to, construing, complementing, and modifying 
“thick descriptions” (Geertz 1973) of NPs’ larger narratives, as it were, 
2. participant’s own real life context and NP’s may, respectively, become en-
twined in communal storytelling situation (twistory; see, chapter I, 1.2.2, esp. 
1.4; cf., 66fn.) contra participant simply seeing oneself in former’s “shoes,” or 
being “lost” in their ‘world’—approaches which effectively undermine the (per-
ceived) sovereignty of the NPs and thus conflict with (1) to boot,  
                                                            
49  Developing her point on time-conditioned “interpretive communities,” Smorti writes, 
“[a]mong others, using possible world theory and locating reasoning in every day contexts 
has ... important consequences [such as] the reasoning appear[ing] to be less linear and more 
[as] [a circular interpretive procedure] [...] [whereby] interpreting is theoretically infinite” 
(ibid.:230; emphases added; cf., Fish 1982).  
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2a. stay contingent on the discussive realm (viz. interconnected space across 
a number of blogs and forums; cf., Howard, in: Owens 2013) and it can be sug-
gested that NPs obtain agency to “operate” alongside, and central to it (as 
Wulff’s “Klatsch-Objekte”), without, crucially, becoming ‘dissolved’ with the 
“onlookers” (Zillmann), or vice versa.50  
 
 
xii Distributed sense-making: Culture as a republic of 
editors (Hafstein) 
The previously introduced ideas proceed from the overarching factor of the ex-
periential situatedness inherent to “narrative cultures” such the one inspired by 
Breaking Bad. Specifically, this means that the “doing the knocking” becomes 
distributed (non-hierarchically) across the board. In common with an oral 
storyteller, concurrently the “giver” and “bearer” of the “voices” narrated (So-
rokin 2010a), no one narrative person, commentary or script writer are here af-
forded the singular, monosemantic act of “doing,” strictly speaking. Rather, 
“doing” is observable as emerging bottom-up from, across, and—crucially—as 
“sites of engagement” (Norris and Jones 2005; cf., Shotter 2001:344–345).51 
 Accordingly, the focus is on the discourse world writ large as a becoming. 
Such processual ‘happening’ is “collective” only insofar as it bears exterior 
attributes commonly ascribed to “communal spirit” (Hellekson and Busse 
2006:4; cf., Hellekson 2014), such as in fanfiction, as discussed in the begin-
ning of present Introduction. Were we to take this becoming discourse world 
itself as a “fantext” (op. cit.:3), however, it would be a qualitative mismatch. 
Why? Because the becoming presently outlined accentuates co-elaborative 
activity insofar as the shared objective (viz. getting NPs’ life-reasonings “just 
right”) is always already non-reducible to a collectively created “product.” 
Hence, the onus of analysis—and theoretical underpinnings preceding it—
should always seek out, and be scaffolded on, the flowings and burnings, rather 
than rivers and fires. It is by the very virtue of the permanent absence of reduc-
tion that co-elaboration markedly diverges from the “collective ‘hive mind’” or 
“collective entity,” professed as core metaphors pertaining to the creation of 
fanfiction (ibid.:2,4; see also, Duda 2014), on the one hand52; but also from the 
                                                            
50  Later, but specifically in chapter 3, I am also implying a degree of commonality in the 
notions of realitization and “reality pact,” latter lifted, with gratitude, from my supervisor 
Prof. Dr. Marina Grishakova’s inaugural lecture (published in Akadeemia, 1/2017).  
51  Cf., “events as meaningful yet unfinalised emergences” (Grishakova and Sorokin 
2016:552). “[A]ctive inference is more action than inference; it is a doing, an enactive 
adjustment, a wordly engagement [, physical, but also social and cultural]” (Gallagher and 
Allen 2016:8; emphasis in original, underlining added).  
52  Cf., e.g., Jenkins (2006:134ff.); Also, cf., “swarm intelligence,” in computational intelli-
gence and data mining research (e.g., Abraham et al. 2006; Kaiser et al. 2010); and, e.g., 
Lévy (2013) on “collective intelligence.”  
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likes of “distributed authorship,” as some areas in leading folklore scholarship 
have suggested, on the other (see, Foley 2012:74ff.53).  
Hence, the dialogue with the aforementioned authors lends itself to further 
refinements in order to position the notion of co-elaboration more rewardingly 
within the key literature on participatory media. For this, a concise genealogy of 
thinking which would intertwine seemingly dissimilar disciplines has to be 
crafted. Fandom scholar Matt Hills, in his Fan Cultures (Hills 2002), juxtaposed 
“creative space of fans” with their belonging to “interpretive communities,” 
thus challenging the want for stress with regard to “emergence of fan cultures” 
(ibid.:xiii-xiv; emphasis in original), for the latter were ordinarily type-set by 
predestined (academic, “highbrow”) “norms.” Specifically, Hills decried—not 
unimportantly—the “sever[e] curtail[ment]” of the subject (ibid.:xiii). A few 
years later, however, media theorist Cornel Sandvoss, for his part, rekindles “the 
death of the author” with “the Death of the Reader [sic],” maintaining that “if 
we cannot locate aesthetic value in the author, text, or reader alone …[it is in] 
interaction between these that aesthetic value manifest[s]” (Sandvoss 2007:45; 
emphasis added). Although Sandvoss draws specifically on the Iserian concep-
tion of reading (viz. active “dialogue” of the text-reader dyad), his words—even 
if inadvertently—unlock potential resonances with co-elaborative activity, as 
circumscribed thus far. Both Hills’ and Sandvoss’ work—if examined in 
unison—hint at bringing the explanation for the notion of co-elaboration to a 
full circle, yet succumb into sectarianism, if separated.  
It would be advisable here, then, would be to recall how Hellekson and 
Busse (2006) termed fanfiction, but revert it—that is, to argue that it is the 
“authorial” narrative such as Breaking Bad that becomes an “open-sourced 
text,” this ‘mantle piece’ instigating the emergence of a distinctive “narrative 
culture.” In other words, the weekly and yearly narrative experience becomes 
folklorized, communalized.54 It begins to aspire common sense55 reasoning and 
construals, resulting in common sense, viz. popular insight, “vernacular creativi-
ty”—a precise variety of emergent “peer production” in a “creative knowledge 
economy” (Banks and Humphreys 2008:405–406,416; cf., Benkler 2006:32; 
Lanham 2006) and being expressed in as well as developing the public sphere 
per se. That is, the activity of these narrative reasoners crafts a discussive site of 
engagement wherein consistent dialectical tension voids “dominant” takes. 
“Master narratives” and “authorial creators,” lest we forget, are such only 
through mainstream (dominant) accredication. Shift to “open-source,” however, 
                                                            
53  Cf., Foley (2010): https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/229725  
54  Perhaps so echoing—in its own way—the idea of “third wave” fandom theorizing which 
emphasizes “[participatory] activities … as fundamental aspect of everyday life” (Thomas 
2011b:2; emphasis added; see also, Thomas 2011a; cf., Baym 1993, 2000, 2010).  
55  As previously implied and for future reference, it may be advisable to take “common 
sense” in Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid’s (Reid 1819) usage of sensus communis, i.e., 
our belief that there’s an external world. Logically following that the stance toward 
another—latter’s specific reality/fiction binary ’packaging’ notwithstanding—is necessarily 
third-personal (cf., discussion in, xi). 
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at the very least aims to undermine this tacit assumption. Internet discussion 
space allows the “dominant” narratives and storytellers to be greatly scrutinized 
up to and including the point where original “authority” is overthrown, sub-
limated for popular control constantly negotiating the mainstream “narratives.” 
Therefore, it is in these spaces where “antiauthorial” (Hafstein 2014:18,22) 
storytelling and narratives (conventionally put) thrive. Here, “authors” be-
come/are made equals for their creative intentions are thrown into doubt (co-
elaboratively “re-reasoned”; see, chapter 2, my concept of text makers’ 
world). As a “site of engagement,” this kind of space accommodates peoples’ 
voice, makes it acute and amplified.56  
Crucially, here I do not mean to suggest as if internet interaction environ-
ments are something like the much-referenced “echo chambers” (e.g., Wallsten 
2005, if to borrow a phrase from political blogs research), but, at least in the 
present case, the exact opposite of such connotations—that “sites of engage-
ments” emerging on Internet can serve as proverbial halls of potential insight, 
accommodating the critical voices of the people, of becoming instances par ex-
cellence to Steven Johnson’s well-known thesis of how “popular culture 
make[s] us smarter” (Johnson 2005; see also, Herman 2003b, 2003d; Cf., 
Thompson 2013). 
Through such co-elaborative activity, then, “the canon,” such as Breaking 
Bad’s “official” narrative, (be)comes to belong, piecemeal, “to the history of a 
community” (Smorti 2008:231).57 Moreover, once the “authorial” narrative ma-
terial becomes “open-sourced” for common reasoning, latter ‘levels’ the prover-
bial playing field. Every actor within the ‘interaction circle,’ either mediated-
direct (commenter-commenter), or “parasocial” (commenters vis-à-vis 
NPs/script writers) becomes construed with a quality of correspondence, of im-
partiality, in the precise sense of any and all “actors” always evoking cautious, 
intentive reasoning processes. 
All the sense-makings—or perhaps more accurately indeed, sense rea-
sonings—are obviously idiosyncratic (close readings in chapter 3 attest to that), 
but, were one to navigate58 their interrelations, the inherent co-elaboration each 
evokes; were one to observe the particular interstices where multiplicity of 
intersecting voices become “caught” in time (as the archivist underpinnings of 
blogs and forums enable; cf., Hayles 2007)—one would find a story of be-
                                                            
56  Cf., the case of commentaries in Uproxx/Hitfix’ “What Is Alan Watching?” blog on 
Masters of Sex where the author of the biography the serial is based on joined the discussion 
early on in order to gauge, and converse about, the reactions the televisual adaptation of his 
work had spawned. 
57  Hence throwing some doubt whether explicit differentiation between “canons” and 
“fanons” (Thomas 2007) is altogether necessary. Also, cf., Banks and Humphreys 
(2008:412ff.), on the consistently negotiated nature of knowledge production along the 
“expert“/„non-expert” axis, especially while keeping in mind how, in the present case, 
commentary sections largely maintain the ad-revenue for the entertainment web pages that 
mediate the “professional criticism” reviews in the first place. 
58  See more on this, in xiii, where I will provide an analysis extract in order to illustrate my 
original conceptualization of beacon. 
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coming—a ‘living description,’ an “antiauthorial” (Hafstein 2014) “work in pro-
gress” (Hellekson and Busse 2006).  
Herewith, Valdimar Tr. Hafstein’s arguments adjust and develop afore-
mentioned tensions especially acutely and deserve to be quoted at length: 
 
[F]olklore59 is peer to peer, it is collaborative, and it is collective. But the choice 
between these two options is not satisfactory; we should not accept it uncriti-
cally. [...] [C]reative processes that are collaborative, incremental, and distributed 
in space and time [are] in fact all around us. They are the norm, not the ex-
ception.  [...] The language of folklore often captures creative processes and 
products more accurately than the language of authorship. Neither is accurate, 
however. Each is based on the exclusion of the other. To construct a new lan-
guage, we need first to understand the discursive grid we are revising so we do 
not wind up reproducing the same old discursive antagonisms with merely a new 
vocabulary. We need an alternative grammar of creativity and a renewed under-
standing of how cultural expressions circulate. (Hafstein 2014:36) 
 
Clearly, herein the scholar’s role, or rather, the extent of her/his influence, gains 
crucial significance. The stance of present dissertation holds that scholar’s posi-
tion is not to “talk over” the voices present in the material, but to talk with them. 
Therefore, scholar acquires editorial agency by complementing and explicating 
the background where necessary (for the reader), but never interpolating or 
equivocating, thus falling prey to the fallacy of reductionism. Theirs is the 
agency of an intermediary, proposing narrative “thick descriptions” contra 
“reads,” “registers,” and or pre-set categorizations. It is in this particular point, 
indeed, where co-elaborative activity becomes established across the board—as 
the correspondence of voices that resounds over (and, perhaps, transforms) no-
tions of “authorial,” “master narrative,” or “storyteller,” even. As Marzolph and 
Bendix keenly observe, “scholarship in the end is a manifestation of narrative 
culture as well” (Marzolph and Bendix 2014:6; also see, Mello 2002, in xiii).  
Consequently, it can be argued that in co-elaboration the relational process of 
“collectivization” eschews collectivity and individualism, locus and subject, 
whilst preserving (communal) co-elaboration and individual’s creative produc-
tion (what I am terming narrcepts, expressed by singular commentary texts). 
The becoming of such multi-agent eventness highlights processes of internal 
distribution, complementation, interrelation, and challenging of and within the 
creativities of individuals, whilst shifting the emphasis from the “competitive” 
aspects inspiring the detection of ’domineering narratives.’ Accordingly, where 
a particular “work in progress” fanfiction—or, for that matter, a fan page 
modeled on the wiki framework (Lostpedia, Heroespedia) (Booth 2010)—is 
                                                            
59  Although explicated in (i), the potential question of how the present dissertation deals 
with “folklore” is worth re-iterating. Perhaps, again, Robert Glenn Howard (in: Owens 2013) 
gives the most illuminating, and apt, response: “As far as the Internet goes—its [sic] not 
really an option; if you want to study the folklore we have right now, you have to study it 
where it is practiced—and, for better or worse, network communication is [the] major place 
to find people sharing folklore now.”  
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necessarily locus-fixed (cf., see, i), narrative co-elaboration in commentary sec-
tions, by contrast, acknowledges locus/subject-transcendency, orienting ‘story 
matter’ beyond “the box of the creative individual” (Glăveanu 2014). On the top 
of all the above, the analyst traces the evolving patterns of meaning ’criss-
crossing’ multifarious concurrent discussive environments, “pool[s] [the] 
assumptions” (Grishakova and Sorokin 2016:556); and, through such kind of 
“decomposing” and “composing” methodology, elucidates the becoming of the 
discourse world or, the “relational space” (op. cit.:2; cf., chapter 2, the original 
concept of beacon). As noted, however, the analyzing scholar embraces thereby 
a narrativistic agency which is not of an interventionalist (and “Othering,” 
“high/low”) kind, but one with marked editorial quality.  
In short, when recalling the analogy of ‘knocking and knockers’ from sub-
section xi, “doing the knocking” denotes the kind that enmeshes (develops a 
correspondence of/with) a variety of intentionally acting persons (real or “fic-
tional”). Thereafter, these kinds of correspondences become analytically 
“decomposed” and “composed”—as “worlds” of distinct kind (denoting the 
‘navigational’ properties of the original notion of beacon, as exemplified below; 
for more, see, chapter 2). Consequently, I am going to follow the contention 
that—broadly speaking—the scholarly interest towards folk-psychological 
“realist” stance with regard to “fictional beings” has remained severely under-
stated, at best, and theoretically understudied, at worst. I will take as my point 
of origin the variegated nature of New Media60 narrative experience with the 
intention to articulate a potential vocabulary (“alternative grammar”) and a 
method (applied through the concept of beacon) for comprehending such a con-
text-sensitive everyday commonsensical storytelling discourse—a narratione 
tempore of intending “actors,” if you will.  
 
 
xiii Overview of subsequent chapters and their contents 
(with introductory, descriptive analyses) 
The empirical data that I am building on consists of commentary texts collected 
from the entertainment web pages, television criticism blogs (Hitfix61, The A. V. 
Club, Hollywood Reporter), and Breaking Bad-centered weekly, user-run forum 
threads (in the Reddit environment), respectively. First, topical tendencies 
channeled by specific topics-channeling narrative motifs were discerned. The 
notion of motif designates hereby specific diegetic constituents that, although 
picked up from the narrative, gain significant amplification (‘afterlife’) in 
                                                            
60  See criticism on this notion in, Lunenfeld (1999[2001]:xvi), however. 
61  It has recently come to my attention that the Hitfix brand and, specifically, television 
critic’s Alan Sepinwall’s blog What’s Alan Watching? have been integrated to a larger 
entertainment web page uproxx.com, with old archives intact, however. See: 
http://uproxx.com/sepinwall/whats-alan-watching-uproxx/ (Accessed: 22.11.2016). 
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commentary discussion.62 These motifs enabled to define a further, illustrative 
sample spanning two consecutive weeks of key episodes of Breaking Bad (in 
turn building on prior four years of “histories,” intertwining narrative persons 
and events.) In-depth close sample analysis was preceded by the preliminary 
pilot study of complete data.63 Both forms of examination were aided by IBM’s 
natural language processing and data mining software Text Analysis for 
Surveys64, whilst remaining cognizant of its underlying dangers, ethical and 
otherwise (see, e.g., Bolukbasi et al. 2016; O’Neil 2016; Gitelman (Ed.) 2013). 
In a largely automated fashion, the software enabled detailed categorization of 
data. While minimal manual tailoring is briefly explained in chapter 3, the dis-
sertation’s objective in applying technical utilities was to decrease analyst’s 
work load vis-à-vis data quantity confronted, whilst eschewing any claims on 
quantitative generalizations (for these, though pertaining to the medium of 
literature, see discussion in Conclusion).  
Nonetheless, I do prospect this merger of the channel of mass communica-
tion (television) and digital communication technologies (blogs, forums)—
streamlined by the software choice—to produce practical value for cutting-edge 
research in digital humanities and narrative, however (e.g., see fascinating work 
on Game of Thrones, in, Gjelsvik and Schubart 2016). Previous statement not-
withstanding, present dissertation rests its case as a qualitative, theoretical 
study, although strategically corresponding to and drawing from the simulta-
neous data investigation. Hence, perhaps the most elementary endeavor this dis-
sertation gesticulates at is the elaboration on a variation of cultural approach, as 
recently set under the aegis of “media-conscious,” “media-centered” narratol-
ogy (Ryan 2014:30; Grishakova and Ryan 2010a:3). Put differently, although I 
do consider the Analysis (see, chapter 3, 3.4–3.5)65 significant on its own right, 
former may seemingly decrease in proportion if compared to preceding theo-
retical discussion. While conceivably such choice could be risky, I would con-
tend that the developed theory, informed by and emerged out of—not enforcing 
itself on—practical observations (cf., xii), overturns it to a calculated risk, hold-
                                                            
62  I am lifting the definition of motif from the Russian formalist literary scholar Boris 
Tomashevski, who defined it as “[an] elementary, atom-like unit of meaning” (in: 
“Thematics,” Lemon and Reis 1965:62). Crucial here is to differentiate that these narrative 
motifs should not be conceived of as appropriated narrative information (in Jenkinsian 
sense), but as acknowledgements, conveying, in one way or another, the intendings-of of 
narrative persons (viz. their intend-worlds (see, chapter 2). Put differently, these narrative 
motifs become intricately tied to the NPs. Latter are made sense of insofar as these motifs 
are being perceived as significant to them.   
63  Amassing in its entirety 1009 commentary texts across three episodes over two years, 
complemented with commentaries accompanying the 4th season’s “post-mortem” interview 
with Breaking Bad’s creator, Vince Gilligan. 
64 See: http://www-03.ibm.com/software/products/en/spss-text-analytics-surveys (Version 
4.0.1 [4.0.1.97] (c) 2010) 
65  In addition, see Appendixes I–II covering analyzed texts and illustrations exemplifying 
software use, respectively. For a summarizing Schema, visualizing the established 
terminological framework, see Conclusion. 
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ing that there can be no theoretical knowledge standing apart from parallel 
empirical scrutiny. 
An introductory overview of the chapters is as follows. In chapter 1 I es-
tablish and advance my conception of narrative persons (NPs). Building on 
preliminary observations based on empirical data, NPs are posited to emerge 
through the individual yet co-elaborative sense-making efforts of people 
providing weekly “running commentary” on Breaking Bad, ordinarily with 
carefully crafted nuance. Specifically, in developing theoretical foundation for 
the NPs, chapter 1 suggests the “complex” co-elaborative sense-making activi-
ty as concordant with that of the “complex TV.” In an attempt to do justice to 
“popular” sentiments enveloped in the collected data, I have found it most reli-
able to dwell and rely on a multidisciplinary heteroglossia (Bakhtin 1981). As 
follows, the primary objective of chapter 1 is to develop an abstract framework 
of “alternative grammar,” entitled the “Carry-Over Model” (COM) which intro-
duces original notions of realitization, narrcept (narrative+percept), and 
twistory66, so laying necessary groundwork for further elaborations of analyti-
cal categories in chapter 2.  
Chapter 2 develops an analytical-methodological interpretation framework, 
put to practice in the sample close analysis in Chapter 3 (3.4–3.5). Herewith, 
critical elaborations of the well-known concepts (“possible worlds,” “story-
world,” “discourse world”) are integrated with my original notions of narrcept, 
realitization and twistory as introduced in chapter 1.  This interrelation of terms 
becomes necessary in emphasizing more distinctly the key undercurrents my 
dissertation addresses: the constructional-developmental (the ‘realm’ of the 
participants making sense) and the navigational (the analytical ‘realm,’ en-
deavoring to circumscribe the “machinery” behind the latter). Accordingly, 
chapter 2 introduces the original and adapted notions such as beacon, on the 
one hand; and intend-world and text makers’ world (subsumed by the “story-
world,” adapted based on David Herman’s reading of the concept), on the other. 
Being an applied method, beacon can be conceived of as (metaphorically) 
gliding in between the ”worlds,” “shining its light” by enabling (a) ‘decom-
position’ of the noted world-variants from individual storytelling (narrcept as 
singular storyworld-in-making); to (b) ‘composing’ them into a potential dis-
course world (a communal ‘sum’ of constantly intersecting storyworlds-in-
making) (see below for more; cf., chapter II, 2.0 (Extended Hypothesis).  
However, for the sake of clarity, the present Introduction has to first inter-
rogate as to what specifically narrcept is, on the one hand; and how beacon as 
an analytical 'tool,' on the other. To the former end, I am presenting an essen-
tially descriptive-only (i.e., devoid as of yet of any analytical terminology) 
analysis based on two sample texts (as narrcepts). To the latter, an extraction 
from the full-blown analysis (see, chapter 3, 3.4–3.5) is presented primarily in 
order to illustrate the generic outline that my conceptualization of beacon as an 
                                                            
66  Viz., entwined “stories” of the participant and the NP, i.e., twi+story, where “twist” (the 
state of being entwined) signifies the narratively scaffolded “interaction-in-development,” 
moulded on the perceived real. 
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applied analytical method is supposed to entail (note the clearly determined 
“worlds” being ‘decomposed’ and then ‘composed’ on the spot through bea-
con’s gliding activity).  
 
Whole episode seemed convoluted. Poisoning the kid just doesn’t make sense as 
a smart play for Gus. Walt has no motive to go after that kid; why would Gus 
automatically assume Jesse would blame Walt? Plus, Jesse is the linchpin of his 
operation; you don’t take a 50/50 chance of permanently alienating the only guy 
who can keep your business running. Walt is a pain for Gus, but he is a pain that 
can gradually be dealt with while Jesse keeps delivering the batches. Poisoning 
the kid just to force the action makes a lot more sense for Gilligan and co. to 
force drama than it does for Gus. Really felt that was a cheap narrative device 
(think of the children!) Gus has consolidated power and is in good shape with the 
cartel taken down a few pegs. Why is he going all in on a risky play poisoning a 
kid? (JH, Uproxx/Hitfix, 02.10.11) 
 
As JH explains, for Gus, poisoning the kid is far from a “smart play.” After all, 
so far JH had observed Gus as an exceptionally refined and cautious individual. 
As is well-known, not long ago, Gus had jeopardized practically everything in 
his rather sheltered life as a mob-boss-in-the-shadows fast-food restaurant 
owner and went ahead, murdering the entire Mexican mafia cartel, all in order 
to escape their clutches and become a “free agent,” as it were. In fact, as Jesse 
accompanied him throughout the whole venture, he now has first-hand 
knowledge of the effects of ricin-poisoning. Hence, JH queries what would im-
pel Gus as though advisedly to endanger the delicate balance he has achieved so 
far due to positive outcomes of his power-plays. After all, the plan anticipating 
Jesse starting immediately to blame Walt depended—as many other commenters 
also note—on a multitude of variables, all of which had to “align” just right. 
Thus JH asks: why Gus should not sate himself with his “consolidated power” 
and keep up his successful double-life as a stainless operator of a fast-food 
joint, on the one hand, and as a ruthless mafia boss, on the other hand? Fol-
lowing from this, JH concedes, one should not lightly infer as though Gus 
would have to “automatically assume” that Jesse indeed does not have any other 
choice than to immediately blame Walt. After all, Gus is first and foremost a 
cold and perpetually calculating pragmatist. Why, is JH adamant, would such a 
guy “take a 50/50 chance of alienating the only guy” who—now that relations 
with Walt remain quite explosive—is of utmost relevance to one’s business? In 
other words, what would Gus have to even gain from an intricate plan which 
would result in (of course, only if all the pieces align accordingly) Jesse having 
been sent to permanently silence Walt? 
Now, skip forward a week when Breaking Bad’s 4th season finale reveals that 
it was actually Walt who—one way or another—was the architect of the (luckily 
designed as non-fatal) poisoning, on the top of outwitting and disposing of Gus 
as originally intended. Commenter JP writes: 
 
43 
Walt couldn’t simply kill Gus. He needed Jesse on his side. Once he killed Gus, 
Jesse would know he was behind it, and Walt had to assume he’d retaliate. Be-
fore Walt could even attempt to go after Gus, he needed Jesse’s loyalty. And 
while you may find it implausible, I can’t think of any other way for Walt to get 
Jesse to come to his side. He had seen Brock, Saul definitely knew about the kid 
(remember, he gave them money on Jesse’s behalf, and could’ve told Walt every-
thing about him and his relationship with Jesse), and he [Walt] likely re-
membered that the last time Jesse wanted Gus dead it was because of a death of a 
child. Walt had to take the chance that Jesse wouldn’t kill him (and let’s face it, 
Walt knows Jesse well enough to know he’s not a killer and is still deeply loyal). 
It makes perfect sense to me. (JP, ibid., 09.10.11) 
 
JP infers, then, that what essentially undergirds the variety of transpired events 
is Walt’s belief (“implausible” for quite a few other commenters) that—by any 
means necessary—he has to first secure Jesse’s unreserved loyalty before he’d 
even consider an “attempt to go after Gus.” But how to fully guarantee it? Here, 
the intentionally non-fatal attempt on Brock’s life becomes the key instigator 
(one has to recall here, as JP does, that as a precursor to all these events, Walt 
was observed sitting in his back-yard, symbolically spinning his revolver on a 
garden table; revolver which ultimately points away from him to a poisonous 
plant, Lily of the Valley—coincidentally captured into last frame of “Face Off,” 
wholly solidifying Walt’s guilt, however indirect). After all, as JP attentively 
notes, Walt does know about Jesse living with the kid (if he didn’t know before, 
he’s most assuredly complicit once he had visited Jesse’s house—in fact, right 
before he was kidnapped, taken to desert and almost killed by Gus’ goons; a 
chain of events that only added insult to injury given how his ultimate plan un-
raveled). What’s more, Saul’s—Walt’s “sleazy” criminally criminal lawyer—
knowledge of the kid is definite as he was consistently visiting Adriana and 
Brock, delivering them money on Jesse’s behalf, and hence, could’ve filled Walt 
in where necessary. Furthermore, JP maintains that Walt “likely remembered” 
how deeply affected Jesse was the last time he’d found out that Gus might have 
murdered an innocent child (Adriana’s kid brother, in fact) and how that pre-
sumption can easily enough recur to fuel his decision to be “on board” with dis-
posing of Gus. Meanwhile, JP acknowledges that in taking all of these 
“chances,” Walt’s biggest gamble is ascertaining that “Jesse wouldn’t kill him,” 
though—on the face of it—he should not be overly worried, knowing “well 
enough” that Jesse is not a “killer.” It is argued throughout, then, that the origi-
nal notion of narrcept (narrative+percept) underscores and integrates the in-
herent “narrativism” characteristic of participants’ “direct,” parasocial percep-
tion of NPs, and becomes expressed in the format of a commentary text. Partici-
pants cannot but to intend for (something/-one) and it can be maintained that—
considering participants’ palpable inclination towards the lives of narrative 
“Others” as “reasoning agents”—narrative proclivity is wielded as by the de-
fault tool for thinking. In this deep-seated dialogical interrelationship, partici-
pants context-sensitively narrativize, i.e., relay Geertzian “thick explanations” 
for NPs’ assumed/concealed/contested intentions (hence “producing” fluid in-
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tend-worlds; see, chapter 2). Moreover, as implicated previously, participants 
frequently entrust their own accumulated “history” of/with given narrative per-
sons’ over “authorial” choices and outcomes which are considered seemingly 
imprecise and unsound in making (or reasoning) sense of key narrative events 
NPs were central in or which they might have directly facilitated. Consequently, 
in a distinct way, serial’s “authors” themselves, too, become ‘intelligent agents’ 
with ‘authorial intentions’—hence contributing to the building ‘matter’ for the 
narrcepts (text makers’ world, see, chapter 2).   
The necessity for the analytical “world” decomposition/composion‘ on the 
one hand, and the gliding tendency of the beacon responsible for it, on the 
other, becomes most pronounced the more “messy” the data gets. Following 
extract from the analysis (see, chapter III, 3.4, for the complete analysis) suf-
fices (the meaning of abbreviations given in brackets). 
 
Meanwhile, Freddo’s response to Spent—wherein explicit addressing instigates 
what I would term ‘narrceptive dialogue’—worked up more specifically from his 
preceding short narrcept —(1) returns to Brian’s narrcept , building on latter’s 
focus on Huell (or, rather, on Walt through Huell), but, pace Brian, Freddo 
strongly enforces Huell’s IW; and (2), elaborates in a more minute detail what 
his ‘dialogue interlocutor’ left unsaid—namely, the exact placement and name of 
the plant supposedly applied by Walt in producing a poison capable to induce 
ricin-like symptoms. Now, for (1), Freddo glides into TMWa [text makers' 
world] (subscript "a" denoting ‘extra-narrative’ reflexion wherein experience’s 
“artificiality” is acknowledged insofar as the latter being re-producible via tech-
nical aids.) Subsequently drawing on the possibility of re-“watch,” then, Freddo 
implores (and indeed, many a participant do) to closely observe the “frisking 
[scene],” for—in organizing his SW [storyworld] now through TMWa gliding 
into Huell’s IW [intend-world]—“the big dude definitely” pockets something. 
The (2) observation, however, Freddo considers the “most important[t],” and in-
deed it can be, were we to, for a moment, think in terms of the overarching, be-
coming DW [discourse world]. Where Spent narrceptivized of non-descript 
plants, Freddo, contrariwise, doesn’t withhold. He directly connects Walt 
“spin[ing] the gun” with the latter on its “third try” pointing to somewhere very 
specific. Namely, “to a flowering potted plant.” And either through his own 
above average knowledge of botany (cf., twistory), or due to this precise infor-
mation having been mentioned previously by others, Freddo doesn’t shy away 
from being as exact as possible—“[i]t is Lilly of the Valley, a poisonous plant! 
Case closed!” 
Indeed, such unperturbed conclusion at the time might have satisfied 
Freddo—and confirmed his suspicions the week later, to boot—but for his co-
participants, gaps and contradictions in actions and events weren’t depleted and 
were, indeed, revisited post-“Face-Off.” Hence, Eric from Hitfix, whilst fully 
acknowledging Huell’s involvement, remains wary in other areas. Although em-
bracing the “swa[p] out” of Jesse’s cigarette back as “the easy part,” and thus 
tying his observation of Huell having frisked “so roughly and ostentatiously” 
with Freddo’s clarification of Huell having “put something in his pocket with his 
left hand,” both participants ultimately corroborate on the ‘out-branched’ sub of 
the 1st gist—i.e., cigarette as “ruse”—on the one hand; whereas, on the other, for 
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Eric—even after “official” reveal—the “poisoning” itself persists as “bigger 
question mark.” Now, even after the plant widely speculated about being 
explicitly disclosed as poison’s source, participants nevertheless reverted to this 
key “scene” of “swapping,” for they couldn’t comprehend how someone like 
Huell (ordinarily observable as a slow, sleepy, big-boned guy) could’ve managed 
it; or, for that matter, how could’ve Walt had done it—for, as we recall—already 
phailcakez emphasized the house arrest imposed on him. Hence, in both of his 
narrcepts (9/10, 10/10), straight after “Face-Off” had aired, Eric soothes (or, 
rather, aims to convince?) any “doubters” by arguing—at length in his second 
narrcept the next day—, having now “re-watch[ed] the scene,” for Huell’s 
“clear” complicity. What is of special interest here is how Eric organizes his SW 
by gliding in between TMWa (and perhaps even TMW proper) and Huell’s IW. 
On the one hand, it is Huell who “appears to reach,” with his “left hand” whilst 
“right hand was clearly empty”; Huell who “palm[ed] something” and thereafter 
“clearly pu[t] that same left hand in his pocket.” On the other, however, it is “the 
actor [who was] instructed” (glide into TMW proper as consisting of “makers” 
enforcing their “intentions”) to “leave options open, at the very least,”; actor who 
“makes a semi-lunge.” Similarly, there are also notations on editing and filming, 
observed to evince deliberate ‘rhythms of deception,’ as it were, not in the sense 
of narrative’s “artifice,” to be sure, but rather in putting implicit accents on the 
intentional trickery of the “textmakers.” Nevertheless, ultimately the conclusion 
recalls Eric’s prior (then still hypothetical) “[C]ase closed!” We are back to 
Huell’s IW, him having “picked Jesse’s pocket” and in the process, “swapped out 
the pack.” Indeed, it organizes as a rather coherent SW and across these two suc-
cessive narrcepts, it might have cohered for Eric. 
 
Now, the analysis extract above should signal that chapters 1 and 2—taken as a 
uniform item—lay important theoretical groundwork to the more in-depth 
analysis by insisting upon suggesting potential alternatives for the mentalistic-
representationalist tropes persistent in character engagement and narrative 
reception research, taken broadly (e.g., Gerrig 1993; Walton 1990; Auerbach 
1954[2003]). According to my arguments, the notion of narrcept—as pre-
viously illustrated by JH, JP, and others—conveys a historically poignant 
expression of processual perception of the NP as a potential “real Other.” Such 
proclivity can be considered—crucially—as being scaffolded on narrative’s 
practical function (in tandem with the “running” experience I am terming 
realitization, see chapter 1). In a singular commentary text taken as a for-
mation of narrceptive thinking—that is, as a narrcept—the perception of the 
NPs becomes expressed in “approximation to” the commenter(s). Such local 
structuring of narrcept operates through the seamless navigation (viz. gliding) 
between and into entwined “worlds,” but remains an unacknowledged although 
commonsensical practice among the participants. In fact, such “worldying” 
(Herman) facilitates to make sense of how communal storytellers make senses 
made of these NPs (see, chapter 2 for my critical read and elaboration, on the 
Possible Worlds Theory). That is, it enables the analyst to observe more than 
meets the eye, as it were. Consequently, although ordinarily utilized for framing 
everyday experientiality, my approach expounds on the social being/mind ap-
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proach and suggests modifying it to necessarily include our “fictive” expe-
rience.  
Put differently, the ‘red line’ threading throughout this dissertation is the ob-
jective to reveal and highlight character engagement where sense-maker’s (or, 
sense-reasoner’s) real life experiences and the “intentional fields” (i.e., “thick” 
life narratives) inhabitated by NPs may ultimately converge (producing cases of 
twistory, see chapter 1 for more). (Here, the latter notion can be expanded—in 
future investigations—beyond a “fictive” individual to also include ‘virtual’ 
expressions of contestable “slices” of/in “social realities.”67) 
Cashing in on previously outlined ideas elaborated further in subsequent 
chapters, it can hence be maintained that present dissertation aims to accentuate 
and elucidate a contextualist process of narrativizing. To that end, expounding 
on a single commentary text as narrcept and one’s sense-making as a narrcep-
tive proclivity appears inadequate, however. But the question of the organizing 
processes in the background of narrceptive thinking writ large, even if taking 
place “behind the scenes,” might perhaps still remain somewhat ambiguous. 
Hence, it would be important to summarize at this point.  
As chapter 2 goes to hypothesize, the idea of gliding—as illustrated 
above—connotes the “processual force” inherent in the reciprocal dimension of 
the beacon, i. e., a metaphorically mobile signal fire. With regard to distinguish-
able “worlds” latent (although explicitly unacknowledged) in narrceptive 
thinking—the “worldying” of storyworld and further constituents thereof—
beacon decomposes (differentiates into fluid “pockets,” or “drafts”68 of expe-
riential communal sense-making) and composes (into storyworld, manifested 
“in process” as an individual narrceptivized commentary text). This is how the 
concept of beacon is designed to handle the “micro” tendencies of popular 
storytelling. Consequently, the recent and earlier elaborations in sense-making 
research such as “narractivity” (Booth 2010), “narbs” (Mitra 2010), “liminal 
plotting” (Dannenberg 2004, 2008), and others correspond to the operative 
variances inherent in beacon’s reciprocal dimension.  
However, beacon as presently envisioned insists on being a dialectical 
mechanism with multiple stress points. For it enables to highlight a ‘pulsating’ 
tension in engaging with processes of and within “popular” (i.e., reciprocal 
layer) and “academic” interpretations. Accordingly, beacon’s gliding concur-
rently connotes “navigational force” by way of beacon’s analytical-methodo-
logical dimension. For the latter expounds on the “macro” tendency of the 
storytelling process. As outlined previously (see, xii), scholar’s analytical 
methodology also preserves a contextualizing and interpretative impulse be-
cause the discourse world is becoming from the moment beacon is considered 
                                                            
67  Such as social pain spots like misogyny and sexism, e.g., Gunn (2013), where online 
environment becomes a “ʻleakage spac[e]’ [for] perpetuating [oppressive] societal stereo-
types” (Grishakova and Sorokin 2016:555). See also, Vaage (2016:150ff.). For more on this, 
see Conclusion. 
68  Indebted to my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Marina Grishakova, for the treatment of this notion 
(see, Grishakova and Sorokin 2016:552). 
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practically—as the dialectical “structurer” of (for) the macro-level.69 Thus, the 
objective of beacon’s analytical-methodological dimension, as maintained in 
chapter 2, is to distinguish these latent “pockets” as “worlds” (NPs’ and NP’s-
participants’ intend-worlds and twistories, respectively; the text makers’ 
world—all subsumed into general storyworld expressed as a singular narr-
cept), on the one hand; and to propose a potential construal of a discourse 
world—as a becoming of storyworlds at large through the analyst’s narrativist 
editorial agency, on the other. As such, beacon both originates from and 
outlines the consistent multi-world dynamics. “[I]f there are many worlds, the 
collection of them all is one” (Goodman). Accordingly, this reveals analyst’s 
capacity for being one of a “bridge-builder” (Mello 2002:241). As qualitative 
analyst Robin A. Mello explains, “since narrative is a way of knowing, a tool 
for exploration, and a key component in the construction of knowledge, it is 
seminal to the work of the researcher” (ibid.:240). However, she goes to advise, 
its utilization “must carefully place the narratives and perspectives of others 
alongside our [the scholars—S.S.] own” (ibid.:241; cf., Scott 1991). Con-
sequently, in disappearing down the proverbial rabbit hole I intend to narrate, in 
an intermediary fashion, peoples’ narrations about narrative (persons), em-
ploying thereby beacon not only as a conceptualizing tool, but also—
crucially—as an applied method.  
Last, but not least, the overarching processual nature of the project as out-
lined in the present Introduction also seeps into latter’s very core. The pre-
liminary, introductory entries on commentary analysis, for instance, as provided 
above, do not reflect the later analysis proper. Similarly, while analysis examp-
les proposed in 1.5.4 do highlight some preceeding theoretical vocabulary and 
insight, analysis remains nevertheless incomplete. Reason for both cases is 
straight-forward for they suggest analyses of narrcepts that anticipate as well as 
instigate what social constructivist John Shotter terms “relationally-responsive,” 
“inter-involve[d]” dialogical understanding (as opposed to “representational-
referential”), marking analyst’s “attempt to work out [theory] from within 
[participants’] ordinary, everyday, spontaneous talk entwined activities, [trying] 
to be responsive to whatever they are responsive to” (Shotter 2001:345–346; 
emphases in original; see also: Shotter 2000, 2003, esp. 362–365, 201070; Lock 
and Strong 2010:324–342). Hence, it is only the analysis proper—as presented 
in chapter 3, 3.4–3.5—that can readily draw on the compact theory, weighed 
throughout chapters 1 and 2 and established hand-in-hand with implicit, broad 
empirical investigations.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
69  Viz. Greek dialektike: “process of resolving or merging contradictions in character,” 
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=dialectic (Accessed: 15.10.2016). 
70  See, In: Hernes and Maitlis (eds) (2010). Process, Sensemaking and Organizing.  
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CHAPTER I 
Narrative Intentionality, or:  
Character is “the one who knocks” 
1.0 Overview of Chapter’s structure and objectives  
The present chapter is structured by broaching the general points of issue put 
forth above in several interrelated sub-chapters. Introductory sub-section (1.1) is 
followed by 1.2, where I will lay the principal “traveling theories”-style ground-
work for a potential conceptual model. This model, the CO-Model (COM) of 
character engagement, is intended to further orient present chapter. It moves to 
introduce the original notions such as realitizing, twistory, the with/in scale and 
narrcept. The preliminary sketch of the model shall be then refined throughout. 
In 1.3 (“Viewers as Keyboard Psychologists”), I will provide initial explication 
of what could be called the perception-psychological understanding of narrative 
persons. Thus, in tying the latter with my conception of twistory, I will deal in 
detail with and elaborate accordingly notions such as “interaction” and 
“relationship.” The concept of twistory is further concretized in 1.4 (“Elabo-
ration of twistory”). Subsequently, 1.5 (“The Girl on the Beach”) elaborates on 
the narrative person’s “actional system” (Wulff) and in doing so, proposes a 
distinctive, re-tooled account for the notion of empathy, as it is ordinarily 
understood in relevant literature. Herewith, diverse theoretical insight is 
consulted, ranging from communication theory to phenomenological ap-
proaches on film and social cognition, respectively. Given sub-chapter culmi-
nates with the further close-reading of empirical data, in addition to what was 
presented in the Introduction. This provides preliminary analytical insight into 
how the CO-Model—as proposed—might be put to use. Thereafter, in 1.6, I 
will continue with short review and subsequent criticism and discussion of the 
key theoretical arguments disvaluing the realist stance—in its distinct sense of 
the inherent necessity of an Other being intended at as deployed in this work. 
The present chapter concludes by contemplating and adapting digital media 
theorist Paul Booth’s recent notion of “television social network,” meant as a 
theoretical “bridging” of sorts, setting the stage for chapter II’s focus on “world-
building,” in turn meant to solidify current chapter’s conceptual approach with 
an appropriate top-down (analytical-methodological) interpretational framework 
for subsequent analysis (chapter III). 
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1.1 Introductory notes: Sense-making (of) Narrative 
Persons, or, the Case of Queer Dumbledore 
[O]nly a dialogic and participatory orientation takes another person’s 
discourse seriously, and is capable of approaching it both as a semantic 
position and as another point of view. Only through such an inner dialogic 
orientation can my discourse find itself in intimate contact with someone 
else’s discourse, and yet at the same time not fuse with it, not swallow it 
up, not dissolve in itself the other’s power to mean; that is, only thus can it 
retain fully its independence as a discourse.  
– M. Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics (1984:64; emphasis 
added; cf., Holquist 1990[2002]:13ff.) 
 
 [T]he work of verisimilitude in the spectator can never cause him – 
unless he is an imbecile – to mistake the thing representing for the thing 
represented.  
– F. Buonamici (quoted In: Smith 1995b:114; emphasis added) 
 
As per film scholar Carl Plantinga’s recent acute observation, critical and every-
day discussions of visual media (film, television) alike haven’t, from time 
immemorial, exactly concealed their utmost fascination with fictional characters 
as persons, perceptually conceived (a label that, in fact, is not limited to 
humans). “For most spectators ... interaction with characters “as persons” is one 
of chief sources of pleasure in narrative fiction” (Plantinga 2011:40; emphasis 
added; Wulff 1996a:11n5). 
Yet, the theoretical implications of such well-known activities have received 
minimal scholarly attention. To my mind it is alarming because, as media 
psychologist Christoph Klimmt and his colleagues note in the edited volume 
Psychology of Entertainment (2006[2011]): “[t]he majority of entertainment 
media is about people” (ibid.:291; emphasis added). Quite simply, why refrain 
from developing a theoretical framework with precisely this kind of focus? Of 
similar relevance here is the consistent penetration of manifold relationships, 
which, to some degree and through diverse channels of discourse, “mediate”—
(in)directly confer upon us information about, and for—our everyday life-expe-
rience (cf., Van Den Bulck 1999; Berger and Luckmann 1966[1991]). Some of 
these interrelations include “real” persons (i.e., family, friends, colleagues); 
some, however, “fictional” (i.e., televisual characters) persons (or groups of 
persons). Keeping the latter distinction in mind, arguably the similar kind of 
satisfaction in “talking about” someone continues into longitudinal fictional 
narratives, in general, and the characters highlighted therein, in particular. As 
online data—such as the narrcepts of JH and JP described in the Introduction—
attest to, relations of the latter sort presage a contingent equivalency in 
meaningfulness vis-à-vis regular social relationships. Such sheer attentiveness 
and concern—rendered into a storied form of commentary—is reciprocal on the 
level of experience, enlisting, indeed, even cases where the perceived Other’s 
morality is not only ambivalent and/or found wanting, but where the Other 
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might not even be regarded as nominally “real” (cf., e.g., Krakowiack and 
Oliver 2012). Put differently, the interpersonal experience acquired through the 
“mediated” (tele-)offerings becomes integral to the “praxis of everyday”—scaf-
folding thus a kind of “ecological television theory” (Wulff 1996a:3,10). 
Previous seemingly stray observations lead us to two key questions, how-
ever: 
 
 can such meaningfulness be explicated? 
 and if so, does it display some distinctive operative propensities that in-
depth theoretical-analytical interrogation could possibly unpack? 
 
One possible answer is intimated by media psychologist David C. Giles (2010) 
when he recalls the utmost vocal vexation of Harry Potter fandom once the 
acclaimed novelist J. K. Rowling suddenly announced that Dumbledore, the 
famed bearded headmaster of the Hogwarts School of Magic and Wizardly, 
might, in fact, be gay. As Giles goes on to aptly observe, Rowling’s extra-
textual “outing” concurrently underscored Dumbledore’s humanly authenticity, 
as the real life discourse suddenly ascribed him with “life beyond the text,” 
hence “reinforc[ing] Potter’ readers impression that the characters ... exist as 
real, tangible people who play a meaningful part in their day-to-day expe-
rience” (ibid.:442; emphasis added). 
The expansive universe of Rowling’s novels and the subsequent feature film 
series had lain the groundwork which enabled the attentive recipients to develop 
an intersubjective interaction71 with their heroes and heroines, whom they had 
observed for more than a decade (film series closed in an heartfelt moment of 
Harry and Hermione being parents themselves, indicating a full circle). These 
beloved characters became “tangible” insofar as they persistently complemented 
their fans’ day-to-day experience. Consequently, such experientiality became 
deeply entwined with characters’ experiential specificities (‘Others’ discourse’) 
writ large due to lengthy observational “exposure” (onlooking) participants had 
on their unfolding lives. 
As Plantinga goes to show throughout his thoughtful analyses of critical 
texts concerning Psycho, such a far-advanced intersubjective tendency frequent-
ly includes even behavioral assessments of characters who express—like 
Norman—“abnormal psychological condition[s]” in direct opposition to the 
                                                            
71  It is crucial to henceforth understand interaction (“with characters ‘as persons,’” 
Plantinga 2011:40) as a “relation” differing in kind, but not necessarily in experiential 
content (for in-depth discussion, see, 1.3.2); as a becoming within the “creative vernacular” 
etching out the CO-Model (see, 1.2), and underwritten by marked affinity with interaction 
“proper,” hence providing continuance to the dialectical tension inherent to our social being 
as an ensemble of social relations. To convey such tendencies I have chosen the phrase 
interaction-in-development (see also, Introduction). The given reading, as we shall see, is 
further reinforced by parasocial approach in communication studies. Neuman (2008:2319–
2320) maintains that broadcast television can “produce an experience of interacting with 
other humans on-screen … audience members may derive comfort and pleasure from the 
sense of having familiarity … relationships with fictional characters …” (emphases added). 
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recipient’s (Plantinga 2011:33–34). In my opinion this observation keenly 
reveals that there’s a palpable reciprocal proclivity intrinsic to our narrative 
experience. We actively construct what philosopher of aesthetics the late Peter 
Goldie called “peoples’ narratives” (Goldie 2004), sanctioned thereby by the 
‘relation structures’ of narrative persons (as I will refer to them throughout), as 
explicitly facilitated by the narrative; or, likewise, implicitly drawn from its 
informational structures. As Goldie observes of our everyday life, “[a] large part 
of [it] is concerned with thicker explanations ... interwoven in a complex net-
work of narrative [explication]” (Goldie 2004:7, emphasis added; Geertz 1973; 
Gallagher 2012a:369–370). Indeed, as evolutionary psychologists Dunbar and 
O’Neill have observed, about two-third of our conversational time is dominated 
by the “whys,” “ifs,” and “what fors” of other peoples’ doings. Wondering how 
one would proceed in the face of his or her situation appears, then, to be a main-
stay of our everyday vernacular. In fact, it is notably a prevalent tendency for 
children of 4 years of age—77% of their conversations have said to involve 
other people (Andrews 2008:21–22). 
From here follows the underlying claim of the present chapter, supported by 
a later analysis (see, chp. III, 3.4–3.5): the aspiration to thoroughly scrutinize 
“other peoples’ doings.” For, as what I have outlined above holds when 
narratively situated existences are encountered and the continuous digital space 
of storytelling provided by commentary sections and forums affords a suitable 
expressive domain. Thus, characters as narrative persons, in their inescapable 
fragmentation and impenetrability, become “real” in kind to actual persons, as it 
were—that is, they are realitizable (even if, for some culture and media critics, 
deceptively, naïvely and/or pathologically so).  
Through becoming the focus of viewers’ attention, narrative persons grow to 
be part and parcel of one’s everyday experience. Narrative proper (i.e., the 
authorial televisual narrative) operates hereby as a kind of paradoxically conti-
nuous “snapshot,” if you will, grounding exposure to the Other’s experience 
with the kind of variegated accessibility it is impossible to maintain in “real 
life” relations. In turn, this accessibility rests on the accentuation of characters’ 
“realities,” i.e., the “intentional fields” they inhabitate.72  
 
 
1.2 The CO-Model (COM)  
1.2.1 Introductory Notes 
Recalling JP’s narrcept from the Introduction, whilst “fleshing out” Walt’s 
narrative in situ, one doesn’t deploy the whole of Walt’s “story,” i.e., the 
accumulative shared “history” (Blanchett and Vaage 2012) the viewer is 
uniquely keyed to (see, 1.3 for discussion). Only “enough” of it is utilized (e.g., 
Walt’s specific knowledge of Adriana’s kid brother’s demise and Jesse’s mental 
unraveling after committing a murder), with contextually relevant dots—for the 
                                                            
72  See, chp. II for the explanation of why I have opted for “inhabitate” over “inhabit.” 
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scrutinized situation on hand—thereafter linked accordingly (Hutto 2012:67). 
What occurs here then is that situational and intentionality-specific narrcepts of 
such “targets of gossip” (Klatsch-Objekte) (Wulff 2006:56)—i.e., capitalizing 
on how, say, Walt might make sense of events—emerge interactively within and 
out of the online setting of user-generated content. As cognitive philosopher 
Shaun Gallagher explains, such narrative “scaffolding” focuses on “some parti-
cular person or group, in some particular situation, acting and interacting in 
particular ways, across some segment of time” (Gallagher 2012b:369). 
Although ‘narrcept’ is explicated in detail later, suffice it to say that the 
notion is consistent with our understanding of others (“non-physical” encoun-
ters included) as being an intrinsically social and interactive affair (Gallagher 
2012b:6). Our conscious acts (e.g., perceptions, imaginings, thoughts, etc.) 
possess an intentional structure. Our consciousness is always a consciousness-
of-something (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008:7,11,107ff.), whereby the manner of 
our experiencing always elicits directedness, a kind of “of-ness” with the world 
at large (ibid.:109; see, 1.5.3). 
Here I believe it becomes affordable, in correlation with Gallagher and 
Zahavi’s (2008) and others’ implication of expanding the understanding of the 
“world” beyond its physical connotations to include social and cultural dimen-
sions, to broach the link tying the viewer and the character as being indicative 
of (1) interaction and (2) relationship (see, 1.3). When narrative persons are 
taken as autonomous beings-in-their-world, nourishing viewers’ imagination 
without—and I would argue it being crucial—spawning from it, they are 
perceived by viewers with a kind of immediacy whereby the sense-making of 
them is deemed situated on an elementary level. Given such kind of (narrative) 
proclivity (cf., Ochs and Capps 2001), viewers make sense of characters’ per-
ceived (i.e., not always acted-upon) intentional action. Hence, the narrcepts 
developed by viewers are gradual and fluid; they remain “open.” Viewers keep 
building upon the hindsight and the foresight amidst the consistently changeable 
“contextual background” ascribed to particular NPs.  
The claim of directedness makes it clear one cannot fully speak of intending 
consciousness without “look[ing] at [the] objective correlate, i.e., the perceived” 
(Gallagher and Zahavi 2008:113). Subsequent discussion, then, subscribes to 
the “realist” view of taking “screen characters” to be as persons, opposed to 
“trait bundles” aided by the “needle” of viewers’ subjective experience, or 
mediating “nodes,” facilitating the uptake of virtual experiences (and emotions), 
while effectively voiding the constant dialectics of experientialities (viz. the 
experience of viewers versus the experience of the narrative person as the 
former might perceive of the latter’s). Such insistence, then, becomes predicated 
on a “commonsensical,” everyday-sophisticated perspective which could poten-
tially be considered as qualifiably different from its “naïve realist” counterpart. 
Previous ideas become especially fore grounded through the conceptualization 
of the underlying principle of realitization, designed to preserve the key maxim 
underscoring the ongoing communal discussions on the Internet: solipsistic 
(“first personal”) approaches on “other people” would effectively cancel out any 
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distributed discussions pertaining to “other people.” Obviously, this is not to 
say, however, that viewers’ “subjective experiences” are not significant. 
Contrariwise, they may turn out to be exceedingly prominent—just not by 
themselves alone, and assuredly not by taking “character” to be just another 
screw in the Great Machinery of Narrative who can be built up solely on one’s 
experiential resources (i.e., as argued, NP are taken as sovereign, with the story, 
as opposed to “in” it). Put differently, the co-elaborative creative vernacular of 
the discussion environments under consideration necessitates that the unit of 
analysis investigated herewith is not—and should not be—the individual 
cognizer, but “the [interactive] system as it unfolds in time” (de Jaegher 2009: 
535; Gallagher 2009:548), including all the “participants, their dynamic inter-
actions, and the context[s] in which these interactions take place” (de Bruin and 
de Saan 2013:229). 
In sum then, the implication here is that viewerly attentive engagement can 
easily be objective in the sense of giving the benefit of the doubt to the character 
actually existing, coupled as the latter is with their own diverse world-relations. 
In doing so, viewers are a far cry from naïve as they both acknowledge and 
integrate sophisticated knowledge of story’s “storiness” (i.e., “What are those 
writers thinking, making that dumb twist?!,” cf. see, text makers’ world, in chp. 
II). Real viewers deliberately do undertake these kinds of intertwined and 
complex intentional stances (cf., Dennett 1987[1998]; for criticism, see, Hutto 
2013:591–601) and thus, it becomes exceedingly evident that the benchmark of 
narrative pleasure entails in-depth considerations about what these “Others” (as 
persons) would do, as opposed to constructing and reacting to “first person”-
filtered homunculistic mind’s eye imagery, merely re-representing what one 
would do were one that “Other.” 
With all the above in mind, my approach going forward is predominantly of 
a “travelling theories,” or a “theoretical sampler,” variety. The inspiration is 
drawn from the recent narrativist tradition of enactivist philosophy, eschewing 
the necessity for the ST/TT models73 and arguing, instead, for the develop-
                                                            
73  Where “theory theory” (TT) diverges into two kinds of modular views: (a) innate 
“theory,” active since birth, encompassing prototypical sets of concepts and employed when 
comprehending others’ intentional functioning; (b) and “scientific” TT (STT) with “less 
substantial innate component,” proposing that “theory” is developmentally acquired, making 
children “little scientists” who constantly “tes[t] and revis[e] their hypotheses about 
intersubjectivity.” Simulation Theory (ST), meanwhile, strongly opposes such “over-
intellectualized” approach, thus accentuating that understanding other minds is internalized, 
i.e., we put ourselves  “in the other’s shoes” (de Bruin and de Saan 2013:225-226). Also, see 
Hutto, in Style’s Special Issue (2011:278ff.) for an oppositional account to ToM. Also, Hutto 
(2009:12-13), Hutto (2007b). For further criticism, see, e.g., Gallagher 2006, 2007, 
2011:22ff.; cf. Hutto 2004; Caracciolo 2014; Deonna and Naney 2014; Leudar and Costall 
(eds) 2009; Slors and MacDonald 2008. For proponents, however, see foremost Walton 
(1990) and Goldman (2006); but also, Zunshine (2006); Nichols and Stich (eds) (2003); 
Abbott (2010).   
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mental capacity to distinguish, decipher and predict74 the third-person know-
ledge, obtained through narrative exposure75 and context-sensitive competence. 
In transposing this assumption for my present area of interest, then, it stands to 
reason that such narrative competency in “fram[ing] the other person’s 
experience” (Gallagher 2012a:370–371) becomes actively re-cycled for longi-
tudinal narrative experiences. It can be referenced as rendering characters—
even non-protagonists—“familiar.” Consequently, previous arguments reveal a 
prevalent phenomenon which, however, has seemingly received undeservedly 
scarce scholarly attention, while, at the same time and across diverse discipli-
nary fields voluminous literature detailing the relevance and functionality of 
representationalist ”engagement models” has been amassed, resting predomi-
nantly on the elucidation of rules for viewers’ “sympathy” of and “identi-
fication” with characters. 
Consequently then, inspired by the aforementioned ideas and conceptuali-
zations, and in further fleshing out my line of thought, I intend to acknowledge 
character engagement which capitalizes on “commonsensical” assumptions and 
can be seen as building on the core tenets of enactivist paradigm (Varela et al. 
1991[1993]; Thompson 200776; Bruin and de Saan 2013:227). My contribution 
to these ongoing discussions hinges on central inquiries of how Internet users 
engage with narrative characters in discursive, narrative contexts (blogs, 
forums), and, specifically, how do the latter “carry over”—and become of key 
importance—in these discursive world(s) being developed. Toward these parti-
cular aims, present chapter introduces the bottom-up concepts such as narrative 
person, narrcept and twistory. I will highlight viewers as involved in “narra-
tive practice” which conceives of interpretation as direct (as opposed to pre-
learned qualities of TT, ST or even the “pure” form of folk psychology itself 
(cf., Persson 2003; Hutto 2004), converging context-sensitively on the minutia 
of situation (de Bruin and de Saan 2013:235), whereby the “fictional Other” is 
taken as a distinctive “intelligent agent” (i.e., a NP) of their own accord. In so 
                                                            
74  Esp., see, Gallagher and Allen (2016), where they oppose “classic computationalis[t] and 
methodological individualis[t]” representationalism over “brain-body-environment [which] 
does not entail that the brain represents mental states of others ... but [participates] in a more 
holistic and embodied process” (ibid.:2; cf., 40n., above; emphasis added) Hence, 
interactivist and narrativist “active inference and embodiment,” viz., “ongoing predictive 
engagement” is accentuated as being brain’s central function (ibid.:8ff.). See also, Gallagher 
(2017).   
75  My adapted usage of Hutto’s NPH and its heuristic of “normalization” (see, 1.5.2 for its 
use in empirical analysis) should not be taken as going against the grain of Hutto’s and his 
proponents’ core claims whose field of research ordinarily does not entail narrative fiction. 
Hutto’s discussion of “mind-guessing,” in light of two literary extracts, implies some open-
ness to my arguments, however; see the special issue of Style, Hutto (2011:281-282); Cf., 
Velleman (2000). 
76  Similarly, I find it fruitful to note here that the notion of “interaction” that I am herewith 
taking also connotes implications similar to how recent cognitive reception theories have 
adapted enactivist frameworks (e.g., Caracciolo 2014). As such, it is rather the perceived 
quality of interaction, in large part due to successive shared knowledge. 
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doing, participants’ activity aspires towards maximizing “explanatory cohe-
rence” (cf., Thagard 2000:104–10577; Givon 2005) and attends to narrative 
person’s larger narrative (Hutto 2011a:282; cf., Hutto and Gallagher 2008; 
Goldie 2004; de Bruin 2010; Hutto and Myin 2014). Hence, viewers’ bonds of 
familiarity as “time-structured occurrences” (Wilson 2009:59) become em-
phasized, as they try to make sense—through narrceptivizing—of NPs and their 
ways of “storying the world” (Herman 2013:23–2478). Such “Others,” once 
recognized and acknowledged as cognizers, meanwhile, supply viewers—via 
bi-directional (or, autopoietic) interaction (see, 1.3)—with experiential 
‘building-blocks.’ These ‘blocks’ may not necessarily be evident on the diegetic 
surface, but nonetheless perceivable as intentionally possible, given NPs’ 
context-specific world-relations as well as—if need be—the ambivalent facial 
expressions, intonations in speech and lines of dialogue. In sum, then, expe-
riential interaction may pertain to largely everything which might not directly 
“drive”79 the plot, but which may afford necessary first-hand knowledge for the 
viewerly exploration of a complex “character.”80  
Hence, I would suggest my present contribution to hint at a new kind of 
“with,” one that wouldn’t recoil from acknowledging the sovereignty of the 
Other as a dialogical “intentional system,” facilitating interaction due to long-
term interest evoked. When interacting with other humans on-screen (Neuman 
2008/2009:2319), it is inchoate to claim that—on the basis of distinctive 
experience aroused—only one’s own first-person experience pertaining to some 
(fictive) situation at hand is sufficient. After all, we are not “reiterating our-
selves” when interpreting other’s reasons (Gallagher 2012a:363–364). In that 
connection, narrative (‘re-sensed’ as local, subjective storyworlds; see, chapter 
II) becomes to contain—by, at the same time, giving exclusive access to—
narrative person’s environmental circumstances and contingencies (Livingstone 
1992:9). Contingent on the entirety of the discussive realm observed (i.e., 
simultaneous co-elaborative conversations across a number of blogs/forums), 
narrative persons—from viewerly perspective and as per the latter’s (tacit) 
aspiration--obtain agency to operate alongside both the discussive realm as well 
as the “first person” imperative, without being “dissolved” within neither. This 
                                                            
77  In adapting Paul Thagard’s dialectics of “target” and “source,” viewers, whilst being 
deeply invested in character’s experientiality in the present, draw on past knowledge of 
character in the process of their sense-making (ibid.:107). 
78   See my critical adaptation of Herman (2013) in chp. II.  
79  In that sense, I would argue present treatment also to expand on Alan Palmer’s influential 
notion of “continuning-consciousness frame” (Palmer 2002, 2004), by complementing it is 
purview with meticulous details concerning “character“’s (inter)mental functioning not 
explicitly indicated by the narrative. 
80  With reservations, de Bruin and de Saan’s (2013:246–247) ideas conceivably echo my 
present claims within their five-point explication of enactivism, esp. those of “level of 
presence” (participants’ environment may differ, but situation is nonetheless shared, e.g., 
video chat), and “level of reciprocity” (e.g., one-way and two-way directed social cognition, 
as well as “active participation within an interaction“). 
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recognition of ‘alongsideness’ is, in essence, what drives my fine-tuned 
“alternative” consideration of interaction, per se. 
In other words, narrative person’s agency pertains to being, in employing 
Shaun Gallagher’s phrasing, “situated in an environment which also tells us 
something about what [he] is doing and thinking” (Gallagher 2012b:15,17; 
emphasis added). Like in everyday interpersonal context, recipients’ knowledge 
of NP is not ready-made, but constantly shifting on the basis on longitudinal 
bonds of familiarity and “shared history” (cf., Livingstone 1992:10ff.; 
1990:100). Consequently, a correlative distinction can be conceivably made as 
empowering viewers’ activity, too. In their narrcepts, formulated as and ex-
pressed through commentary texts (cf., preliminary examples from Intro-
duction), viewers act upon a duplex capacity of immersion and distance (qua 
stance of objectivity; cf., text makers’ world, see: chp. II). Immersive quality of 
the story (as something generally undisputable, esp. for fan(s)(doms)) may, in 
fact, even be strengthened by an objective perspective on observed NPs—of 
being absorbed by them, not in them (Sorokin 2016b, 2017a, b)—due to viewer-
NP interaction which bases itself on “emotional intelligence” of the former 
(Bordwell 2008:51–52). Meanwhile, viewers’ real-life cognitive schemata 
(Fludernik 1996[2005]:32–34) feeds into the envisaged objective stance, casting 
sense-making as a joint phenomenon. That is, in making sense of narrative 
persons making sense, viewers frequently “blend” their world outlook with 
those of the NPs’ (see 1.2.2, twistory; cf., intend-worlds, in chp. II). 
Now, prior accentuations do not suggest that the emotional aspect of narra-
tive experience, i.e., the “empathy” (Einfühlung), can be excluded wholesale. 
Thus, in sub-chapter 1.5 I will propose an alternative reading by drawing, 
amongst others, on the pragma-semiotical approach to filmic experience (Wulff) 
which distinctly underscores the intrinsic relevance of NPs’ “actional context,” 
i.e., their complex interpersonal relationships. Moreover, especially in the light 
of the two examples given (1.0), I would maintain that such Interactional Para-
digm (IP)—as explored in 1.3 below—owes more to the narrativist approach to 
empathy (see Gallagher 2012a, 2012b; cf., Coplan 2011), on the one hand; and 
on the “emotional intelligence,” i.e., viewers’ commitment of watching “lives in 
real-time” (Bordwell 2008:51–52; 2010), on the other. Viewers witness people 
they might not necessarily endorse (Hutto 2012:67), but on-looking them 
nonetheless evokes their “solidarity” in the sense of the actional and emotional 
backdrop being of sovereign Other’s experiences (Gallagher 2012a:375–376). 
Hence, participants like JH and JP on online “sites of engagement” (Norris and 
Jones 2005; see, chp. II for discussion) can be observed to achieve satisfaction 
from scrutinizing what precisely makes those narrative persons “tick,” what 
drives their intentionalities. In all, then, how could these NPs be perceived of as 
making sense of as well as fashioning their own volatile life-environment (and 
concurrently, how their compatriots could be perceived as making sense of and 
affecting theirs).  
Such a discursive penchant for focusing on fictional characters and their 
narratives (Plantinga 2011:46) rests on (filmic) comprehension; “[the] grasp of 
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the concrete significance of the perceptual material as patterns of social action” 
which, in particular, emphasize our inherent interest for the interrelatedness 
with other persons as well as complements such intersubjective knowledge re-
sources (Bordwell 2008:43ff.; emphasis added). Hence, NP’s experience be-
comes an effective “social glue” (Giles 2010), drawing together communities of 
what Bordwell calls “innate talent” espousing a “creative vernacular” that opts 
for acknowledging the ambiguity of the lives borne witness and thus aspires to 
continuously construct their contextual coherence, in ways similar to how sense 
of real fellow-beings is consistently (re)made. All in all, then, my approach is 
committed to recognizing subjective knowledge(s) as bound by and drawn upon 
(narrative) interaction.  
Admittedly, however, whilst this project may be empirically justified, theore-
tically it might seem as an irresolvable uphill battle of sorts, even though there 
have been substantial appeals for widening (or indeed, shifting altogether) the 
academic paradigms concerned (e.g., Giles 2002, 2010; Newman 2006a, 2006b; 
Plantinga 2009, 2011). I think the primary reason lies in recognizing how 
various contemporary doctrines of character perception—“filmic,” but not 
necessarily limited to—have been consistently constrained by a simulationist 
mind-set, hence decreasing their insightfulness insofar as analyzing natural 
reciprocal situation towards NPs.  
As Giles’ quote embarking present chapter tellingly indicates, however, it 
has proven increasingly difficult to overlook intrinsically intersubjective inter-
actional conceptualizing (as per his example: “I don’t think Snape has ever said 
anything untrue” (emphases added). Yet, following Giles and others, it may be 
contended that majority of theoretical thought on the matter, especially crucially 
with regard to narratology and narrative research, appear to have pleaded 
foremost to solipsistic constructs that operate as mediators for unnatural and 
illusional “drama of cognition [in the mind of its beholder]” (Abbott 2010:224; 
emphasis added). Nevertheless, as Michael Z. Newman thoughtfully observes, 
“[c]haracters are not real people, granted, but this does not mean that they are 
not people ... their traits are not them; they are descriptions of them” (2006b:53, 
underlining added; cf., Grabes 2004, 2008). More to the point, such ap-
proaches—to use literary theorist Richard Walsh’s phrasing—tend to “devalue 
involvement in proportion as they devalue fictional being” (Walsh 2007:154). 
An apt corollary extending the precise reproach of the prevailing Cartesian 
preference in the “continental” tradition of thought (for contemporary criticism 
on the Cartesianist incidence, see, e.g., Shotter 2001, 2003) was indeed fore-
shadowed by Paul Ricœur (1979) when he decried the implacable dialectics of 
denotation and connotation; that is, of reducing fiction into illusion, whilst 
impeding its ontology—of making it a poetic discourse that “merely evok[es] 
feelings, emotions and passions devoid of any ontological weight” (Ricœur 
1979:140; cf., Ricœur 1994:124). In concert with Ricœur, I thus submit that “to 
form an image is not to have an image, in the sense of having a mental repre-
sentation; instead it is to read, through the icon of a relation, the relation [to] 
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[‘bound’ images, i.e., images engendered by poetic diction itself]” (ibid.:133; 
emphases added), 
Ricœur persists that one cannot reproduce poetic image because of its non-
referentiality, of it having no “original” in one’s experiential world. Thus, he 
considers reproductive imagination—the “mental alchemy” it engenders—as 
parasitizing on the image per se. As a converse corrective, Ricœur opts to 
examine non-referentiality as the very feature which enables augmentation of 
our world-vision and wherein the image’s reality oscillates between the twin 
senses of work’s context (i.e., as poet’s “mythos”) and the accompanying 
context of recipient’s thought at work (what Ricœur terms one’s redescription of 
reality), respectively (ibid.:123ff.,139–14081).  
In his later writings, Ricœur celebrates these ideas as fiction’s heuristic force 
(Ricœur 1994:123–124), linking it hereby to the vocabulary of the second law 
of thermodynamics, maintaining that such heuristics “scal[es] the entropic slope 
of ordinary perception” (ibid.). Indeed, what can be detected as inherently 
contextualist assumptions—or as he phrases it, the “creative mimesis of reality 
proceeding from the poetic mythos” (ibid.:141, emphases in original)—may 
reveal the vigorous cognitive exigency behind comprehending fictional narra-
tive (and its “characters”) necessarily as a cohesive whole, and may offer expla-
nation as to why, above all, the creative and evaluative nature of language—in 
present case utilized to talk of, or more specifically, in writing about narrative 
experiences—becomes expressed more directly and naturally than leading 
strands of theoretical traditions make it out to be (cf., ibid.:125–126).  
To some extent, some of the above has persevered in contemporary academic 
literature, perhaps most influentially in narratologist Monika Fludernik’s 
(1996[2005]) inspiring account of “natural narratology” which conceives of 
readers as—by her phrasing—realistically motivated. By “narrativizing” the 
unfamiliar, the encountered fictional reality—and experiencing agents therein—
become re-cognized by recipients’ (real-life) embodied practices; latter which 
operate through and towards the experientiality manifested in the text. In short: 
fictional enterprise necessitates a kind of self-reflexive loop, as indicated also 
by Daniel D. Hutto’s Narrative Practice Hypothesis (Hutto 2007a). Hence, the 
“homologization of the fictional and real worlds” can be seen as effectively 
obfuscating the supposed frontier separating “fiction” and “reality” (Fludernik 
1996[2005]:26–30,98,235). Where Ricœur’s ideas underscored narrative’s 
phenomenal-paradoxical quality of “augmenting” one’s conception of ‘the real’ 
as well as preserving fiction’s ontological “weight,” Fludernik’s meticulous 
study exploits the other side of the same proverbial coin—namely, how the rea-
lism itself is inherently “man-made,” opposing thus “imitational meanings [and 
being instead an] interpretational strategy of mimeticism in accordance to which 
textual encounters are reinterpreted as relating to a fictive reality that shares a 
number of qualities with the ‘real’ world” (Fludernik 1996[2005]:238). 
                                                            
81  See also, Ricœur (1984:80) and Milly Buonanno’s elequent elaboration to the social 
sphere wherein she refers to televisual drama as a powerful “widener” of viewers’ “personal 
capital of social relationships” (2008:79-81). 
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Drawing on the previous insights what I will attempt to advance throughout 
this chapter can be subsumed—implicating hereby the necessity of German-
Dutch “interaktionistische Fernsehtheorie” school—under the generic title of 
Interaction Paradigm (IP) (for in-depth consideration, see, 1.3 en passim). It is 
characterized by the CO-Model (COM) and latter’s operational heuristics of 
realitizing, twistory and more (see below). On the one hand, these pit-stops 
pave the way for further elaborations presented in chp II, and, on the other, 
suggest theoretical elucidations for the analysis of Breaking Bad’s online 
discussions over two key episodes in consecutive weeks (see, chapter III, 3.4–
3.5). Crucially, the present investigation builds on the preliminary analyses of 
the online data (Sorokin 2013a, b, 2015, 2016a, b, 2017a, b) and is, as such, 
explicitly “inform[ed] and guide[d]” by the phenomenal experiences as stored 
in the online realm (cf., Gallagher and Zahavi 2008:10). 
 
 
1.2.2 The ‘Carry-Over’ Model (CO-Model) of Television Experience 
As initiated by reception studies on daily soap operas since early 1990s it has 
become a go-to truism that longitudinal “exposure” to televisual characters 
results in them being perceived by viewers as “family members” or “neighbor-
figures” (Vaage 2014; Blanchet and Vaage 2012; Baym 2000; Keppler 1995, 
1996). Pursuant to this perspective, television becomes a Beziehungskiste 
(Vorderer 1996 (Ed.)—i.e., a “tube” facilitating protracted effects which accu-
mulate into deepening bonds of familiarity with plentiful characters positioned 
amidst networked paradigmatic strands (cf., Allen 1985:70). Accordingly, it has 
been detected that such propensity also casts a wider net by obfuscating the very 
confines of “real” and “fiction.” Recent experiment pitting the real-life figure 
depictions (heads of states like G. W. Bush, etc.) against those of fictional cha-
racters found that both sets were perceived “equally realistic[ally] and un-
realistic[ally]” (Konijn and Bushman 2007:169,174–175).  
Throughout, I am drawing on the online reception of weekly “prime-time” 
serials, i.e., Breaking Bad. The conjecture subsequently pursued, under the 
rubric of Interaction Paradigm (IP), builds on the core argument that serial’s 
characters as narrative persons (NPs) “carry over” (CO-Model, i.e., COM) 
(on)to recipients’ experiential plane for the discursive act “levels” the onto-
logical disparity. On the one hand, NPs become thus imbued with idiomatic 
sovereignty and individuality within the confines of the co-elaborative space of 
creative vernacular, whilst—on the other—preserving similar tendencies vis-a-
vis the storyworld (see the with-principle below). Here, the assumption of 
“tangibility” mentioned on the outset of present chapter becomes facilitated by 
the informational amplitude availed by the narrative—and complemented by the 
narratively expressed perception–--about the observable person. Whereas real 
life might afford us limited scope on “other people” viz. in the specific sense of 
lacking sufficient resources for elaborating on their intentional proclivity, the 
superior accessibility (either explicit or latent) to the NP benefits the partici-
pants in, perhaps, evoking a more enriching interactional experience (whilst 
60 
also being instrumental in contributing to one’s real life outlook, to boot). 
Consequently, such dissimilarity highlights claims of experiential immediacy 
and presence-ness wherein recipients’ own accumulative knowledge carries 
approximative weight (Wilson 2009; Hartmann 2008; Wulff 2002).  
During their serialized encounters, viewers naturally ’key to’ the doings and 
the presumed inner reflextions of these “screen persons.” Accordingly, this kind 
of base-level operative principle of COM—what I am terming realitizing—can 
be regarded as either an implicit, largely automatic capacity which keeps “run-
ning” liminally, or as a tacitly ‘launched’ “reality pact” (cf., Grishakova 2017). 
Consequently, realitizing is meant to scaffold the follow-up cognitive pro-
cessing and the creative discussive vernacular involved (i.e., complex online 
talk of characters ‘as persons’). The notion of realitizing is inspired by an 
English neologism82 explained as an act of bringing someone to the ‘state’ of 
“reality.” This vocabulary gestures towards the intention to build upon diverse, 
yet interconnected theories, such as the ecological and “commonsensical” 
models of filmic communication (e.g., Carroll 2003; Anderson and Anderson 
2007a). 
In his Engaging the Moving Image, film philosopher Nöel Carroll (2003) 
challenges the classical conception of film as language (semiotic deciphering of 
“codes”), proposing instead convincing evidence revealing pictorial recog-
nition—at the level of the “single-shot image”— as a natural, if not altogether 
innate, capability. Referentiality of language is negotiable. Conventionally we 
say “dog,” but—if necessary—language can be arranged to say “cat,” instead.83 
Images, conversely, directly link into our intrinsic knowledge resources, effecti-
vely “activat[ing] everyday cognitive and perceptual skills and capacities” 
(ibid.:54–55). Called by Carroll the “international mode of communication,” it 
is something shared cross-culturally and, even by interspecific means (see, 
ibid.:18–21 for an array of fascinating examples). Similarly, it is something we 
might have on hand since a very young age. In developmental science, Slater 
and Quinn (2001) and others have observed that the newborn infants may 
possess an evolutionary “prototype face” which allows them to both recognize 
human faces post-birth as well as to continually build upon that initial (possibly 
prenatal) experience (ibid.:22–23; cf., Nelson 2003).  
In fact, when expanding on the perception of “face,” interest in and 
recognition of distinctly human face and body, as ecological film theorist Joseph 
D. Anderson puts it, doesn’t persist with infancy. Citing an experiment by 
Cutting and Proffitt, Anderson argues that the recognition of the other is 
facilitated by a “universal schema” (which also naturally extends to “characters 
encountered on a movie screen”). As shown by Cutting and Proffitt, (1) people 
recognized their friends’ gaits through the “dance” of fluorescent “spots” which 
were attached to their joints beforehand; (2) again other people, though un-
                                                            
82 http://nws.merriam-webster.com/opendictionary/newword_display_alpha.php?letter=Re& 
last=20 (Accessed: 3.11.2014). Observe that my usage diverges from the original, though 
still adhering to its spirit. 
83  Cf., Voloshinov (1930[1973]:28). 
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familiar with the walkers, were capable to “distinguish between male and 
female walkers”; and (3) yet a third group, upon being shown “computer 
simulations based upon the algorithm [based on the] experimental [human] 
subjects,” were in agreement as to the gender of the walkers represented by the 
dots on the video screen (Anderson 1996[1998]:131–132, emphasis added).84 
From here it is seemingly only a relatively small step to Heider and Simmel’s 
(1944) classic study where respondents attributed human-like intentionalities to 
the moving and intersecting geometrical figures on the screen (cf., Heider 
1958[1964]:24). However, it can nevertheless be justifiably asked where to 
might such fascinating observations lead?  
One possibility is to suggest a ‘weak-to-stronger’ kind of narrativity (i.e., a 
sliding scale) inherent to the very act(ivity) of perceiving of something. Latter 
assumption pertains especially to cases of engagements that are either: (i) self-
centered and goal-directed (see the rock-throwing example below), or (ii) self- 
and other-directed, intention-driven, e.g., what I have previously termed “para-
social perception.” Beyond one’s exposure to narrative content, though, this 
assumption—in its strictest sense—conforms to the principle of ’weak narra-
tivity,’ because it adheres to nothing other than the pair of constituents of the 
generic narrative toolbox—namely the cause and the effect (i.e., of how in-
tending something is set towards some accomplishable aim). Hence, although 
prominent ecological psychologists, such as James and Eleanor Gibson, never 
evoked the idea of direct narrative perceiving per se, I submit that latter’s echo 
can nonetheless be observed in the notions of “affordances” and “information 
pickup” that rely heavily on environmental causation. In his seminal The Eco-
logical Approach to Visual Perception (Gibson 1986[2015]), Gibson argued for 
the context-specificity of affordances (cf., Heider 1958[1964]:24; Gallagher and 
Zahavi 2008:7–8; also, cf., Bruner 1957:126–127,130). Hence, Gibson’s con-
ception of “direct perception” meant “observers perceiv[ing] themselves in the 
environment, surrounded by it, and in relation to it” (Mace 1986:152). “The 
possibility of perceiving a property of the environment directly, without supple-
mentation [i.e., intermediary concepts and representations], exists when there is 
sufficient information to specify it and a perceiver who is attuned to that infor-
mation—again emphasizing the perceiver-environment fit. Information is not 
punctuate, instantaneous, or fleeting. It is spread over space and over time” 
(E.J.Gibson and Pick 2003:18; emphasis in the original).  
To give a Gibsonian example, a stone can be either thrown for protection (its 
affordance as “throw-able”); or, conversely, deployed as hammer to fix some-
thing (Gibson 1986[2015]:126). Now, if some other stone, aside from its sphe-
rical or square form, appears in addition rather large in diameter, an observer in 
urgent need of sitting perceives of it possibly as affording her necessary 
composition as something “sit-on-able” (op. cit.:120). Yet, if the observer in 
need of a short rest happens to be, say, a child, the same stone might not be “sit-
                                                            
84  See also, Gallagher and Allen (2016:15) on the interactionalist approach on “face 
perception.“ 
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on-able,” as it may be lofty and require climbing for which she’s too exhausted, 
hence necessitating further looking (cf., Gibson and Pick 2000[2003]:16).85 In 
other words, of central significance here is the issue of fit. In the hypothetical 
scenarios described, same stone (as an environmental “invariant”) is perceived 
as an affordance for one party, yet inadequate for another. This, then, is deter-
mined by the “theory of perception,” viz. “information pickup,” which James 
Gibson and his followers conceived as a direct and unmediated process where—
most importantly—“meaningfulness” was insofar as being predicated on the 
causal necessity. William H. Mace has perhaps put it most eloquently: “One 
does not detect something meaningless first and then interpret it meaningfully. 
There is only one step. That is the one Gibson referred to as information pickup. 
This does not say that the supporting processes for the act of pickup are not 
complex. There are many degrees of freedoms to be coordinated” (Mace 
1986:144; emphasis in original; for extensive early criticisms on ecological (-
psychological) approach, see, e.g., Ullman (1980), Schmitt (1987), esp. 275–
276; Richardson et al. (2010); Jenkins (2008); Jones (2003); Chemero (2003).  
My underlining point here in what may seem an odd swerve is to note the 
perception-of by means of “environmental niches” as being explicitly filtered 
through the intentional exigency and predicament at hand—we are actively not 
only “seeking,” but shaping information (op. cit.:20; cf., Anderson 1996[1998], 
2005). This necessity of stretching one’s legs (=cause) leads to acknowledging 
the “ofness” with the world, of going “in search of” amidst the many “surfaces” 
latter provides until the best contextual fit is established, e.g., a sizable stone to 
sit upon (effect). Consequently, the intending perception begets an emergent 
formation of sorts—a motivated, directed motion that leads from point A to 
point B. 
From this follows that in some situated case of problem-solving, an imme-
diate narrcept is developed (here the notion is taken in its broadest possible 
sense shedding any sort of exclusivity), which, in embracing the intentional 
directedness, sets up an interrelated sequentiality of crucial steps, facilitating 
thus an “affordable” best possible solution. As such a broad example of narrcept 
reveals, such intentional stance (“world-of-ness”)—i.e., an “interactive system” 
(Gibson and Pick 2000[2003]:14)—is readily narrativistic even in the subject-
world, i.e., the private sphere, well before the intentions possibilities of other 
perceivers become the issue of interest.  
Meanwhile, Carroll’s answer, were we to return to filmic image, is to inquire 
after the “comprehen[sion] [of] what a picture is a picture of” (Carroll 2003:18–
19, emphasis in original). He asserts that on the base level of the single-shot 
image (i.e., “pictorial” frame on the film reel), we are, in effect, re-cognizing the 
depiction as something (or “type[s] of something,” (ibid.:21) correlative to our 
preceding experiences. Emphasis is on the hyphen here, for our identifying 
                                                            
85  Cf., Karl Marx, in his famous Estranged Labor (1844), approaching not exactly 
oppositional issues from the labor theory of value, in fact argued for “all nature [being 
man’s] inorganic body” (emphasis in original) (Marx 1844/1988:75-76; cf. Marx and Engels 
1846/1998:49).   
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something afresh and re-experiencing the initial situatedness of becoming-
familiar run in parallel. Thus, in Carroll’s (radical) constructivist conclusion, 
looking suffices. In comprehension, he argues, we “trigger recognitional capa-
cities that are hardwired [in us]” (ibid.:23).  
However, one shot does not make a motion picture and latter’s engagement 
with our natural cognitive and perceptual capacities extends well beyond a 
singular frame, to be sure. As one generic example, we could recall Bordwell’s 
(2008) discussion of how in watching a non-subtitled Hong-Kong action movie 
and being faced with insurmountable language barrier, it was nonetheless pos-
sible to not only follow the action, but comprehend it relatively well. Bordwell 
put it down to the foreknowledge of the genre tropes, of attentively observing 
characters’ body language, of hypothesizing the significance of their internal 
relationships, and so forth (see also, Carroll 2003:25ff.).  
Accordingly, we can induce from Carroll’s assumptions that when an intelli-
gent agent is depicted—say, a (human) person—his presence is incontestable 
because based on the articulation of such presence—bestowing it agency 
through affectionate, tangible (material) usage of language—correlates with 
how real world persons, intimate familiars even, who surround us, are discussed 
about. We cannot very well say that what we see is a figment of our imagination 
and that we are, instead, only entertaining the thought of seeing a (depicted) 
person (contra Smith 1997, 1998). Having developed recognition of our 
conspecifics, it naturally extends to the comprehension of screen content, but as 
opposed to written media, mental re-representation here is gratuitous—re-
cognition suffices (see also, Anderson 1996[1998]:19–22). Hence, the “fictio-
nality,” the non-being (versus “reality”) of such “screen persons” should not be 
cast as a pretence on the face of the infamous paradox of fiction, but as neces-
sarily empowering this person’s—narrative person’s—beingness, on account of 
the perceptually correlative feedback with/to de réel (see, Choi (2006) for 
criticism on Carroll’s account86). 
The previous arguments further elaborate on the internal dynamics of the 
proposed CO-model (COM). Realitizing, its base-line operative principle, lays 
the foundation for and allows to split the “substance” of (joint) sense 
construction along the axis of narrative person’s intersubjective functioning 
(i.e., him making sense of his “actional context”) and commenters’ own (real-
life and genre-specific) cognitive parameters, respectively. Such “fluid” dia-
lectics which cannot be pinned down with definite rules, I am terming twistory. 
This notion is intended to convey the distribution and processual convergence 
of the experiential knowledges of the involved (and “pseudo-involved”) 
                                                            
86  Carroll acknowledges that whilst emphasizing “pictoral” film images he’s effectively 
excluding abstractness of avant-garde and experimental cinema. Though it may be seen as 
the “hot spot” of his theory, my issue is more “mainstream.” What about highly futuristic 
sci-fi films which may introduce rather acute cognitive dissonance? Is Carroll’s prior argu-
ment of “types of something” supposed to extend here as a cover-all? If so, to what degree? 
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participants, the viewer-commenter and the NP(s)—an interlaced “well of his-
tory”87 (Sorokin 2015, 2016a, 2017a, b; cf., Blanchett and Vaage 2012). 
As previously implied, twistory is utilized in highly context-sensitive and 
creative88 fashion when the attempts to meaningfully comprehend the possibi-
lities for NP’s acting for reasons are drawn upon intertwined (life-)contexts (cf., 
Linell 2009:26). Accordingly, viewers become objectively—idiosyncratically as 
well as co-elaboratively, as opposed to “collaboratively”—engaged in discursi-
vely reciprocating89 narrative persons’ experiential range, their intentional field 
(Wulff 2006:48). Significantly for the present project, however, such “storying” 
(Herman 2013) of possibilities for narrative person’s mental as well as explicitly 
traceable behavioral minutia cannot entirely rely on what narrative has readily 
divulged. In fact, “complex” televisual narratives such as Breaking Bad rarely 
make such explications explicit in their operational aesthetics (cf., Mittell 2012–
2013/2015). Instead, narrative reveals ‘white spaces’ of the unsaid90 that might 
not even be significant to the narrative’s plot. All this is dispersed as intricately 
“stranded” amidst and between diverse information scaffolding characters’ inge-
nious emotional backdrop (cf., Gorton 2009:118–120) (see with/in – interaction 
scale below). 
The previously introduced vocabulary accentuates what could be seen as the 
ground-rule of character-specific narrative pleasure. It is cognitively stimulating 
to weigh the particulars of what the other would do (or be thinking of doing)—
that is, to discursively ’key to’ such narrative person and to enact on, to narr-
perceive (viz. construe a commentary text expressing a narrcept) through the 
affordances of twistory and NP’s specific knowledge, or lack thereof—instead 
of developing mental representations as though “simulating” or “mirroring” the 
                                                            
87  Whilst “twi-” is (a) taken from the idea of being intertwined, “twist” is also a striking 
synonym for “intertwine”; hence twi(st) + stories, wherein the overlap of “st” signifies 
intrinsically autopoietic qualities of both “stories” (viz. commentator’s “real life,” and 
narrative person’s “actional context”) utilized in the processual sense-making. 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/intertwine (Accessed: 1.11.2014). 
88  As opposed to being steeped in full-on imagination. Here, then, I am addressing the core 
difference between being “creative” and “imaginative,” respectively. Whilst the former 
underlines the inventive act of creation (e.g., something new from old (cf., e.g., Turner 
2014)—i.e., utilizing story-context in multiple perspectives in developing narrcept)—the 
latter focuses on the formulation of mind-imagery. In constructing such co-elaborative, 
distributed idea of creative problem-solving, I followed Glăveanu’s concept of distributed 
creativity (see, Intro). Present contention is that such creavity corroborates the “micro” layer 
of (subjective) narrcept, which thereafter emerges into “macro” layers. Thereby, neither 
’level’ cannot be considered as strictly exclusive, but severely interleaved (see, chp. II and 
chp. III, 3.4-3.5 for close analyses).  
89  My usage of  “reciprocity” attempts to convey that even though what occcurs is not 
reciprocity “proper” (i.e., corrrespondence between ’actual’ people on both ends) one cannot 
exclude the social constructivist aspect of such relation as a kind of one-sidedness that 
’carves out’ its own bidirectionality if and when necessary. Such assumption also stays true 
to the spirit of the original conception of “parasocial interaction” (see, 1.3, passim).  
90  Cf., “spare character miscellanea” (Booth 2012:315; cf., “off screen spaces,” Wulff 
(2012:1). 
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other (Gallagher 2012:372b; cf., Gorton 2009:124). This argument is explained 
with sublime accuracy by aesthetics philosopher Robert Stecker in his reading 
of Anna Karenina: 
 
[We] imagin[e] all those things she actually ponders not in the sense that [we 
imagine] pondering those things [ourselves] but imaging that she does, that she 
reacts to these in certain ways, and that this puts her in a certain state of mind. 
Because it is descriptively richer, this is a more vivid imagining of how she sees 
her situation. (Stecker 2011:299–300; emphases in original) 
 
In other words, people encountered via entertainment media “breed enjoyment” 
(Klimmt et al. 2006[2011]:291). Hence, the operative principles of twistory—as 
I envisage the notion—are not singularly conflatable with “perceived realism,” 
in latter’s sense of “story” irregularities that undermine its overarching 
coherence and result in the charge of “unrealism” (Busselle and Bilandzic 2008; 
Bilandzic and Busselle 2011; cf., Giles 2010:453–454). However, nor intends 
this kind of “imagine-that” perspective to exclude “plot logic,” as it were. 
Rather, the latter is conceived of as informing COM’s unabridged outline by 
incorporating in unison the notions of “narrativization” and “normalization” 
(Fludernik 1996[2005]; Hutto 2007a). Whilst the latter deploys previously 
described contextual duality to develop narrcepts on NPs’ intentional possibi-
lities, the former thereafter attempts to position them within—while signifi-
cantly re-structuring where necessary—the fluid storyworld as narrceptivized in 
a commentary text. Naturally, previous assumptions taken together can be inter-
rogated as to whether what I have distinguished as NP’s “knowledge,” too, 
essentially appertains to the recipient. This allegation—summed up in Alain 
Resnais’ pregnant phrase “only character is the spectator”91—I will take to spell 
out the “rule of superimposition” and venture to emphatically challenge 
throughout. 
Nonetheless, hereby I do not intend to suggest viewers wholly foregoing 
their de facto sophistication which dictates that they indeed are not scrutinizing 
the lives of their familiars. Contrary to popular belief viewers are adequately 
sophisticated to express such intertwined knowledges in an all-encompassing 
fashion (Walsh 2007:148–153, esp. 156–157). In fact, if the narrative introduces 
some nagging inconsistency which perceivably runs counter to, say, depiction of 
particular NP thus far92, it may distract the effect of realitizing in compelling 
recipients to somehow reconcile various conflicting experiential knowledges on 
hand. I carefully chose to say “distract,” however, because realitizing is not 
hereby withheld or ruptured, it is just—for lack of a better term—“rerouted” to 
take into account the discrepancy made explicit (by the narrative). The rerouting 
itself, though, whilst seemingly introducing a novel avenue, yet finds its way 
                                                            
91  Quoted in, Berger (1978). 
92  E.g., did Breaking Bad’s mafiosi Gus Fring suddenly acquire superhuman capabilities 
and “sensed” the bomb beneath his car? Or, did Huell truly have necessary agility required to 
swap Jesse’s cigarette packs unnoticed? 
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back on to the proverbial high road in that the solution to the problem posed is 
nonetheless anchored in (as well as “recuperated” with) the NP↔recipient 
twistory93, whilst also markedly drawing on the text(makers)world (see. chp. II; 
and chp. III, 3.4–3.5). 
Further illumination is added if we would cast the arguments thus far in 
terms of a relational scale with(in) - interaction. On the one hand, continuing 
the thread of thought initiated by Ricœur, Fludernik and especially Wulff (see, 
1.5 for extended discussion), we would have NPs’ ‘actual world’ (cum cha-
racter’s “actional context”) in regards to which COM brackets the “in,” whilst 
firmly underscoring the context-sensitive relevance of “with.” That is, diverse 
information (actions, events, etc.) entails and effectuates NPs’ embodied cogni-
tion (their experiential information) which then becomes viewerly acknow-
ledged as epistemologically distinctive—as a modifiable narrative on its own 
right, subsumed into the construction of storyworld enacted through the narrcept 
(see, chp. II for specifics). In fact, NP’s ‘actual world’ content reveals expe-
riential minutia which recipients can uncover—something with the narrative 
proper, but not necessarily dissolved (with)in it (cf., see also, “taking in”, 
“collecting,” Casebier 1991:9ff.; also, cf., Rimmon-Kenan’s “interdependency” 
(1983[2002]:37)). Often, however, such information remains inchoate on its 
own and thus cannot be employed wholesale to understand narrative person’s 
experiential workings. Here’s where the heuristics of context-sensitive direct 
interpretation, i.e., “normalization” (Hutto 2008a), is employed in developing 
the narrcepts (see, 1.5.2). In such instances, narrative functions as a “guide”—a 
“resource,” or “tool” for thinking (Herman, Vygotsky)—conferring viewer to 
enactively uncover what may be intentionally possible for the NP(s). 
Hence, although the dynamics introduced by notions of realitizing and twis-
tory under the rubic of COM may hint at similarities with Jenkinsian and Bord-
wellian term “appropriation” of de Certeauan inheritance (i.e., displacing “cha-
racter” from his/her natural ‘habitat,’ that is, a specific narrative, into some, 
perhaps, wholly different one, like in cases of fanfiction), this thorough em-
phasis on narrative’s relevance functions as a balancing factor to fend off 
complete reductionism. Dialogist scholar Per Linell suggests a helpful corollary 
here: “A referent – an object or event referred to – is never a referent in abstract; 
it is referred to by somebody in a specific situation ... as part of a cognitive-
communicative construction” (Linell 2009:24,26, emphasis added; also see, 
ibid.:28, esp. 19n., 20n.). 
Accordingly, this is where interaction comes in as we are able to distinguish 
two autonomous units of embodied cognition—that of viewer and narrative 
person (NP)—participating in their own kinds of situated sense-reasonings 
whereby former’s is the ’real’ embodied cognition, whilst latter’s is perceived, 
becoming so through the realitization and “carry-over” (the CO-Model), 
                                                            
93  E.g., Gus’ utter caution is explained away by viewers as they draw upon the prior shared 
knowledge of him having lived in Chile during Pinochet’s regime; whilst limited knowledge 
of Huell’s life is supplemented by viewer’s own unfortunate contact with real-life “expert 
thief.” 
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highlighting latter’s experientiality as being-in-their-own-lifeworld. Within such 
“relational whole” (Linell 2009:15), viewers’ experiential resources (e.g., pre-
learned everyday schemata, a ‘formal’ toolbox incl. genre-specific expectations, 
etc.) are intersubjectively linked with—contra conflating—those of NPs (i.e., 
their presumptive experiential sense-making discourse). Interaction, then, as I 
envisage it, is multi-directional, oscillating in situ between viewers↔NPs.94 As 
such, the previously proposed ‘scaling’ essentially characterizes the core dyna-
mics of COM by fascinatingly expanding—I believe—on the manner in which 
recipient-narrative communication has ordinarily been understood.  
Given the variety of previous observations, it becomes reasonable to assume 
that the viewerly narrcepts under the COM-permitted intersubjective nexus both 
capitalize on as well as “hone” viewers’ cognitive skill-set, whereby conceiving 
their engagement as an embodied narrative practice (Gallagher 2001:90–91,103; 
Hutto 2004:459, 2011b:1). Such a cognitive work-out can be seen as culturally 
modifying the brain (Johnson 2005; Doidge 2007; Boyd 2008:33–34) and 
complementing our adaptability as beings-in-the-world, whilst underscoring the 
ingrained narrativity thereof (Plantinga 2011:39–40, 47; Boyd 2009:15; cf., 
Gottschall and Wilson (eds) 2005; Gottschall 2012). To that end, a work of art 
in general and fictional narrative in particular functions as a “merry-go-round of 
social pattern[s],” enabling the recipients “to think – emotionally, imaginatively, 
reflectively – about human behavior writ large” (Boyd 2009:209; Plantinga 
2011:39). 
In sum, COM, that is, the “Carry-Over Model” insists on acknowledging the 
theoretical implications of the significance inherent to allegedly “naïve-realist” 
stance that viewers’ become, through time, the first-hand witnesses to—or 
having, as Italian media theorist Milly Buonanno put it in her illuminating The 
Age of Television: Experiences and Theories: “a seat in the front row” (Buo-
nanno 2008:79) for—characters’ real-time changes. This implication enables to 
discontinue the conventional first person, ego-centric perspective in favor of a 
more commonsensical, and no less sophisticated, third-person approach, i.e., 
viewers talking (and thinking)—i.e., narrceptively and co-elaboratively—of 
characters as their familiars (if not as friends), as persons, albeit of the “narra-
tive” kind.   
With all that in mind, next sub-chapter is dedicated on further elaborations 
on aligning the notions of interaction, relationship, and interactivity with COM, 
by construing necessarily insights from the twin concepts: parasocial interaction 
and relationship (PSI and PSR). 
                                                            
94  Plus—crucially—, along the axis of viewer↔viewers, as co-elaborative activity 
immersed in the communication, and ‘shaping,’ of knowledge.  
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1.3 Viewers as Keyboard Psychologists:  
Interaction, Relationship and Narrcepts 
1.3.1 Some introductory notes 
Earliest indications for a theoretical approach in addressing the intrinsic 
complexity in regards to viewer’s relationship with a televisual “persona” date 
back five decades. In their trailblazing and prophetic article, American 
psychiatrists Donald Horton and R. Richard Wohl, under their rubric of “para-
social interaction” (henceforth PSI), explored a variety of intertwined notions 
such as the continuous relationship, familiarity, and shared history “media 
persona” may evoke (Horton and Wohl 1956[2006]95; cf., Horton and Strauss 
1957). Clearly ahead of their time (television was still getting “in vogue” in the 
1950s), their text keenly anticipates struggles that grew but more byzantine over 
time with regards to mass media reception. It is not unexpected, then, that their 
thoughts still reverberate influentially amidst contemporary television audience 
research. Accordingly, it is my contention that a closer exploration of H&W’s 
original concept is necessary, juxtaposed hereby with confluent contemporary 
developments. Of special, overarching interest here is the subtle yet significant 
divergence inscribed to PSI and its associate term parasocial relationship (PSR), 
a divisive pair yet used interchangeably by H&W. 
Present demarcation permits an important dual emphasis, however. Namely, 
it encourages an ‘elastic’ re-conception for the notion of empathy which would 
seek fruitful alternatives to the problematic pair of identification with/of. Hence, 
the dialogic, context-sensitive and processual undercurrent inherent to these 
notions is paramount, whilst allowing to substantially build into the tri-direc-
tional social accentuation – viewer/NP (“relation-schema,” see 1.4; cf., 
twistory), NP/other NPs (“relational field,” see 1.5) and viewers/viewers/NPs 
(“television social network”; see, 1.7; for even more elaborations, see text 
makers’ world, in chp. II). All these layers inherently conform into what I 
envisage as the natural system of NP-centric narrative experience. In sum, then, 
my intention is to scrutinize the applicability of the PSI/PSR framework for a 
more qualitatively-inclined practical theory noted to be insufficient (Giles 
2012:164–165; 2010:445–446; for quantitativists, see, e.g., Chory-Assad and 
Ciccirillo 2005; Tian and Hoffner 2010), whilst concurrently aiming to circum-
scribe the operative specificities of social, interpersonal aspect involved.  
Hence, the interplay of PSI/PSR is examined exclusively through the prism 
of serialized narrative reception as availed by “big data” depositories (Mitra 
2013, 201496) across Internet discussions, taken as co-elaborative environments. 
Hereby, the primary accent of present exploration rests on teasing out the 
                                                            
95  Originally published in Psychiatry, re-published in online journal Particip@tions (vol. 
3(1), 2006). http://www.participations.org/volume%203/issue%201/3_01_hortonwohl.htm 
(Accessed: 3.11.2014), henceforth H&W. 
96  Nevertheless, scholarship especially should emphasize extreme caution with regards to 
“big data” usage. 
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intrinsic foundations afforded by this symbiosis, especially for recipients’ 
narrative practice (Hutto), that is, their narrceptivizing—constructing narr-
cepts—focusing on characters as self-reflexive, intending “social entities.” As 
such, my present approach diverges from the current strands of PSI research 
into online “celebrity worship” and informational and reality programming, 
respectively (e.g., Sanderson and Emmons 2014; Kassing and Sanderson 2009; 
Tian and Yoo 2015; Chung and Cho 2014). 
 
 
1.3.2 Interaction/Relationship: Setting the Stage 
Let us commence with H&W’s inspiring observation that 
 
[i]n television, especially, the [human] image which is presented makes available 
nuances of appearance and gesture to which ordinary social perception is atten-
tive and to which interaction is cued [...] audience ... observes and participates in 
the show by turns. (H&W ibid.; cf., Hartmann et al. 2004b:26) 
 
This banner of “image” as conceived by them comprises predominantly televi-
sion “personas” like announcers, quizmasters and news anchors whose exis-
tences are functionally concatenated to the media, on the one hand, and being 
derived from the PSI, on the other. Importantly, however, H&W do allow for a 
congruently equivalent relationship with fictional characters and even with 
“puppets anthropomorphically transformed into ‘personalities’.” As they ex-
plain, the resulting “persona,” her origin notwithstanding, is indigenous to her 
social “scene,” insofar as becoming so through the (one-sided) interaction (the 
“intimacy at a distance”). The kind of interaction, as Horton and Wohl espouse, 
commences in many ways as resembling (“cueing”) (real) social interaction, 
even though the base-line for such dialogical coupling remains experiential. 
This, in turn, underlines the multi-foldedness and protean quality of viewerly 
experience and its intrinsically intentional structure, for it comes to indicate 
perceiving of and constructing interaction, as well as elaborating on the ob-
served Other’s experience within latter’s informational flow.   
These specific tenets from H&W’s original theory have recently found 
enriching theorizing by German and Dutch scholars under the aegis of inter-
aktionistische Fernsehtheorie (interactional TV-theory, IF) as well as under 
Anglo-American media psychologist David Giles’ more qualitative research 
agenda. Exhilaratingly opposing the majority of traditional research largely 
building on H&W’s psychopathological leanings (see also, Hagen 2011), 
German and Dutch schools argue for a normality stance, maintaining that para-
social relationships become constructed through the particular structures of 
media (i.e., long-term televisual narrative) and hence, should be taken at once 
complementing and drawing on the (real) social interaction (orthosozialen) as 
well as perspicuously opposing the accounts of “identifying-with” and “taking-
over” in regards to one’s engagement with narrative persons (Hippel 
1993:130,139; Giles 2010:451; Mikos 1996; Zillmann 1991 passim). Moreover, 
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under the paradigm of IF, such relations are anything but “pathological uses” of 
media.97 Nevertheless, as Giles acutely observes, even the contemporary re-
search is not yet vacant of the tendency to take parasociality as something 
“potentially ‘pathologizing’” (Giles 2012:167; 2010:454), something H&W’s 
original text admittedly implies.  
As such, the effects of PSI are conceived of as something faux, “preying” on 
the lonely, anti-social and otherwise “off-norm.” In one of such cases of 
stigmatization, psychologists Gardner and Knowles (2008) consider what they 
call “anthropomorphic thinking” as gratifying the “need” for social connections 
(ibid.:158). PSI thus becomes the handy stand-in for the “real” found lacking 
(Giles 2003: 189; Buonanno 2008:80–81; cf., e.g., Stever 2013; Derrick et al. 
2008; Schiappa et al. 2005). The latter charge might even be paramount, Giles 
believes, for it paints attentiveness and involvement ostensible in, say, fandoms, 
as a psychological deficiency; as something with a negative connotation (Giles 
2012:167–168; for strong opposition to this bias, esp. in regards to fandoms, see 
the landmark volumes of Jenkins 1992; Hills 2002). In other words, the 
qualitative lead in H&W’s theory which envisioned PSI as an extension of 
normal social activity has been unceremoniously sidelined and any kind of 
”commonsensical” approach effectively scrapped together with it (Giles 
2003:189–192, 2002:293; Keppler 1995, 1996). The calcification of said re-
search is implied by Giles’ frank concession in his 2012 volume, noting how the 
PSI-scale type interaction “measuring”—together with questionnaires with 
“preformulated interpretations” (Cohen 2002)—have secured itself a yardstick 
status, whereas alternatives are/remain discouraged (Giles 2012:165; see, Levy 
(1979), for the origins of psychometric scale98).  
Yet, Giles himself, too, is eventually unable to escape the proverbial clutches 
of measuring. His proposition for “open-ended items” for respondents’ 
discussive script, whilst assuredly promising, nonetheless garners echos of a 
guiding “man-made” environment (see, Giles 2012:169ff.). Put differently, 
Giles’ general criticism is justified and his call for qualitative approach well-
prepared, but it is all the more peculiar that he himself overlooks a possible 
golden mean—the social dimension outlined by voluminous information 
storages on the Internet. As current section initially revealed, online sources—
especially forums—are not alien for Giles, yet he merely gesticulates towards 
their academic potential (Giles 2010:450–451; also see, Giles 2003:264). 
Question remains thus: why not investigate parasocial tendencies as they occur, 
emerging narrceptively and co-elaboratively in online environments (or have 
once occurred and have now become depositories, as it were, within social 
media’s “big data”) (Mitra 2013, Mitra and Mamani 2014)? 
                                                            
97  See Klemens Hippel’s magnificent critique on these tendencies in, Hippel (1992:137-
141). For an alternative perspective of parasocial interaction as play, see, however, Hippel 
(1993).  
98  Also, for “PSI-Process Scale,” a more qualitatively advanced methodological tool, see, 
e.g., Hartmann and Klimmt (2005); Schramm and Hartmann (2008); also, Hartmann and 
Goldhoorn (2011). 
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Giles’ methodological leanings notwithstanding his theoretical insistence in 
separating PSR and PSI as cognitively distinct merits further investigation, 
however. Giles (2002) initially develops PSI as successive encounters, setting 
up a “continuum [of] extended social activity” (ibid.:293; 2010:451–454) with 
televisual encounters (i.e., a narrative person in a serial). Through such “conti-
nued monitoring and evaluation of [particular] other[s’] behaviour[s],” PSI 
builds towards PSR, extending thereby over episodic and private media use into 
persistent, serialized and ultimately co-elaborative postexposure/viewing 
discussions (Giles 2012:165–166,168; 2010:448–449; 2002:296; Klimmt et al. 
2006[2011]:292–293). Narrative persons thus, to reference Giles’ clever phrase, 
become something of a “social glue.” In the social spaces of group activity, e.g 
in specialized blogs or forums, they come to facilitate joint cultural ground as 
“discussion material[s]” (Giles 2010:443,449; 2003:191–192; cf., Plantinga 
2011). In short: NPs develop into “meaningful Others” who are not forlorn once 
the “watching,” Zillmannian onlooking, ceases (Giles 2012:163; 2010:448).  
This can be considered the core argument of Giles’ three-level model of 
PSI.99 On the cognitive level (private contemplations expanding into large-scale 
co-elaborations), the operative tendencies inherent to social and parasocial 
relationships largely coincide and latter’s technical indirectness and non-
reciprocity is sidestepped by sheer meaningfulness it provides. Consequently, it 
is also indicated that the relationship with (the) NP(s) may—thus corroborating 
the “vernacular creativity” argument—develop from within the “[real] social 
interaction, [the] discuss[ion] about the figure[s] with other [co-viewers]” (Giles 
2003:195, 2002:296), whilst 
 
[PSI/PSR itself] is about encountering a figure through a medium and then 
treating that figure as if it were a real human being. We don’t need to “behave” 
overtly in any particular way, but we need to respond, albeit in a purely cognitive 
fashion, to the figure as we might respond to a human in an ordinary social 
encounter. (Giles 2010:454, emphasis in original, underlining added; Giles 
2003:1; cf., Grabes 2004, 2008) 
 
This fertile re-conceptualization of PSI as a continuance of virtual back and fro, 
i.e., an “online response” (Cohen 2014:144), and PSR as its protean forma-
tion—a realitized narrative person with whom a twistory is formed, leading 
towards narrcepts drawing from such co-cognitive “event”—found further 
refinements under the theoretical auspices of German/Dutch communication 
science (Hartmann et al. 2004a, b; Hartmann 2008; Hartmann and Goldhoorn 
2011; Klimmt et al. 2006[2011]; Schramm et al. 2002; also see, Konijn and 
Hoorn 2005). Approach implied above and subsequently discussed is adapted 
from Dutch media scholar Tilo Hartmann and colleagues. Although their ideas 
are rooted in how viewers’ may complexly construct their experiences of narra-
tive persons, I would argue their work also complementing as well as ultimately 
flowing into theories of other scholars, including H. J. Wulff’s text-theoretical 
                                                            
99  See, Giles (2003:192ff.).  
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(semio-pragmatical) approach which aims to unpack what H&W once called 
media persona’s “social scene” (see, 1.5). 
 
 
1.4 Elaboration of twistory: Processuality of PSI,  
Emergence of PSR’s “relation-schema“ 
Acknowledging NPs as perceptually sovereign socially cognizing entities 
(beings-of-their world) 
Right from the outset, Tilo Hartmann and colleagues’ (Hartmann et al. 2004a, b) 
processual, multi-dimensional PSI-model punctuates the exigency to ponder 
media personae as “natural social entities” (natürliche soziale Entitäten), i.e., 
realistically and/or anthropomorphically plausible media depictions who facili-
tate reciprocal “interpersonal involvement” (op. cit.:22–23, 36–37; Wulff 
1996a:2). The initial phase of recognition—a “running” capacity, i.e., realiti-
zation (recall 1.2)—Hartmann et al explain, establishes an agency-endowed 
Other. Such narrative person could potentially motivate cognitive interest 
having become perceptually present via asymmetrical interaction. Asymmetri-
cality, meanwhile, wanes to a “technical” deficiency which is readily comple-
mentary by observing these personae amidst their own “interlinking commu-
nications” (Hartmann 2004b:27–29; Hartmann et al. 2004a:33; Hartmann 
2008:182). As Hartmann aptly put in another connection (MMORPGs, chat 
bots), viewer as “[a]n observer feels drawn into a communicational situation if 
the perceived behavioral expression of the other social entity is taken as 
symbolic/meaningful and rather intentionally performed action” (Hartmann 
2008:181,189; Hartmann et al. 2004b:26; see, 1.5.3 and 1.5.4 for specific 
discussion on intentionality). Furthermore, previously considered proclivities 
can be taken to predicate on “perceived” or “light” (ibid.:34) distance vis-a-vis 
the subject in question (Hartmann 2008:184), i.e., the acknowledgement of the 
narrative person as a social entity par excellence—aware of one’s environment 
and prone to develop construals about it100, on the one hand; and being more 
accessible—through consistent mediation—than perhaps someone in “real” 
social relations even, on the other (cf., Hartmann et al. 2004b:34). This em-
phasis on the social extension is significant, as, like Giles (2010) observed, it 
widens the scope of PSI/PSR out from under the propensity to “measure” 
interactions only with one “chosen figure” (e.g., favorite soap character) 
(ibid.:447). These particular themes are revisited in the next next sub-chapter. 
 
 
                                                            
100  While Hartmann (2008) seemingly links “distance” explicitly to spatial concerns (e.g., 
cf., Meyrowitz’ (1986) “paraproxemics“), my adapted usage is primarily intended to further 
underscore narrative person’s sovereignty (cf., scale of with/in, twistory) as perceived by the 
recipient. Hence, viewers do not “mindread” (e.g., cf., Hartmann and Goldhoorn 2011:1106), 
but are actively involved in context-sensitive direct interpretation (e.g., Hutto 2007, 2008 
passim). 
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Historicing co-elaboration of narrative(-personal) potentialities 
Herewith, Hartmann et al, building on Giles’ outline, explicitly differentiate 
between what they call two levels of intensity in one’s involvement with the 
narrative person: PSI and PSR. By such phrasing, both “levels” subtly integrate 
the reciprocal unit (i.e., viewer) into the work-flow of the respective modes. 
Although PSI rules out reciprocity proper, consecutive involvement with and 
exposure to (i.e., “re-recognition“; 1.1–1.2, 1.5.3) the media “figure” [sic] 
facilitates a sequential string of data, as it were, leading to the self-modifying 
interactive “dyad [consisting of] the recipient and the media figur [narrative 
person—S.S.]” (Hartmann et al. 2004b:30ff.) As such, “dyad” is generically 
consistent with my term twistory which I took to consist of two interrelated and 
sovereign (co-)cognizing units (see, 1.2):  
 
From the sum total of the interaction sequences arises an interaction history of 
the Dyad. Further interactions of the Dyad are always implemented as well as 
influenced by the background of previous interaction histories, whilst the inter-
actional pattern [Interaktionsmuster] representative of the Dyad crystallizes and 
consolidates. On the dyadic level[, then] we can observe an interactional pattern 
with media figures that is self-stabilizing and cyclically recurrent and which 
manifests as [a] parasocial relationship with [a] media figur. (Hartmann et al 
2004a:10, my translation–S. S.; emphasis added) 
 
Consequently, both notions thus allow to confer upon a kind of localized 
dimension of historicity, wherein experiential data (the narrative) becomes split 
across the interactive duality. Hence, twistory as I envisage it indicates the 
consecutive sum-total of narrative experience the viewer has ascertained so far 
(in concert with his own experiential real life resources), whilst contemplating 
narrative person(s) possible weighing in on analogous (or, comparatively, often 
impoverished) information as inferred by viewers’ inclination to observe them 
as “natural social entities” (cf., Hartmann et al. 2004b:37).  
 
‘Shared’ histories (twistory) 
Incidentally, recent work by media scholars Blanchett and Vaage (2012) has 
termed such joint attention or co-cognition the “shared history account” 
(ibid.:27–30). Also falling in with the notion of “re-recognition,” Blanchett and 
Vaage stress the pleasurably constructive influence of exposure through which 
the familiarity of individual characters in television serials becomes enhanced 
(as opposed to feature films101) (ibid.:24). Presumably it is not wholly accidental 
that the authors herewith chose a term with a doubly bidirectional meaning. As I 
see it, narrative person (NP) “carries over” to viewers’ experiential field (into 
the co-elaborative online space as well as into preceding and concurrent private 
contemplation, i.e., narrcept’s storyworld) and “catches on” therein, establishing 
                                                            
101  In a related connection, Dolf Zillmann (2005:164) writes of how especially cinematic 
narrative compresses time and hence disallows for the emotions to naturally “run their 
course,” i.e., develop over a particular stretch of time.  
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thus twistory intrinsic to COM. On the other hand, though, exposure per se 
exposes viewers to the life and assumed reflexive experience of “characters” the 
more they obtain knowledge of them. Theirs is the “slow-building portrait [of a 
person’s life],” fraught with ambivalences and contradictions, not unlike the 
intertwined lives of the recipients and their conspecifics (Gorton 2009:124–125; 
Livingstone 1990:59). As corroborated by media psychologist Schiappa and 
colleagues, viewers observe these “screen persons” as undertaking “self-dis-
closures,” which, in turn, facilitate the formation and profound incremental qua-
lity of interpersonal relationships. Piecemeal, and co-elaboratively, viewers 
build up a sense of understanding with regard to narrative persons (Schiappa et 
al. 2007:302). 
 
“Digging deep”: seeking contextual fits regardless of the favorite/marginal 
polarization 
Furthermore, as user-generated content on Breaking Bad can readily intimate, 
the revelations about these NPs are not always explicitly graspable on the 
momentary “surface” of the narrative. Hence, in order to truly ascertain the 
intentional and emotional depth possibly characteristic to any such persons, 
viewers recognize the significance of burrowing deeper. In effect, they deploy 
the accumulative “shared history” with the narrative person, looking for relevant 
clues as to why the latter (re)acted or still might (re)act the way s/he did/ 
does/will. Consistent with how H&W originally conceived of the term, then, 
“parasocial interaction” becomes an interaction which “occurs along the similar 
lines as evaluation of people in face-to-face contact” and can be taken to be a 
“normal consequence” of television viewing (Schiappa et al. 2007:302–304; cf., 
Caughey 1984). As the phenomenologist television scholar Tony Wilson ex-
plains, viewers become caught up and participate by onlooking the NPs’ inter-
related searches “to find the world intelligible” (Wilson 2004:79,81; cf., Wilson 
2009). That is, what ultimately drives the varied contents of a narrcept—from 
twistory to intend-worlds to text makers’ worlds to ultimately storyworld, then 
(see, chp. II clarifications on latter terms)—is the reciprocal attentiveness to a 
kind of intersubjective interaction which effectively interpermeates or ‘ent-
wines’ experiences. 
Accordingly, what Hartmann et al meant by their Interaktionsmuster 
amounts to participant’s idiographic bottom-up “relation-schemas102” (Be-
ziehungschema), first correlated with narrative persons and thereafter expanded 
on co-elaboratively in prolonged online discussions. Put differently, what occurs 
                                                            
102  Note that Wulff shall later employ a comparative term in referencing the “constellation” 
of media persona’s social relations. The reason I call attention to it here is because it helps to 
outline the multilayered nature of social cognition taking place: (1) viewers↔characters, (2) 
characters↔characters, and last but assuredly not least importantly, (3) viewers↔viewers; 
whilst my COM-model accommodates (1) and (2), it is conceptual power diverges in 
enabling to also account for (3) within the same dynamics. All aforementioned becomes 
further enforced by the critical adaption of the Possible Worlds Theory (PWT) as an 
interpretational framework for the finalizing analysis (see, chp. II).  
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is a highly attentive “perceptive-cognitive” sub-process of PSI103 (Hartmann et 
al. 2004b:42). Here, participants make a consistent focused effort (i.e., they 
intend at) to “understand perso[n]’s situation, his goals, thoughts [Gedanken] 
[and] intentional actions and predications,” thus accommodating latter’s 
“history” accordingly (ibid.:32; see, 1.5 and 1.5.2 for the narrative development 
of such an effort). The availability of such schema becomes indispensible since 
the first perceptual encounter with the narrative person because continual ob-
servations and evaluations both “outfit” and are “filtered” through it in a cycli-
cal process. Participants’ observation of the narrative persons is anticipative, 
whereas understanding the latter becomes an ever-continuing process, wherein a 
contextual fit is sought (cf., Wilson 2009:4–6,32ff.). In other words, bearing in 
mind the discussion from 1.2, the “ofness” with the world becomes two-fold 
here. Opposing the deploying of some preconceived schematic knowledge of 
how persons “function” in real world, the schema as understood here is deve-
loped from ground up by perceiving of how the Others specifically are of-their-
world. Not only do viewers’ co-elaborative sense-making consistently punctuate 
the self-Other coupling, but they specifically elaborate on the being-in-the-
world operating with regard to that observed Other. In doing so, recipients 
“assess how persona’s circumstances might in the near future develop [and] 
what the persona himself might do or shall do next” (Hartmann et al. ibid.). 
Conversely, similar reciprocal discourse can also be retrofitted, as JP’s narrcept, 
discussed in the Introduction, intimated.  
Admittedly, though, these kinds of developments ordinarily are not split 
evenly across observed “characters.” Drawing on the notions of “obtrusiveness” 
and “selectivity,” Hartmann et al assert that only some person(a)s may evoke 
such intensive “High-Level-PSI” (HLP) vis-a-vis the viewer (evoking, in turn, a 
deeper sense of person’s world-ofness). The magnitude of “previous know-
ledge” (Vorwissen) is key. Obviously, serial TV narratives are not for casual 
attendance, being already ipso facto wrought with complexity for an incidental 
viewer. Already H&W anticipated that much: 
 
The persona offers, above all, a continuing relationship. His appearance is a 
regular and dependable event, to be counted on, planned for, and integrated into 
the routines of daily life. His devotees ‘live with him’ and share the small 
episodes of his public life [...] their continued association ... acquires a history, 
and the accumulation of shared past experiences gives additional meaning to the 
present performance. (H&W ibid.; emphases and underlinings added) 
 
Another point to stress here is that whilst the idea of a “obtrusive” person(a)s 
assuredly has a valid basis for participants do tend to navigate towards 
protagonists and their closest conspecifics, whilst ordinarily forsaking the 
“marginals,” it nonetheless hints at the danger to be theoretically ensnared by 
                                                            
103  Also delineated are affective and conative dimensions, respectively (see, Hartmann et al. 
2004b:34–36). For present purposes, the inclination is to accept Wulff’s position on empathy 
with which, in fact, Hartmann et al’s account differs (see, ibid.:35). 
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the “chosen/favorite character” tunnel-vision Giles had warned us about. 
Indeed, although Hartmann et al at once anticipate this criticism by ultimately 
noting the multiplicity of person(a)s participants have to deal as well as 
emphasize throughout their writing the relevance of person(a)’s social context, 
this aspect is nonetheless insufficiently developed (but see, 1.3.2). 
Similarly, such introduced polarity becomes challenging when reconciling 
cases where marginal person(a)s may “graduate” into evoking HLPs, viz. 
“High-Level PSIs.” Breaking Bad’s Huell, the hunky bodyguard/comical “side-
kick” of Saul, Walt’s criminal lawyer, is an excellent case in point. Right up to 
and including serial’s end, viewers had learnt nothing at all about his past 
endeavors (even Gilligan’s 4th season’s post-mortem interview remained close-
lipped). Yet, his centrality in key events that shaped trajectories in equal 
measure for both Walt and Jesse begs for him to have one. As I will explore in 
detail in the analysis (see, chp. III, 3.4–3.5), viewers indeed “dig deep” in con-
sidering Huell’s (hypothetical) background on the basis of his present “actional 
context” (e.g., he could’ve been an “expert thief” once, considering the kind of 
people Saul must employ due to his criminal disposition) (cf., Schema 5–6; 
chapter III, 3.5). 
Furthermore, for the sake of absolute clarity, I find it relevant herewith to 
firmly stress that the framework proposed by Hartmann and colleagues implies 
the representation and mental “stabilizing” of interactional data about the 
person(a), and not the imagining of the latter in one’s mind’s eye (see, 1.5 for 
further elaboration). To put the same point differently, their contribution doesn’t 
contest the principles of directedness and directness as previously considered 
(see, 1.2). In fact, the inspiration of Hartmann et al as well as other authors 
considered is seemingly the social constructivist assumption that real life 
interrelations are too, to a point, comprehended in a mediated format. From here 
follows that “social entities” in media (i.e., in narratives) are “processed” in a 
congeneric fashion (Hartmann et al. 2004a:11,19). As such, the development of 
an extensive Bild pertaining to the narrative person is homothetic to what would 
be obtained from an interlocutor in real two-party interaction (Hartmann et al. 
2004b:32). Given the obfuscation of such border area, then, Hartmann even-
tually even turns critical of the theoretical value of the notion of “interaction,” 
proposing thus respectively parasocial “processing” or “engagement” as more 
precise notions to consider (see, Hartmann 2008:186–187). The former can be 
dispensed as stereotypical (simple, automatic reactions; fully in line with “folk 
scripts” (see Plantinga 2011, 1.1) and deployed more in case of generic Low-
Level-PSI where our “surface” knowledge resources of Others may suffice); 
whereas the latter is elaborate (deliberate and motivated; deploying the provided 
information creatively for “pleasurable interest“, op. cit.; Anderson 1996[1998]: 
135–136; Wulff 1996b:5).  
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1.5 The Girl on the Beach: Narrative person’s “social field.” 
Empathy and Identification Re-Constructed 
Ecological media theory; character engagement as an interpersonal event 
Prolific media scholar and former film-maker Hans Jürgen Wulff approaches 
central issues touched upon in the previous sub-chapter with his semio-
pragmatic approach to film and television (Wulff 1999; cf., Hippel 1998). He 
seeks common ground with how the particulars of narrative itself may be 
integrated into what he refers to as the ecological media theory, attesting to the 
observation “that television watching [fernsehen] is not only the reception of 
texts, but also an interpersonal event [Geschehen] between depicted [abgebil-
deten] persons and recipients, is just as much self-evident as long known” 
(Wulff 1996a:1; my translation—S.S.). 
As I noted in passing on the outset of present chapter, this “ecology” of 
interpersonal experience becomes a crucial constituent of the everyday expe-
rience per se, as the media consumption begins to accentuate the “social-
medial,” the recognition ((re-)cognition) of the Other out of whose being-in-the-
world meaningfulness (sinn-voll) can be found (Wulff 1996a:3,6,6n5).  
With that in mind, Wulff presents two superbly compelling examples. First, 
he describes correspondence with a colleague who intimates to him a story of a 
protagonist—a certain steam boat captain—who enjoys cinema visits when on 
shore. During one of such stopovers, the captain watches a film with Brigitte 
Bardot. He finds himself enchanted and entranced, but is unable to finish 
because the cinema catches fire and the captain is impelled to flee. In another 
port, he catches the same movie, but yet again, interruption occurs; revolution 
breaks out and film is cancelled. The captain becomes heartbroken. Henceforth, 
the girl on the screen was all he was able to think about. On yet another day, the 
captain encounters a girl on the beach. They start to chat and ultimately he 
recounts to her, with utter fascination, his experience. The girl on the beach was 
Brigitte Bardot, but the poor steam boat captain didn’t recognize her.104  
For the second example, Wulff draws on Martin Esslin’s semiotical stage 
theory, referencing an example of an actor depicting “a boozer” in accordance 
with how the inebriated usually appear in real life. Accordingly, the resulting 
“invented person” is at once an individual of his world, whilst also sharing 
common ground with that of the viewer (cf., Wulff 1996b:1,4–8).  
Amongst other detectable layers, these fascinating examples permit to pin-
point the breadth of Wulff’s “interpersonal event.” Wulff stresses viewerly 
“sketching” activity, which takes its cue from the corporeal (Körper105) de-
                                                            
104  On the flipside of the bitter-sweet, unfortunately, rest cases where actresses are horrified 
at cases where their “real” self and narrative person conveyed becomes conflated in online 
discussions (see, Gunn (2013): http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/24/opinion/i-have-a-
character-issue.html?_r=0 (Accessed: 24.10.2016) 
105 In connection with corporeality, Wulff also speaks of actor’s “impersonations,” of how 
their embodiments of diverse characters over time “seeps into” how each new character is 
perceived through and due to him-as-actor. This “character synthesis” (Wulff 2006, 1996b:2-
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piction of an existing106 someone and pertains thus to the relation respondents/ 
observers107 develop with her; which, in turn, evokes “model-like imagining” 
(modellhafte Vorstellung) about the person under observation (Wulff 2006:47; 
1996b). Accordingly, such interaction can be acknowledged as a “socialization 
modality” (Wulff 1996a:11). I deliberately highlighted “about,” for Wulff’s 
“picture-making” rather implies a relational map which decisively transcends 
the solitary observed individual in favour of elucidating the relational, inter-
personal properties that make her/him one. To put the same point differently, 
narrative persons (NPs)—not unlike real ones—(be)come to respondents’/ 
participants’ knowledge through the (explicit and/or implied) diverse 
interrelations they elicit in their own “actional-context” (see, Palmer 2010, 
2011a, 2011b for a sympathetic view from cognitive literary theory).  
Concurrently, such an effort to understand NPs correlates closely with 
participants’ real-life everyday social understanding. It pertains to the persons of 
their local, proximate environment (unmittelbaren Umgebung) (Wulff 1996a:3; 
1996b:6; cf., Rescher, from chp. II). The latter phrase here enables to stress and 
to reiterate two significant points under development in present work: (1) 
narrative persons can be ascribed with the capacity to become “localized,” they 
“carry over”—as I put it, become realitized in participants’ immediate (dis-
cussive) environment, e.g., via the narrcepts within (and across) the “sites of 
engagement” (see, chp. II); thus (2) adding auxiliary expedience for the NP 
becoming a subject of such co-elaborative social cognition via twistory which 
functions simultaneously on the intersecting levels of private and collective 
(Wulff 2006:47–48,58).  
Accordingly, Wulff builds on Hartmann et al’s prior work and considers “the 
parasociality [that] occur[s] between depicted persons and audience” as 
possessing a constitutive quality, something that’s intrinsic and cannot be 
“strip[ed] away, thought away, or also replace[d]” (ibid.:48), on the one hand; 
and which “conduct” (Verhalten) is open for reflexive viewerly interpretation, 
on the other (Wulff 1996a:9). As implied by this contention, the proverbial 
poles of “fact” and “fiction” are necessarily flexible and not rigidly fixed, and 
thus, the acknowledgement of the ‘screen Other’ as someone of sovereign 
capacity doesn’t hold any exclusivity over the “mediality of the events and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
6) is undoubtedly a very important topic, though not necessarily in the purview of present 
investigation (but see, Mittell 2012-2013/2015 for the relevant discussion of how Bryan 
Cranston’s prior roles as a likeable comedic actor might have influenced his reception as the 
notorious Walter White) (Mittell 2012-2013:48-50). 
106  In the context of Wulff’s arguments I am using this notion with caution, for Wulff 
ultimately accentuates “the experience of actor’s presence,” whereas I underscore that such 
experience, as Wulff sees it, is crucially comprised of dual, concurrent presences.  
107  These usages I have lifted from Zillmann (1994, 1996), though majority of German-
Dutch criticism adheres to this language. As I see it for my purposes, “respondent” (viz. 
participant in order to emphasize the co-elaborative aspect) is actively involved, whereas 
“recipient” is more, quite literally, on the “receiving end.” As such, “respondent” and 
“observer” are not unequivocal, but rather can be used in tandem, for the latter emphasizes 
the inherently observant tendencies of the former. 
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communicative [and narrative] frames that circumscribe them” (op. cit.:48), and 
vice versa. Both frames of looking, as it were, can intertwine and co-exist, 
instead of cancelling each other out or requiring the participant to opt for one 
against the other.  
 
Twin senses of constitutive viewerly interpretation of world-ofness (NPs’ 
intentional field+participatory twistory) 
Especially this prior emphasis encourages me to contend that the term “consti-
tutive” begets twin senses here. On the one hand, it adheres to the processual 
PSI-model, especially as elaborated further by Wulff’s take on H&W’s notion 
“social scene.” By his contention, the latter—which Wulff intermittently terms 
“social field,” “actional-context,” and most strikingly, “intentional field”—has 
to be known as narrative (Wulff 2006:50108; 2003a:139,146ff.; 1996a:3); and as 
narrative persons’ Handlungsraum (“space of acting”), their intentional reality 
(Wulff 2012:1). As discerned, it is the latter’s “data”—with the narrative proper, 
but not necessarily (always explicitly) in it (see, 1.2)—that persistently feeds the 
respondents/participants’ Bild-machen (Wulff 1996b:3–4).109 On the other hand, 
however, the usage of “constitutive” corresponds to the assumption of es-
tablishing couplings, dyads or twistories comprised of the accumulation of 
participant(s)-narrative person(s) experiential data, for by Wulff’s (and H&W’s 
prior to him) own admission such interactivity is participatory (mitmachen/ 
teilen) (cf., Wulff 1996a:2). 
Last but not least, “constitutive” is also seemingly consistent with the pheno-
menological assumption of “ofness,” the natural proclivity to (and perceive) 
intend(ing). Wulff is, I would argue, resolutely against the kind of unyielding 
radical solipsism which views narrative experience, by definition, only as a 
prolonged thought experiment, void of any—however soft—realist claims 
(Smith 1995 passim; see, 1.6 for critical discussion; cf., Redfern 2004). At the 
same time, it doesn’t follow that this “tangible relationship [experience]” has to 
result in participants’ “simulating the character’s actions and bodily postures” 
(D’Aloia 2012:220; emphasis in original). “Seeing is not meaningful or con-
ceivable without an object of seeing, the subject at which seeing as an inten-
tional activity is directed” (zu Hüningen and Wulff 2005:3,5–6; emphasis 
added; cf., 1.6).  
 
                                                            
108 Although I have to vehemently disagree with what Wulff ultimately develops as the 
“implied viewer” (implizite Zuschauer) (Wulff 1996a:3,8). His argument about how the 
viewer only has the designated “structural role” in the interactive event rings technically true 
(we are not, after all, speaking of “true” interaction), however, I cannot accept, like phrased 
by Wulff, the viewer ceasing to be “individual subject” (ibid.) within this kind of involve-
ment. This distinction, unfortunately, goes against the very core of twistory as deliniated 
indeed.   
109  See, 1.4 explicating the interrelation of these complex layers by utilizing the notions of 
“normalization” (Hutto’s NPH) and “narrativization” (from Fludernik’s ’Natural Narrato-
logy’ framework).  
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1.5.1 The “intentional field” of the narrative person 
Against the usurpation of NPs’ agency: narrceptivizing empathy from within 
NPs’ intentional field 
In further outlining such “alternative” line of thought, however, let us further 
scrutinize Wulff’s ideas. Consistent with Hartmann et al, the aspect of inter-
action (as gradual reception—and seeking—of pertinent person-specific infor-
mation) is implied in Wulff’s account. What Wulff specifically adds to the 
ongoing discussion is his resolute challenge thrown at the “simplistic [and] 
unsustainable” view of empathy (Wulff 2002:1) which holds, as Wulff notes, 
that we not only “copy” depicted Other’s emotion and “tune” ours accordingly, 
but we effectively usurp experiencer’s agency in doing so: “figure’s emotion, 
according to this controversial thesis, arises also from the viewer” (ibid.; em-
phasis added).110 Countermanding latter impression, Wulff suggests caution vis-
a-vis “the emotions of another person” (albeit a “fictional” one), hence pro-
posing that the traits and “desire-orientations” (Wunschorientierungen) of 
whom I am terming narrative persons are gleaned by the viewers through 
“penetrat[ing] [former’s] intentional field from within” (ihr intentionales Feld111 
von innen her durchdringen; ibid.; Wulff 2006:48, emphasis added). Empathy 
so re-conceived allows for rich, contextual abductions from the “intentional 
vigours of [narrative person’s] emotional life” (Seelenleben) (ibid.:59–60; cf., 
Feshbach 1989). Accordingly, Wulff identifies such empathic quality as intrinsic 
to respondent-NP relationship (in the sense correlative to both the ideas of 
Hartmann as well as to my conceptualization of twistory considered pre-
viously). Hereby, the depth of the “empathic field” (empathische Feld), as Wulff 
calls it by developing a “lamination model” as an alternative to Smith’s “imagi-
native scenario,” is actively worked out (aktive Tätigkeit/Teilnahme) through 
and by the commitment (Bindung112) to the depicted person, uniting hence 
latter’s “social field” with diverse viewerly knowledge (Wulff 2003:137–138, 
esp. 142ff.; 2002:7–8). 
 
I will call such scenario the empathic field which I take to mean the symbolic 
context [consisting] of social life, genre, [and] the special action[s] and 
dramatical conflicts. This contextual complex is not merely integrated into the 
story [Geschichte] (it therefore has narrative before and after), but is above all 
                                                            
110  Wulff similarly contests “overtaking,” i.e., identifying-with, see 1.5.1. 
111 I.e., emotions, antipathies, preferences, etc.—in all: narrative person’s “social style” 
(ibid.) Note here that Smith, too, has written along similar lines (Smith 1997), but whereas 
Wulff clearly distinguishes ’self’ and ’other’, Smith—by drawing on Wollheim’s notion of 
“central imagining“—maintains that we “self-imagine” having experiences of the kind the 
Other is presumably experiencing at the time (ibid.:413). In addition to exemplifying what 
presently is called into question, Smith’s conceptualization veers too closely to Freud’s terms 
introjection/assimilation, of which long-lasting effects in film theory Smith self-proclaims to 
have fought against (see also, Wulff 2003:158n2). 
112 Note also, that in a literal translation “Bindung” additionally means “association,” “con-
nectedness (with),” hence further underscoring the bottom line made thus far, i.e., my 
proposition of twistory. 
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realized in a constellation of persons [Personenkonstellation]. (ibid.:1–2; my 
translation—S.S.) 
 
While the above may seem commonsensical, Giles did previously remind us 
that there remains a prevalent theoretical-practical propensity to cultivate 
narrow-cast understandings of character engagement—and by extension—
empathy. Meanwhile, Wulff convincingly maintains that such stance of singu-
larity, i.e., the focus on a “favorite character,” only tells half the story (if, 
indeed, even that). Accordingly, as implied by Wulff’s theorizing, empathy per 
se is concurrently highly expansive as well as can be rendered into a gradual 
cognitive construct, evoking a specific kind of all-inclusive processes of ‘keying 
to,’ evoking multiple at-once “intimat[ions] at a distance” (H&W). That is, the 
respondents/participants narrceptivize NPs’ life-environment as a kind of 
system for actions, estimating thus their intentional orientation with regard to 
their “possibilities for action [and] the probabilities for the successes and fai-
lures [of such actions contemplated]” (Wulff 2002:5–8; Wulff 2006:57; Wulff 
2003:142; Schiappa et al. 2007:304; Tröhler 2006). 
Hence, the claims put forth thus far allow to draw upon the narrativizing 
base-line arguably inherent in everyday social interaction wherein “the Other” is 
comprehended through contextual attributions (Hartmann 2008:190). Not 
coincidentally then, Giles (2010) draws from Wulff’s emphasis on context, 
tying it to “logical ‘humane’” responses facilitated by the narrative as latter’s 
conspecifics’ Handlungskontext sui generis, i.e., the biographical and historical 
knowledge (incl. narrative person’s “private moments”) obtained of him 
(ibid.:454; Giles 2003:255; cf., Livingstone 1990:46,58). Consequently, Giles’ 
arguments recall the heading of 1.3 for he conceives of such involved recipients 
as “psychologists.” But how does such psychologising activity—scaffolded on 
the tangibly real—operate exactly? 
Following Wulff, the objective of such adductive psychology is consistent 
with working on a processual, incremental “picture.” This is not, however, a 
“solipsistic modellation,” Wulff heeds, restricted to a singularity. In poet Walt 
Whitman’s undying words, it is necessarily a picture containing multitudes 
(Wulff 2003:145–146).  
 
In a fictional dyadic relationship I have to not only comprehend what something 
means for one figure, but also, how he understands another figure; and I have to 
simultaneously comprehend how each [of the] other [andere] figures the first 
[die erste] interprets and what [kind of] hypotheses he maintains over what this 
Something [dieses Etwas] for everyone [jene] means. (Wulff 2003:143; emphasis 
in original; my translation—S.S.)   
 
NPs’ sovereignty: a third personal perspective in reconceiving empathy as  
a contextual, objective process 
Now, how do the aforementioned statements influence the nature of empathy? 
Accordingly, notion’s reconception further underlines NP’s sovereignty on the 
level of shared experiences, whilst cutting out the (representationalist) ”little 
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man in the brain” in favor of the third personal perspective. Understanding and 
recognizing NP’s “actional context” (Handlungskontext) becomes paramount, as 
the partiality (“openness”) it may entail demands reciprocal elaboration, 
which—in turn—complements knowledge of and facilitates understanding of 
the person(s) observed even in those cases where “disliking” them actually 
becomes the foundation onto which the relationship is paradoxically built 
(Wulff 2003:139–140; Kippel 1992:137; Wulff 1996a:9). These arguments 
reveal that empathy can be conceived as opposing both its presumed fixed-
ness—it never just is as a “traitlike ability” to be activated (Zillmann 2006 
[2011]:151)—as well as its firm anchorage to respondents/participants’ “likes.” 
Instead, empathy becomes an objective process which can be viewed as navi-
gating from the initial transience vis-a-vis narrative happenings toward a (pos-
sible) permanence in accordance with the self-modifying situational whole, i.e., 
narrative person’s “constraints and affordances” as a being-in-their-world 
(Wulff 2002:2; Anderson 1996[1998]:137).  
Accordingly, this approach gesticulates towards lifting a particular handicap 
from empathy. Being foremost a contextually-empowered communicative 
construct which is both developed and utilized by “respond[ers] as observers, as 
third parties” (Zillmann 1996:212, 2011:106), the evaluation of some empathic 
responses as “perverse,” of somehow unbecoming, reciprocally speaking, may 
become a misnomer. Why? As renowned media scholar Dolf Zillmann aptly 
puts it, any indication of stepping onto another’s shoes, as it were, “is simply 
not necessary [as] it violates parsimony of explanation, and most importantly, is 
empirically unfounded” (op. cit.; emphasis added; cf., chapter III, 3.4–3.5). In 
fact, Zillmann has fruitfully developed latter view, termed the “witness perspec-
tive”—under his emotional reactivity paradigm—over a decade (Zillmann 
2011:106; Zillmann 1996:213; op. cit.:105; cf., Zillmann 1991, 1994, 2003). 
 
 
1.5.2 “Living terrain of response and responsibility”: alternative 
insights in conceptualizing “empathy” and “identification” 
Assimilation of social realities 
Specifically, Zillmann adopts the stance of semiotic iconicity of a given repre-
sentation under the auspices of which he argues for latter’s perceivable “appa-
rent reality.” This assumption, taken to supersede Coleridgean “suspension of 
disbelief,” enables for the onlooker to treat the “social situation before [her] the 
way an actual social situation [would be treated]” (Zillmann 2011:106; cf., 
Caughey 1984). Zillmann’s accentuation here brings to mind feminist audience 
researcher Tania Modleski’s argument that female viewers of soap operas don’t 
identify with narrative persons, but rather “relate to them as intimates, as 
extensions of [their] world” (cit. in Stadler, H. 1990: 48; emphases added; cf., 
Stadler 2008:42, “outward extension of the self”; emphasis added). 
Hence, if to consider Wulff’s and Zillmann’s views in concert, instead of 
keeping with the doubling of “re-,” representation as herewith proposed bleeds 
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over to onlooker’s everyday, or more accurately for present consideration, 
carries over into it (the “Carry-Over” Model). As such, it “augments” the latter, 
or, if to recall Paul Ricœur’s phrasing—feeds it back to itself in a more expe-
rientially meaningful form (Andringa and Schreier 2004; Stadler 2008:30–32; 
cf., Nicolopoulou and Richner 2007). 
 
Building a case for attentive empathy 
Nonetheless, some of Zillmann’s arguments remain contestable. Primarily, it is 
arguable whether his opinion that empathy—which the present work conceives 
of as a narratively scaffolded, longitudinal process capitalizing on concern and 
attention—can be conceived as a structural entity where you partition one speci-
fic ‘slice’ for “bad people” (what Zillmann calls “ill-wishing” and “schaden-
freude”) and something entirely different for those who are considered/per-
ceived as “good” (Zillmann 2011:107ff.) For such distinction, unfortunately, 
reminds us how heavy contrasts tend to breed distrust toward half-tones to the 
point it becomes inconceivable that latter even exist. Consequently, such 
research readily overlooks the proliferation of contemporary “morally gray” 
(anti)heroes, as those in contemporary "complex" television, from Mad Men’s 
Don Draper to Justified’s Raylan Givens, all the way back to the trend-setter 
himself—Tony Soprano. In such notorious line-up of “complexly human” narra-
tive persons (perhaps most definitively transcending the contour of mere 
“figure”; cf., Wulff 1996b:5), Breaking Bad’s Walter White, however, may be 
an example par excellence. Throughout his downfall from mild-mannered hus-
band into a feared mafia kingpin (or, from Mr. Chips to Scarface, as Gilligan 
initially pitched the story idea), Walter—out of self-preservation, greed, and 
ultimately both—facilitates or indirectly effectuates despicable acts on an 
exponential scale and thus, viewers’ judgments of him do correspond by 
growing successively negative, even veering on revolting.113 Yet simulta-
neously, what could be called ‘empathic interactivity,’ i.e., attention to and 
concern for him amidst his actional context, may consequently, for the sake of 
discussion, defy (or perhaps rather, instigate a ‘pause’ on) such impulses; some-
thing the narrcepts also vividly attest to (see, chapter III, 3.4–3.5). In other 
words, this “witness perspective” as presently outlined crucially re-structures 
the intial ground of the concept of the empathy, hence underscoring an exigency 
for a clear self-Other coupling which zooms in on the empathy with Other’s 
experience. As such, it draws from the tendency of our intrinsic, insuppressible 
world-ofness.  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
113 Case in point: in analysis (see, chp. III, 3.4–3.5), one of the descriptive elements 
attributiable to a narrative person such as Walt is “monster,” accompanying, e.g., discussions 
running across various “child-threads” in A.V. Club blog environment post-4th season finale 
“Face-Off.“ 
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Alternatives to conventional understanding of “identifying-with” 
As I have thus far has aimed to elucidate, the leading contemporary approaches 
regarding the complex issues discussed (see more for critical discussion in 1.6) 
call for a re-negotiation of the deep-rooted requirements for both empathy as 
well as identifying-with (“Sich-Versetzen”) as the very nuclei of narrative 
(character) engagement (cf., e.g., Cohen 2001). As a direct consequence, Wulff 
thrusts ahead by anticipating identification per se as a non-occurrence, because 
“observed affects cannot become wholly those of the observer,” whereas what 
he refers to as “approximation” (or coming-nearer, convergence; Annäherung) 
undoubtedly occurs (Wulff 2002:1; cf., Rescher, in chp. II). 
In his elaboration on “identification” and “empathy,” Carroll (2010) shares 
Wulff’s initiative114 by coining the notion of “vectoral converge[nce].” Here, 
audience’s emotive uptake is co-inciding or joint with that of the protagonist. 
Observe, however, that latter’s fearfulness doesn’t cause dread in the recipient, 
although he might still feel it following a situative appraisal, independently of—
whilst congruently with—the narrative person feeling it. For Carroll, then, the 
“emotional sync,” as ascribed into the conceptualizations of “infectious” or 
“contagious” identification, respectively, is substituted with “the idea that 
audience[s] [are] resonating emotionally or ‘communing’ with the pertinent 
characters” (for comparison, see, Coplan 2004, 2006). Thus, in what in some 
ways might correspond with previous considerations, emotional “replication” 
becomes exchanged for an endeavor to capture (“approximate”) the “general 
drift” of Other’s Seelenleben. The vectorality of “like” overturns the horizon-
tality of the “same” (op. cit..:338–340). Carroll’s argument is additionally note-
worthy for its subtle discernment of cognizing agents involved. As complete 
“sync” ultimately opens itself up to the charges of superimposition, Carroll’s 
treatment appears designed to side-step such pitfalls.  
 
Reconceiving empathy a narrative third personal concern for the Others  
(the meaningfulness of their “why?”)  
Keeping all the major strains of thought thus far considered in mind, I will now 
turn to inquire: although we frequently might, would we indeed always only 
“wish for” the worst for a narrative person we might not actually like (or, 
having been “forced” to gradually dislike over a stretch of time, e.g., Walter)? 
Although Walter White’s example is one of many notably complicated ones, it 
nonetheless attests to the unlikeliness of such deduction. Our engagement with 
narratives might not necessarily always play off of our worst impulses. Rather, I 
am inclined to agree with Wulff’s estimation that empathy and counter-empathy 
can be “synthesized” into one empathic field which develops, unbiased, “along 
the action line [Handlungslinie]” and comprises of everyone of note (Wulff 
                                                            
114  Later in his work, Carroll, like Zillmann before him, stumbles exceedingly deeper into 
the deceptive rabbit hole of “good” (or, “us“) and “bad” („them“) characters. The “gray,” as 
it were, is denied any existence whatsoever. One can only surmise that it is excluded in order 
to avert any undermining of the very neat Smithian (corroborated by the usage of “allied“) 
emotion hierarchy that Carroll eventually develops (ibid.:343–344).  
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2003:139,142). In fact, the “positive” or “negative” depictions may ultimately 
inhibit sympathetic responses, and, at worst, evoke apathy altogether (ibid.:139–
140; Wulff 2002:7). On the other hand, in accordance with previous delibe-
rations, a more appealing solution would be the “concern” for the Others, mani-
festing as an intrinsically “responsible, constructive form of attention that 
parallels the ideal form in which one might attend to others, or to ethical issues” 
(Stadler 2008:31; emphasis added).115 Note that I am not at all claiming 
subjective judgments, evaluations and overarching social norms, taboos and 
prejudices enforced by our everyday becoming excluded. Rather, they are 
’seeping in’ in proportion to them potentially ‘meshing’ with participants’ own 
utilizable experiences as the constituents of the intersubjective twistory.116 
Thusly, like in the case of Breaking Bad’s commentary texts as (subjective) 
narrcepts, respondents are availed to genuinely probe their knowledge of “the 
Other” as a (narrative) person; to ascertain the intentional backdrop, the 
meaningfulness of his/her “why?” (cf., Carroll 2010:330–332; cf., Stadler 
2008:24). 
In her monograph Pulling Focus. Intersubjective Experience, Narrative 
Film, and Ethics, phenomenological film theorist Jane Stadler (2008) draws on 
Ricœur’s notions “configuration” and “redescription” (see, 1.1 for short discus-
sion on the latter) and considers the above inquiry into Other’s “why?” under 
the guidelines of “practical reason” which she takes to be scaffolded on the 
inherently narrative, interpretative and thus, volatile core of our everyday 
(ibid.:20ff.). Stadler’s reference to the kind of merger wherein the worlds of 
both NP’s and participants’ alike interweave—or, I would say, become per-
ceived in their engrènement [intermeshing]—can be seen as preserving con-
sistency with my notion of twistory. Accordingly, in exemplifying the complex 
relationships between “moral agents” at the core of feature film Dead Man 
Walking, Stadler’s thoughts are additionally instructive for the present debate on 
one’s empathic focus for they illuminate the “real-life” moral ambivalence, so 
                                                            
115  Observe here the claim of accessibility considered earlier vis-a-vis our admission to 
others’ lives in any real life sense. The relationship Stadler also espouses is especially “ideal” 
in that regard, insofar as focusing at length on “complex, extended narratives,” wherein 
“complex” corresponds to moral ambivalence, “extended” however to intersecting and over-
lapping “actional contexts” of the narrative persons involved (ibid.:31ff.) Note also Wulff’s 
(2003:143) implication that in such “synthesis” the concern as “caring about” (sich sorgen 
für) particular NPs (like those of “more liked“) in conjunction with the anticipation of 
narrative events is absent. Wulff appears to be saying that in order to unite everyone 
involved under the same proverbial banner, one has to outgrow one’s “concern” for fellow 
beings. I don’t think, however, that such absolutes are wholly necessary. As such, my present 
utilization of “concern” keeps closer to Stadler’s ideas and—especially—those of Gallagher 
and others (see below).     
116  Similarly, these claims do not mean as if these same “norms, taboos and prejudices” are 
not, or wouldn’t be, judged in the context of the world of which the “offending” narrative 
person is part of; a world which can be (re-)recognizably, as it were, like ours. Equally so, 
too, they can be judged favorably, with no offense having taken place, or, if to recall Anna 
Gunn’s experience, ’channel’ real life patriarchal gender prejudices onto the discussive treat-
ment of a narrative person (like Gunn’s Skyler, Walter’s wife and unwitting accomplice). 
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frequently (re-)recognizable on the screen: ”The film doesn’t exclude the pos-
sibility that there may be fixed moral landmarks; things that are always wrong, 
or always right. Instead it offers a vision of the living terrain of response and 
responsibility that often moves under one’s feet” (ibid.:34; emphasis added). 
Consequently, the kind of witnessing spoken of thus far and empathy 
following from it does not—perhaps indeed cannot, by its very definition—
necessarily endorse Other’s actions, world-view, etc. (Hutto 2012:67). Rather, 
what conceivably is evoked here is viewers’ “solidarity” (in strict Carrollian 
sense) towards the actional and emotional backdrop of sovereign Other’s 
experiences (Gallagher 2012a:375–376). 
Accordingly, it is exactly here where I find philosophers of mind Shaun 
Gallagher’s (Gallagher 2011, 2012a, 2012b) and Dan Zahavi’s (Zahavi 2010, 
2011; Zahavi and Overgaard 2012) work on non-simulationist empathy to evoke 
prime insights. It is especially evident after Jane Stadler’s emphasis on narrative 
persons’ actional context (i.e., their interconnectedness facilitated by “extended 
narratives”; Stadler 2008:34), on the one hand; and, respondents’ attentiveness 
to the “detail of the situation” former facilitates, on the other (ibid.). These two 
investigative threads, complete with Wulff’s assumptions on narrative const-
raints, I take to accompany and significantly intersect in the following dis-
cussion. 
 
 
1.5.3 Against “ontological exclusivism”: Realist (Direct) 
Narrativist Assumptions on the (Narrative) Other and Empathy 
Narrative “double sight” 
Nonetheless, present implementation of the narrativist approach on social 
cognition, as outlined by Shaun Gallagher et al. (for criticism, e.g., Lavelle 
2012) and opposing the simulationist and theory-theorist views on “mind-
reading,” may at first blush, appear premature. Throughout present chapter of 
this dissertation, however, I have relentlessly underscored the intrinsically 
social, interactive, and shared qualities of character engagement, whilst also 
embracing respondents’ narrative “double-sight,” as it were (the simultaneous 
acknowledgement of the artifice which is also the “intentional reality,” an 
‘habitat’ to, the narrative persons; see also, cf., text makers’ world, in chp. II). 
Hence, this particular shift to social cognition research as currently undertaken 
should not be grasped as detours, but rather, as finalizing roadworks for the path 
laid thus far.  
Still, further pause is given by the fact that narrative scholars have generally 
steered clear—although with some exceptional examples of the contrary, 
ranging from capitalizing on the “externalist” initiative (Palmer “continuing-
consciousness frame” and “social mind”; cf., Vygotsky, Bakhtin, Wertsch), 
radical-constructivist approach on “experientiality” (Fludernik), to the respon-
dent’s “experiential background” (Caracciolo 2014)—from giving these “non-
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existents” too much (or, indeed, any) leeway, in disproportion to what everyday, 
situated and longitudinal interactional engagement may suggest.  
 
Against isomorphism, for discovery 
Indeed, the tendency just suggested has produced a long-standing situation 
wherein the only approach that has been acknowledged as staking any claim on 
character ontology is possible-worlds semantics, even though the way it has 
been utilized distinctly disvalues any intermeshing with respondents’ world-
ofness. For it paints narrative persons—that is, possible INDs (viz. individuals) 
in PW terminology—as merely “constructs[, ...] stipulated by story texts [and 
recipients], not discovered.” By such ruling, characters are supposedly always 
in, and their fait accompli is to go through—merely mediate—the motions of 
the story (Margolin 1990:846–848, emphasis added; however, see chp. II for my 
critical adaption of PWT). Even more recently, Marco Caracciolo’s (2014) 
admirable pass at integrating enactivist philosophy with reception analysis 
resulted in an oddly disproportionate claim that “experience[s] [we] attribute to 
[characters, e.g.,] Hamlet [are], as a matter of fact, the experience[s] [we under-
go] while reading” (ibid.:5; emphasis added). That is, we appreciate the predica-
ments of those we observe or read about only insofar as we have the proclivity, 
the foreknowledge (or both) to see ourselves in their problems. Meanwhile, the 
very idea of acknowledging narrative other as an Other remains utterly incon-
ceivable. 
For good measure, though, other recent critics, like Palmer, do decry the 
disinclination to see of such person and her/his functional mind behind the 
forest of signs, i.e., recipient’s own experiences. In fact, Palmer, in spearheading 
the relevance of—correlating with my emphasis on intentionality—character 
dispositions, identifies an “absence of a holistic approach,” for the examinations 
of narrative person’s characterization (“traits”) and mental events (i.e., 
consciousness), respectively, are seemingly segregated in narrative theory as 
such (Palmer 2010:28,31). More recently, David Herman’s illuminating Story-
telling and Sciences of Mind (2013) amasses a wealth of inter- and trans-
disciplinary insight which seemingly facilitates a complimentary conception of 
narrative person however one can still identify the old reliance of the “in” 
thinking (see chp. II for my specific treatment of Herman’s approach, however).  
In summation, I think that majority of the above anxieties are—on the most 
generic level— traceable to the isomorphic117 mindset by which we do not enact 
on a given environment, but, instead, “operate on [the] mental models” gene-
rated by our perception of the former (which, of course, begs the question where 
did the “knowledge” come from when it never was direct) (e.g., Kintsch 
1998:14; cf., Gallagher 2010:114; Thompson 2007; Varela et al. 1991[1993]; 
Hutchins 1995[1996]; 2010; Dewey 1896). From here, the claims of characters 
as “models,” constructed from the mental representations they evoke, obviously 
                                                            
117  In fact, Zahavi (2010, 2011) ties the notion of “isomorphism” directly to the short-
comings of the simulationist (ST) and theory-theory (TT) accounts of cognition.  
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are not far behind (e.g., Eder 2010:19). Yet, would it not be more natural to 
allege that if some sort of contingent non-immediate “modeling activity” vis-a-
vis narrative experience exists, it emerges rather on the observative stage of 
academic analysis, without necessarily pertaining neither to real-time perception 
nor to the postexposure discussions which are inherently of realitizing nature 
(cf., Sorokin 2016a, 2017a, b; analyst’s observational stage indeed carries my 
treatment of PWT, see chapter II). Accordingly, the idea of representing as 
“storing” the knowledge of, surely is not without merit altogether insofar as one 
cannot go without some means or a “toolset” in circumscribing what one per-
ceives of the intentional focus on hand, e.g., a narrative person (cf., Casebier’s 
notion of “codetermination,” below).  
 
NPs’ experientially perceived sovereignty w i t h the narrative (as their 
“intentional field”) 
As very broadly delineated, then, such is the atmosphere of distrust any vali-
dating, “alternative” view of narrative person faces. Consequently, these limi-
tations do exasperate present aspiration to accentuate NPs’ sovereign agency (as 
experientially given) with the narrative as their “intentional reality,” facilitating 
thus, through continuous interaction, direct and immediate reciprocal under-
standing. Yet, the explicit opposition doesn’t mean that such—apparently 
“radical”—construal should be offhandedly disregarded altogether, as there are 
notable academic works that have, to significant effect, interrogated the issue at 
hand. 
Late Alan Paskow, a phenomenological aesthetics scholar (Paskow 2004, 
1994; for reviews, see Worth 2005; Dostal 2007), cautions us not take reciprocal 
experience lightly in arguing for what he identifies as the “ontological 
exclusivism regarding fictional beings” (Paskow 2004:59,77n52). Hence he 
turns to investigate the experiential aspect of taking-as-real by building upon 
comprehensive philosophical insights (ibid.:77–78; cf., 1.2). Paskow links such 
experientiality evoked by what he argues are beings experienced in absentia 
(“overseas daughter” vs fictional being) by maintaining that they can be posited 
as “out there,” partial to the joint world (Paskow 2004:60)118: 
 
[I]f I take my consciousness of my distant daughter to be truly of her, then she, 
as my intentional object, is posited to be in my world. But what shall we say 
about a fictional being? Can I say the same thing about Anna Karenina that I say 
about my daughter? Is she an intentional object whom I posit to be in my world? 
If so, is she taken to be real in the same way that I take my daughter to be real? 
(ibid.) 
                                                            
118  Note that “out there” can—on the surface—introduce affinities with the leading view 
from possible worlds semantics, but, as the discussion below will attest, this would be a 
misrepresentation of Paskow’s ideas. Cf., for my critical treatment and adaptation of PWT, 
see chp. II. 
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The dual consciousness 
At the first glance, Paskow’s positive answer can be broached as neglecting one 
of the integral aspects characteristic to my proposal throughout (viz. “narrative 
double-sight”), but this claim would be unwarranted. Elaborating on the works 
of Wollheim and Wittgenstein (see also, 1.6), Paskow instead contends that our 
“seeing as” and “seeing in” comprise essentially parallel discourses. We can 
posit the depiction as “truly real” and become involved “in his life” as well as 
remain perfectly cognizant of its artifice. We do not “shout our curses at Iago,” 
though being perhaps inclined to do so. These inherent dynamics are, for 
Paskow, exactly what enables for these beings to “dwell” in the world with us 
(as beings-that and beings-how) (ibid.:61–62,67). Put differently, Paskow 
concludes that we possess “dual consciousnesses,” those of “agentI” and 
“agent2” which enable a split alongside the “double-sight” of narrative expe-
rience (or “dual vision,” as per Paskow). We may “(wrongly) shed the belief” of 
agentI as we mature, but that doesn’t mean that this agency, set deep in our 
awareness, suddenly dissipates (though critics evidently less truthful about 
themselves may argue so). Instead, these consciousness-agents remain “dia-
lectical” with each other (ibid.:63–69) (for comparison, Smith’s creative/critical 
faculty, discussed in 1.6). For, as Paskow wonderfully states of such seemingly 
contradictory dynamics (or, a dilemma enforcing choice, for some), 
 
[its] net effect is not the sheer overruling of my first-person consciousness by my 
rational, third-person consciousness, for the sense or felt-meaning that I derive 
from the experience of the signified being continues to reverberate in my world. 
(ibid.:64–65) 
 
However, it has to be noted that whilst considering the above points, Paskow’s 
early insistence on the inherent “absence” of such beings may give pause (recall 
how his example of “fictional being” correlated with that of “overseas daughter”). 
Yet, these hesitations prove premature (see, discussion on Zahavi below).  
 
Depictured presences recognized as discoverable by the perceivers 
Meanwhile, another phenomenological film scholar Allan Casebier (1991) 
draws in his much-polemized (see, Sullivan 1997) “anticonstructionist” (op. 
cit..:6) account largely from same sources and ends up contemplating cinematic 
mediation through the lens of Husserlian reduction. The core term Casebier 
returns to time and again is, yet again, “recognition.” Be it Dürer’s knight or the 
Italian boys in de Sica’s Sciuscia (Shoeshine), they “exist independently of [the] 
conscious acts of apprehending” as constituent parts of the “depictured” reality, 
to use Husserl’s phrase (ibid.:9). Insofar as their presence precedes any con-
scious contemplation, they are “discoverable by the perceivers”119—a term 
Casebier employs to counteract representationalist constructions (and also re-
calling Gibsonian terminology, to boot). Intuitively, one can spot twin affinities 
in the notion of “recognition” as presently deployed. As discussed by Casebier, 
                                                            
119  For “discovering,” also see, Turvey’s critique on Smith (1997), in 1.6). 
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it firstly relates to the respondent-independent “presence-ing” of the (depicted) 
narrative person (also see, Turvey, in 1.6). Secondly, however, it also shares 
similarities with Nöel Carroll’s treatment of the term (cf., 1.2). How so? In 
order to hint at an answer, let us try to unpack Casebier’s thought.  
From the outset, he introduces a plethora of Edmund Husserl’s highly tech-
nical terms (see, ibid.:12ff.). As Casebier explains, “noematic” and “hyletic” 
data relate to the appearances (“boy actors performing”) and extradiegetic 
data/knowledge (camera placement, editing, sound, etc.), respectively. Con-
sequently, both are deployed by “noesis,” i.e., how the mind “positions itself” 
vis-a-vis the objects perceived. Here, hyletic is apperceived (i.e., “passed 
through,” e.g., camera movement, editing rhythms, acting, etc.) and noemata 
apprehended (as appearances having been formed through the former). All this 
dynamics leads to the “grasp[ing of] the object represented”—i.e., the real 
Italian boys (ibid.:14–16; emphasis in original). In accordance with these terms 
Casebier employs the concept of “codetermination.” With this notion, 
significant for the larger discussion at hand thus far, Casebier elucidates what he 
calls “spectorial contribution.” Prior subjective experiences, Casebier argues, 
enact a “determinative,” though likewise apperceptional role in ultimately per-
ceiving the object—through the noemata—as real. 
 
Presence p r e d a t i n g its construction (determining the Other from within) 
The key difference, as Casebier alleges, with constructivist paradigm is revealed 
in that object’s presence predates its construction. That is, whilst intending 
towards uncovering the real through various “indeterminacies,” you nonetheless 
cannot—by definition—actually discover something if you, always and already, 
have to construct it. Or, and even more notably, if to put the emphasis on the 
prefix: all the perceiver does (can do?) is become a participant in a joint action, 
of “determining” the Other from within their Otherness (the “affordances” 
interacted to you, to adapt J. J. Gibson’s language), as opposed to wholly 
singularly “constitut[ing] the properties of the object of perception” (ibid.:19–
22; emphasis in original; cf., Zahavi 2010:301–302).120   
All the above ideas are encouraging in regards to the discussion thus far. Yet, 
Casebier’s account is not without its shortcomings. As by far the worst offender, 
it is tricky to overcome Casebier’s recurrent claim of “depictured objects” (e.g., 
the white horse in Shoeshine) being taken to “exis[t] independently of the 
motion picture” (on top the of being recognized as, say, a symbol for freedom 
(op. cit.:16,23). That is to say, obviously: that kind of horse as such does exist 
separate of the film he’s brought to “perform” in, but is not that distinction 
                                                            
120  Implicit in Casebier’s notion of codetermination also appears to be wider social sphere in 
the sense of idiosyncratic results (see, Casebier 1991:21). This draws the term even nearer to 
my conception of twistory. See also, Husserl’s notion of “horizon,” ibid.:21-25: in the 
experience of Shoeshine, we codetermine the young boy as Italian boy in the postwar society 
via “predelineated expectations” as to “what properties an Italian boy has” (ibid.:23). 
Although possibly an incomplete understanding of him, the gradual discovery and not up-
front “construction” leads to a fuller undertanding of him as a person on its own right.  
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something along the lines of claiming that the actor (like those boys “per-
forming” in Shoeshine) exists apart from the film? Hence it appears that 
although Husserl seemingly cautions to take “depictured reality” as something 
situated, and so—if to keep with Casebier’s favorite example—a horse there 
“depictured” is the horse for that particular context, Casebier’s read on Husserl 
doesn’t necessarily accept that. Nonetheless, his further treatment of intentio-
nality—used as its Latin translation of “extending or stretching out to” – may 
leave some fruitful common ground (if issues noted above were bracketed, that 
is): 
 
Husserl would counsel the use of reduction to notice how we pass through the 
sensa [hyletic], how we permit ourselves to reach beyond what appears to us, to 
intend a real white horse without noticing in the perceptual act that we are doing 
it. (ibid.:17) 
 
The above statement, read at face value, shares clear connections with my pre-
vious discussion of realitizing (see, 1.2 passim), hence allowing for a partial 
compliance with Casebier’s views. I can additionally contend that such stance 
correlates rather neatly with CO-Model’s claim that narrative persons’ reality 
pertains to them as sovereign entities with the narrative—i.e., the “depictured 
reality” as something situated and non-reductable. In summation, then, Case-
bier’s attack on the solipsist tradition is impressive and well-met, and hence 
enables, in concert with Paskow’s more respondent-centric account, to add 
further momentum on my claim of narrative persons’ sovereignty. 
 
How does knowing what we would do help us know what someone else would 
do? Everyday cognition research, ST and TT 
Yet, the arguments outlined throughout would still face considerable opposition. 
So, how to proceed next? We could, for instance, review how our everyday 
cognition is traditionally theorized, for I believe that these peculiar resistances 
regards to narrative persons’ ontology are, in fact, rooted in the similarly 
ingrained incredulity leveled at our direct approach to the everyday life at large. 
Accordingly, the approved views on social cognition in general and on empathy 
in particular, fail, in earnest, to account for the “minded life of others” (Zahavi 
2010:290–291, 2011; Goldie 1999 passim; for criticism of latter accounts, see 
e.g., Jacob 2011). One of the leading figures of the simulation theory (ST) 
branch of mind-reading, Alvin Goldman, for instance, although conceiving ST 
as an extended form of empathy, conceptualizes simulation as “involv[ing] imi-
tation, copying, or reexperience of the mind reading target’s mental processes” 
(Shanton and Goldman 2010:527; “replication,” Goldman 2006:36; Stueber 
2006, 2008; Currie 2008; Gallese 2003:513, empathy as “inner imitation”). 
Hence, by definition, the consideration of Other-as-Other is relinquished al-
together and we can join Shaun Gallagher in asking: “how does knowing what 
we would do help us know what someone else would do?” (Gallagher 
2012a:363).  
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However, as Dan Zahavi observes, this prevalent line of thinking keeps with 
the “orthodoxy” introduced by ST and TT (and STT, see 1.2)—dating back to 
German psychologist Theodore Lipps’ work (Lipps 1907)—by which both 
traditions work off of the common understanding of Other’s mind as a “black 
box” for “the only mind I have any direct access and non-inferential knowledge 
of is my own” (Zahavi 2010:286,289, 2011:542–546). As such, the latter is then, 
consequently, “put through paces” to probe (“re-iterate”) what’s essentially its 
own content (Gallagher 2012a:363; Hutto 2008:13; Zahavi 2010:295; for 
comparison, Goldman 2006:36,40; Lipps 1900:418). However, claiming it may 
occur (which Zahavi, at least, doesn’t contest in and of itself) and taking it as 
the “default method of “mentalizing” are two different issues altogether, as such 
substantial claim is uncorroborated by phenomenological and experiential 
evidence (Zahavi 2011:553,556). Indeed, verification even on neurological 
level, i.e., mirror neurons, as Gallagher scathingly argues, may have been mis-
represented as the claims ST has staked on it oppose the conception of its own 
theory (that is, manipulation of own experiential resources in order to under-
stand “the Other”). For in the “intersubjective circumstances ... [i]t is not us (or 
our brain) initiating a simulation; it is the other who does this to us via a per-
ceptual elicitation” (Zahavi 2012a:365). Consequently, a better fit in comple-
menting the “nightmare vision of the solipsist” is the practical view by which 
“our recognition of others as minded creatures is not only more fundamental 
and certain than our ascription of specific beliefs and emotions to others; but the 
latter practice is firmly rooted in the former conviction” (Zahavi 2010:299; 
2011a:552–553). 
 
Empathy as the basic, irreducible form of intentionality: Narrative competence 
and Other’s Context 
Hence, empathy becomes the “basic, irreducible form of intentionality” towards 
another’s experience, for latter becomes one’s central cause—or, a point of 
concentration—in fashioning some kind of understanding of (op. cit..:291,295). 
Hence, another’s emotions are not merely transmitted, they are reacted to(ward) 
(cf., Carroll’s “vectoral convergence” et al., in 1.5.2), i.e., experiencing 
(enacting) another occurs, but never in the capacity of analogical one-to-one 
mapping, as it were.  
However, how to enact on Other’s experience without appropriating them? 
How to ascertain the “whys, meanings and motives” they, in their precise being-
of-the-world, might insist on? In their criticisms of simulationist/theory-theory 
views on empathy and mindreading, Shaun Gallagher (Gallagher 2011, 2012a, 
2012b) turns to an interdisciplinary, and explicitly narrativist approach, whereas 
Zahavi’s draws on the work of Alfred Schutz (Schutz 1932, 1967) on inter-
personal understanding which rests on the general thesis that the Other is a 
“minded, experiencing subject” (op. cit.:297–298; see also, Heider 1957). As 
such, both propositions adhere to what’s come to be known as the context-
sensitive direct social cognition. Especially, Zahavi underscores Schutz’ insis-
tence on the contextualized interpretation in—to recall Casebier—“uncovering” 
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the necessary indeterminacies at hand (memory about the perceived Other, or 
memory of oneself having some experience the former goes through). Crucially, 
by Schutz’ distinction, this is not direct perception, for in a face-to-face relation-
ship, there’s a concrete “we-relationship.” Instead, for Schutz, the former acti-
vity occurs after the fact (when, say, we are not wholly satisfied with the 
explanation our friend gave us in regards to his sudden burst of anger).  
Now, this emphasis could be—on the surface—construed as entirely in-
compatible with how I have so far outlined the respondent-narrative person 
interaction, but not so. Although it is worth to note that I have taken from the 
outset to denote “direct” as gradually built access towards the Other, that is, the 
narrative person, such claim is not necessarily intended as a defense. As Zahavi 
observes, “directness” can be conceived of as our intending towards Other’s 
psychological state as our primary intentional object, i.e., it is correlative with 
“experiential character of access,” as such (Zahavi 2011:548–549). If that 
assumption has merit, “direct” can be observed to have similar connotations 
with “concentration.” Consequently, I could maintain that respondents’ interper-
sonal relationship with NPs is undoubtedly direct in the sense of being con-
centrated (through different degrees of familiarity) at them amidst their social, 
or “intentional field.” Hence, the consideration of “direct” affords certain 
fluidity, hence maintaining its accordance with interactive knowledge obtained 
through joint recurrent encounters with “media figures.” In addition, the suita-
bility of “direct” can be further interrogated strictly on Schutz’ (and by exten-
sion, Zahavi’s) terms.  
Firstly, Schutz, whilst taking it as fundamental, yet acknowledges the inhe-
rent limits of the face-to-face encounter and the usefulness of knowledge of the 
person scrutinized. “[I]f we wish to reach a deeper level of interpersonal under-
standing, we have to go beyond what is directly available” (Zahavi 2010:299, 
emphases added; Schutz 1967:169; cf., Casebier 1991). Secondly, as Zahavi 
accurately insists, face-to-face interaction doesn’t possess a verbatim quality, 
but is rather a “theoretically unmediated quasi-perceptual ability” (Zahavi 2010: 
302).121 For interaction is multilayered, consisting of, but not limited to, pre-
vious face-to-face encounterings; interactions with those abroad; with (expe-
rientially) non-concrete individuals like tax officials as mere “points” in our 
social strata; or even, recalling the grandmother example Paskow used, with 
those who still continue to influence us, as it were. Here, too, experience is 
direct, but in the precise sense of “co-exist[ence] in time” which allows for the 
concurrent absence from one’s “immediate surroundings,” viz. face-to-face 
proximity (Zahavi 2010:300).122 
Yet, even in cases of Schutzian “they-orientation,” these contemporaries as 
ideal types (e.g., mailmen) one ordinarily lacks intimate knowledge of are in-
disputably constituents of the two-fold orientation of “we think of each other as 
one of them.” In both cases, same pragmatic context is shared (ibid.:301–302; 
                                                            
121  A claim particulary evident in the contemporary everyday life where we are—like it or 
not—deeply immersed in various social media. 
122  Cf., Paskow’s “absence,” from previous discussion. 
94 
Schutz 1967:202; Zahavi 2011:547–549). In the distinct case underwriting 
present dissertation, such “pragmatic context” emerges through the realitizing 
of (viz. passing through the data of the artifice) the long-familiar narrative per-
sons into a narrcept (expressed as an individual commentary text with a ‘fluid’ 
construal of storyworld of “reasoning agents”) that may express a joint pheno-
menon of twistory. The latter, in effect, develops them—as “objects of gossip” 
within the “sites of engagement”—into comprehensible constituents of parti-
cipants’ “in the world,” whereas NPs’ own world-ofness (even though it, strictly 
speaking, is not our world) won’t be neglected. In summation, then, the 
“general thesis of other self” prevails throughout for the “contexture” pertaining 
to the encountered Others is of primal significance. Hence, “[o]ne can con-
sequently concede that our typical understanding of others is contextual without 
endorsing the view that our engagement with others as minded creatures is 
primarily a question of attributing hidden mental states to them” (Zahavi 2010: 
302; emphasis added). 
Meanwhile, Gallagher’s developmental narrativist account (like that of 
Hutto’s considered shortly) greatly contributes to and, indeed, terminologically 
specifies Zahavi’s account. In accordance with Wulff’s understanding of em-
pathy treated previously, Gallagher’s approach (1) links the knowledge 
of/understanding dynamics of peoples’ narrative directly to “empathic attitude 
toward them” (Gallagher 2012a:374); whereas (2), following (1), allows to 
maintain the possibility to emphasize with those unlike us (e.g., aliens from 
other planets, circulating geometrical shapes, etc.). Now, how can that be? 
Here’s where the developmental narrativist aspect becomes evident, for it is the 
diverse know-how obtained through narratives (since a young age) that 
scaffolds our later (mature?) understanding of others (in all, “massive herme-
neutical background,” i.e., various practical knowledge concerning the expec-
tations and guidance of how to deal with other people; Gallagher 2011123; for a 
more up-to-date treatment, cf., Gallagher and Allen 2016:15ff.). Recalling 
Paskow, it is the consumption of narratives that single-handedly makes our con-
sciousness’ agentI possible. In other words, this “narrative competence” enables 
us to recognize others (real or fictional) as storied (cf. Batty 2014). The sheer 
knowledge of their “contextualized details” facilitates narrativist “fram[ing]” of 
their, to use Hutto’s phrase, “storied happenings,” which might not be—at 
first—explicitly comprehensible (Gallagher 2012a:370). In fact, as Gallagher 
suggests, this deep focus on other effectively restructures empathy per se (and, 
as such, comes full circle in underscoring the intrinsic interpretative quality 
linked to making sense of our world-ofness; Gallagher and Zahavi 2008), as it 
comes to indicate “[one’s openness] to the experience and the life of the other, 
in their context, as [one] can understand it, not in terms of [one’s] own narrow 
experience, but in terms that can be drawn from a diversity of narratives that 
inform [one’s] understanding” (ibid.:372; emphasis added). 
                                                            
123  I can see this term as having specifically Other-centric connotations on what Casebier 
references as “codetermination” in the previous discussion. 
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Hence, there is always necessarily a distance—narrative distance, by Gal-
lagher—between oneself and Other (ibid.:376; Zahavi and Overgaard 2012). 
Other’s situation is always his/her situation, whereas claiming so doesn’t auto-
matically preclude empathic responses, i.e., the “concern condition,” nor facili-
tate a reducito ad absurdum of conflating selves (Gallagher 2012a:362): 
 
Only when I find out his story will I be able to move to a level of empathic 
understanding. If, however, his story is that he is crying because he lost the gun 
with which he was going to kill me, then it is unlikely that any sort of positive 
emphatic understanding will result, although I may still understand his 
intentions, his actions, maybe even his motives. The story, the narrative, helps to 
fill in the circumstances, and for understanding of the empathic sort, one needs to 
understand the circumstances. (Gallagher 2012b:17, emphases added) 
 
Promptly put, empathy, then, emerges in and becomes empowered through the 
unpacking of Other’s context; of aspiring after that person’s intentional whole-
ness (Einheit) (Wulff 2006:57–59). Additionally, and especially importantly for 
the discussion up to this point and onwards, this (learned) proclivity to craft 
peoples’ narratives as espoused by Gallagher is not merely situative, but more-
over, expansive in time. For we observe others “engaged in long-term projects 
(plots) that add meaning to what they are doing” (Gallagher 2012a:371). Sub-
sequently, this enables us to understand them—iteratively—in a more nuanced 
fashion. To put the same point differently, developmental narrative account 
facilitates a kind of feedback loop—either outside of or engaged with “fictio-
nal” narratives, we are always already developing highly fluctuating narratives 
of the Others encountered.   
 
Everyday narrative-practical “realist” stance of character engagement  
In my opinion, the previous discussion develops a sizeable argument in justi-
fying what could be referred to as the everyday realist stance (perhaps quali-
fiably separate from “naïve” realist). This approach would (incidentally) contri-
bute to both “real” and “fictional” social cognition, and in so doing, can be seen 
as cutting across the prevailing trends. As such, it is gratifying to note that the 
idea of “narrative practice” in understanding another is not inherently foreign 
for the studies distinctly set on the cognitive “poetics” of audiovisual narratives. 
For one, David Bordwell’s notion of “emotional intelligence” (Bordwell 2008: 
52) could, concerning prior insight, function as a conceptual bridge. As clarified 
by Bordwell, our narrative comprehension and intentionality towards depicted 
Others are severely interlinked. A far more important facet of the same equa-
tion, however, is that we consistently “run scenarios” which hypothesize how 
these Others might act on their intentional proclivities in “story situations” 
which circumscribe their actional context as intelligent agents. As Bordwell’s 
account, though constructivist, puts it, we “gauge personalit[ies] or current 
attitu[des] on the basis of [narrative persons’] emotional responses” (ibid.). 
Such narrative understanding becomes an “intersubjective way of knowing” 
(Stadler 2008:37). Once again, given distinction reminds us the with-principle 
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(1.2): narrative persons just are not transparent pawns the perceiver can some-
how vicariously “live through,” experiencing illicit desires. As Dolf Zillmann 
has noted on various occasions, this Freudian mindset is not adequately profi-
cient and lacks empirical heft, to boot.  
Previously discussed ideas and propositions find their culmination in the 
following sub-chapter where a preliminary empirical analysis sketch is outlined. 
It highlights how precisely narrcepts—expressed as individual commentary 
texts—operate and emerge. Thereafter I will move to introducing and expli-
cating criticisms on the still prevailing key theoretical points on the (non-being 
of) “character” (see, 1.6) and close with the summarizing concept of “television 
social network,” meant to round up present chapter as well as lead into chapter 
II.  
 
 
1.5.4 Narrative Persons and their “social field”:  
A Preliminary Proposal for an Everyday Realist Analysis 
As the previous sub-chapters endeavored to explicate, everything pertaining to 
the idea of character engagement as evidenced in the online discussion space 
reverberates by and through the foundational notion of interactivity which could 
additionally be characterized by so-called three-dimensional understanding of 
narrative persons (NPs): (a) interaction(al engagement), (b) relationship/ 
twistory, (c) network (see, 1.7). Going further, one could even insist that what 
we have here is a kind of twistority, as CO-Model’s key notion twistory evinces 
multiple bi-directional relations. Its narratively substantial movements circum-
scribe a (self?-)storying interactive system on top of specific technical strategies 
facilitating the discussional space as such.124 However, what comprises of such 
“3-D understanding” is an assumption which is to be taken in the precise sense 
of a well-rounded comprehension of the narrative other as a person, emerging 
from “a multiplicity of relational dimensions” (cf., Shotter 2001:346):  
 
1. Viewer/participant↔narrative person/s: i.e., the subjective/idiosyncratic 
gradation. It is about how one individual respondent perceives of a NP as 
developing large-scale reasonings of some situation at hand: (i) ordinarily 
drawing on what s/he knows to be possibly accurate about either the 
thinking, doing or thinking of doing of his conspecifics; (ii) or of her/his 
own possible outlook as potentially perceived by a reasoning NP. Hence, the 
attentive, concerned observation (witnessing) of Other’s “social field” 
amounts to specific kinds of narrceptivizing perceptions of intentionality – in 
short: narrcepts, expressed as individual commentary texts; 
                                                            
124  E.g., thematically correlative commentaries establishing “distributed” threads (of 
narrceptive thinking) amidst the larger data entity, i.e., weekly commentary section at 
Uproxx/Hitfix, or recipient-made episodic discussion threads at Reddit. See, chapter III, 3.4–
3.5. 
97 
2.  Narrative person↔narrative person: the key layer onto which participants’ 
intending focuses (concentrates)—the social, “intentional field” of narrative 
persons as they habituate their “world”—feeding into the operative tenden-
cies as put forth in (1);  
3.  And lastly, viewer↔viewer: here—with the analytical prospects afforded by 
IBM SPSS Text Analysis for Surveys (TAS4 for short), such as identifying 
the interlaced  relationship of narrative motifs (cigarette, poisoning, ricin) 
and narrative persons (Walt, Jesse, Gus, Huell, Saul) within the “big data”—
it is investigated whether, and if so, how, the diverse narrcepts as outlined 
from a number of users (and across two episodes and several online discussion 
environments) enable to circumscribe distinct macro-patterns of storying (for 
my critical-adaptive approach on the possible worlds semantics as a necessary 
interpretational framework to further flesh this out, see, chp. II).  
 
That being said, the present chapter has and continues to be primarily dedicated 
to expound on the first of the noted ‘gradations,’ whereas both the more ter-
minologically precise analysis as well as the intrinsically “macro” approach—
guided by the original notion of beacon—as spearheaded in this study (as 
emphasized primarily by (3), shall be held for the analysis section proper (see, 
chapter III, 3.4–3.5). However, for subsequent explanatory purposes, additional 
commentary contributions relating to the prior text concentrating on Gus (cf., 
JH’s narrcept in the Introduction) are provided below and considered based on 
the “alternative grammar” of participants’ “creative vernacular” as elaborated 
on thus far.  
 
[T]here is no way the doctors would know the boy was poisoned unless someone 
told them, and no one could have told them but Jesse. So the fact that Jesse knew 
about the poisoning, didn’t kill Walt, and caused Gus to be led to a place where 
he could be “gotten to” would all cause alarm bells to go off [for Gus]. This is a 
man who, through careful planning and extreme patience, outsmarted and took 
down the entire Mexican cartel. There is no way he would be outsmarted by one 
of Jesse and Walt’s plans.  (Joseph, Hitfix, 3.10.11) 
 
Out of many of its kind, Joseph’s text maintains how Gus cannot be the poiso-
ner. This can be taken, following prior discussion, as the general “framing” of 
the overall narrcept on hand. It is chiefly substantiated by Gus’ last minute 
reversal of actions whereby he chooses not to return to his car following the 
meet with Jesse in the hospital’s chapel (viz. Jesse and Walt had a plan to blow 
up Gus via his vehicle and that was the reason Jesse coaxed him to the hospital). 
In accordance with JH’s text, here, too, the focality rests on the meaningfully 
charged “Mexico incident,” though noteworthy is the alteration of the accent 
that comes with it. As the former text implied, JH didn’t treat the proceedings in 
Mexico as an end-game contingent on Gus’ nature, his strength of character 
(“careful planning,” “extreme patience”), but instead, as a pragmatic seizure of 
power, a logical continuance to the hitherto accomplishments for someone like 
him. Therefore, a blatant self-sabotage of something long-last achieved (i.e., a 
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mafia kingpin who answers to no one), is out of the question. Conversely, whilst 
Joseph concentrates on (intends of) Gus, he observes these two events (the “take 
down” of the cartel, and Gus’ present detour) as having an indisputable common 
ground which (contra JH) perhaps even fortifies Gus’ focal involvement with 
recent events (i.e., the possible child murder). In effect, the Mexico incident 
becomes the overlapping aspect to both narrcepts (JH’s and Joseph’s) through 
which the intentionality of the same NP (Gus) is “normalized” (Hutto 2007:7) to 
emphatically differing returns. Where JH deploys the aforementioned event as 
the rationale for Gus’ non-involvement, Joseph binds the emotional backdrop of 
it expressly with the possibility that Gus could be—entirely justifiably—the 
man behind child-murder. “This is the man,” writes Joseph, whose ironclad 
consistency ultimately reaped benefits in obliterating the whole cartel from the 
face of the earth by deploying an extremely finely tuned plan. Hence Joseph 
develops his narrcept, embedding onto it the assumption that Gus cannot be the 
kind of man who’d take the bait of Jesse/Walt. Rather, by weighing all the 
evidence, only thing left to do is to adduce that Gus was way ahead of everyone 
else involved (approx. five steps, as another respondent noted) (Cf. 3.5). He 
effectively saw them through, and agreed to meet Jesse solely due to the desire 
to do some reconnoitering. However, at the very moment he realized that the 
possible poisoning scare could’ve only emanated from Jesse, whereas Walt is 
still alive (due to which one knows/suspects his, i.e., Gus’, involvement), he 
smelt a trap and thought appropriate to abandon his car in the parking lot 
altogether.  
However, let us also examine another narrcept, now from another discussion 
environment concurrent with Uproxx/Hitfix. Respondent Nickysix’s text is 
lengthy, at first concentrating on (intending of) Jesse (and on Jesse through 
Brock), however the portion of present interest is as follows: 
 
[--]What convinced me that Gus really did do it was the chapel scene: 1. I think 
that when Jesse made a point of saying that Brock had been poisoned, Gus knew 
what he [Jesse – S.S.] suspected. And that is why Gus gave him time off [from 
work]. And that is the moment that Jesse knew for sure that Gus really did do it 
(and the moment that I was convinced that he did). Why else did he suddenly 
develop what seemed like a sense of empathy for Jesse in that moment? 2. That 
also explains why Gus was suddenly telepathic and refused to get in the car. It hit 
him that Jesse knew about the poison and that he had been summoned to the 
hospital for a reason other than a pissing contest in the chapel. This is how I see 
it anyway. To me, it is the only real explanation for everyone’s actions, especially 
Gus’ big realization at the end.[--]  (Nickysix, The A. V. Club) 
 
Likewise to Joseph’s, Nickysix’ narrcept’s general “frame” is also Gus’ involve-
ment, though he arrives at the affirmative assumption. Similarly, the point of 
origin of his/hers abduction pertains the confrontation between Gus and Jesse in 
the hospital’s chapel. A significant facet characteristic to Nickysix’s reasoning, 
however, is derived from the peculiarities of Jesse’s behavior in the focal scene. 
Similarly to a number of respondents, Nickysix zooms in on the nuance in 
99 
Jesse’s articulation which reveals his suspicions—namely his particularly 
emphatically presented statement that Brock’s illness originates expressly from 
poisoning. By such embeddedness, Nickysix stresses Jesse’s explicit intentio-
nality to express himself just so; hence opening a possibility to “read” Gus’ 
reaction (having some time prior bought into Walt’s categorical denial). By 
implication, then, Nickysix views Gus as the executive force behind such 
monstrous act. Such understanding, in itself, however, is contingent upon of the 
dynamics of “action” (to recall Wulff’s phrase) intertwining these two narrative 
persons—Gus and Jesse. Hence, the events in Mexico as the ‘overlapping 
aspect’ interlacing all the narrcepts presently considered—although perhaps 
remaining on the background—bears on the agenda here as well as it did in the 
cases of JH and Joseph. For what’s presumably obvious information for Gus, 
Jesse should recognize the lethal effect of ricin from his own immediate 
experience, as he saw Gus “cutting down” the whole cartel with that particular 
poison. By previous considerations, then, Nickysix’ narrcept differs con-
siderably from JH’s and Joseph’s. JH linked the cartel murder and its after-
effects on the account of Gus’ personal character firmly with the impossibility 
of the act of child killing (one excludes the other). Meanwhile, Joseph thought 
that Gus’ assent to meet in the hospital was primarily charged by the desire to 
reconnoitre in the sense of observing how “far behind“—in comparison to 
himself—the others involved actually are. Yet, it concluded with him “sensing 
the trap” (i.e., he killed the kid, because deeply levelheaded plans are not 
foreign to him, although he couldn’t have predicted Jesse and Walt picking up 
his trace, as it were, so quickly). Conversely, Nickysix attests for the possibility 
of another interpretation altogether; one by which Gus may have gone to 
ascertain the fulfillment of his plan (that is, to confirm Jesse’s conviction to go 
and kill Walt immediately), however, once there he recognized that others had 
seen “through” his plan and it wouldn’t be advisable to return to his car. 
Accordingly, whereas Joseph explicated Gus’ “spidey-sense” (that is how the 
respondents kept on referring to the man’s decision not to return to his car) 
through his skill—refined to perfection in time—to make far-reaching calcula-
tions, enabling him to foresee the networks of moves of his conspecifics already 
in the germinating stage, Nickysix explains Gus’ “telepathy” chiefly in situ as 
Gus is forced to re-evaluate his previous doings on the fly. Although that facet 
represents the man as a kind of calculator par excellence, it also develops him 
as not nearly so ironclad of an individual, who rather attempts to minimize 
possible damages (cf. above the ordinary norm of friendlier-warmer behaviour 
towards Jesse). Here Gus understands—to keep with Nicksix’ argumentation—
that even if he is not wholly “caught” yet, then at the very least, he is being 
suspected, and, as follows, his life may be in danger. Hence, he decides to desert 
his car.  
The final close analysis, also taking into account the elaboration on con-
ceptual ideas introduced in the present chapter and elaborated on in chp. II, shall 
be provided in chapter III, 3.4–3.5. The objective of the present short analysis 
was, first and foremost, to put the preceeding theoretical insight—drawing on 
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its still “fluid,” under construction analytical vocabulary—into practice for the 
first time. In other words, it specifically highlighted respondents/participants’ 
proclivity in developing narrcepts—specific kinds of narrativistic perceptions 
of intentionality—by concentrating on (intending of) the NPs they’ve grown 
familiar with over time. As such, what was presently proposed can be conceived 
of as the empirical culmination of the theoretical claims entertained throughout 
chapter I, hence providing a practical angle in challenging the intrinsically 
solipsist (and “modelist”) view on character engagement. Hence, what is still 
left to do is to propose further, even more targeted criticisms against the latter. 
This is going to be the objective of the next sub-chapter.  
 
 
1.6 The review and criticism of and discussion on  
Murray Smith’s character-theory 
The purpose of the subsequent sub-chapter is to come full circle, as it were, in 
my core criticisms, whilst I take on the review and criticism of the renowned 
film theorist Murray Smith.  
 
1.  It is herewith useful to recall previous discussions focusing on and touching 
upon empathy (see, 1.5.1–1.5.3) and it is (im)possibility when faced with 
narrative persons (NPs), who are “dislikable,” or otherwise outside the 
“norm.”  
2. I will intend to closely review Smith’s initial account (Smith 1995), by 
observing its stages which, in some cases, over amplified originally rather 
harmless concerns with his theory. 
 
For (1), one should primarily interrogate Smith’s highly influential and much-
cited text “Gangsters, Cannibals, Aesthetes, or Apparently Perverse Allegian-
ces” (Smith 1999). In further championing his key contention of “imagining 
from the inside” (Smith 1997), Smith asserts that we imaginatively self-have the 
depicted, “illicit,” actions of the other. In doing so, Smith proposes, our “thrill” 
begets a dualistic quality. That is, due to those actions being inherently fictional 
and strictly non-occurring, feeling of guilt is effectively absolved into a “sense 
of excitement,” for  
 
fictional persons don’t perform actual deeds. In our imagination we indulge 
forbidden desires (including desires that are desires only because they are 
forbidden) and experience emotions apt to the actual realization of these desires, 
while ultimately being reassured that we, like the ‘good-bad’ characters, are 
attractive and morally worthy. (ibid.:224; emphases and underlining added; 
Smith 2011:238) 
 
These thoughts unwittingly evoke a celebrated—albeit, ironically, “fictional”—
exchange: 
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Do not try and bend the spoon. That’s impossible. Instead, only try to realize the 
truth.  
What truth? 
There is no spoon.  
There is no spoon? 
Then you will see, that is not the spoon that bends, it is only yourself. 
(The Matrix, 1999) 
 
Obviously, for Neo, these suggestions were tremendously beneficial. They 
instructed him to appreciate his conditional existence in a “desert of the real” 
wherein the real itself can be “bent” and re-shaped if and when one’s will can be 
trained to be sufficiently superintending. Within the confines of such unpre-
dictable virtual architecture wherein twice-seen black cats signify a code change 
and previously non-existent walls are suddenly erected, nothing that appeared 
was of actual presence, but rather the programmed uptake of one’s mind. Hence, 
the key insight—as compacted by the fastidious language of the “enlightened 
one”’s to Neo—was to reach beyond, to comprehend the unfixedness of these 
propositions, of realizing the negotiable quality of the shown imagery (and 
sensations), for it is essentially him who makes them to begin with.  
Now, how about our experience with audiovisual arts? Smith’s quotation 
above makes for a complicated and confounding read. Being as Smith has 
acknowledged his reliance on the tool-set of analytical philosophy (primarily 
the “paradox of fiction” argument), the lines of thought he sketches, as it were, 
hardly come as a surprise. However, does it not, perhaps, end up undermining 
his objective to make theoretical sense as to how viewers respond to characters 
the way they do? Nevertheless, his ostensible reluctance to stop cold with the 
denial of any ontological rooting has caught my eye tracing back to Engaging 
Characters. Let us ask thus the following. When “social entities” in fictions are 
incapable for “actual deeds” and if everything we know about (and come to 
know of) those deeds essentially resides in our (playful) imagination (as the 
character is nonexistent and we only see actor-as-character as a “imagination 
guide” of sorts; see, Smith 1998), why would Smith nonetheless bookend such a 
claim by ascribing some agency to the narrative persons observed (i.e., moral 
worthiness). Indeed, Smith, in his attempts to make the cake and have it, 
reaches even further by utilizing such tendency through comparing them (as our 
imaginational content) with us as embodied beings. If to add all this up, how-
ever, the contrast undermines the very vigorousness of the contention he pro-
poses.  
Now, in keeping Smith’s general outline in mind (I will take on his wider 
theory shortly), let us consider the corresponding thoughts of spectator engage-
ment researcher Margaret Bruun Vaage (2013). Vaage, in fact, grapples with 
how to frame her colleague’s post-watch culpability of having cheered on to the 
climaxing events of Lars von Trier’s controversial Dogville. Vaage asks thus 
whether the consequential quality inherent to the emotional pleasure one draws 
from Grace’s bloody display of they-had-it-coming revenge is conceivably 
relieving this kind of judgment from its full, real life weight, because, well, 
102 
nothing really happened (=it was “fictional”). Vaage summarizes this as 
“fictional relief,” contrasting it with a real-life news story of suffering. She then 
goes on to claim that emotions evoked by the two cannot be compared. So, if to 
allow a moment of hypothetical contemplation, consider the following. You 
would be made familiar with an analogous, but real news report of a nonde-
script woman, who, having been an unwitting target of a nondescript village’s 
collective abuse, at one point goes ahead and murders the lot. Would you be 
dissuaded from experiencing these (satisfying) revenge-justifying emotions on 
account of them being not only morally wrong, but “real” occurrences, book-
ended with a “factual” human deed, to boot, given to you by non-emotional 
style of report? Now, consider the flip side: would it follow from this con-
cession that you’re effectively condemning the very same act, whereas tempo-
rarily allowing yourself not to, whilst observing the notorious climax of 
Dogville—note: having thereby been a long-term witness to Grace’s growing 
despair? Indeed, these are tough and knotty questions to pose, but I would not 
be so quick to think of this dialectic as a polarity with no conceivable overlaps.  
It is not at all difficult to see how the notion of fictional relief as espoused by 
Vaage appears to implicitly suggest that we afford to ourselves essentially an 
emotional reign which is free of a moral compass of any kind. This tendency is 
apparently especially prevalent in case of crime depictions considered taboo in 
real life. Vaage (2015) writes thus: “when it comes to rape and sexual abuse of 
women and children especially, our intuitive and emotional reaction seems to be 
that (almost) anything goes” as far as dealing with the culprit is concerned 
(ibid.:426). To unpack Vaage’s thought, then: allowing oneself the emotional 
satisfaction when abusers in Dogville get their due introduces “guilt” afterwards 
which, in turn, requires legitimization, whereas in the case of a rapist, we are 
empowered by our real-life moral norms and hence take similar revenge 
scenario as infallible (no “relieving” presumably follows).  
Something feels dangerously off-kilter here. I am unconvinced that we 
would just disconnect our real-life “moral system” and activate instead a R-
rated transitory disposition exclusively for fiction, effectively turning ourselves 
into ruthless sociopaths who are free to cherry-pick severities of crimes 
witnessed (cf., ibid.:431). Or, let’s take another, more recent example: BBC’s 
serial The Fall (2013-…). How to “label” an emotion towards a protagonist, 
who, in a far darker reversal of Dexter, is a family man and grief counselor by 
day, and a serial killer and sexual sadist by night? Whilst no one would under-
standably “cheer” him on, it is nonetheless palpable that we can trace an em-
pathic component here via the “concern” for him in regards to the inescapable 
capturing. This may be further exacerbated by subtle hints and eventual reveals 
both about his childhood traumas and lack of family, respectively. While it 
would be easy to write it up as “concern is present because viewers do not want 
the serial to end,” I do not think that spells the whole story. “Bad” narrative 
persons seem to endlessly fascinate us and the storytellers who construct 
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them125, to be sure, but are we really collectively “perverse” for not adhering—
in a “fictional” space, no less—to some agreed-upon moralistic normative, on 
the one hand, whilst incapable to empathize—however “minimally”—with such 
persons, in the sense of Gallagher, Zahavi et alii? Hence, although it unlikely 
was Vaage’s intention, readings like the sort she gave above essentially elimi-
nate empathy full stop.  
Conversely, it is worth to concisely consider two views here. Milly 
Buonanno’s contribution contrasts with and draws on Alfred Schutz’s assertion 
pertaining to the plurality of life-worlds and one’s navigation between them 
(i.e., from ‘fantasy’ back to ‘everyday’) (cf., Schultz 1972:230ff.). Buonanno, in 
associating televisual storytelling (e.g., drama serials) with evoking a “narration 
of society” (Buonanno 2008:80), would rather sustain a healthy nexus between 
the two, because “the imagined is real not only because we let ourselves believe 
it ... but also because it can intersect with and to some extent modify our 
everyday life itself, or at any rate the perception we have of some of its dimen-
sions and our way of relating to them” (ibid.:77, emphasis added). 
Meanwhile, Nöel Carroll (2004), in broaching the eponymous protagonist of 
The Sopranos, develops the twin notion of “allied fascination,” or, as it becomes 
refined in his later writings, “solidarity” (see, Carroll 2010) (cf., 1.5). As 
viewers, we find ourselves fascinated in negotiating a pro-attitude towards 
Tony, because, as Carroll puts it, the show concurrently “exercises our talent for 
calculating the most morally optimal allegianc[e] possible in ethically murky 
situations” as well as makes us understand—in-depth, I might add—why Tony 
does and is how he is, in short, his reasons (op. cit.:94,96). As Carroll elo-
quently observes, the impulses for such a fascination line up especially lucidly 
through Tony’s therapy sessions with Dr. Jennifer Melfi, for “[t]he layers of 
intentional dissembling, unconscious self-deception, understatement, knots, 
hypocrisy, and misdescription that [he] puts in motion are consistently en-
grossing; one is constantly comparing what he says and what he is aware of 
with his actual situation (as we know it)” (ibid.89–90; emphasis added). 
Herewith it is appropriate to return to Murray Smith, as his seminal En-
gaging Characters espoused principles very similar to the critics above, and it is 
only his later work which has become exceedingly adamant in underscoring the 
unflinching dichotomy as previously discussed, hence enabling to detect notable 
discrepancies whilst analyzing his earlier and recent sentiments on the matters 
on hand. 
Smith (1995a) concedes as his objective a theoretically strengthened under-
standing of “naïve realist” folk response to character (“I identified with her,” “I 
feel as if it were myself on the screen”)—“a psychology and sociology of spec-
tatoral responses to character, understood as elements of narrative film struc-
ture.” In rejecting psychoanalysis as the dominating “’metapsychology’ of cine-
ma,” he draws primarily on analytical philosophy and cognitive anthropology 
                                                            
125  Strangely enough, noted thematics are also central to Vaage’s recent monograph, see 
Vaage (2016). 
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(and, to some degree, (post-)structuralism), hence aiming to devise a revisional 
“system which posits several distinct levels of engagement with fictional 
characters [leading to] the structure of empathy” (emphasis in original) (ibid.:5–
12). In so doing, Smith opposes the Genettean structuralistic devaluation of 
character, claiming instead that “basic human agency or ‘personhood’” is an 
unmistaken part and parcel of our “imaginative engagement with fictional 
narratives” (ibid.:17). Whilst retaining the principal ideas of Edward Branigan’s 
approach (character’s mimetic126 constructedness and latter’s non-independency 
from the text), Smith renounces Branigan’s preference of not conceiving cha-
racter as the nucleus facilitating the “intelligibility” of (filmic) text. Namely, 
Smith is unconvinced whether the privileged state—in the sense of being the 
key for making narrative intelligible—of character can be so easily dispensed 
with. Whilst he acknowledges that it wouldn’t necessarily be the case all the 
time, some centrality of character always has to be sustained. By such emphasis, 
however, Smith doesn’t intend to fall back on, as he puts it, “[the] realist 
characterization as the only legitimate goal of narrative fiction, a view in which 
characters should transcend the work in which they are produced and take on an 
independent, albeit merely imaginative, existence” (ibid.:18). 
Instead, by relying on the correlation with agent-filled “immediate expe-
rience[s] of the social world” (i.e., agents constrained by social structures, e.g., 
a policeman), Smith advocates for a kindred salience whilst speaking of 
character as the fictional analogue of the human agent. Salience he conceives 
foremost as interdependent with narrative (as it is “node” that does not “stand 
outside [it]”), thus operating for viewers as a mediating structure, facilitating 
their “’entry into’” narrative. Contrasting his “dynamic model” with closed and 
abstract structuralist account of relying entirely on textual markers which 
recipients’ cumulatively gather in order to ultimately unveil the “whole” (i.e., 
“traits” into general thematic motifs)—approach, which, by Smith, leaves “the 
nature of this agency inchoate” (emphasis added)—Smith argues that viewers 
“bring to [the cinema experience]” their own pre-knowledge (a bailiwick of 
cultural models and stereotypes) which they then subsequently utilize in 
“’fill[ing] out’ the information provided by the text” (ibid.:19–20).  
By identifying imagination as the key ingredient in comprehending the 
relationship between self and others, Smith moves to enlist the assistance of 
schema theory which, as a “realist, constructivist epistemology”—accentuating 
the running organization of external “sense-data” by protean mental struc-
                                                            
126  Mimesis, as conceived by Smith’s account, has to be specifically deliniated here. In 
employing it, Smith’s objective is to dismantle it from the purview of theories seeing it as 
denoting “reproduced” reality. Instead, Smith’s idea correlates closely with narratologist 
Monika Fludernik’s. Both of them conceive of mimesis as a process that appeals to (a) one’s 
knowledge of textual and artistic conventions (itself founded on the assumption that 
recipients do not just ipso facto suppress this knowledge in favour of “pretense“), and (b) 
knowledge of the real world (Smith 1995a:53). However, I do find Fludernik’s proposition 
far more complimentary regards to the claim of the narrative-internal soverignity of narrative 
persons primarily because ultimately for Smith, the latter remain all but mediating “nodes” 
waiting to be “filled.”  
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tures—leads him to underscore, following Gombrich, how character as an agent 
(constructed through and as a “person schema”) doesn’t necessarily have to be 
something wholly unified. Rather, this assumption can be retained on the basis 
of “’loose integration’ of schemata,” merely implying capacity for “purposeful 
action” (as schema is always constrained by attainable goals). What follows 
from the latter connection is that Smith preserves schema theory’s inherent 
automaticity. In what he dubs “natural habits of mind [that] transparently” scaf-
fold our everyday behavior (ibid.:49), drawing hereby on cognitive anthro-
pology, Smith argues that we tend to assume, without necessarily thinking about 
it beforehand, that character in a fictional representation is contained in one 
body (Smith subsumes these ideas later into his “structure of empathy” frame-
work, specifically under “recognition” that he synonymises with character 
“construction” (ibid.:75)127, but which I find definitively non-alignable with 
how both e.g., Nöel Carroll and or Allan Casebier employ the term).  
Smith recalls here the relevance of one’s imagination, broaching it as the 
capacity to “expand [on] and adapt existing conceptual frameworks through 
new experience, including [one’s] experience of fictional representations” 
(ibid.:52). Consequently, Smith coins “mimetic hypothesis,” that is, a stance 
which underscores viewer’s experiential (‘encyclopedic’) pre-knowledge as the 
prerequisite for “seeing characters as persons.” It can be achieved, Smith 
maintains, because of our initial know-how reveals us that we are “processing 
an artifact.” Along similar lines, there should not be anything intrinsically “un-
intelligible” in our emotional responses to “fictional events” vis-a-vis real ones. 
Although the existence of particular object is merely our “imaginative pro-
po[sal],” making the existential tether, as it were, incompatible with a real-life 
analogue (and thus, allowing us to be “sympathetic” towards someone we 
wouldn’t—e.g., a murderer), it doesn’t follow as if emotional responses to real 
events are imbued with more significance and legitimacy than emotional 
responses to fiction (ibid.:57–58). Our ability to fathom such artifact grows out 
of “our experience in the world,” and, as a direct result, we are sophisticated 
enough (though, perhaps, slightly miffed) to “draw upon the two structures of 
emotion simultaneously,” in the cases, say, when the film obfuscates the 
margins of (historical) real and fiction. Ultimately, however, “the text itself may 
transform the way we understand and experience the world” (ibid.:54). Our 
experientiality, then, can be found in constant flux, under revision due to 
exposures to fictions (each, quite possibly, with its own spin on what we may’ve 
taken for granted beforehand). 
Concurrently with it “changing” us, however—Smith claims, following Paul 
Ricœur’s work on fiction and reality (Ricœur 1979)—our own attention to the 
“real” becomes suspended. But not only is “our real” been postponed, as it 
were. As embraced by Smith, fiction, too, by such a view, affords a kind of 
distanced in-look, enabling us to “try new ... ways of being-in-the-world” (ibid.; 
                                                            
127  Smith notes, however, that schemas are not wholly rigid and that there’s “a certain 
degree of flexibility” to them. That is, they can change “historically as social practices shift.”  
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cited op. cit.), wherein we entertain diverse emotional responses which, though 
tantamount to their “real” analogues, are yet intrinsically once removed from 
the “real,” precisely because they are entertained, as opposed to (directly) felt.   
With reservations, a number of ideas from Engaging Characters could 
conceivably operate within the vocabulary established in the present disser-
tation. However, in succeeding years, Smith appears to have resigned almost 
entirely to reduce everything onto the level of imagination. Whilst considering 
our engagements with “fictions” more generally, he hence claims: “in 
responding to a fiction film, we see a film and in seeing it are led to imagine 
that what it depicts takes place” (Smith 1998:63, emphases added; cf., Allen 
1998). For as far as character is concerned, Smith goes on to remark, we don’t 
actually see one, but we are rather taken by the “activity of make-belief” 
initiated by the depiction of actor-as-character. This assumption right here intro-
duces the central predicament I am having with Smith’s position, even if there’s 
much to be indebted for in his consideration—especially, again, in the earlier 
work—of “filmic” character.  
As previously clarified, the very existence of character, as a “salient node of 
narrative structure”, for Smith, is specifically what affords spectators with 
distinct possibility to imbue some narrative film with “intelligibility.” In 
rejecting ideological and illusionist “subjection” accounts (Smith 1995b:123) as 
well as “realist characterization”—taken to mean characters transcending the 
work in which they are produced and taking on an independent, albeit merely 
imaginative existence, Smith rather considers character qua narrative “node” as 
functioning like a mediating structure, fostering entry-way “quasi-experiences” 
(ibid.:124) through which our immersion takes flight (Smith 1995a:18; cf., 1.6).  
Although, as sub-section 1.5 showed, the relevance of narrative situatedness 
perseveres within the confines of my own framework, I do not envisage it as 
stifling as Smith’s reliance on such thoroughly either-or opposition, whereby, 
indeed, any consideration of narrative persons’ “intentional reality” is neglected 
altogether. Admittedly, though, it comes as no surpise, because Smith’s frame-
work—by definition—doesn’t expound on the “ways and means” by which 
narrative persons as agents intending and making sense are reciprocally per-
ceived. After all, acknowledging that would make him undermine his own 
solipsist perspective by which audiovisual narratives do not provide us with 
“intentional objects” at all.  
Times and again, Smith emphasizes that “human agency” is the core tenet 
onto which our “comprehension of narratives” is scaffolded, but he cannot have 
it both ways. If such aforementioned “agency” is not only our “construct,” but a 
subordinate one for—and not equal in relevance, whilst epistemologically dif-
fering, to—“plot”; in that case, all we do, essentially, is re-represent it imagina-
tively and, as such, all of our understanding of others (as Smith too, especially 
in his early work, correlates ‘human agency’ also with our “real life” inter-
actions) is predicated on whatever we come up within the confines of our 
minds.  
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Pace Smith, narrative persons (NPs) do not just mediate for us whatever it is 
we expect a “human perspective” to mediate in a particular story. Instead, we 
observe an independently experiencing, intelligent agent whom we can, indeed, 
consider as our “guide” to his world at large, but then and only then, when we 
first accept him as having a life outside of our grasp— within the “off screen 
spaces,” to borrow Wulff’s phrase—but yet within the narrative context as his 
intentional, psychological world (reality). In other words, we have to overcome 
the perspective based on which, as the prominent television scholar Jason 
Mittell recently sharply put it in his thought-provoking Complex TV, “in moving 
image media like film and television ... character tends to be taken as a self-
evident given, wrapped up into conventions of performance and stardom” (Mittell 
2015; Cit. in: Mittell 2012/2013128, “Character”, section 2; emphasis added).  
Murray Smith’s forceful corollary goes even further, however. Hence, his 
suggestion as if the measure of realness of characters is tantamount to realness 
of imitating decoys—i.e., both are unequal to “real persons” and (real) ducks, 
respectively—is, whilst prima facie a humorous play on words, actually an 
incisive summary of his views on the subject. By Smith’s account (Smith 2011) 
our perception of characters is informed by their “twofoldness” (term originally 
coined by Richard Wollheim). They are at once “more or less realistic repre-
sentations of persons [as well as] artifacts.” Put differently, a decoy is “real” 
insofar as we allow it to be, once modeled in our mind. Smith refers to this as 
“cash[ing] out in several different ways” on the “reality of characters.” I find the 
latter a rather quaint phrase, however, considering how he has increasingly 
denied characters any kind of agency outside of the viewerly purview. Smith’s 
“mimetic hypothesis” framework, in fact, thoroughly contests character’s 
“ontological integrity,” of him/her being a “real entit[y] to which we can make 
reference” (Dauer 1994:37n2), and calls it an “over-simplification.” I cannot 
help but wonder, however, whether Smith’s own anti-realist proposition, 
“stress[ing] the role of the imagination in the creation and appreciation of 
characters” (ibid.) may eventually fall prey to similar accusation. By these 
ideas, a realist approach (or rather, what he identifies as the “realist, construc-
tivist epistemology”) to character is allowed insofar as it explicitly states that 
recipient’s mind is the originating space, or more accurately perhaps, the 
Cartesian Theater (Dennett 1991) that realizes the real, as it were, of/for the 
character.  
That is, we imbue a decoy with a measure of “realness” in making it 
resemble its referent—the duck. In so doing, if to trace the logic of Smith’s 
argument, we superimpose our presumption of duck’s realness, as it were, onto 
the decoy, whilst, in turn, indeed relieving or usurping, in and of itself, any 
measure of realness—and by extension, agency—it might have had beforehand. 
Not only is “real decoy” not a “real duck”, it isn't even a decoy proper, unless 
we make it so. However, doesn’t the decoy resembling duck exist regardless of 
                                                            
128 Jason Mittell, Complex TV: The Poetics of Contemporary Television Storytelling, pre-pub-
lication edition (MediaCommons Press, 2012–13), http://mcpress.media-commons.org/ 
complextelevision/  
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whether we specifically distinguish it to re-represent something? If we construct 
some nondescript “prop of make-belief” and call it “duck,” would the act of 
naming make it any more real than it previously was? In evaluating Smith’s 
account, I suppose the takeaway is yes, it would. Even if people on screen may 
crucially resemble persons, such “cruciality” is derived from the murky depths 
of our mind where we, as prop-masters of representationalist bias, pull strings at 
will, making things go bump in the night.  
Conversely, I have maintained throughout present chapter that realist onto-
logy should not be discarded off-handedly as something “naïve,” because the 
acceptance of narrative person’s “actional context,” his/her “intentional field” as 
being possibly real and thus—for sake of argument, at the very least—resulting 
in him/her being contingently real in—having carried over into— the expe-
riential field (“site of engagement”) of online discussion (and the private 
contemplations scaffolding it), is, on the face of it, hardly a simplistic under-
taking the opposition makes it out to be. As aesthetics scholar Peter Lamarque 
puts it, there is no “metaphysical reason” why seemingly opposing camps main-
taining character as person-in-fictional-world (e.g., realist) and character as 
fulfilling some narrative role(s) (e.g., eliminativist) should not amicably co-
exist, adapting each other for an inclusive hybrid theory (Lamarque 2010:190). 
In fact, the inspiring arguments previously made by Hans Jürgen Wulff only 
prove the correctness of Lamarque’s claim. Hence, philosopher Sarah E. Worth, 
too, concludes her thoroughly invigorating article “Fictional Spaces” (2004) by 
noting that given our story-telling capacity in and out of “fiction,” the dis-
tinction between “real” and “fictional” intentional objects results in a “false 
dichotomy” (ibid.: 455), even more so with the rising popularity of virtual rea-
lity environments, IMAX and 3-D cinema. 
In his latest writings, Murray Smith, too, almost appears to subscribe to such 
ideas as he agrees that “well-constructed character[s] [may] enable this sort of 
[realist] stance” (Smith 2011:278). That is, of facilitating the conception of 
characters as “flesh-and-bone humans unless otherwise noted[, who] live in a 
world that works physically in the same way as does ours” (Worth 2004: 454). 
However, contrary to Wulff, Smith nonetheless unfortunately insists upon the 
reality-fiction pairing as a strictly either-or opposition. In describing how the 
listeners of a long-running UK radio drama The Archers responded to the passing 
of a prominent character, Smith argues that  “[listeners’] willingness and ability to 
respond to The Archers’ characters as if they were real is matched by a thorough 
understanding of the characters’ irreality” (op. cit.:279; emphasis added). 
By “irreality” Smith here refers to listeners’ sophistication about the show 
(as “artifice”). By my lights, though, the realness of characters and the “ir-
reality”129 of where they are situated are not issues that can be viewed as 
mutually exclusive. Indeed, what I have called realitizing is much like an 
umbrella notion hinting at complex cognitive operations which definitely are 
                                                            
129  A term which sounds dangerously “material” for an analyst of an art form as well as 
perilously psychoanalytical for someone claiming distaste of the latter. 
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not limited to “back and forth [flipping] between references to characters and 
the stars and performers that embody them” (ibid.:237). Hence, it is—surely—
inefficient to speak of experiences of a character, and by extension, of how we 
perceive of and negotiate with those experiences as well as decipher as to how 
character him/herself may perceive them, without first—in principle—
inscribing this very cognizer with sovereignty of existence that necessarily 
backpedals (without thereby losing sight of) the external factors of this kind of 
“twofoldness.” It goes without saying, then, that in an ordinary setting of tele-
vision or movie watching, all of us naturally comprehend the artifice of it all, 
but unless it starts to insists upon itself (e.g., Tarantino’s Inglorious Basterds 
may be a good case in point here), we not only proverbially “buy into it,” but 
we in situ emphatically generate as well as— and this is important—constantly 
elaborate on our belief. In short: we tend to intend creatively towards—we 
narrceptivize the audiovisual experiences unfolding before us. In doing so, we 
cannot but complement it with naturalizing “touches.” It was cyberspace re-
searcher Janet H. Murray who conveyed this very same idea I think very acutely 
already more than a decade ago: 
 
The pleasurable surrender of the mind to an imaginative world is often described, 
in Coleridge’s phrase, as “the willing suspension of disbelief.” But this is too 
passive a formulation even for traditional media. When we enter a fictional 
world, we do not merely “suspend” a critical faculty; we also exercise a creative 
faculty. We do not suspend disbelief so much as we actively create belief. 
Because of our desire to experience immersion, we focus our attention on the 
developing world and we use our intelligence to reinforce rather than to question 
the reality of the experience. (Smith 1997:110; emphases added) 
 
To put the same point in more practical terms, we are not monitoring, say, 
Anthony Hopkins play-acting of play-eating play-someone’s play-brains on the 
silver rectangle of the movie screen, so much as observing an autonomous, 
intentional activity of an atrocious serial killer named Hannibal Lecter. And yes, 
in fashioning out this kind of perspective we indeed may take into account our 
present or accumulative enjoyment of seeing Hopkins bring out the best even in 
the flattest of characters (my mother, incidentally, thoroughly enjoys seeing 
Hopkins everywhere, no matter how “bad” the film) (cf., Wulff 2006). But this 
fact doesn’t change the wheel-turnings of our cognitive machinery whilst we 
perceive of Hannibal as a person of agency in his world! 
To recall cybertext theorist Janet H. Murray’s distinction of “creative” and 
“critical” faculty, one could say that this sort of external knowledge plays into 
our “critical faculty,” which, running in parallel with its creative-intentional 
counterpart, should not necessarily suffocate it.130 In other words: it does not 
                                                            
130  In fact, this assumption of “critical faculty” can be seen as correlative with how Wulff 
considered narrative in relation with characters as other people. Also, recall Paskow’s 
distinction of agentI and agent2. 
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stop us from discussing Hannibal’s actions as those of a regularly conceivable 
human being (even if a narrative person).  
Hence, I would think it insightful to conclude present sub-chapter with Mal-
colm Turvey’s perhaps the most targeted criticism on Smith’s and early Nöel 
Carroll’s (Carroll 1990) work which claimed films engendering experiences that 
are not actually real, but imagined as mere thoughts being entertained (i.e., re-
representations). As he accurately concedes, however, such view conflicts with 
our “ordinary language descriptions of experience” (Turvey 1997[2003]: 
433ff.), whilst crucially extending to our descriptors of (conceptual) thinking, as 
well. After all, none of us presumably conveys our narrative experiences by 
noting that “the thought of having been saddened by the passing of a great 
character saddened me.” Indeed, “it is almost as if the prototypical spectator of 
these theories is blind to the film itself” (ibid.; emphasis in original). Mind in 
nature, to borrow Evan Thompson’s influential book title, is assuredly more 
sophisticated. As I have maintained throughout present chapter, we directly per-
ceive presence without doubting its veracity or constructing some kind in-
between space, as if compelling oneself to rationalize the impulse for immersion 
as coming from within. In fact, Turvey—having subscribed to what he calls the 
“seeing theory”—summarizes this polarity remarkably succinctly by construct-
ing the verb “presence”-ing. Hereby greatly indebted to Wittgenstein’s enriching 
discussion of the duckrabbit image, Turvey argues that 
 
it [the “seeing as” rabbit/duck] is not the product of our mental agency, 
imagination, or the mental activity of interpretation. Rather, the aspect [i.e., 
seeing-as rabbit] is something that seems to presence itself or emerge within the 
figure in question independently of beholder, and it is for that reason that we 
describe this visual experience as if the figure itself had changed physically, 
thereby attributing agency to it.  (ibid.:452; emphases added) 
 
Now, if we take the “aspect” to correlate here with the notion of character, this 
read of Turvey’s invigorating contemplation, additionally charged by Casebier’s 
prior thoughts, leads me to believe that though there is some constructing 
activity apparent (e.g., the narrcepts organizing narrative persons’ reasonings 
vis-a-vis key events into storyworld, see chp. II), it doesn’t eliminate the 
existing presence-ness; if anything, it may become further enriched and “fleshed 
out” by the cognitive capabilities of the viewers as active participants 
(respondents) as opposed to recipients (passive “receivers”).  
As phenomenologist television scholar Tony Wilson puts it, there is certain 
immediacy to the “interpretative looking” (2009:2,56). Similarly, Turvey goes 
on to maintain that “the rabbit-aspect [is something] the beholder must go in 
search of, even if he knows [it is] there” (Turvey 1997[2003]:451; underlining 
added, emphasis in the original). Again, here we can recall my proposition of 
realitizing. While it is not, as such, ipso facto acknowledged (see 1.2), it is 
nonetheless conceivable as an emergent outline, accompanying and circum-
scribing discussional dynamics, whilst we are, in deploying our cognitive 
toolset, “in search of [it].”  If to adapt the words of Italian philosopher Alfonso 
111 
Iacano, a successful (I take it here in the sense of involved, “intending-at”) 
engagement with “world of art” in and of itself naturalizes the “fiction” 
buttressing it (Gallese and Wojciehowski 2011:19–20).  
But let us afford now a quick summary. As I have maintained throughout, 
viewers—especially those of longitudinal serialized televisual narratives that 
ordinarily foreground “complexly human” characters—can be conceived as 
initially observing and subsequently subscribing to in-depth contemplations in 
regards to the unfolding of “other lives.” They become “caught up” in the 
narrative persons’ “perceptions of the possibilities and problems” as they 
participate in their individual and interrelated searches “to find the world 
intelligible” (Wilson 2004:79,81) amidst their environmental contingencies 
(Livingstone 1992:9). For viewers, these narratively situated existences appear 
concurrently inescapably fragmented and impenetrable (similarly to how we 
perceive “everyday individuals,” as well as our own stance vis-a-vis the world) 
(Bortolussi and Dixon 2003:139; op. cit.131). As such, narrative persons (NPs) 
are (1) directly accessible, and characterized by (2) directedness—narrative 
persons evoke the “ofness” with—i.e., intentionality towards—their world that 
viewers “tune into” naturally. Directness (not to be mistaken with intentional 
directedness), meanwhile, I have taken to correlate with the overarching 
narrative-historical knowledge—of the “Other” and more especially, about 
his/her world and its co-inhabitators about whose experiential operating the 
“Other” may have limited comprehension of, whereas viewer frequently might 
not; but also of narrative genre tendencies, etc.—that affords a range of 
exposure impossible to successfully maintain in everyday interactions (also see, 
text makers’ world, in chp. II).    
 
 
1.7 Stage-setting for Chapter II: Television Social Network 
Weighing diverse previous insights, then, the CO-Model (COM) as I envisage it 
highlights narrative persons’ (and their “constellations”’) carry-over to reci-
pients’ socio-sphere, i.e., their online commentary space (cf. Wulff 1996a:11, 
5n.), onto the “sites of engagement” (see, chp. II, discussion on discourse 
world). Through this reciprocal act, the ontological playing-field, as it were, 
becomes “leveled” in a situation-specific sense as realitizing is deployed 
distinctly within the co-elaboratively functioning discussion realm. These modi-
fications, however, necessitate further complementation of the terminology to 
properly account for nuances of my CO-model in general and its operative 
forces twistory and narrcept, in particular. Here I proceed to adapt Paul Booth’s 
recent notion of “television social network” (Booth 2012). The latter shall work 
                                                            
131  Frith and Wentzer (2013) take it even further, arguing that “even if I am talking with you 
face-to-face, I cannot access your mind to check whether my interpretation of what you have 
said corresponds to what you intended me to understand. I can create a coherent story, but I 
can never get independent evidence about the correctness of my interpretations” (Cit. in: 
Gallagher and Allen 2016:13; emphasis added). Cf., “predictive engagement.“ 
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as the proverbial conceptual bridge guiding the discussion thus far towards 
chapters II and III, respectively. 
Whilst similarly criticizing the theoretical prevalence to take character as 
plot’s subservient, hence undermining the ontological factor indicated through 
such person’s relations and “extra[-]textual” tidbits of him/her (especially 
significant in complex narratives), Booth’s attractive idea of the social network 
“mode” seeks to “map [the] narrative” specifically around such “social sys-
tems,” as Wulff put it (Booth 2012:313–315). In regards to narrative persons, 
indeed, majority of Booth’s argument overlaps with Wulff’s. Aside from 
equating recipients’ (everyday) social networking—off- and online—with those 
facilitated by narrative persons, Booth even draws on the analogy of accumu-
latively changing “picture” of “person and all [his] network forms” (ibid.:318). 
Hence, for brevity’s sake I will skip straight to Booth’s implication of 
participants and characters being conceived as “nodes,” co-existing in a joint 
social space where the focus dwells on the observation and (re-)negotiation of 
narrative persons’ “networks.” Crucially, the analysts as observers shall also 
themselves become part of them (see, Extended Research Hypothesis, in chp. II, 
2.0), as will narrative’s “creators” and “writers” (see, text makers’ world, in chp. 
II).  
Here, Booth borrows the notion of “node” (not to be mistaken with how 
Murray Smith developed the term) from David M. Boje’s influential “ante-
narrative” account in organization and management theory. There, “node” is 
constituent of a “folk story network” (Boje 2001:65), indicating a “living story 
of becoming” (Boje 2013).132 Specifically, as Booth’s reading implies, these are 
the emerging and intersecting character-stories which are experienced jointly 
and in situ (Boje 2001:62ff.).133 Within the confines of present chapter, nodes 
are conceivable as the foci of communicational exchange wherein participatory 
narrcepts build upon the fragmented and possibly ambiguous stories of narrative 
persons, whilst concurrently drawing from—and feeding back into—parti-
cipants’ own experiences. As I see it, such re-calibration of twistory enhances 
the original notion substantially, leading to its self-expansion which explicitly 
includes the co-elaborate effort in discursive online environments. In claiming 
that, though, my approach diverges from Booth’s, who, incidentally, appears to 
overlook Boje’s vehement denial of narrative in its sense of something finite (a 
debatable claim, indeed). 
Even more to the point, Booth goes to maintain, on the one hand, that “we 
are silent members of our television social network, barely participating in the 
social interaction” (Booth 2012:315, emphasis added); viewers become, then, 
not only Zillmannian “onlookers,” but “lurkers” (Baym 2000) on the lives of 
others. On the other hand, Booth takes the networked relationships within narra-
tives to literally account for either “connections” between characters or 
                                                            
132  See also Sonia Livingstone’s earlier notion of “multidimensional scaling” (1992:10).  
133  Boje’s construal of social network analysis also echoes the chp. III of the present work 
for archived commentary data affords to trace the natural, untampered reciprocal develop-
ment of long-term narrative’s “people ... and [their] stories” (op. cit.:64). 
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functioning as “re-furbishers” for explicit story events wherein novel know-
ledge about and story-building of (minor) characters retroactively intersect with 
“stories” of major characters.  
Assuredly, Booth’s reading of Lost’s utterly infamous episode “Expose” is 
shrewd and admirable, however it nonetheless evokes the question whether this 
one-off episode’s eponymous Nikki, seen intersecting with Boone in what was 
show’s pilot and hence “filling in” an admittedly marginal piece of Boone’s 
“story” several years after the fact134, builds a sufficient basis for speaking of 
narrative persons’ stories, in their own right, on the one hand, and their (rela-
tive, possible) plot-independency, on the other. For the latter, one could argue 
that it wasn’t as much Boone’s story than a fleeting “scenic bit” partial to the 
major plot-point—fixing Jack as the (coming) leader (ibid.:318–19).135 Mean-
while, for the former, this event of “pen-asking”—I dare to infer—meant, in the 
grander scheme of an immediate plane crash(!), precious little to those involved 
(i.e., Nikki and Boone)136, which, in turn, gives reason to believe that Booth’s 
conception of “network” forgoes any implications pertaining to the pheno-
menological functioning of these narrative persons—something which, in a 
natural reception situation, is not so readily overlooked.  
Consequently, my suggestion of the CO-model as so far delineated is 
designed to circumscribe and effectively trace exactly this sort of more reflexive 
insights. As present chapter maintained throughout, narrative persons “carry 
over” into the recipients’ experiential field. This “field” is at once idiosyncratic 
(in the sense of a singular recipient’s experiential knowledge), but likewise 
expandable onto a “site of engagement” where such singularities overlap and 
intertwine vis-à-vis the “social fields” observed. In such an environment, narra-
tive persons become subjects of discussion, and are hence realitized due to both 
tacit reason and necessity. Consequently, NPs’ (possible) social, intentionally-
enforced interactions are disentangled with great attentive care, ultimately 
leading to always already becoming discourse worlds, comprised of the expe-
riential “stuff of characters,” as it were, developed through the dialectical, 
contextualizing impulse of the beacon (see, chp. II). Although participants are 
indeed unable to introduce change with their observations of the narrative 
                                                            
134  In Lost’s pilot episode, Jack attempts to resuscitate someone post-crash and sends Boone 
to look for a pen (to guarantee air-flow to the lungs), which the latter ends up asking from 
Nikki. 
135  Booth’s emphasis on availing characters their ontology is welcome, but unfortunately 
Lost’s example, unlike that of Breaking Bad (and, a number of others, to be sure), is not a 
perfect fit and can even be seen as contradicting—to a degree—Booth’s own argument given 
that the literal “tidbits” of “extra” information pertaining to persons in Lost hardly ever 
amounted to the latter wagging the tail of the former, as it were. Though fanfiction may 
attest to a different perspective, from the ongoing commentary discussions examined (but 
ultimately excluded from the present work),  it became evident that Island’s mysteries were 
always emphatically at the center. 
136  Booth anticipates as much, it has to be noted, in 4n. 
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occurrences137, it doesn’t follow as if they cannot be creative in how they 
intersect with the social occurrences on a global, communal co-elaborative level 
writ large, i.e., in postexposure discussions. Recognizing explicit connections, 
then, as Booth attempts to, bares usefulness in building participants’ attentive-
ness from the ground up, but it doesn’t really explain the accompanying claim 
for (deeper) phenomenological factors, as esp. sub-chapter 1.5 attempted to 
outline. Consequently, it is precisely how this kind of “attentiveness” emerges 
and senses are reasoned, that the next chapter of present dissertation aims to 
elaborate on. I will approach it by proposing a critical reading on the famous 
Possible Worlds Theory, adapting it—in the process—into an appropriate 
interpretational framework for the Analysis ahead (see, chp. III).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
137  Though there have been times where fan feedback has driven certain far-reaching 
modifications down the road, e.g., Michael Emerson’s guest performance as Ben expanding 
into far more in Lost. 
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CHAPTER II 
Sense (in) making worlds:  
Possible Worlds in the Blink of a Beacon 
2.0 Analytical Interlude: Extended Research Hypothesis 
Vygotsky’s is a vision of the social constitution of mind: “through others 
we become ourselves” (1931b, p. 105 [SS 3, p. 144])  
– David Bakhurst, In: The Cambridge Companion to Vygotsky, p. 56 
Process is fundamental: the river is not an object, but a continuing flow; 
the sun is not a thing, but an enduring fire. Everything is a matter of 
process, of activity, of change (panta rhei). 
 – Nicholas Rescher, Process Philosophy: A Survey of Basic Issues, p. 10 
Clearly such forms, then, apart from their moment-by-moment emergence 
within the unfolding flow of activity in which they subsist, have no 
substantial existence in themselves. Yet, in being ’out there’ as distinctive 
othernesses in their own right, partially but not wholly responsive to our 
actions ... they are ’somethings’ with a felt presence.  
– John Shotter, ’Real presences’. Meaning as a Living Moment in a 
Participatory World, p. 366  
 
The hypothesis and its expanded description for the Analytical portion of the 
present dissertation builds on and is guided by the theoretical discussion ad-
vanced in chapter I and subsequently, in 2.1 and further. The analyzable 
corpus—focused on in chapter III (see, 3.4–3.5)—consists of Internet commen-
taries with regard to two successively aired episodes of the popular and 
critically acclaimed TV serial Breaking Bad. Topical tendencies channeled by 
specific attention-channeling narrative motifs (CIGARETTE, RICIN, 
POISONING) are observed in the Internet discussions. In addition to going 
concerns with diegetic deficiencies, the conclusions of the authorial narrative 
also—even if concrete or strongly suggestive—can cause dissatisfaction for 
being conceived as contradictory and incoherent. Hence, complexity in TV 
narratives (cf. Mittell 2015(/2012–2013), 2013; see also, Kroener 2013) 
becomes concordant with sense-making complexity. Consequently, I hypo-
thesize that the latter can be approached by and further elucidated through the 
adaptive criticism of the “possible worlds theory” (Ryan 2001; Lewis 1986; 
Rescher 1975; Loux 1979; Goodman 1978; cf., Doležel 1998; Bruner 1990, 
1991b, 2004). 
I take “possible worlds”—such as storyworlds (Herman 2002, 2009), 
intention-worlds (cf., Ryan 1985, 1991, 2008), and textworlds (Werth 1999)—, 
pivoting on realitized narrative persons (NPs) (see chapter I; 2.1) as “rational 
constructs” (Eco 1979/1984:220). As I envison it, my subsequent propositions 
into the “possible worlds” terminology develop in a synchronized and inter-
woven fashion, progressing bottom-up towards a composite discourse world. In 
particular, speaking analytically, when observing developing viewer-com-
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menters’ singular narrcepts as well as their wider inter-dynamics, an implicit 
process of gliding between various “worlds” can be established. On the level of 
analytical reflection, then—in “narrating the narrating”—“worlds” can be diffe-
rentiated, i.e., “decomposed” from the whole narrceptive content (viz. individual 
narrcepts and their interrelations in content); and, thereafter, composed, i.e., 
unified as a potential interpretation of a ongoing discourse world. Meanwhile, 
speaking reciprocally, viewer-commenters’ utilize the “world” resources latent-
ly, although creatively (see below; 3.3 for prompt summary of my adaptive pro-
positions; also, Conclusion, vi). Accordingly, as already emphasized in the 
Introduction, such activity underscores the significance of a becoming experien-
ce, developed context-sensitively (one could say “historically”138) vis-à-vis 
narrative’s seriality.  
I maintain that the above conceived navigational tendency of “gliding” 
altogether characterizes my original notion of beacon. As I have envisioned it, 
beacon signifies concurrent analytical-methodological and reciprocal dimen-
sion (of character engagement) and my provocative intention is to consider it as 
a metaphorical mobile signal fire (cf., Rescher 2000:4ff. inter alia). Functio-
nally, beacon’s a kind of feedback loop with its existence set betwixt the 
“worlds,” “transilluminating” their interrelations and affiliating them into the 
composite “discourse world.” Descriptors of viewerly activity such as “narracti-
vity” (Booth 2009, 2010), collaborative (liminal) “plotting” (Dannenberg 2004, 
2008), “narbs” (Mitra), and others (cf., G. Prince’s “disnarrated,” see Dannen-
berg 2014; Fish’s ”intellection”) are vehicles of viewerly storytelling. Impor-
tantly, here storytelling deploys world-building latently in order to negotiate 
with and furnish (narrative) experience (cf., Herman 2013:5–6ff.). Consequent-
ly, the aforementioned notions respond to and characterize the “operative 
variances” of beacon’s reciprocal dimension. However, these intertwined layers 
of the beacon suggest it being a dialectical mechanism, a dialogical contra-
diction between the “popular” and “academic” interpretations. Hence, taken 
from the analytical-methodological perspective, beacon is an (1) interpretation 
mechanism, a contextualizing impulse teasing out and organizing the incre-
mental and indeterminate bottom-up build-ups (cf., Sorokin 2011, 2013a, b, 
2014, 2015, 2016a, b, 2017a, b; cf., Grishakova and Sorokin 2016) within and 
across the Internet discussion spaces. Consequently: (i) subjective narrcepts—
the ‘expressive form’ of the commentary texts—exemplify the interactional, 
narractive dimension; (ii) thereafter, with beacon utilized as an analytical 
applied method, this narractive motion becomes, by the analyst, “sorted” into 
“kinds” of differing weight139—i.e., “worlds”; This is what is meant by beacon’s 
analytical-methodological dimension; (iii) Hence emerges methodologically 
construed composition of an omni-directionally context-sensitive discourse 
world (cf., van Dijk 2008). Due to the influx of episodic narrative information 
from the two key episodes chosen, beacon both originates from and outlines the 
                                                            
138  Cf., Gapunian “storying,” In: Sorokin (2010a:27-28); Kulick and Willson (1994).  
139  Cf., “[H]ierarchy of world versions,” Gutenberg (2012). 
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consistent multi-world dynamics. As noted by Goodman: “[i]f there are many 
worlds, the collection of them all is one” (Goodman 1978:2, 8).  
Accordingly, beacon is (2) the discursive guiding principle, elaborating on 
the path toward this “one” world. How? First, as noted, beacon decomposes 
(differentiation into worlds), thereafter composes (unification into (one possible 
interpretation of a) discourse world) (ibid.:7–14). Hence, my hypothesis 
maintains that the utilization of the PWT framework enables for the analyst to 
“narrate”—by introducing beacon as a dialectical applied mechanism of 
dialogical interpretation— the ongoing viewerly narrations by sorting their 
storytelling into “kinds” of “worlds.” In other words, “worlds,” too, become 
“tools for thinking” (Herman, Vygotsky), for viewers and analyst alike, though 
in the former case such ‘categorization’ can be observed as covert, unacknow-
ledged and latent, as opposed to overt in the latter case. Hence, analyst’s 
capacity becomes that of the “editor” (Hafstein 2014) and “bridge-builder” 
(Mello 2002) and beacon just is method capitalizing on that objective. In 
exploiting the impulse and principle subscribed to the beacon, the tellers and the 
told, the many a world “fictional” and real, are all leveraged in construing—
sans discriminative “focus” (ultimately involving implicit hierarchies)—a fluid 
(and one potentiality of a) discourse world of Breaking Bad on the Internet (cf., 
Goodman 1978:6–7). 
 
 
 2.1. Critical-adaptive ‘sorting-hat’ for the Possible Worlds 
Theory (PWT); or, Kinds, Wholes, Parts, and Donkeys,  
Oh My! 
 
The Leibnizian concept of “infinitude of possible worlds” (Leibniz 1710[2007]: 
131) was distanced from its religious context140, repurposed, and developed in 
the contemporary field of propositional modal semantics by logicians Monta-
gue, Hintikka, Kripke, and others (see, Loux 1979a for introductory overview; 
cf., edited volume, Sture 1989). However, as Nathalie Jacoby (2005) has 
observed, the theoretical thinking pivoting towards PW is long-standing, earliest 
noted in the theory of poetry, as developed in 18th century Germany, by Leibniz’ 
contemporaries Baumgarten, Breitinger and Bodmer (ibid.:105). Illustrious 
explanation, fit for the occasion, is provided by Breitinger: 
                                                            
140  See also, Jacoby (2005:106n3) and Bell (2010:20). 
[T]he property of being a donkey comes out as the set of all donkeys, the 
donkeys of other worlds along with the donkeys of ours. 
[W]e know a priori that besides the donkeys among our worldmates there 
are countless other donkeys, spread over countless worlds. They are 
other-worldly donkeys, unactualized donkeys, ‘merely possible’ donkeys, 
but donkeys nonetheless.  
– David K. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, p. 50, 110 
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[D]enn was ist Dichten anders, als sich in der Phantasie neue Begriffe und 
Vorstellungen formieren deren Originale nicht in der gegenwärtigen Welt der 
würklichen Dinge, sondern in irgend einem andern möglichen Welt-Gebäude zu 
suchen sind. Ein jedes wohlerfundene Gedicht ist darum nicht anderst 
anzusehen, als seine Historie aus einer andern möglichen Welt. (Breitinger 
1740:59f.; quoted op. cit..; emphases added) 
 
The evocative semantics availed by phrases such as “possible world-building” 
and the “[observing as] history from another[,]possible world”141 both echo the 
Extended Hypothesis (EH). Let us specifically earmark the former for now, 
observing its influence in contemporary sciences, taken broadly.  
Hence, some theorists have built on the notion of “worldmaking” (Goodman 
1978), adapting it to scaffold “scenario worldmaking,” affording attunement of 
“discordant[ly] pluralist” perspectives (Vervoort et al. 2015:1–4). Worldmaking 
as “dialogical, imaginative engagement,” Vervoort et al. contend, would accen-
tuate “ontological creativity” in world-building over merely “representing” it 
(ibid.:3–4, 8; cf., Bakhtin 1981; see also, Ramírez and van der Heijden (eds) 
2008:189ff.; van der Heijden (Ed.) 2002). 
Cast through the previous ideas, “worldmaking” could be conceptualized as 
granting agencies (social actors as “worldmakers”), whilst—crucially—im-
puting, ex hypothesi, (constructive) agencies on others. All this is facilitated 
through open-ended “collaborative creation of imaginative future scenarios” 
(cf., Vervoort et al. 2015:5; emphasis in original), understood as bracketing 
“real” whilst realitizing142 (viz. fashioning as realistic) the “imaginary”—a kind 
of mutually agreed upon “reality pact” (Grishakova 2017; Vervoort et al. 
2015:8; also, Grishakova and Sorokin 2016; Sorokin 2016a; Onuf 2013; Putnam 
1983[1996]; cf., Boyd 1997[2000]:53–55).  
The aforementioned assumptions, however, avail the PWT framework—
taken in a generalized fashion143—to be broached on its suitability as the vehicle 
tout court in the theories of fiction, fictionality—and especially—, of reception. 
In fact, literary theorist Göran Rossholm (2004) has gone as far noting that 
PWTs  “explain fiction by introducing fiction” (ibid.:258). Being as they are 
inherently “incomplete” (a tendency characteristically absent in PWs, by 
Rossholm’s view)—he charges— “[t]here are simply no such things” as existent 
fictive universes (fictive worlds). “If they existed,” Rossholm alleges, “they 
wouldn’t be fictive” (ibid. 2n.). Deeming notions such as “to imagine” and 
“imagination” as too “vague” and “inclusive,” Rossholm’s overriding stance is 
rooted on reader’s “attitude” towards (commonsensically perceived? accessed?) 
                                                            
141  But also “to look for” [zu suchen sind], cf., Casebier, from chp. I.  
142  See. chp. I.  
143  Truth conditions for fictional worlds; the way the reader deals with textual gaps (Eco’s 
inferences and possible scenarios, Ryan’s “minimal departure“), the ontological status of 
characters, fictional worlds (Doležel, Pavel), analysis of the character worlds in terms of 
beliefs, wishes, obligations, goals and plans (Ryan), conceptualizing “world” in digital 
narratives (Bell); immersion, transportation and make-believe (Ryan).  
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information144, considered in “actualistic cognitive terms” (ibid.:257–259; em-
phasis added). Consequently, Rossholm suggests that our experience of “fictio-
nal” narratives is encapsulated through the posture of “taking as true” 
(ibid.:262ff.; emphasis added), for 
 
what makes a text as true[?] [T]he reader makes it so [through the processes of] 
fiction reading and truth seeking, truth finding or truth confirmation. This does 
not mean that verisimilitude … does not play any role in the game of making the 
reader take the text as true. In a watered-down sense it is necessary: without 
recognizing anything we don’t grasp anything. (ibid.:266; emphasis added)   
 
For Rossholm, taking a text as “true” counterfactually, then, is “too strong.” In-
stead of being potential “facts” in counterfactual elsewhere(s), he argues, 
counterfactuality amounts to “tak[ing] the text as true non-factually” (ibid.:262). 
Arising conundrum is such only seemingly, however. What Rossholm actually 
underscores here is, in my opinion, rather straightforward. Namely, he alters the 
power relations—the “truths” and the “facts” are no longer “properties of the 
text,” but appropriations into the purview of the recipient, This, in turn, links 
with the perspective reinforcing the absence of conflict (pace Smith; see, chp. 
I145) between “taking as true” and “non-factuality,” respectively, because the 
“truth-finding” itself is consciously conceived of as non-factual whilst taken as 
(commonsensically interpreted) “truth” (cf., Introduction). 
As I argued throughout chapter I, we have a proclivity to “read for reasons,” 
or, then, to “take as true.” Rossholm doesn’t necessarily disagree with the 
former, for he brings out three interrelated tendencies playing into such stance. 
(1) “expectation of consistency”; (2) in practice, the process of inferring “truth” 
from fictional/factual operates “in [the] same way”; and (3) in the “fictional” 
experience, “factual beliefs” are, to a point, utilized “in the same way” as they 
are with “factual texts” (ibid.:267–268).   
These kinds of polemics are approached seemingly more conservatively 
were we to observe the establishing of PW for the narratological field. Speci-
fically, Marie-Laure Ryan returns directly to modal semantics noted previously. 
She draws on Michael J. Loux’ unpacking of Kripke’s thought where PWT is 
taken as “a set of possible worlds,” wherein the “actual world” (AW) is “is one 
of the objects belong[ing] [to a set]” (Loux 1979a:21; Ryan 1991:16; emphasis 
added). Such articulation, however, can be undercut by virtuality, were it 
characterized by way of convergences, entanglements, and leakages across the 
member set. Consequently, this potential set—a discourse world to the story-, 
text-, and intention-world channeling in situ into the former—begets “fuzzy” 
characteristics, if to build on Ryan’s usage of the notion (see, Ryan 2006). As 
Loux explains, in Kripke’s (1963) “propositional modal system M” the afore-
                                                            
144  As opposed to some objective  “truth” (ibid.:257). Cf., also, Rossholm’s critique on 
Walton (ibid.:259). 
145  See also, Sorokin (n.d.): https://www.academia.edu/12253269/Article_review_of_ 
Murray_Smiths_On_the_Two-foldness_of_Character_2011_ 
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mentioned tendency is conveyed by “a relation over members,” i.e., a nexus 
granting mobile “accessibility” (see, Loux 1979a:21; emphasis added).  
This relation constructs the world-potency, in general, and the interrelation 
of worlds, in particular. In not so many words, it is the “worldmaking” impulse, 
writ large (cf., Bruner 1991b inter alia; Goodman 1978). How to precisely 
define and characterize such relation for present project, however? Although I 
will take up my propositions shortly, it is evident that echoes of what I have 
referenced as beacon in EH can be detected. Still, at this juncture, and especially 
in light of previous implications, let us linger for a moment on David Lewis’s 
proposition—considering “possible worlds and their contents [as] equally real” 
(Loux 1979a:9) (viz., worlds/inhabitants) to the AW—offering an intense 
corroboration indeed. 
 
There are so many other worlds, in fact, that absolutely every way that a world 
could possibly be is a way that some world is. And as with worlds, so it is with 
parts of worlds. There are ever so many ways that part of a world could be; and 
so many and so varied are the other worlds that absolutely every way that a part 
of the world could possibly be is a way that some part of some world is. (Lewis 
1986:2; emphases in original; underlining added) 
 
Although above quotation seemingly collides with Lewis’ previous reasoning 
prohibiting any sort of overlap between the worlds, his subsequent claim of 
non-categorical differences does introduce a complementary fluidity, however. 
“The other worlds are of a kind with this world of ours. [...] The difference 
between this and the other worlds is not a categorical difference. Nor does this 
world differ from the others in the manner of existing” (ibid.; emphases added). 
Consequently, Loux frames Lewis’ position as formalizing “our common-sense 
thinking about modality” (Loux 1979a:10; emphasis added). Building on this, 
Ryan defines Lewis’ “modal realis[t]” position as “indexical realism” for PWs 
are taken as “respectable entities in their own right” (Lewis 1979:183; Ryan 
1991:18,21ff.). Further, hypertext theorist Alice Bell (2010) clarifies Lewis’ 
stance as “concretist” for “the ontological status of all domains is relative; 
[possible and actual worlds are] ontologically indistinguishable” (ibid.:21; em-
phases added). 
Now, were we to take Lewis’ absolutism with folk-psychological undertones 
at face value, what could we surmise? Firstly: “parts” (of “worlds”), too, mani-
fest as sovereign entities. Whilst existing within bounds of one world (their 
AW), the very existence of “parts” opens up novel worlds for which the former 
become AWs (discursivity). Secondly: in transposing the logical implications of 
previous thinking to “this world of ours” and speaking of “kinds with” and 
“manner[s] of” with regards to NPs, I can maintain of being of “my world,” in 
proportion in kind to them being of theirs. Bluntly, if I (supposedly) exist, don’t 
they? Further, if I can claim to exist in a sovereign manner, wouldn’t one derive 
that something similar can be actively entertained by the NPs with regards to 
(themselves and) their compatriots? That is, wouldn’t the manner of existence 
in their AW beget them sovereignty in the sense of them being with their world, 
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as opposed to merely passively itemizing it (playing up the “in,” i.e., authorial 
force/artificiality)?  
In short: where resides the authority to decide over the validity of the inter-
relation of “necessity and possibility” (Ryan 1991:17ff.) the recipients develop 
with their experiential world, on the one hand; and, what they perceive NPs as 
doing, which is construed as matching in kind and manner to theirs, on the 
other?  
Were we to recall Rossholm’s ideas or espouse Nelson Goodman’s expla-
nation, “authority”—if there even has to be any—can be laid on the proverbial 
feet of sense-making. Conceivably building on what Nicholas Rescher had 
previously termed “world-derivative tactic” (Rescher 1975:77), writes Good-
man: 
 
[W]orldmaking consists of taking apart and putting together, often conjointly: on 
the one hand, of diving wholes into parts and partitioning kinds into subspecies, 
analyzing complexes into component features, drawing distinctions; on the other 
hand, of composing wholes and kinds out of parts and members and subclasses, 
combing features into complexes, and making connections. (Goodman 1978:2,7; 
emphases added) 
 
Where Goodman’s constructivist approach is generic, Rescher’s specifically 
capitalizes on the perception of individuals inhabiting these kinds of worlds, 
thereby regarded as latter’s “stock,” not unlike “the actuals” in a “real world.” 
Hence, he sorts PWs into two distinctive kinds: 
 
(1) the proximately possible ones that include only those individuals belonging to 
this, the actual world, albeit perhaps in different and in fact “unrealized” variant 
forms and (2) the remotely possible ones that include also wholly different 
supernumerary individuals that are not to be found in this world at all. (Rescher 
1975:77; emphases in original, my underlining; cf., Lewis 1986:110) 
 
I think it goes without saying that discussion up to this point has encompassed 
the former “kind.” Rescher boils this description of variance and virtuality 
down to a “less ‘unrealistic’[, ]merely an alternative version” of (our) AW. 
Therefore, PAW146 ultimately necessitates a non-assumptive stance, for its 
content is taken more or less at face value. Moreover because—to anticipate 
Ryan’s further thoughts below—these possible individuals are “of the fully indi-
viduated type” (op. cit.:78). Rather significantly for the arguments thus far put 
forth, Rescher also explores the principle of “compossibility,” where (in certain 
specific conditions, say, a realist narrative) “a set of severally possible indivi-
duals [are] conjointly admissible as a “possible world” (ibid.; emphasis, under-
lining added).  
Another PW pioneer for literary theory and narratology, Lubomir Doležel 
largely shares Rescher’s views. Speaking of “one-person” and “multi-person” 
                                                            
146  “Proximately/possible actual world,” if to abbreviate it so henceforth. 
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“worlds,” Doležel views persons as sovereign “entities,” for their intentional 
acting and mutual interaction “enriches [given] world.” The former make the 
latter, in effect, “the space of human or humanlike existence” for world’s “thres-
hold of narrativity” increases (1998:32–33).147 As Doležel maintains, the story-
generation directly correlates with persons’ existence within the world. Never-
theless, Doležel treads cautiously lest any alarm bells be sounded. Where the 
emphasis of the “with” appears though fitting, he opts for the “safe” middle-
ground—“within” (see, chapter I for my specific counter-argument).  
However, if to proceed construing both Rescher’s and Doležel’s prior work 
specifically under the aegis of the arguments of NPs’ “intentional field,” 
former’s sovereignty within it, and the overall realitizating potential produced 
by such a stance, the seeming implication is that these possible individuals not 
only make the world they inhabit, but this very creation is socially distributed—
in a kind of ‘associated humanity’ fashion—both “on screen,” and behind it. 
Whilst NPs inhabitate their worlds, the viewers/participants are “coupled” with 
them in that very undertaking, actively realitizing it. Indeed, as analysis 
presented in chapter III will prove, NPs are perceived not only as exerting their 
individuality vis-à-vis the narrative148; but they do so collectively, via a detailed 
network of relationships that the recipients may confide in, as opposed to what 
the “official” storytellers maintain. Cast under such light, I would have to dis-
agree with Bell’s (2010:21) read—following Nolan (2002)—of Rescher being 
an “abstractionist” (contra Lewis’ “concretism”), because Bell seemingly dis-
regards149 the potential fertile merger the ideas thus far considered and sug-
gested, although, indeed, purporting to “reconcile any relevant theoretical 
debates” (op. cit.:23).   
Nevertheless, the discussion thus far does appear consistent with the CO-
model as outlined in chapter I. However, we should still further examine what 
kind of feasible tangencies can be preserved between the latter and the 
specifically narratologically driven approach to PW, most prominently spear-
headed by Ryan. One potential opening can be introduced by building on the 
Ryan’s elaboration on previously discussed ideas in Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Narrative (Ryan 2005[2010]:446–450).  
Following Maítre (1983), Ryan refers to a narrative-world typology, in-
cluding, amongst others, “strongly realistic texts” which depict “imaginary 
states of affairs [that] could be [construed as] actual” (op. cit.:592). While latter 
description is readily reminiscent of Breaking Bad’s narrative—which springs 
                                                            
147  Cf., however, Ryan (1991:112): “Narrativity resides in a text’s ability to bring a world to 
life, to populate it with individuals[...]” (emphases added). 
148  Viz. in constructing the storyworld, their realitization overpowers the rule-set pertaining 
to the “authorial” narrative; that is, the prior history of the NP is entrusted over what the 
narrative may even go as far as to spell out. 
149  See, e.g., op. cit.:22, where Bell conflates “concrete” experience with material 
experience even though neuroscience has shown how our brain responds similarly in cases 
of “real” and “fiction” (Emmott and Sanford 2012:141; cf., Solymosi and Shook 2014).  
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from a potential if a mildly exaggerated core issue150—, such supplementary 
criteria151, as proposed by Ryan, excises any lingering hesitancies.  
Although realism may appear palpable enough for making its distinct em-
phasis unnecessary, it could arguably still afford an important re-tuning of 
abstract arguments thus far for they become positioned on a more “solid,” 
commonsensically comprehensible footing. It affords complementary credence 
to key claims behind the inquiry as to (i) why, in particular, peoples’ relation-
ships with the NPs of Breaking Bad—characterized in its most “intimate” by the 
original notion of twistory (see, chapter I)—indeed are so inclined to seep 
through, as it were (cf., Black and Barnes 2015); and (ii) how, in general, the 
terminological framework presently proposed further contributes to the rising 
importance of “quality TV as conversation phenomenon” (Schlütz 2016; cf., 
Mittell 2012–2013/2015; Allrath and Gymnich (eds) 2005).  
Hence, in going forward, key tenets fleshing out the critical-adaptive read on 
the PW could, in principle, be ultimately reconstructed out of Ryan’s “principle 
of minimal departure” (PoMD) (Ryan 1991:21ff.). As stated, in constructing a 
fictional world, participants principally dwell on latter’s similarity with the “real 
world”—a tendency, lest we forget, which is not necessarily exclusive to 
“realist” texts (Herman 2009b:82). Emergent gaps are filled with experiential 
knowledge, i.e., pre-learned, rudimentary everyday schemata152, a ‘formal’ 
toolbox with genre-specific expectations.153 The comprehension of “fiction,” 
then, involves the usage of tools—resources—for real-life thinking.  
In her classic Possible Worlds, Ryan prospects for a conceptual segment 
which would connect modal semantics to the theory of fiction. She evokes 
Aristotle’s recognition of “poet’s function [being to] describe, not the thing that 
has happened, but a kind of thing that might happen, i.e., what is possible as 
being probable or necessary” (Aristotle 1451a37–1451b26; The Revised Oxford 
Translation 1984:1459). 
Now, ordinarily Aristotle’s phrasing has been taken to convey that an author 
is something of a magician. Where’s initially an empty hat, an author pulls out a 
white rabbit. She lulls (or overwhelms) us with mundane (or prosaic), lest we 
sight the unsighted, i.e., read between the lines. However, we consistently do, 
and, therein, one may argue, might perhaps lay the mightiest paradox attri-
butable to narratives, by far. It can be suggested that Aristotle’s phrase conveys 
how in reception—permitting here an idiomatical play—we tend to forage for, 
appropriate, “poach” and invoke proverbial “trees” for the “forest.” To clarify: 
                                                            
150  A mild-mannered chemistry teacher with a secondary job as a car washer discovers that 
he is terminally sick, and possessing high grade knowledge of practical chemistry, proceeds 
to produce methamphetamine. 
151  Common ground with the “actual world” (AW) afforded by the depicted geography/ 
history, technological progress, natural species, human population. E.g., how the television 
production had to “move out” from the Whites’ house once its owner in the “real life” 
required it back.  
152  E.g., in the restaurant, you commonly sit down and wouldn’t storm the kitchen.  
153  E.g., unlike in horror genre, the dead don’t suddenly re-animate in dramas, whereas 
dramas rarely have conventional happy endings the way fairy tales, i.e., fantasy, do. 
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in deciphering hidden subtexts and veiled meanings, we absolutely thrive on 
second-guessing our narrative experience, even in seemingly redundant, 
“foolproof” cases. For Ryan, this kind of inherent distrust is precisely the 
essence linking with and emerging as hypothetical (counterfactual) “worlds.” 
Latter arise from slightest of (changes in) events, thence unraveling into diver-
gent potentialities (i.e., the butterfly effect; counterfactuals such as “killing 
Hitler as a baby,” etc.). However, as strikingly illustrated by strategic, though 
relatively en passant Aristotelian gambit here (as well as more specifically later 
on), Ryan also ends up revealing herself as an upholder of the mentalistic-
representationalist paradigm. 
By contrast, the present dissertation enacts a modest call to expand on and 
re-conceptualize this key idea of Aristotle, although bracketing his undisguised 
and presently conflicting affinity for “imitation” (cf., op. cit.:1453). Herewith, 
the key difference is sketched if we would understand Ryan addressing 
Aristotle’s phrase from within (i.e., author mediating the narrative, it being h/er 
“function”). Meanwhile, present work has insisted upon a kindred inter-
pretation, but from without. That is, one could inquire: what’s participant’s 
“business”? Piecing together author’s intent? Or instead, articulating, ordinarily 
in nuanced detail, ones’ own intending for? Differently put, as similarly active 
creators, recipients readily cultivate their proclivity to not only see more than 
meets the eye—but to transplant.  154 Accordingly, in consistently constructing 
and developing hypotheticals, participants also leverage their prosaic disposi-
tion to intend for someone.  
Previous description amounts to the core distinction making the emphasis on 
narrative persons (NPs) viz., potential real persons, significant. Specifically, 
NPs incrementally become through gliding, the ‘sorting’ of information—the 
key navigational force of beacon’s concurrent reciprocal and analytical-
methodological dimension, as maintained by the Extended Research Hypothesis 
above. Hence, gliding vacillates between contents of worlds NPs inhabitate 
either (i) as sovereign agents; (ii) in their independent thought as common-
sensically narrceptived by the recipient (my critical interpretation on Ryan’s 
“intent-world” (IW), see 2.3); (iii) or ultimately, in the “world” with(in) which 
NPs’ agency commences, writ large, including thus “extratextual” criticisms on 
storytelling strategies (text makers’ world), on the one hand, recipients’ real life 
experiences, on the other (i.e., twistory; see, chapter I). 
In short, then, narrative persons (NPs) are conceived of as exhibiting the 
virtually sovereign contours paralleling their potential real life counterparts. 
Consequently, they are developed in accordance with how the knowledge of 
“the Other” in an analogous real life situations emerges—as emphasized many a 
time throughout chapter I—as being “shaped” through and by intentionality (cf., 
chapter I, i.e., twistory; the scale of with-in). That is, NPs—as realitized 
“persons”—start to “inhabitate” similar experiential frames ordinarily explored 
by recipients with regards to their daily lives’ compatriots. Whilst observing 
                                                            
154  Taking the “active” stance, as opposed to “being transported.” See below for more. 
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these lives, there’s no mimesis, no simulative “becoming,” but a processual, 
intermeshing sense-making of them as them.  
Neurologically speaking this blueprint is followed in formulating extensive 
hypotheses about people—impinging on their “social field”—at large, their 
being “fictive” or “real,” notwithstanding. Indeed, extensive research on our 
brain processes has shown to corroborate this. As maintained by Sanford and 
Emmott (2012): “[T]here is considerable evidence showing that there is overlap 
in the areas of brain that are responsible for actual perception, and the 
imagination of perception” (ibid.:141, 160; emphases added).  
Another perspective, perhaps more accurately corroborating the non-
representationalist stance elaborated on previously and especially in chapter I, 
comes from the neuropragmatist current, drawing on classical pragmatism and 
neuroscience. Criticizing the cognitive neuroscience’s “mechanist” perspective 
of neat, sectionalized units, neuropragmatism proposes a non-reductionist view 
wherein diverse processes such as “[s]ensation, thought, feeling, and volition,” 
though “discriminable,” become “interfused” constituents in “continuous flow 
of neural activity” (Solymosi and Shook 2014:8; see, 2.3 for Herman’s (2013) 
provisions on this). Thus, “organism’s” situated interaction with environment is 
holistic and the assumptive clear line between “external world” and “[internal] 
cognition” dims. Cognition is interaction—we “transform [our] lived environ-
ment” (op. cit.:8,10), ‘shape’ the informational affordances for contextual “fits” 
(cf., the work of Gibsons’, shortly overviewed in chapter I). Consequently, 
neuropragmatists emphasize contexualized, ecological and social comprehen-
sion of cognition, for only in these active processes “mind is studied and 
nowhere else. At no time do an organism’s activities or cognition deal with 
some ‘external world’ that can be specified independently from the organism” 
(op. cit.:9; emphasis added). 
How does neuropragmatist view relate to issues scrutinized in present 
dissertation, however? Shortly put: if we would accept the hypothesis that 
viewers consider NPs as “social Others,” it stands to reason that both the latter 
and the “environment,” viz., their social-intentional “field,” become treated in 
“interfusional,” i.e., twistorial fashion. Similarly, above conception of “lived 
experience,” i.e., the inherent perceptual “transforming” of the life-while-it-
lives, also significantly links with the Rescherian/Doleželian observation of 
(possible) individuals’ conjoined agencies in being as a “possible world”; of 
making it—crucially—become through their interaction. “If a storyworld155 is 
anybody’s world, it is the world of the characters” (Ryan 2014:32). To put the 
same point in more specific terms for present purposes—as David Herman 
notes, referring to Lynne R. Baker’s work--“worlds” are “intention-dependent” 
(Cit. in: Herman 2013:75).  
                                                            
155  Ryan’s usage of “storyworld” here is mired by representationalism. Hence, I think it is 
wise to repeat that by my reasoning, the “storyworld“—my usage preserving the spirit of 
Herman’s—of the NPs cohers as the processual result the reciprocal sense-making (viz., 
sense reasoning) of former’s—as another’s—lived experience, their social field. For further 
criticism on Ryan, see below. 
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From here, I would reason, naturally flows that if—to paraphrase Doležel—
the existence (and interaction) of “entities” elevates story’s narrativity, it has to 
be taken bidirectionally. In proportion to the increased narrativity due to NPs, 
sense-making, or reasoning—viz., narrativizing proclivity—also heightens, and 
begets a social primacy, to boot. “Our thinking, decision-making … are all 
impacted by our environmental situations” (Sholymosi and Shook 2014:10). 
Hence, one could argue that reflexive (narrativizing) narrative experience, in 
particular, and narrative research, in general, can elaborate on what’s termed the 
“cultural origin of creative reasoning,” referring to potential fenestrations 
suggestive of “transmitted modes of cultural activities engaging human brains,” 
where not ready-made “theaters” of experiences are produced, but “rough 
continuities,” accentuating dynamic adequacy (ibid.:10,11). “Much of human 
experience … and all of knowledge is an emergent feature of social epistemic 
practices” (ibid.:12; emphasis added).  
This neuropragmatic and direct perceptionist emphasis on “environment”—
in union with Hutto’s “narrative practice” (see, chapter I)—gains further vigor 
from Vygotsky’s approach on the integrality of consciousness and behavior. 
Although a kind of implicit leitmotif for present work, chapter I did reference 
his legacy only in passing, however. I intend to rectify this in 2.3 by employing 
Vygotskyian thought in wholly solidifying my conception of Hermanian 
“worldying.” Vygotskian paradigm does still casts a productive shadow, 
reverberating in, say, social learning theory and cognitive anthropology where 
inherently social basis for “learning and development” are underscored 
(ibid.:38–39), and should therefore, I think, be expanded even further from 
existent usages in narrative research.  
On the surface, Ryan’s work might not necessarily disagree with the 
admittedly wide-ranged position outlined thus far, however some differences 
can perhaps be detected with regard to her later work, considered shortly (Ryan 
2014; cf., also Ciccoricco 2015). Nevertheless, Ryan’s earlier work distin-
guishes in narratives (i) “textual actual world (TAW) (the factual, i.e., explicit 
narrative information) and (ii) its “virtualities,” the implicit, i.e., non-factual. 
The immersion is thus deemed “imaginatively real,” Ryan maintains, complete 
with ontologically wholesome NPs (cf., Ryan 2005[2010]:591). Seemingly in 
accordance, then, with the previous discussion, “actualization” is always pre-
ceded by/simultaneous with counterfactual “intent-driven action[s].” To recall 
Lewis’ whole-part dialectics, Ryan concedes these virtualities as, for instance, 
the content of characters’ “intention-worlds” (IW). In Ryan’s framework, IWs 
are the PWs within the generic modality of TAW (see 2.3 for more). Elaborating 
on previous ideas, Ryan goes to generalize PWs as being (a) “imagined and 
asserted by the author;” (b) “imagined, believed, wished by the characters;” i.e., 
“sub-worlds” such as the IWs; (c) and, ultimately, the potential narrative “forks” 
reciprocally hypothesized (ibid.:591–592; Eco 1979[1984]:246).  
Considering the discussion up to this point, one mark appears crucially 
unchecked, however. Namely, the fourth kind of quality, arising from the 
participant↔NP interrelation for which I have proposed characterization 
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through my original notions of realitization and twistory. Consequently, here 
then I would have to take some departures from Ryan’s thought. These caveats 
have to be explained, however. In the edited volume of Storyworlds Across 
Media, Ryan argues, “[i]t is therefore necessary to distinguish the world as it is 
presented and shaped by a story from the world as it exists autonomously. The 
former is storyworld, the latter the reference world” (Ryan 2014:33). Ryan’s 
argument follows conventional core modal logic. What it boils down to, by my 
lights, is how you define “autonomously.” Drawing on the discussion thus far, 
an argument can be made that “storyworlds” (or rather, to avoid confusion with 
my usage of the latter term, narrative worlds) are “autonomously” existent, in 
the precise sense of this “me-Other,” intentional distinction which is afforded 
form by narrativized “worldying.” To be fair, Ryan may concede to that, for she 
clearly distinguishes “text of the story” as an “material object,” whereas story-
world as “the meaning” (ibid.:34)—and is not the very act of realitizizing, i.e., 
making real, meaningful? Similarly, why, if to utilize Ryan’s own phrasing, does 
“fiction[al] experience” have to nominally be “a blend of objective knowledge 
and make-belief [wherein recipient] pretends to believe that [storyworld] exists 
autonomously or, in other words, that it is real” (ibid.:34–35; emphasis added)?  
When talking of (tele)visual156 narratives, NPs can be depicted as, say, 
actively thinking (e.g., Walter White in that pivotal scene in his back-garden, 
concocting his poisoning plan). Yet, channeling Smith (see, chapter I), Ryan 
says of fiction films that “[recipients] pretend that they are watching un-
mediated events” (ibid.:38; emphasis added). Whilst implicitly rejecting 
Anderson’s Gibsonian “direct approach” take (or the interactionalist and 
intentionalist perspectives; see, chapter I), Ryan’s seeming persistence of 
“pretence” can conceivably be traced back to going against the grain of literary 
convention, wherein mere producing of several blank pages feigning “inner 
thought”—if to stay with suggested example—would obviously be absurd.  Is 157
reducing NPs to “imaginary representations” the only way out, though? To put 
the same point differently, televisual158 narratives in the “good writing” (the 
“complex,” “quality TV,” e.g., Breaking Bad et alii) variety are synonymous 
with abstaining from wearing characters’ inner thoughts (and or pent-up 
emotions) on one’s sleeve. This is discouraged indeed for the threat of losing 
maximum reciprocal effect. I would contend that narratology would find itself 
refreshed in embracing this crucial aspect in reception, even if it might 
contradict or undermine conventional theories established thus far. This is not to 
imply as if Ryan’s vision doesn’t permit expounding on the “phenomenological 
approach focused on the act of imagination,” for quite the contrary, Ryan’s 
adamant that “[w]hat can be the object of [representations], if not a world in 
                                                            
156  Or even cases of role-playing video games with complexly developed characters that the 
player may face in their quests, etc. 
157 Authors have experimented, obviously, e.g., William Faulkner. However, these kinds of 
aesthetical choices are not part of any currently governing “canon” that I know of.  
158  But also in cases of cinematic and visual artistry (i.e., graphic novels). 
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which readers, spectators, and players make themselves imaginatively at home” 
(ibid.:38; emphasis added). 
At issue here, of course, is the highlighted portion. What occurs is essentially 
a two-fold interchange of “authorities.” On the one hand, where previously text 
(author) “gave” the meanings (to unearth) and characters to “simulate,” “specta-
tors” now can just be “imaginatively” trespassing. On the other, it is as if such 
spectorial input dwindles insofar as they are told what they are arguably 
supposed to be doing. Indeed, one could counterclaim that it is not their “home” 
to “make” themselves anything “at,” but that of the NPs who inhabitate it; who 
effectively make it be by their presence with it (and observed doing so by 
“spectators,” or rather, by Zillmannian onlookers). In other words, to borrow 
Ryan’s own phrase, “dialogue of the deaf” (ibid.:27; cf., Introduction) appears 
preserved—NP as a potentially realitized “social Other” goes unacknowledged. 
Consequently—with noted ‘radical’ reservations intact—the theoretical 
framework outlined for present work can be supplemented with two crucial 
deductions for the convergence with the core inspiration of Ryan’s principle of 
minimal departure (PoMD) can nevertheless be anticipated. Considered under 
these specifically tuned auspices, then, PoMD can be observed to extend 
covering, on the one hand, NPs as if “real (social) Others” (irrespective of them 
actually being so, either technically or narratively speaking, cf., Heider and 
Simmel 1944; Sanford and Emmott 2012:140–141) and the genre-specific 
knowledge of what is “allowed” (in the narrative as an “material object”) and 
what is not, on the other. In the latter case, Ryan’s conception of TAW can be 
elaborated on to intersect with subsequent illustrative close analysis in chapter 
III where participants’ criticism on authors’ creative choices and potential 
disconcerting “logistical” issues vis-à-vis experiential narrative glides with and 
contributes to the construal of storyworld as narrceptivized in commentary 
texts, subsuming narrative persons’ intend-worlds (and or twistories developed 
with participants), and text makers’ worlds.   
As 2.0 hinted, my adaptive and critical reading of the Possible Worlds 
Theory proposes an alternative to various default conventions in theorizing. 
Having opted for a “traveling theories,” “theoretical sampler” approach 
throughout, present chapter has attempted fill the felt void with a further 
(analytically centered) elaboration on the thus far established theoretical 
alternative in highlighting the experiential reception (viz. ‘parasocial per-
ception’) of those who, in stories from time immemorial, enthrall us the most: 
people. However, as noted, rather than seizing the opportunity, narrative 
research has further contributed on advancing the manufacturedness of 
narratives and encounters therein. By underscoring the artifice with aplomb, 
narrative theory, instead of “cracking the code,” has perpetuated the enigma.  
Note though that any kind of “absolute” deciphering is obviously beyond the 
scope and intention of present dissertation (nor may it be entirely possible). I 
would hope, though—perhaps indeed against all hope—for my contribution 
being one of the initial steps, both in theory and in practice. Of course, it is not 
difficult—from a theoretical standpoint—to sympathize with the imperative/ 
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normative thinking, as exemplified by the still favorable artificiality and the 
“fictional”/”real” dichotomy. However, it is harder, if not to say rather 
nonsensical, to reiterate such dichotomical arguments when having observed 
and analyzed a real, “living” creative co-elaborative “reception”—a vernacular 
of a kind—such as one provided by the lengthy and plentiful Internet discussion 
on longitudinal TV serials like Breaking Bad. In short, the core of the discussion 
up to this point is reminiscent of Gore Vidal’s phrase from his Screening History 
(Vidal 1992): “I saw the world in movie terms, as who did not or, indeed, does 
not?” (Cit. in: Moss 2008:21). 
However, it remains to be ascertained how exactly does this “sorting” into 
“kinds” of “worlds” actually operate within the larger terminological framework 
of present dissertation. Here’s where primarily the notions of beacon, story-
world, and worldying (Herman 2002, 2013); but not less importantly, original 
notions of intend-world and text makers’ world, and ultimately, discourse 
world (van Dijk) become foregrounded and accordingly explicated. 
 
 
2.2. Beacon’s dialecticality—what, why, and for whom?  
As I envision it, beacon is a dialectical mechanism of illumination, encircling 
and mirroring the becomings of the discourse world—from the perspective of 
the analyst—and that of the storyworld—from the perspective of the partici-
pant, respectively. In short, beacon is a bottom-up mechanism, containing 
multitudes (co-elaboration of worlds) by scrutinizing and affiliating singularities 
(commentary text, viz. narrcept, demarcating a becoming storyworld). At its 
most generic, then, beacon pursues “natural, characteristically un-guided 
pattern forming which emphasizes thematic focal points as they emerge in sy-
nergic long-term commentary discussions” (Sorokin 2015:9; emphasis in 
original). 
Why have I opted for the notion of “beacon,” specifically, however? Prima-
rily for its association, indeed direct responsibility for, navigation. As I have 
envisioned, by installing beacon as a “mobile signal fire,” this notion explicitly 
“enacts” the (observant) narration of seemingly chaotic and vast-scale online 
communication processes spanning weeks/years.159 Functionally, and analo-
gically to real life (i.e., its act of “blinking for”), beacon is recursive and self-
productive. Insofar as its real existence is preordained by deceptive waters and 
seafarer’s hardship, beacon’s abstract usability owes to the characteristic 
convergences and reverberations of the multiple “worlds” which it decomposes 
(differentiation into kinds of worlds) and composes (unification into a (possible 
interpretation of a) discourse world). Meanwhile, beacon itself, too, is 
developed through both processes (and through the narrcepts, as expressed 
through commentary texts, wherefrom the multitudes of worlds originally 
germinate) (see, 2.0, 2.1; for analysis, chapter III, 3.4–3.5). Ultimately, beacon 
                                                            
159  In present work, the analytical focus is on a key fortnight of episodic discussions, with 
large quantities of data left for future investigations. 
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may be taken as the “purest” analytical tool for it effectively obfuscates where 
“empiricality” ends and “theorizing” begins; it emerged from the data, whilst 
emerging (“shedding light to”) particular sectors of data, simultaneously. 
Specifically in regards to Breaking Bad’s Internet feedback, beacon lays bare 
convoluted viewerly understandings, the kinds of networks comprised of NPs 
intertwined “social fields,” distributable into categories of “kinds” of “worlds.” 
However, it is crucial to underscore here that to take the extracted and thus 
highlighted communicational patterns as “narratives” strictu sensu would be 
misleading. Rather, by its very design, the continual construal towards the 
understanding of NPs—be it singularly (narrcepts) or co-elaboratively 
(“discourse world”) by the participants—evinces a narrative quality. This is due 
to intrinsic reciprocal aspiration and proclivity for intentional readings, of 
grasping for the coherence and closeablity (of narrative) and of (realitized) 
persons’ stories (therewith), on the one hand; and of the analyst him/erself being 
the last, though merely one possible and incomplete at that, “instance” of the 
story formation, on the other.  
Even in cases where an answer is obtained, its suitability might be ultimately 
unsatisfying due to “logistical” inconsistencies.160 Hence, narrceptual involve-
ment also emphasizes narrative uncertainties which consistently escape the 
ordained closure of “narrative prison” (Boje and Durant 2013:23). Nonetheless, 
the preservation of the nuanced contextual knowledge of some NP(s) is under-
scored, making it—in effect—the rich lens through which relevant ambivalent 
events with regards to them become re-evaluated. 
Hence, these bits of knowledge—what I am calling attention-drawing (collo-
cating, in the spirit of Mello’s (2002), see below) narrative motifs—should not 
be conceived of as appropriated narrative information (Jenkins, fanfiction), but 
preferably as acknowledgements—conveying the intendings-of someone (albeit 
“fictional”). In other words, though “logistic gaps” in storytelling are detected 
and addressed accordingly (see, text makers’ world), viewers endeavor to 
respect the integrity of a (narrative) person’s “story,” their narrative with—as 
opposed to within—the (overarching) narrative. Taken from the analytical 
perspective and afforded a wider extent, IBM’s natural language analyzing and 
data mining software SPSS Text Analysis for Surveys161 (TAS4) affords to 
keenly observe such complex sense-making (viz. sense reasoning) at work.  
As I will clarify further in chapter III, having (i) outlined these distinctive 
narrative motifs, viz. “communication artifacts” (cf., Crowston et al. 2012) 
(RICIN, CIGARETTE, POISON) in the preliminary pilot analysis in concert 
with the theoretical discussion, and (ii) having interlaced these with data 
pertaining to concrete NPs, noted software enabled to tease out layered 
discursive itineraries, specifically tailored to focus on NPs. The large variety of 
dynamisms unearthed by TAS4 allowed crafting a naturalistic theory—
established in chapter I and elaborated further presently, in chapter II—which 
                                                            
160  E.g., as suggested by the feedback on Breaking Bad’s “End Times,” Walt was otherwise 
occupied and couldn’t have poisoned the kid. 
161  Version 4.0.1 [4.0.1.97] (c) 2010.  
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proposes an intriguing alternative to the traditional understanding of narrative in 
general and, in case of Breaking Bad, of “character” in particular. Consequently, 
indications relating to the assumptions of narrative’s intrinsic finalizability and 
its “phasing” towards closure, respectively, can conceivably be drawn. As such, 
the “alternative” reading permits beacon—as a contextualizing impulse deve-
loping world-arrays—to crystallize also as an agent of meta-narration, as it 
were, mediating narrations in situ—a feat so far pegged as unrealizable (cf., 
Abbott 2008). 
 
 
2.2.1 Making sense of sense-makers: the “analytical” and 
“reciprocal” dimensions of the beacon 
As noted, beacon is a dialectical mechanism. As such, a beacon’s “analytical 
dimension” corresponds to the observation that during the analysis, the data be-
come exceedingly more “storied” and narrative the “[tool for the] way of 
knowing” and circumscribing the always already evolving storytelling (Mello 
2002; Gubrium and Holstein 1998; Clandinin and Connelly 2000; cf., Eaves and 
Walton 2013; Davalos et al. 2015). In circumscribing such processual quality of 
storytelling, the objective of this kind of narrative mediation is to preserve the 
integrity of the situation of telling in developing data-specific model of 
analysis.162  
This context-sensitive and all-inclusive, i.e., “collocative” analysis, as coined 
by qualitative analyst Robin A. Mello (2002) tracks temporal evolutions within 
the “worlds.” Beacon consistently “sheds light at,” decomposes, composes and 
pursues the alterations in these potentialities. Within these fluid ‘pockets’ of 
narrative experience, miscellaneous internal “histories” (e.g., the query of 
Jesse’s lost cigarette and its potential relation to Walt’s/Gus’ guilt) are explored 
and minutely scrutinized, as the narrcepts and, especially, their interrelations 
reveal. Put differently, this (in a very broad sense) historically conditioned 
sense-making (or reasoning) reflects on the longitudinal and jointly constructed 
inquiry into given narrative experience and its (shared) “structure.” That is, how 
the participants co-elaboratively expound on their joint experience and how the 
analyst, being the “last instance operator” within/of such participatory activity, 
reflects on the former in order to construct their “narration of narrations” (cf., 
Mello 2002:234,238). 
To get a more clarified sense of beacon’s “reciprocal dimension,” however, 
one would have to shortly review leading theories concentrating specifically on 
(the formats of) sense-making—beacon’s operative variances (cf., (i) in Intro-
duction).  
                                                            
162  I.e., the ’story’ of the “discourse world“; its setting – blog or forum; time of the telling 
(either promply after the broadcast, or few-to-several days later; teller and his/her 
interconnections with other participants if any, either across different loci or within a 
singular one, etc. All this marks a diverse range of issues that necessarily are not all covered 
in the present dissertation, but can be investigated in further depth in the future. 
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Consequently, reader-response theorist and anti-foundationalist Stanley Fish, 
back in the 1980’s, led with two key questions: “what does this mean?” and 
“what does this do?” As text’s meaning develops dynamically in parallel with 
“reader’s expectations, projections, conclusions [and] judgements,” Fish ex-
plains, the generic inquiry of the former becomes superseded by the latter. The 
“do” points simultaneously at the “action of the text on a reader” and at the 
“actions performed by a reader as he negotiates the text” (Fish 1982:2–3; 
emphases in original). Such “meaning experience,” to employ Fish’s phrase, 
emerges gradually from the on-line interaction between text and response, i.e., 
the “situated interpretive labor” (Fish 1989[1995]:8). Fish circumscribes above 
as the primary, “common” reading experience. However, he deems such 
perspective necessarily incomplete. Namely, one further builds on such 
“primary” response in one’s reflexion on it (the “after-the-fact” level, viz. the 
post-broadcast discussions). Fish refers to these acts as intellecting the 
(primary) experience, of groping the “aboutness” itself. As he argues, it is the 
interrogation of a particular “configuratio[n] of experience” (ibid.:4–7).163 
Fish goes to argue that although one can circumscribe the subjective (con-
text) model (of the situated discourse), the “authorizing agency” of inter-
pretation is “at once both and neither.” That is to say, shared strategies of sense-
making overthrow both the “subject” and “text” as root constituents. Hence, 
Fish’s arguments corroborate the claims entertained throughout the present 
work (ibid.:13–14). Also, it is additionally crucial here to observe Fish’s 
implication of analyst’s role, suggesting that whilst analyzing peoples’ 
“meaning experience” (say, induced by means of reading or audiovisually), the 
analyst tunes themselves to the participants’ mental context, for “on any one 
moment in the reading experience [analyst] must take into account all that has 
happened (in the reader’s mind) at previous moments, each of which was in its 
turn subject to the accumulating pressures of its predecessors” (Fish 1982:27; 
emphasis added). 
In accordance with what I indicated previously as “internal histories”—
manifesting, as it were, through the beacon’s decomposition/composition into 
“worlds”—Fish’s method further underscores the temporal, processual nature of 
the reading (viz. Other-observing) experience by “slow[ing] [it] down ... so that 
“events” one does not notice in normal time, but which do occur, are brought 
before our analytical attentions” (ibid.:28; emphasis added). 
In a nutshell, then, Fish’s proposition supports the thesis of highly context-
sensitive editorial “read” on readings, or, as I put it previously, a narration of 
(viewerly, ongoing) narrations (cf., Mello 2002; see also, Fish 1989[1995]; cf., 
Jahn 1999).  
For her part, Hilary P. Dannenberg, also a literary theorist, coined the notion 
of liminal plotting. Latter term is meant to convey the emphasis on how future-
oriented suspense (e.g., Hitchcock's bomb and table) directs readers’ mental 
engagement by way of a kind of fast-forwarding technique (Dannenberg 2004, 
                                                            
163  However, cf., Pier (2005:241-242,244). 
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2008:36–39). This consideration of “fast-forwarding” is what I would like to 
especially emphasize here. As Dannenberg explains, while entrenched in the 
narrative present, recipients construct potential “logical extrapolations” to some 
suspenseful story sequence currently at hand (cf. narrative motifs). They 
construct possible futures (as-if counterfactuals) which are then stored as in-
progress “mental images” (2008:38). These tendencies are especially en-
couraged by (or more accurately, through) complex narratives that “weav[e] a 
rich, ontologically multidimensional fabric of alternate possibilities,” thus 
unyielding to, and perhaps excluding even, the “authoritative” version (ibid.; 
46, 116; cf., Thompson and Byrne 2002; Gallagher 2011).  
Subsequently, Dannenberg introduces the notion of “double immersion.” 
Here, recipient's attention “is spliced between two temporal realms within the 
narrative world” (emphasis added)—that of narrative's “actional present,” and 
that of reader's liminal imagery contemplating possible futures. Thus, Dannen-
berg appears to assert that while constructing such mental imagery, one is still 
situated in narrative, as if its all-embracing immersive effect would suppress 
any independent cognitive space. Although such incongruity is significant for 
current work—and I thus unwise to overlook—its existence is not necessarily 
relevant for Dannenberg. After all, her examination also, as many a repre-
sentationalist and simulationalist, admits to the rubric of transportation and 
trespassing, whilst simultaneously supposedly making the traveler “oblivious” 
to the outside world (ibid.:38–39).  
However, for present purposes, experiential narrative proper (i.e., perception 
of suspenseful “actional present”) and the mental constructing it facilitates 
should not be conflated to indicate one interchangeable cognitive realm. Alter-
natively, such distinction should highlight a dyadic pairing which would clearly 
differentiate the agencies involved in this kind of double-layered mental 
functioning (cf., twistory). Consequently, there would be internally-fueled 
suspense (suspense induced by the creative paces performed), on the one hand; 
and externally-fueled suspense (how narrative's “actional present” is perceived 
by the recipient), on the other. My line of thought is corroborated by cognitive 
linguist Barbara Dancygier's recent attempt, one could say, at liberating the 
notion of suspense out from under the decades’-long stronghold of narrative 
proper. Namely, as she aptly claims, suspense essentially is “our need to engage 
with the text and [to] have the intention to complete the gaps in the story” 
(Dancygier 2012:37; emphasis added). In other words, suspense, also, is some-
thing actively constructed whilst engaged with narratives, in general, and with 
regards to the NPs inhabitating the former, in particular, that is, the focus of the 
present work (see also, Dannenberg 2014; Prince 1988). Similarly, Monika 
Fludernik’s (1996[2005]) account164 insisted that even a gaping deficit of useable 
narrative “inputs” does not appear to constrain us creatively. By Fludernik's 
assertion, even if confronted with a narrative situation where our unabridged 
                                                            
164  For which the “direct realist” mindset accompanying present dissertation is—at least 
partially—indebted to.  
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comprehension becomes severely restricted, are we to remain bound by narrative 
proclivity (cf., Ochs and Capps 2001). In Fludernik's four level-model of what she 
termed “natural narratology,” this tactic became known as narrativization. 
Confronted with texts that are perceived as “radically inconsistent,” recipients 
“cast about for ways and means” for interpretive recuperation.165  
 
 
2.3. The Emergent worlds of the blinking beacon 
2.3.1 Worldying the storyworld 
David Herman introduces “storyworld” as a context-sensitive modeler, ope-
rating at an integrative and measured pace and outlining “the ecology of 
narrative interpretation”: 
 
[In] making sense of narrative, interpreters attempt to reconstruct not just what 
happened – who did what to who and with whom, for how long, how often and 
in what order – but also the surrounding context or environment embedding 
existents, their attributes, and the actions and events in which they are more or 
less centrally involved.  
[…] 
Recipients do not just attempt to piece together bits of action into a linear 
timeline but furthermore try to measure the significance of that timeline that 
emerges against other possible courses of development in the world [in 
question]. (Herman 2002:13–14; emphases added.) 
 
In other words, Herman’s storyworld evinces a “macrolevel,” bottom-up quality, 
reciprocally-speaking. Narrative (e.g., a television serial) becomes understood 
as a foundational “blueprint,” consisting of “textual cues” (some of which 
specifically “stand out,” i.e., narrative motifs). During narrative experience, as 
Herman explains it, recipients attempt to reconstruct the integrity of the 
narrative by tracking surrounding context and existences—whom I am calling 
NPs—and their interrelations, i.e., “intentional field” (Wulff); or what Herman 
(2002:14) calls, following von Wright, “larger acting situation”) therewith. 
Accordingly, recipients are ceaselessly integrating such variegated narrative 
constituency into a cohesive unity, while additionally continuously “measuring” 
the significance of their own creation (cf., Herman 1997; cf., Fish’s intel-
lection). Nevertheless, Herman’s initial treatment of storyworld (Herman 2002), 
similarly to Ryan’s PoMD, appears, at least to an extent, grounded in 
mentalistic-reprentationalist, or perhaps more specifically, in ”first personal” 
conceptualizations. Although storyworld is professed possessing “world-
creating [power]” vis-à-vis narrative, such operation foregrounds a predestined 
quality of “transportation,” compounding to projections and “liv[ing] out[s]” 
                                                            
165  Similar kind of arguments are put forth for real life situations also: “people tend to 
change unusual events to make them more normal” (Byrne 2005:5; emphasis added). See 
discussion on Hutto’s (2008) “normalization,” in chapter I. 
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from within (op. cit.:15–17; recall previous discussion on Ryan; also, Dan-
nenberg above). Nevertheless, even within this apparent stranglehold, there are 
detectable antithetical glimmers (see, e.g., ibid.:23–24, Herman drawing on 
Garfinkel (1967). That is, the distinctive narrative (narrativizing) proclivity 
inherent to everyday social relations, of how we consistently “make sense” (out 
of) our experiences (of our experiences) (cf., Herman 2003b, 2003d, 2011). 
Latter ideas make a far more established, stronger and sophisticated re-entry 
in Herman’s recent Storytelling and the Sciences of Mind (2013). This work 
expands on the idea of “blueprint,” however uniting within it both (1) the aspect 
of “world,” and (2) those inhabitating it. Hence, it builds towards clarifying how 
“stories provide an optimal context” for (developing a theoretical framework in) 
understanding (realitizing?) the “model persons” (Herman 2002:24; op. cit.:76): 
“Stories [are] the primary means for evoking worlds of various sorts, inven-
torying the persons and other entities that inhabit those worlds, and tracing out 
the consequences of actions and events impinging on the domain of the … 
persons in the worlds in question” (ibid.:78–79; emphases added). 
Note also how Herman’s usage of “domain” can be conceived of as 
corresponding to my core claim about the sovereignty of the NPs. This is further 
corroborated both by Herman’s firm antireductionist stance viewing “person as 
a basic concept or category [constituting an] autonomous analytic domain” 
(ibid.:79); as well as through his rather extensive and thoroughgoing utilization 
of ecological and intersubjective approaches to the question(s) of “person” (and 
by extension, “environment”) which, in broad strokes, parallel dialogues with 
various “travelling theories” attempted throughout chapter I (ibid.:80ff.; see 
also, Sorokin 2016a).  
In short, Herman’s objective—in building on the tradition accommodating 
Vygotsky, Gibson, and others—is to develop an inclusive account of narrative 
as a perspective-enfolding “instrument of mind,” viz. one’s natural “affordance” 
in making sense of the world (the surroundings)—characterized by our base 
intentional proclivity of acting—and of presuming another to act—for reasons. 
As Herman puts it, “narrative constitutes a time-tested instrument for navigating 
human-scale environments for acting and interacting” (op. cit.:83; emphases 
added). Now, my accentuation of “navigating” obviously wasn’t accidental for 
its employment recalls my original notion of beacon (see, 2.2): a dialectical 
mechanism of navigation, decomposing and composing the “worlds,” in both 
kinds of narrceptual thinking—in the situation of reflexive reception; and later, 
as tracked, collocated and narrativized by the analyst.  
By way of an example, when Herman subscribes a particular “sense-making 
power” to a compact sports (tennis) news bulletin, lamenting diverse number of 
features converging into it (time frames, people, events, etc.), I would suggest 
beacon as being the organizing—or, if to borrow Herman’s term, “meso-
physical166,” everyday—“force” behind (i) not only making sense of (i.e., 
                                                            
166  Herman builds throughout present argumentation on Gibson’s notion of “terrestrial 
event.“ 
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granting “access,” “shedding light” to) these two hundred odd words packed 
with meaningful information (“composition”), but (ii) also guiding him in 
disentangling this “narrative” in providing further nuanced detail (“decom-
position” into (composite) “worlds” that collapse on the storyworld) (see, 
ibid.:83–85). Drawing on the above, but also on the previous discussion on 
neuropragmatism, beacon’s operation follows a similar kind of “internalizing” 
(Vygotsky) logic vis-à-vis NPs and participants. Namely, beacon helps the latter 
in “calibrating” particular kinds of storyworlds (enacted through narrcepts) in 
situating events and their (potential, revealed/rejected) consequences “at the 
person level” (ibid.:85). That is, beacon first and foremost embeds the former in 
the wide and confined context for acting (for someone). Thereafter, beacon’s 
instrumentality highlights analyst’s narrceptual thinking—of how he/she further 
situates these individual storytellings within the grander becoming discursive 
scheme, i.e., the discourse world.  
However, if to maintain that these upshots convey two kinds of “be-
comings”—(i) the becoming of the storyworld, (ii) and the becoming of the 
discourse world (see, 2.3.4 below)—what still lacks is a concrete clarification 
of the “worlds” affiliating the two. That is, it remains to be asked how the 
intend-world and the text makers’ world both develop, merge with and relate 
to this overarching “possible worlds” framework that I am specifically sug-
gesting here. Consequently, I will provide a short, abstract theoretical sketch 
with regards to both (for the analytical treatment, see, chapter III, 3.4–3.5).  
 
Worldying the intend-worlds 
Marie-Laurie Ryan’s approach to intention-world (I-world, IW) preserves and 
expands on, I would contend, her entire—as argued in 2.3—from within account 
(Ryan 1985, 1991, 2005[2010]). Hence, Ryan views IWs as “representations,” 
“fictions-within-fictions” (Ryan 2005[2010]), wherein “a character commits 
himself, privately or to witness, to reaching a certain target” by following, or 
“projecting” a certain “course of action.” Ryan’s perspective can perhaps, to an 
extent, be viewed as corroborating the sovereignty claims entertained in my 
project, though truthfully, it may also interpolate with it. Namely, Ryan doesn’t 
go further than allowing the recipient a mere tracking of representation’s repre-
sentations, whilst preserving the teleological imperative, i.e., it is always and 
only the narrative that’s supposed to give practical “cues” for its closeability. 
By contrast, what I would define as intend-world167 does not only rely on 
obtained information, “privately or to witness,” for—as I have noted pre-
viously—in televisual media we lack auxiliary material to consult what a NP 
might have thought in cases when it is left unexpressed, even if this “lack” is, 
indeed, “to witness” (recall the scene of “actively” thinking Walter in his back-
garden, playing Russian Roulette with his revolver). It is precisely here where—
in my opinion—reciprocally passive “intention-world” becomes intend-world: 
                                                            
167  I would rather opt to such a notion in order to explicitly differentiate “intention” (noun) 
from “[to] intend” (verb), in order to preserve consistency with beacon and its processual 
navigation.   
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participants intend from without, trying to comprehend realitized NPs and their 
social relations, whereas the latter still preserve their sovereignty with their AW 
(actual world).  As a result, the interpretative space inherent in Ryan’s orig168 inal 
notion (and also in Werth’s “private worlds” (Werth 1999)—I would maintain—
expands and gains more weight with regard to in situ sense-making (viz. sense 
reasoning) processes. To summarize: because Ryan’s account of NP’s “private 
world” is nevertheless rooted in latter’s textual representation, it is not exactly 
neither accurate nor appropriate for present discussion. That is, once a social 
relation with NPs is established, viz. intentional stance directed at them, any 
kind of monological “private world” becomes promptly nonsensical. Instead, 
shared spaces emerge, wherein inter-party intend-worlds may even intersect and 
correspond, if and when necessary (twistory, see chapter I).   
 
Worldying the text makers’ world 
To the best of my knowledge, my conception of the text makers’ world is 
original insofar as the conventional accounts of “textworld” appear inapplicable 
for present purposes. As I am envisioning it, viewers/participants juxtapose their 
construals of narrative events and (potential) acts of NPs with how narrative’s 
“material” authors (i.e., creator Vince Gilligan, his “writers room,” as it were) 
may have undermined either the “correct” intentional activity of the NPs, the 
events latter significantly factor into, or both. In other words, in correspondence 
to the commonsensical, “realist” approach, what participants do is “leveling” 
the proverbial playing field, as it were. Thereby, they don’t “switch frames” nor 
make “inferential walks” as more or less oriented by the narrative. 
Rather, in the criticisms, evaluations, suspicions, and discrepancies mounted 
toward the script writers as “text makers,” participants reveal a unifying, 
inclusive undercurrent with other facets of narrceptive thought. That is, both 
NPs and “text makers” are approached to as “equals.” Partial within the overall 
process, the latter, too, are subscribed a particular acting for reason, i.e., the 
writing to best to their ability (subjectively taken). In other words, taken from 
the perspective of the narrceptivized storyworld, script writers—insofar as 
characters become NPs—are also “actors,” “doers,” reasoning agents whose 
intentions participants aim to elucidate, though from grounds seemingly 
different than those of the NPs; although insofar as in the becoming storyworld, 
developed by the beacon on the principle of a non-hierarchal array, these kinds 
of differences are negligible.  
For all intents and purposes, then, the text makers’ world can, in some ways, 
be collapsed with how, e.g., Herman has treated reciprocal proclivity to 
scrutinize the “authorial intent,” though the twist is that it is not “authorial” any 
longer (pace Jenkins), but part of a larger, composite, co-elaborated pattern—a 
storyworld into (a potential) discourse world (former writ large). Although 
                                                            
168  AW I am largely taking in Ryanian sense. I don’t think of there being any major conflicts 
in doing so. 
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storyworld may persist to some degree of internal “hierarchies of certainty169,” 
it is nevertheless structured by deploying equal array of purpose in “sorting” 
into “kinds.” As such, everything in the becoming storyworld is/becomes to be 
“story-able,” “story-ied.” 
Consequently, storyworld, as I envision it, doesn’t discriminate between 
narrative events, persons of whatever “origin,” their (possible, assumed) 
intentional functioning, e.g., “authorial”170 choices and contingent backslashes 
latter might portend (i.e., the consistency with NP’s “life narrative”), etc. Story-
world, then, is, in short, the proverbial meeting ground of all related persons, 
perceived to act for reasons. At its most minimalist, this is established every 
now and again in singular narrcepts (wherein storyworld first becomes), 
whereas at its most maximalist, these tendencies find their expression in the 
becoming discourse world. As such, almost everything but the attention-
catching narrative motifs are “shifted” outside the purview of the “text,” 
wherein meanings are mere—as Valentina Pisanty, in her recent article on Eco’s 
legacy, very beautifully yet symptomatically put—”embryo[es] within the text 
itself” (Pisanty 2015:38).  
Contrastively, the present project suggests that the senses made are not only 
based on the “appropriated” information (i.e., narrative motifs), but that the 
latter is, at most, instigator of a process intertwining absolutely everything.171 
Hence, ultimately the position as if “text” “gives” anything cannot be supported 
in its fullest sense. Obviously, text as narrative has its function, but only insofar 
it highlights the partial story(world) made sense of. Or, to put the same point 
differently, “incompleteness” is, in effect, brought along, not “found” (and 
“solved” thereafter).   However, Pisanty’s very attentive observation can leave 172
some space for maneuvering vis-à-vis Eco. Namely, his earlier work173 The 
Open Work proposes a “second meaning” of openness for the work of art. This 
resides in recipient’s “’estranged’ attitude towards the text, while being at the 
same time encouraged by the aesthetic text itself” (Pisanty 2015:41). I will 
leave it open for discussion, however—for the position of “estrangement” might 
                                                            
169  I.e., there is more to be gleaned from the extra-narrative materials on the writing process, 
say, whereas in case of NPs participants are wholly left to develop their own on-the-go 
storyworlds. 
170  In fact, it can be argued that any kind of “authority” is, in effect, liquidated. There just 
are persons, carrying various kinds of interest (i.e., being “shed” beacon’s “light” on, 
accordingly), in the middle of the sense-making process. Also note how my suggestion of 
text makers’ world expands on Booth’s notion of “television social network” (see, Chapter 
I), for script writers as “textmakers” can also be observed and made sense (reasoned) of as 
“nodes” in the overarching social interrelations.  
171  Real life frames can develop into twistory; NPs’ “social field” relates to their intend-
world; script writers’ choices and following reciprocal criticism thereof emerges as text 
makers’ world—and all the above “feeds into” story- and, ultimately, discourse world. 
172  In this assumption also the grander human design reverberates, conditioning peoples’ 
proclivity to, ipso facto, seek “coherent” narratives in their lives. Accordingly, “solving” is 
illusory, overshadowed by  interminability and unfinalizability. 
173  Taken in the order of the publications in the original language. 
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not necessarily be what this work supports—but, as a sum total, it may be the 
closest Eco comes to sympathizing with the general spirit of the ideas presently 
entertained. 
 
 
2.3.2 Story(world)ing the discourse world 
Before departing to shortly clarify technical matters and concluding with the 
final Sample Analysis (see, chapter III, 3.4–3.5), the totality of the theoretical 
discussion up to this point has to converge. Such a congregation can be found—
as referenced many times previously—in what I envision as the discourse 
worlds (DW) of (in) current investigation. Heretofore, I have specified DW as 
the becoming inherent to the “analytical dimension” of the beacon. It charac-
terizes the analyst as an editorial agency decomposing and composing the 
“worlds” (intend-world↔text makers’ world↔storyworld) participants develop 
online in making sense of the NPs and the narrative—as former’s “social field.” 
For a concluding elaboration, I will utilize both the pioneering work of 
discourse analyst Teun A. van Dijk (van Dijk 1976, 1980, 2008) as well as 
recent MDA (mediated discourse analysis) approach, especially the promising 
notion of site of engagement introduced therein (Jones 2005; Norris and Jones 
2005b; cf., Jones and Norris 2005a; Norris and Jones 2005a).  
As Jones and Norris’ (2005a) discussion reveals, building on MDA also 
proves consistent with and complements previously adapted Hermanian posi-
tion of storytelling exploited as a “cultural tool” for thinking—an “affordance” 
with “real time” (viz. online) social expression (see, 2.3.1; ibid.:5; Vygotsky 
1930[1978]; Wertsch 1998; Bakhtin 1981; cf., chapter I). Specifically, MDA 
approach towards “discourse” is developed from an “actionalist” position:  
 
[T]he relationship between the discourse and action is dynamic and contingent, 
located at a nexus of social practices, social identities and social goals. This 
relationship is manifested in the tension between the kinds of action that 
discourse and other cultural tools make possible and the ways people purpose-
fully mix these tools in response to their immediate circumstances. MDA sees 
discourse as ‘cycling’ through social actions. (Jones and Norris 2005:9; em-
phases added) 
 
Such description dovetails relatively smoothly with what I have suggested my 
original notion of beacon to entail. As proposed, beacon’s internal dialectical 
nature affords it (i) particular kind of “tension”—pitting “popular” and “acade-
mic” sense-making through “worldying”—, and (ii) mobility. By latter distinc-
tion, it “cycle[s]” through/between as well as “sheds light on” the becoming 
“worlds.” Bearing this in mind, beacon, in a way, elaborates on MDA’s theo-
retical framework as well as solidifies the case for the significance of actively 
monitoring and “updating” the situative experiences of experiences (of “big D” 
Discourse, like narrative such as a TV-show, and its production174; see, ibid.:10). 
                                                            
174  Both discernable as well as assumptive. 
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Indeed, one of MDA’s key notions, site of engagement (SoE), concentrates on 
the virtual “social practices,” transpiring in “real time.” In solidarity with 
activity theory (cf. 2.3) and interactional approach more widely, a site of 
engagement is identified as an “amalgamatio[n] of the pattern of orientation 
towards time and space that participants bring to these moments and locations 
of social action mediated through … attention structures” (ibid.:140; emphasis 
in original; Jones 2005:141). 
Subsequently, researcher’s involvement is not neglected, but positioned 
accordingly: 
 
[It is considered] how we as researchers contribute to the construction of such 
spaces through our own actions, and how multiple trajectories of actions and 
practices of both the researcher and the researched converge in these sites of 
engagement. (ibid.; emphasis added; cf., Hafstein 2014; Mello 2002)   
 
Hence, MDA approximates leading ideas of present dissertation in embracing 
“anticipatory discourses” with processual disposition (Jones 2005:ibid.; see 
also, De Saint-Georges 2005 in the same volume). Further, as Jones (2005) 
proposes, actions—such as storytelling175 (cf., Hutto and Kirchhoff 2015)—do 
not “occur ‘in’ or ‘at’ but as sites of engagement” (op. cit..:143; emphasis in 
original). Hence, Jones’ treatment preserves consistency with my principal 
approach (see, 2.2.1 passim). Meanwhile, the notion of “attention structures” 
retains a certain family resemblance with my conceptualization of narrative 
motifs, for they, too “open up [SoEs, which are] made up of … those aspects of 
space and time that we are inclined to pay attention to. We construct [SoEs] 
through our attention” (ibid.:152; emphasis in original, underlining added).176  
Significantly for present usage, aforementioned notion evinces a “distri-
buted” quality, setting out “across social, physical, conceptual [and] relational 
structures” (ibid.:152–153). Incidentally, this suggestion further solidifies the 
case for present utilization of natural language processing and data mining 
software for the qualitative analysis of such “anticipating discourses” across 
diverse digital platforms (blogs, forums) for the latter reveal consistent con-
verging on similar narrative motifs (or, indeed, topical “attention structures”). 
Accordingly, the notion of “attention” splices individual (cognitive) and social 
undertones, respectively. It converts into a particular quality the “interlocutors 
trade in interaction” (ibid.:153).  
It is therefore not difficult to surmise MDA’s “actionalist” perspective to 
evince a kind of social constructionist format, already readily existent in the 
                                                            
175  Note van Dijk having drawn similar linkages back in his 1974 University of Amsterdam 
seminar: “[N]arrative discourse is an interesting empirical testing ground for the theory of 
action” (van Dijk 1974:287). 
176  Rodney H. Jones draws here on work on “attention economics,” underscoring the 
attractiveness of information “in an age of information overload” (see, ibid.). I wouldn’t take 
it as much of a stretch to expand these ideas to also cover—to a degree—„complex TV” 
reception, on the one hand, and the enormous quantity of feedback produced by the “creative 
vernacular” online, on the other.   
141 
adage of “discourse in action.” Now, as maintained by the constructivist posi-
tion, taken broadly, there’s no “objective,” factual experience. Instead, there’s 
the reflexive reconstruction of the latter, of opining about it post-occurrence 
from the fleeting perspective of a “now” which Ricœur had called the “pointlike 
instant” (van Dijk 2008:24–25,56–61; Ricoeur 1984:9; cf., Bruner 1991a).177 
Accordingly, van Dijk persists that as a general practice, discourse elements are 
related to the what, i.e., the central situation spoken about. Meanwhile, the 
how—the socio-cultural, pragmatic mental “interface” between the two—is 
effectively omitted (van Dijk 2008:57,72–73; however see, Jones and Norris 
2005:9, for the “actionalist” approach on what). 
My present endeavor can be aligned with van Dijk’s key works insofar as I 
have sought a theoretical symbiosis amidst what he calls the “organizations of 
knowledge” (van Dijk 1980:vii)—discourse, context, (narrative) macro-, super- 
and microstructure—and elaborated on it (i) through the introduction of my 
own original notions, and (i) by critically adapting and complementing the base 
terminology of the Possible Worlds Theory. Incidentally, the notions of “inten-
tion” and “goals” are significant fixtures in van Dijk’s theory of context. For 
van Dijk, they formulate an interdependent duality defined as follows: 
 
[I]ntentions [are] (parts of) mental models. Intending an action is constructing a 
mental model of an ongoing or future fragment of conduct. 
[G]oals [are] mental models of actions and their wanted consequences. 
(van Dijk 2008:81; emphasis in original) 
 
Van Dijk’s mentalistic-representationalist leanings notwithstanding, the inter-
dependency of these terms stems conceivably from the former “flowing” into 
the latter. Similarly, viewers/participants possess the proclivity to intend for 
something. Being engaged in a “communicative act,” their narrceptive thinking 
utilizes “worldying” (via beacon) in order to elaborate on the perceived 
intentionality of the NPs (ibid.:82).178 The inherent aspiration of such construal 
points, on top of making sense of “fictional” Other’s mental gymnastics, 
towards the overall narrative conclusion viz. coherence. That is, how the whole 
experience of making sense ultimately becomes, as the saying goes, “tied up.” 
(Something that doesn’t actually occur, as maintained above; cf., see, Schema 6, 
in the Analysis.) Consequently, this perspective unites both the weekly practice 
                                                            
177  Regarding (scientific) epistemology and “facts,” philsopher of science P. Feyerabend 
(Feyerabend 1975[1993]) has argued for the non-existence of scientific “bare fact[s].” The 
facts, Feyerabend suggests, “enter our knowledge” as conveyances of perspectual 
“ideation[s].” Accordingly unstable and non-fixed, they become scientist’s produce (ibid.:11-
13; cf., ibid.:22). 
178  Accordingly, same occurs with the analyst. The difference is that where participants’ 
narrcepts express a situatively “potential” and, agreeably consistent, specifically NP(s)-
focused storyworld, analyst first decomposes the latter (differentiating its content), and 
thereafter, secondly, composes editorial narrations of this (i) the initial storyworld, and (ii)  
of the possible discourse world that becomes out of all the intersecting storyworlds sampled 
subsequently.  
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of sense-making (viz. sense reasoning) as well as builds on the significance of 
the viewer/participant-NP intersubjective relation.  
Herein lays the consistency with key currents of thought so far elaborated. In 
other words, it becomes possible to suggest two intersecting routes when 
speaking of “intention“: (1) that of a singular viewer’s when intending-for and 
constructing their “microstructure” (i.e., narrcept); and (2) that of the analyst, 
who, as an editorial “builder” of narration-of-narrations (i.e., discourse world), 
traces diverse idiosyncratic “stories” towards a (potential) “end” of, “outline” 
for the common knowledge; that is, analyst traces the NP-centric intending into 
kinds of “worlds” by deploying beacon as the processual applied method.  
Van Dijk’s approach also preserves consistency with the MDA line circum-
scribed previously. In Discourse and Context (van Dijk 2008), he commences 
by correlating the notion of “context” with participants’ interpretative propen-
sity. Specifically, the discourse, van Dijk argues—converging on some social 
situation (say, experiencing a TV-narrative)—becomes produced and (sub-
sequently) influenced by the shared (intersubjective) interpretations of this 
central, ongoing event (the experiencing of the NP in their “social field,” say). 
In a nutshell, this is what van Dijk conveys with the utilization of context. On 
the basis of some situative event, a virtual “midsection” is developed which 
facilitates not only the production of its discourse, but also the subsequent 
structuring and interpretation. Hence, recalling Jones (2005), social—i.e., 
discussive, participatory, distributed—construal makes the event, sanctions its 
emergence. As communicative situations are inherently participatory and 
intersubjective (e.g., communally shared social cognitions like specific 
“learned” or “planned” knowledges and/or discourse genres179); so, too, are 
contexts “personal and social” (van Dijk 2008:17; emphases in original; 
ibid.:23), accommodating—indeed, becoming to be through—the “unique,” viz. 
subjective experiences. Maintains van Dijk: “One of the reasons why subjective 
definitions of the same communicative situation are unique and different for 
each participant is that by definition their knowledge (opinions, emotions) at 
each moment must be minimally different for the very interaction to make sense 
in the first place” (ibid.:16). 
Van Dijk’s meaning above is not laborious to grasp. Due to diverging 
experiential resources that each participant bestows on comprehending some 
event, the experiences thus undergone cannot but be (at least minimally, in 
comparison) unique for everyone involved. As an umbrella notion, van Dijk 
suggests herewith the usage of experience model (EM), reminding thus also 
Herman’s original approach to storyworld. Each new communicative situation 
necessitates its own EMs, with the chief characteristic of dynamism (ibid.:69): 
 
[They are] ongoingly updated and adapted to (the subjective interpretation of) 
the current constraints of the situation, including the immediately preceding 
discourse and interaction. In other words, contexts develop “ongoingly” and “on 
                                                            
179  Like apprehension of the supposed “rules” of a drama serial staying relatively true to 
“real life” (cf., op. cit.:18). 
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line,” that is, in parallel with interaction and (other) thoughts. (ibid.:18; em-
phases in original, underlinings added) 
 
Moving yet further, we can herewith turn to van Dijk’s “macrostructure.” For 
the key implication expounding on my Extended Hypothesis was that in a 
collaborative realm of Internet commentary, one can observe the emergence of 
macrostructural entities—which I envision as discourse worlds. Ensuing from 
participants’ multifarious communication, and having made “become” by 
beacon’s activity, discourse world circumscribes peoples’ venture of joint sense-
making and experiencing—a position that, I would argue, is “reductive” only 
insofar as, like previously maintained from various angles, actually containing 
multitudes (cf., van Dijk 1976:547ff.). Similarly, although van Dijk does readily 
insist on the relevance of “intersubjective and social constraints,” I would argue 
that it would be proficient to also widen the dimensions of the key terminology 
accordingly for they largely remain—although necessarily not being of lesser 
relevance—built around the subjectivist, “egocentric,” cognitive implications 
(cf., van Dijk 2008:20,60,77). 
Consequently, my suggestion—also echoed in the basic theses of the 
MDA—would be to expand the significance of “macrostructure,” so that it 
explicitly recognizes the shared cognition and the co-elaborative produce of 
sense (on the top of “subjective”.) I insist to arrive at it through my original 
notion of beacon. Put differently, the question arises how to distinguish peoples’ 
common goal vis-a-vis a “communicative situation” (ibid.:25), i.e., the 
experiential narrative. That is, one has to inquire about peoples’ ongoing aspi-
ration in (1) constructing the semantic coherence of the whole (i.e., how 
miscellaneous narrative events dovetails with the assumed reasonings of the 
NPs) based on (2) the subtle interchange of narrative’s “historic” context 
(‘stored’ as “worlds”) and (3) weekly, episodic information. 
This is the precise spot where systematic interrelations, the semantic “levels” 
of micro and macro, become significant (van Dijk 1980:13). If we think of one 
(micro)structure in the sense of how a particular “communicative situation” is 
comprehended and conveyed as a narrcept (formulated as, expressed in, a 
commentary text) in a “fluid,” ongoing discourse (say, reflexting on a TV-show 
episode); and if we thereafter juxtapose it with a similar conveyance of expe-
rience (an episode next week), we are effectively speaking of temporal shifts 
within the developing experience (as was underscored by Mello, Jones, et al.). 
Separate narrative episodes, though consecutive, each lay foundation for a 
unique “communicative episode,” expounding on the communicative situation 
at hand.  
Along similar lines, this situation in which people concentrate on one 
(communicative) episode can be distributed into interrelated thematic “packets” 
of varying, although still interrelated, importance. Now, what happens when, 
say, two of such “packets” are analytically juxtaposed? As the sample analysis 
in chapter III, 3.4–3.5 suggests, we would be left with interrelated, though 
differing, contexts that, being bilaterally complementary, update “higher” 
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constructs—the kind of “macrostructures” from storyworld to discourse 
world—with fresh “micro-information” on the level of individual commentary 
texts (as narrcepts).  
To what specifically does “upgrading” amount to under the aegis of such 
design, however? If to draw on Breaking Bad’s data, these commentary texts are 
thematically univalent due to peoples’ “magnified” focus on the narrative 
motifs, e.g., CIGARETTE.180 In constructing the narrative coherence, the sup-
posed significance of such narrative ingredient gains in relevance. However, 
there are also underdeveloped—the “signaled and indexed, rather than fully 
expressed“—sub-contexts within (van Dijk 2008:35; emphasis in original). 
These are discursive and referential. Their emergence can be observed when 
some other narrative motif is comparatively “magnified” therein (e.g., RICIN). 
What occurs now is that the latter may evoke important “upgrades” in the latent 
tendencies of the former (CIGARETTE), whilst complementing “current” 
primary focus, i.e., the whys and ifs of RICIN’s overarching relevance.  
To summarize: various kinds of “worlds”—from intend-world to text 
makers’ world to storyworld to, ultimately, discourse world (and back)—can be 
taken as “macrostructures” only insofar as their impermanent, re-usable value is 
established, maintained, accentuated and venerated. Becoming is the key 
perhaps best suited to unlock “windows” (to take after Norris and Jones 2005a) 
which have remained shut for far too long.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
180  See Appendixes I–II for more examples, presented as screen captures from the software. 
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CHAPTER III 
Details Matter: Discussion and  
close analysis of the sample 
3.0 Some general introductory points 
The utilized commentary texts enable us to expound on how the kind of inter-
sectionality of worlds (noted in the conclusion of previous chapter) precisely 
operates. For instance, with the commentaries under the auspices of the 
presently analyzed category (in TAS4 terminology) CIGARETTE, the focus is 
on Jesse’s ricin-laced cigarette’s sudden disappearance (cf., previous prelimi-
nary analyses, see, Introduction and 1.5.4). To concisely summarize the un-
folding plot: the cigarette vanishes (as is ultimately correctly assumed by 
viewers-commenters) due to Saul’s bodyguard Huell’s thieving expertise. In 
particular, this event drives Jesse to entertain the possibility of Brock, his 
girlfriend’s son, having been deadly poisoned. At first, he’s convinced of Walt’s 
guilt, but then urged—following a dramatic face-to-face with Walt—to set his 
sights on Gus instead. The 4th season ends with Jesse still thinking of Gus as 
having been the culprit; whereas viewers get the culminating reveal that it had 
been, all along, Walt. Against such highly eventful backdrop, “categories” such 
as CIGARETTE, but also POISONING, RICIN, and others convey and instigate 
participatory attention and thus correlate with what I have called narrative 
motifs. However, instead of appropriating them—in the Jenkinsian sense—the 
participants in the Breaking Bad discussions rather opt to acknowledge these 
narrative ingredients as strictly significant for the narrativizable intentional 
agencies involved, i.e., Walt, Gus, Jesse, et al. as realitized narrative persons, 
perceived to make sense of their own autonomous intend-worlds. In short, the 
operative tendencies of the motifs permit to expound on the development of 
realitized models of NPs as theorized in chapter I. 
As depicted by the undirected graph in Category Network Layout (CNL, see 
Appendix II, Example 1), the categories as motifs, e.g., CIGARETTE, and as 
NPs, e.g., WALT, can evoke linkages of distinct intensity which become 
threaded throughout other currently relevant categories. As TAS4’s terminology 
suggests, this tendency is known as “shared responses.” For, due to software’s 
non-exclusivity principle, narrcepts as “responses” “belong” everywhere at 
once. This inclination is further complemented via Category Web Table (CWT, 
see Appendix II, Example 2). The format of category pairs, either by using the 
principal category, or the latter’s sub-domains, implies in itself generic statis-
tical results, expounding on the “shared” user-generated content alongside a 
distinct category vis-à-vis category axis. Prior visualization, then, is turned into 
precise numerological insight, thus allowing the earmarking of “categories” 
(motifs, NPs) which intersect the most. It is a versatile technological method, 
enabling the extraction of exact sample sizes for the qualitative close analysis.  
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Meanwhile, visualization—as per illustrations in Appendix II, Examples 1–
2—enables us to provide a graphical correlation with the unique storytelling 
choices employed in the (individual) commentaries. Consequently, the benefits 
of such bilateral motions of various categories—either conveying motifs or 
NPs—are indisputably vital as this is the spot where the “macro-structural” 
insight, viz. the discourse world becomes, as “narrated” by the analyst. How-
ever, I would caution it only being a partial view, even though these kinds of 
profoundly entangled sense-making (viz. reasoning) patterns justifiably high-
light the initially unhinged focus they may evoke. As a possible means of 
clarification, I would suggest that additional centering can be provided by the 
reducing the area of interest to singular principal categories—as presently done 
by focusing on CIGARETTE—, exploiting thereby TAS4’s expedient feature of 
“relevance rank.” Due to such analytical tuning, it becomes possible to distin-
guish specialized “configurations” in the discursive storytelling practices on 
hand. 
 
 
3.1 The Role and Measure of the Computation Method. 
General overview of TAS4 
The Expanded Hypothesis (see, 2.0) explored in detail theoretically in chapters I 
and II rests on the applied computational method of text mining as afforded by 
Natural Language181 Processing (NLP) techniques in IBM’s SPSS Text Analytics 
for Surveys (TAS4). NLP—rooted in the theories of artificial intelligence, com-
putational linguistics and machine learning—complements text mining where 
its capacities, like the advanced understanding of language (i.e., latter’s high 
contextuality), are exploited in the advanced uncovering, predicting and inter-
preting of emerging patterns within a set of information (Larson and Watson 
2013:2–3; Yu et al. 2011:735,739; for a more technical perspective, see e.g., 
Aggarwal and Zhai (eds) 2012b). Hence, it becomes uniquely possible to 
systematically analyze a variety of emerging topical patterns which help to 
convey how viewerly experiences about the NPs and or plot ambivalences of a 
serial TV narrative develop over time within and across discursive and 
interactional online environments (blogs, forums). As hypothesized, these 
exponential “growths” in the communication of coherent knowledge emerge as 
more or less distinct entities—as intersecting “worlds” with varying degrees of 
significance—from within the large quantities of commentary material, i.e., the 
“Big Data” (BD) (Mitra 2013; Vogt et al. 2014).  
As a working definition, social scientists Paul Vogt and colleagues propose 
BD to indicate predominantly Web-based and textual social media archives 
comprised of “an amount of information impossible for one individual to code 
and analyze in less than a year without computer help” (ibid.:159–160, 174ff.). 
Surfacing as recently as 2012, BD swiftly penetrated the academic vernacular 
                                                            
181  I.e., “language spoken or written by humans” (Tierney 2012:176; emphasis added). 
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and has since spearheaded interdisciplinary conversations about data mani-
pulation in the sense of “mining” diverse media for personalized user contribu-
tions (Mitra and Mamani 2014:84; cf., Aggarwal and Zhai 2012a:9). Hence, the 
technical choices for present project are in accordance with cutting-edge 
qualitative research interest on contextual “mining” via NLP. This kind of 
interest extends over diverse fields of research, scrutinizing medical records, 
open source software discussion lists, customer interaction, organizational e-
mail correspondences, Facebook status updates, and more (see, e.g., Kahya-
Özyirmidokuz 2014). 
Specifically, the core objective with present episodically and asynchronously 
produced raw data is to elaborate on and facilitate the qualitative analysis of the 
narrative sense-making as an “observant narration.” Although the emergence of 
such narration can span extremely longitudinal periods, presently an interval of 
two weeks has been chosen. Thus far, the phenomenon of the sense-making 
process has been observed in the academic circles, widely taken, primarily only 
via controlled (and short-term) lab experiments such as relatively short reading 
tests. Meanwhile, the potentially more natural habitat of sense-making like the 
online discussion environments has engendered superficial interest, possibly 
because of the sheer quantity and splintered nature of the data available. How-
ever, present qualitative microanalysis building on transdisciplinary theoretical 
framework as presented in preceding chapters surmounts such impediment by 
elaborating on the capabilities of NLP processing. 
 
General overview of TAS4 
Although I will soon turn to the internal terminology exploited by TAS4 in a bid 
to further reinforce prior claims, a few introductory words about TAS4 in 
general are in order. 
In fact, the key functionalities which set this particular software apart from 
its various predecessors and contemporaries (e.g., NVivo, Atlas.ti, RQDA, 
CATMA, Rapidminer) lie in its capacity to generate automatic “concepts” (or, 
as ordinarily termed in content analysis, “codes“; Saldaña 2009:3ff.). Hence, 
TAS4 (1) reduces and increases the factors of labor-intensity and time-saving, 
respectively, by (i) rising objectivism in making inter-rater reliability check 
principally obsolete and by relieving the inductive load on the analyst; and (ii) 
by providing, through NLP algorithms, a more complex support for higher 
levels of language (Tierney 2012:176–180; cf., Crowston et al. 2012:229–230); 
and (iii) by providing a finalized analytic toolset where heavy complementary 
programming and customization is not an absolute necessity.  
Specifically for (ii) above, TAS4 (2) preserves and weighs contextual 
linkages between the categories produced via concepts (or “terms” as employed 
intermittently in TAS4’s vocabulary). None of the other software successfully 
excels in both of these areas of interest. For example, perhaps the most well-
known data mining tool—Rapidminer—allows for procedures of “tokenization” 
and “lemmatization” (i.e., algorithms invoking word stems), but forgoes the 
contextual relevancies. Meanwhile, in R’s qualitative analysis package RQDA, 
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complex “code categories” can be developed through manual coding procedure. 
However, categories as such are not inter-relatable through R’s feature of 
“plotting” visualized links. Instead, they can be observed to share commona-
lities only insofar as their content, i.e., detailed codes, overlap. That is, you can 
manually highlight one specific code to observe its relationships, whereas 
categories themselves remain static. 
The utmost context-sensitivity with which the participants approach the 
incremental discussions is of crucial importance for the following analysis. To 
that end, the global proposition herewith is for a qualitative data analysis (QDA) 
which is further reinforced the key theoretical tenets established in previous 
chapters. 
The software of TAS4 is, to best of my knowledge, a relatively novel and 
innovative analytical tool. Text mining by utilizing NLP—especially as a 
measure to scaffold and enrich subsequent qualitative analysis—has not yet 
been applied to shed systematic light on the “cognitive work-out” (Johnson 
2005) induced by complex narrative experience flowing into continuous, and 
equally intricate, process of sense-making. 
The processing of voluminous data in TAS4 is subsequently aided by its 
usage of graphical outputs which draw on graph and network theory (e.g., 
“network” as an “unrestricted,” i.e., non-arrowed graph; see Appendix II, 
Example 1; varieties on the “category web” visualizing). Hence, it becomes 
possible to tease out insights about the relationships between emerging cate-
gories highlighting—through the beacon mechanism—“networked” attempts at 
“worldying” and intertwining key NPs, as instigated (channeled) by narrative 
motifs. Of special interest herewith is to unearth latent (versus “manifest”) 
meaning content, therefore—once again—directly building on the Expanded 
Hypothesis emphasizing the crucial narrativist role of the analyst.   
 
 
3.2 Corpus: its Rules of Inclusion/Exclusion and  
Preparation of the Data 
For the close analysis of Breaking Bad’s online feedback, commentary texts 
from episodic review and general entertainment sites like Uproxx/Hitfix, The A. 
V. Club and Hollywood Reporter’s Bastard Machine were assembled. Forum 
posts from user-made episode discussion threads from Reddit were also utilized. 
Speaking in numerical totals, this unedited commentary data ranged from 100 to 
over 1400 (per locii) for Breaking Bad’s 4th season’s penultimate episode “End 
Times” and hit the 2100 mark for the finale “Face Off.” The core objective here 
was to collect time-accurate data, i.e., viewers’ immediate, post-viewing respon-
ses. Hence, a number of elimination rules had to be introduced subsequently.  
Firstly, where the technical possibilities of the web pages enabled it, the 
specific time/date accompanying the commentaries was recorded. However, in 
some cases, possibly owing to purges of archives to release resources, this 
restriction became only partially achievable, for the commentary archives—at 
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the time of the conducted fieldwork—ultimately reverted to approximate dating 
models for posted comments (e.g., “3 years ago”).   
Consequently, a second, complementary rule had to be introduced—
recurrence of discussive themes. A Pilot Analysis examined the available data in 
order to ascertain (a) repeating themes and/or theme-bundles, guided thereby by 
(i) the appropriateness of the commentary text vis-a-vis the analysis at hand 
(i.e., brief, non-exhaustive comments were excluded, e.g., “I liked this 
episode”); and (ii) the range of reflextion observable in the text. The latter 
option was highlighted primarily for the Reddit data. Being a completely user-
made environment with no financial implications, episodic threads in Reddit 
were usually generated prior to episode’s airing and left “to run” concurrently 
with the episode being watched. Hence, it was further possible to isolate brief 
excitatory, minimally reflexive remarks. Subsequently, these data were judged 
not to substantially contribute to the in-depth discussions which generally 
occurred post-watch.182  
Consequently, all the commentary texts that met the outlined rule-set were 
promptly inserted to the two-column Microsoft Excel Spreadsheet (Microsoft 
Excel, 2007). Here, too, a certain set of pre-established rules were developed 
based on the Pilot Analysis. Because TAS4 software doesn’t allow repeating 
insertions on its ID field (see Appendix II, Example 3, for illustration), the latter 
had to contain various kinds of crucial information without appearing confusing 
and/or causing unwanted overlaps. Hence, pertinent information in the first 
column in Excel was formatted to contain participant’s name, narrcept’s 
location, notation of the episode (A), and a unique signifier (e.g., Justin_Jordan-
A-Hitfix-02–10–11-a7). The “unique signifier” was chosen to indicate (i) 
uniqueness of each entry due to consistent recurrence of user names and dates; 
and (ii) in order to tease out a more relational insight from the narrcepts taken as 
a whole. What is implied here is that the value of such denotation enabled to 
precisely circumscribe thematic chains of commentary internal to the web page 
(e.g., the “child-threads” of Reddit environment), or even going across multiple 
web pages simultaneously. These enabled to specifically characterize how the 
technical capabilities of said web pages guided and shaped ongoing conversa-
tions (i.e., successive responses to particular commentaries; second-level chains 
within these “child-threads,” etc).  
Owing to the usage of “unique signifier,” it became possible to chronicle the 
inner workings of such internal commentary chains. For this, the “initiating” 
commentary of the second-level chain was specifically highlighted with its 
unique signifier disclosed in brackets at the end of the previously described 
format (e.g., Justin_Jordan-Hitfix-02-10-11-a7-a6 (a4)). Although present 
dissertation bracketed the suggested potentialities for future interrogations, it 
has to be noted that these specific data permit not only focused analysis outside 
                                                            
182  Note, though, that Reddit—due it being a community initiative—can also include 
discussion threads made specifically for “late-comers.” However, the Pilot Analysis of this 
data revealed that the discussive themes were in accordance with those of the original thread 
and, as such, it was proven unnecessary to make largely overlapping collections.  
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of the purview of TAS4 software, but may also complement the latter, where 
possible. 
The Pilot Analysis in its entirety consisted of 1009 commentary texts (as 
narrcepts) expanded over three episodes of Breaking Bad’s 4th season (“End 
Times,” “Face-Off,” and “Confessions,”). This data were collected and inserted 
into said Excel spreadsheet.  
Next, Excel’s two-column table, consisting of the ID-field with merged 
information, and the commentary text, was inserted into the TAS4 software. 
Here, an analysis consisting of two “cycles” (Saldana 2009:3ff.) or, phases, 
commenced. Within the first phase, TAS4 automatically mined the text for 
relevant, high-frequency single words or word phrases (e.g. ricin, ricin 
cigarette). As previously implied, in TAS4, this extracted data is synonymous 
with “terms” for they correlate with software’s pre-made internal “type dictio-
naries.” Dictionaries are mostly tailored towards marketing and customer 
satisfaction analyses, consisting of default libraries like Location, Organization, 
Person, Positive, Negative, etc. However, this framework is wholly customiz-
able and writing one’s own “libraries“—which is what present analysis opted 
for—is encouraged. 
Initial mining, then, draws on linguistic algorithms and the default and 
custom resources and employs similarity measure to cluster terms into respec-
tive “concepts” (and “concept patterns”) and “types” (and “type patterns.”).  183
The latter stem directly from and echo these internal typologies, e.g., if a 
concept named walt is one of the extracted concepts, and if the Type Pattern 
view option is chosen, the concept can be seen to correspond to its parent 
typology, e.g., narrative_person_WALTER + <>. Here, “<>” correlates with 
walt, but also with both manual and default typologies, e.g., “Positive 
Opinion184.”  
Extracted concepts/terms helped to pinpoint precise focal points across all 
data considered. Hence, specific areas of interest in the reciprocal storytelling 
and communication of knowledge are revealed. Once all relevant insight was 
gleaned from this preliminary “First Cycle” (cf., Saldana 2009) extraction 
process, custom typologies (e.g., narrative_person_WALTER) were established 
and complemented with more matching terms to assure a fluent and data-
specific approach (see, Appendix II). 
 
 
3.3 Storyworlding a discourse world of Breaking Bad:  
Final navigational warnings 
The initial step preceding the sample analysis was to highlight temporally 
simultaneous discussions across several blog/forum environments. To that end, 
TAS4’s “relevance rank” (henceforth RR; see Appendix II, Example 3, for 
                                                            
183  Cf., IBM SPSS Text Analysis for Surveys User’s Guide, pub. 2012, p. 79. 
184  This content was not relevant for present analysis. 
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illustration) was utilized. Consistent with theoretical underpinnings explored in 
chapter II, RR permitted the observation of temporal intersections in the dis-
cussions pertaining to the key episodes, i.e., “End Times” and “Face-Off” 
(broadcasted a week later). Through these observed “timelines,” specific 
meaning “pockets,” emerging in and as a response to the “anticipatory 
discourse” with regards to Breaking Bad—i.e., the “worlds”—were “shed light 
on,” decomposed and composed by the beacon mechanism. Once more, then, 
the vocabulary of “worlds,” as conceived in chapter II:  
 
(1) a storyworld (SW). Envisioned as a subjective “calibration,” enacted 
through narrcept—the expression of beacon’s “reciprocal dimension”—
and conveying narratively situated events and their (potential, revealed, 
and rejected) consequences “at the person level,” thereby collapsing 
into itself, on the principle of non-hierarchal array, (2) and (3). In short: 
in SW, all the intentionally significant “persons” ‘meet’ for they are 
perceived to act for reasons. Hence, the minimalist “format” of such 
predisposition is established in narrcepts. The maximalist form, there-
after, formulates all SWs in the sampled “anticipatory discourse” to 
facilitate a becoming discourse world (4)  (see, 2.3.1),  
(2) (multitudes of) intend-worlds (IW). Although focusing on NPs, IWs 
also highlight emergent shared and distributed spaces which suggest 
intersecting “inter-party” relations, i.e., twistory. Moreover, for 
narrcepts communicate intending from without, they convey attempts to 
comprehend realitized NPs and their social relations. In doing so, 
former’s sovereignty with their AW (“actual world”) is recognized, kept 
intact and un-encroached (see, 2.3.2), 
(3) a text makers’ world (TMW). Emphasizing the narrceptive principle 
organizing SW, script writers and “creators” (such as Vince Gilligan) 
also become “actors,” “doers,” viz. reasoning agents. Their (potential) 
intentions necessitate elucidation in the format of criticism, evaluation 
and contesting (see, 2.3.3), 
(4) last but obviously not the least, a discourse world (DW).  DW charac-
terizes the analyst consistently decomposing and composing the 
“worlds” in 1–3. The latter are developed in making sense of the NPs by 
taking given narrative (Breaking Bad) as former’s “intentional field.” 
Consequently, DW is the becoming of analyst’s “narration of narra-
tions,” of the “running” circumscription of the joint venture of sense-
making and experiencing, hence subsuming and negotiating the labels 
of “popular” and “academic.” Put differently, DW subscribes also the 
analyst with a necessarily editorial “narrativist” proclivity; one becomes 
subsequently a “worlder” for/of viewers’ story(telling) (see, 2.3.4) 
 
Note herewith that, as 1–3 imply, although participants opt for compatibility 
over discernment (i.e., unitary thinking), the categorical decomposition is 
ordinarily implied within. This implication is expressed by what in chapter II 
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was termed, and herewith is going to be exemplified—the seamless navigation, 
viz. gliding.  
Now, in embarking on my analytical quest, I will navigate the commentaries 
focusing on the narrative motif of CIGARETTE in the discussions post-“End 
Times” and “Face-Off.” Although under TAS4 categorization, “CIGARETTE” 
amounted to 124 commentary texts, the sample data affords a close reading to 
twenty nine185 with the objective to produce a piecemeal interpretation of a 
potential, temporally situated, discourse world. Of major significance here are 
the connections engendered. These connections beget diverse alterations in 
different cases, and hence, underscore the necessity of substantial analytical 
scrutiny. Bluntly, here we speak of the combinations of meanings. These 
combinations frequently interweave a diversity of narrative motifs so that in 
speaking of one, indeed, several are encompassed at once (in addition to 
CIGARETTE also RICIN, POISONING, WALT’s GUN, and more).  
Narrative motifs, in turn, indicate prevailing narrative gists, operating within 
a particular “extract”—a temporal, “zig-zag” of linearity with intertwined com-
mentaries in succession, in order to tease out processuality, the narrativizing as 
an happening itself. Therefore, any kind of “generalizations” can be considered 
to be not only of secondary importance, but to possibly introduce a reductive 
bias against the process at hand. In following these caveats, the cigarette (and its 
disappearance) begets three-fold gists: 
 
(i) Walt’s either directly involved in the poisoning, or—regardless of the 
responsibility for the poisoning—the latter’s instrumental and clever 
ruse orchestrated by him to manipulate with Jesse’s wavering alle-
giance, 
(ii) the cigarette as a tool of child-like curiosity leading Brock to acci-
dentally poison himself; 
(iii) lastly, the cigarette “ploy” as if spotted beforehand by Gus186 and 
masterminded to sow discord between Walt and Jesse with the distinct 
aim of conclusively rid himself of the former.  
 
Although obviously not the only circumscribable gists, they nonetheless, and by 
a wide margin, spearhead the bulk of overall discussions throughout the 
categorized 124 texts and especially in the sample analyzed. 
Incidentally, it is advisable to caution against taking these gists for isolated 
(or, isolating) entities. Participants mix them together without restraint due to 
their narrceptive thinking integrating all three within same individual com-
mentary texts (as narrcepts). Nevertheless, singular commentaries could exhibit 
a negative “charge” vis-a-vis a particular gist, whereas acknowledging another 
through the construction of former’s negation; that is, of elaborating on its 
                                                            
185  See, Appendix I, for more. 
186  Due to his tendency to install eavesdropping “bugs” everywhere. 
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incompatibility.187 As demonstrated shortly, characteristic of gists is also to 
“branch out.” That means, within a limited format of narrcept, participants draw 
within one gist other relevant NPs and significant events from the “social 
systems” of the NPs, producing a kind of “rootlet” within the original “root,” as 
it were. 
Hence, at the very outset we are to enquire, albeit paradoxically, into which 
kinds of proverbial rabbit holes does the beacon lead us? Let us take jump, alas. 
 
 
3.4 Storyworldying the becoming of  
a potential Discourse World 
Circumscribing a discourse world with Phailcakez’storyworld as a temporal 
‘anchor’  
Following the approach outlined above, I will commence with—and build on—
a narrcept from Reddit188 (highest RR, viz. its focus is most entrenched in 
narrative motif CIGARETTE) amongst those concentrating on “End Times.” 
My first objective is to complement the becoming of this particular SW with (i) 
other SWs—some established in parts, spanning several narrcepts from one 
participant over a particular interval—belonging to the same “distributed”189 (or 
“child-”) thread in the Reddit environment; as well as (ii) SWs from altogether 
other environments, suggesting thus temporal collisions in distributed narrcep-
tive thinking. Note that though aforementioned dynamic is initially observed 
under the rubric of the first key episode, “End Times,” it fluently “flows” to 
incorporate the consecutive, “Face-Off.”  
This, in turn, enforces the underlying understanding that discourse world as a 
becoming is not fixed, but forever “in transit.” Hence, the temporal “lines” 
inherent to “Face-Off” are thereupon juxtaposed in process, as if collapsed onto 
those investigated of of “End Times.” The underlying contention conveys such a 
course of action as the most effective and inclusive mode in revealing the 
processual development of narrceptive thinking and its subject- and locus-
transcendent character, to boot. It not only evokes the “worlds,” but suggests 
ultimately how these “worlds” consistently not only “feed into” each other, but 
also into an observant “macro” tendency—the discourse world writ large, viz. 
encompassing both key episodes of Breaking Bad “put together” to make sense 
by the analyst (for visualization, see, Schema 1 below). 
Phailcakez’ becoming SW (see, Schema 1, for illustration) has its vital 
undercurrent scaffolded on the narrceptive thinking circumscribing Walt’s IW. 
Hence, it is professed that Walt—owing to potential threat to his life—could 
have had neither “time [n]or motivation” for the variety of antics involved in 
poisoning. Subsequently, this SW is orientated through the implicit acknow-
                                                            
187  See 3.4 for examples and extended discussions on this particular distinction (esp. 
phai lcakez , but also others henceforward). 
188  See, Appendix I, Example 1. 
189  See below for what I specifically mean by the utilization of this term. 
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ledgement that—aside “flipping his shit” and “chasing his tail”—Walt was also 
always only observed barricading his house—seemingly doing everything 
humanly possible not to leave (the crucial back garden moment notwith-
standing). Consequently, contingent on the IW-specific auspices of a jeopar-
dized life, Walt’s direct involvement would’ve necessitated acquirement of 
additional knowledge and or suggested other intermediary steps. All the afore-
mentioned, however, remain admittedly “doubt[ful]” for Walt already had (was 
in) enough “trouble” to start with. As such, phailcakez organizes the local 
coherence of their SW (viz. beacon ‘gliding’ in its “reciprocal dimension”) by 
alleging Walt as (a) having had no knowledge of where both Brock and his 
mother live; and (b) not “even” knowing them, to boot. Significantly, however, 
both arguments are derived from a false ’footing,’190 as it were, and 
phailcakez—either by inadvertent or strategically calculated (storytelling) 
omission—consolidates their SW by, instead, embracing the 2nd gist outlined 
above—i.e., Brock’s accidental self-poisoning via Jesse’s cigarette. Hence, 
there’s seamless navigation, viz. ‘gliding,’ from Walt’s IW to Brock’s (“he got 
hold of [the cigarette] himself”). This involves switching the “agencies” of 
responsibility in order to preserve and organize the local consistency of the SW 
as narrceptivized. Meanwhile, latter’s contingency is heavily wrought with the 
preliminary assumption regarding uncertainty of ricin poisoning having 
occurred in the first place. Although proposed hesitantly (“I think”), the aspect 
of poisoning being yet far from “proven” necessarily fits—if for nothing else 
than for the ’shifting’ of blame. Hence, to a degree, perhaps, the presumed 
factor of culpability extends itself to cover “reasoning agents” on a one-to-many 
axis. Accordingly, phailcakez’ situated SW post-“End Times” becomes by 
acknowledging 2nd gist through the distinct negation of the 1st. That is, by 
underscoring and crafting on two highly relevant IWs—Walt’s and Brock’s—
whereas (perhaps by design) evoking a curious ’blind spot’ (a ’mis-remem-
bering’ on Walt’s knowledge—though very limited as availed by narrative—on 
Brock/his mother) insofar as other narrceptivized SWs, analyzed subsequently, 
are concerned. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
190  Walt had visited Jesse just a few episodes ago and although Jesse didn’t invite him in, 
Walt clearly threw a passing glance at both a pre-teen boy and a young woman sitting in the 
living room.   
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Schema 1: Reddit’s phai lcakez’ becoming SW. “Thought bubbles” are utilized to 
highlight the fluctuating centrality (stronger-to-less red) of two interwoven IWs of 
narrative persons (NP), indicated by the narrceptive thinking (viz. narrception) of 
phai lcakez’ narrcept; “callouts” (“[not] even,” etc.) demarcate the precise ‘shapings’ 
of the IW in question via beacon’s ‘gliding’ in its “reciprocal dimension,” whereas latter 
is further emphasized by the two-way arrows as illustrative ‘points of tangency,’ as it 
were. Phai lcakez’ narrceptivized SW ‘anchors’ the entire discourse world presently 
unpacked in its becoming (see, Schema 3 passim). 
 
 
Nevertheless, narrceptive thinking, viz. narrception of IreneInIdoho from 
Hitfix191 (also see, Schema 2) is largely aligned with Reddit’s phailcakez’,  
however the organization highlighted by her concise narrcept fine-tunes Walt’s 
IW as narrceptivized by phailcakez (cf . ,  Schema 3). Namely, Irene 
proclaims that even “if” it “truly” is (and I am intentionally re-engaging with 
phailcakez’  phrasing here) Walt’s doing, (usage of) “Jesse’s cigarette” 
would’ve been unnecessary. Implication here, then, is that given Walt’s high-
grade chemist skills, “he could just make more ricin.” Hence, whilst forgoing 
the negation phailcakez utilized previously, IreneInIdoho makes sense of 
key events by emphatically narrceptivizing Walt’s IW, whilst treating Brock’s 
IW as more or less a generic afterthought (“if… then either an accident..”); as 
opposed to how phailcakez’ narrception developed. The finalizing “or,” 
                                                            
191  See, Appendix I, Example 2. 
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though, ultimately proposes pregnancy of meaning by harboring a suggestion of 
3rd gist—that of Gus’ involvement, though left un-named and perhaps not even 
intended as such.  
 
 
 
 
Schema 2: Hitfix’s I renefromIdaho becoming SW, post-“End Times.” For a 
depiction of ‘dialogic’ co-elaboration across different discussion environments 
(Hitfix↔Reddit) by way of Irene’s and Reddit’s phailcakez’ development of Walt’s IW, 
see subsequent schema 3. Note how such initial layer of dialogue also outlines the 
basics for the becoming discourse world, writ large. 
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Schema 3: Reddit’s phailcakez’ and Hitfix’s I reneFromIdaho’s narrcepts in a base 
level indirect/asynchronous ‘dialogue,’ depicting ‘base level’ generalization on the co-
elaborative becoming of a discourse world. Photo credit:http://1.bp.blogspot.com/--
m9CG5hC_cY/Ti5OJXcNaGI/AAAAAAAAAKs/Mr5GVQL3VwE/s1600/6113beacon.
jpg (Accessed: 26.07.2017). 
 
 
Meanwhile, two narrcepts from wutisareddit192 return us to Reddit—
succeeding phailcakez’193 by just a few narrcepts—and establish and 
elaborate on a very sophisticated SW, fine-tuning various details and nuances 
earlier contemplated. Firstly, the organization of wutisareddit’s SW dispels 
cigarette’s centrality.194 Specifically, here cigarette’s functional, not necessarily 
operational value vis-à-vis ricin is fore grounded. By such explanation, Walter’s 
and Jesse’s so-called “ricin ploy” required cigarette foremost as a depository, 
hiding the “tube of it [the ricin].” According to their plan, the poison had to be, 
in some opportune moment, “dump[ed] out,” thus disposing of Gus. However, 
note here how wutisareddit’s attentive reminiscence highlights the joint 
                                                            
192  See,  Appendix I, Examples 3-4. 
193  59a/63a versus 59a; see, 3.3 for the discussion on “unique signifiers.” 
194 Technically speaking, this is corroborated by the narrcepts having a lower RR than 
previously. 
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vernacular with phailcakez’s SW above.195 Where the former ‘maps’ the 
“dumping” strictly on Walt’s/Jesse’s shared “social surroundings” the latter 
positioned it—let us recall—in the worldying of Walt’s IW, thereby effectively 
discrediting him as Brock’s poisoner (/potential murderer) (“dumped ricin on 
the kids [sic] cheerios or whatever”). Now, what wutisareddit  narrceptivizes 
next serves exclusive scrutiny for it arguably initiates one of the examples of a 
kind of “branching out” within gists—presently the 1st. Namely, a question is 
broached whether Walt actually “DID [sic]” the poisoning with the explicit 
intent to shift blame onto Gus, and all this in order to “get Jesse back on his 
side” (note also: implicit negation of 3rd gist). Similarly to phailcakez and 
IreneInIdaho, wutisareddit  articulates indetermination about whether and 
when “he,” viz. Walt, “could have done it,” but—and here’s the crucial bottom 
line of differentiation—wutisareddit  is fairly confident in “writers doing this 
[i.e., “make” Walt intend as such].” I will return to the later ‘edit’ of the same 
post shortly, but for starters, there’s an awful lot to unpack presently. Firstly, 
through gliding into Walt’s IW, the potentiality of him being the proverbial 
blunt instrument in the (at that point possibly) lethal gamble is entertained. 
However, there’s an emphatic discernment insofar as Walt’s, on the one hand, 
and writers’, on the other, intentions are concerned. Wutisareddit  is “not 
sure” whether Walt—as a sovereign “reasoning agent” with his actual world—
“could have done it.” By the same token, though, “writers doing this” organizes 
the local coherence of the becoming SW. How, though? By gliding into TMW, 
wutisareddit  narrceptivizes the former through construing viewerly focus as 
being primarily tuned on “Walt & Jesse vs. Gus.” That is, wutisareddit  
basically portends here how such a “spring[ing] on [viewers]” shall indeed 
occur.196 Now, for Reddit (just as most of the forum environments I know of) 
allows one to amend original post, this particular narrcept from wutisareddit  
shows author’s return to explicitly backtrack from the initial contention (Walt’s 
to blame due to writers’ plan). Herewith, the reasoning is that it “would be 
unlikely” because Walt visiting “Jesse’s house”197 pre-dates him being “dragged 
out to the desert” by Tyrus (Gus’ hired hand). Wutisareddit  commits here to 
the hesitant argument that Walt might not have “thought of poisoning Brock 
before that.” Later198, wutisareddit  further reiterates having “jumped the gun” 
vis-à-vis posting such “theory,” although finding some solace in the fact of 
being one of “a lot of people” having narrceptivized so. However, 
wutisareddit’s “theory” also succumbs to a particular kind of omission. 
Namely, the visit and Walt being “dragged out” are explicitly linked—Tyrus 
electrifies Walt and pulls a bag over his head literally a few steps from Jesse’s 
                                                            
195 Given how both narrcepts originate from the same “distributed” thread with regards to 
(narrceptive) content, locus, and tempus. 
196  I.e., the last revelatory moment from “Face-Off” where camera zooms in on the 
poisonous plant (Lily of the Valley) from Walt’s back-garden. 
197  Recall phai lcakez omitting this and hence wut isareddi t  can now be seen as 
elaborating on this, or perhaps rather, making an attempt at rectification. 
198  Cf., Example 4. 
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doorway. Hence, what wutisareddit  conceives as disputation of the previous 
indeed ends up enforcing it. The utmost humiliation suffered in the desert (and 
also of being somewhat suspicious of Jesse being on Gus’ “side”) marks the 
spot where Walt’s plan initially germinated. Having, prior to being attacked, 
born first-hand witness to Jesse having “collateral damage,” as it were, Walt 
might have preyed on a possible manipulation angle.199 Nevertheless, even in 
this later narrcept,  wutisareddit  further fine-tunes their “jumped the gun” 
argument by emphasizing the “impossib[ility]” of Walt’s involvement—by 
necessarily shortly gliding into TMW to note viewers’ potentially being 
withheld something—because, and hereby we next glide to Jesse’s IW, Jesse 
saw “the ricin in his pocket” the morning “episode takes place.”200 This supple-
ment, however, also feeds into wutisareddit’s original omission. Namely, 
Jesse indeed did see cigarettes in his pocket, complete with one turned upside 
down (marking the one with ricin vial inside), but he didn’t explicitly check 
whether the vial’s still inside. (At this point, the pack was already swapped, 
more on this later.) Lastly, but doubtlessly not any less importantly, 
wutisareddit  prefaces their later narrcept with an explicit recognition of how 
deeply ingrained the 2nd noted gist (note the capitalization meant to convey the 
intensity and multiplicity of such argument)—that of Brock smoking/poisoning 
himself accidentally—is in the overall discourse world, writ large. Wutisa-
reddit’s professed “theory,” however, is its inversion, effectively negating 
what phailcakez initially opted for. Though relatively hesitant in subscribing 
to 1st, given various irregularities it entails, wutisareddit  would nonetheless 
utilize it as a benchmark in assessing and organizing the local coherency of their 
SW, constructed in succession through two narrcepts.  
Now, were we to move further yet more “branching out” within 1st gist 
would occur. Namely, the distrust in ricin’s involvement steadily increases. 
Rather significantly, even one of the original bloggers—Hollywood Reporter’s 
Tim Goodman—would be pulled into the proverbial fray. Specifically, Brian 
Beeghly201 went as far as promptly calling Goodman out (“you might be 
jumping to conclusions”) for his distinctive stance on poisoning via ricin, as if 
he were one of the ’regular’ discussion participants (which critics conceivably 
are, indeed). Pace Goodman—who, to be fair, gets literally paid for being 
“obvious”—Brian cautions against such explicit ‘decelerations’ for the 
narrceptive thinking “at this point” should not be as palpable. Herewith, 
Brian—succeeding phailcakez, although from a different locus—builds on 
the 1st gist by introducing and furthering the ‘ruse’ aspect, present already in the 
first of wutisareddit’s narrcepts considered previously (i.e., getting Jesse 
(back) “on his side”). In fact, if to hotfoot ahead, similarly to wutisareddit , 
Brian,  too—from this particular ‘angle’—gets dangerously close in arti-
culating “Face-Off”’s twist. As it comes to be known (but ultimately severely 
                                                            
199  We will return to fashioning these connotations in more nuance throughout, either as 
“potentialities” post-„End Times,” or as “points of contention” post-„Face-Off.”  
200  Here a kind of merger of IW and TMW occurs, herewith left un-termed. 
201  See, Appendix I, Example 5. 
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contested), Walt indeed did employ a “more mild poison.” However, if ricin is 
suddenly deemed ineffectual in sense-making, where does it leave the cigarette? 
Here, the narrceptive glide into Walt’s IW is central. If he “masterminded the 
whole thing,” as Brian puts it, how did he supposedly manage it?  
This inquiry is central for Brian in orienting his SW “at this point.” First 
off, he glides into Walt’s IW, directly implicating the latter, on the one hand; 
but, on the other, implying, “perhaps,” Huell’s (Walt’s/Jesse’s crooked advo-
cate’s Saul’s bodyguard) involvement in getting the cigarette away from Jesse. 
However, it bears to emphasize here that Huell’s involvement is considered 
entirely through Walt. It is as if—for Brian—Huell’s IW doesn’t merit any 
consideration. Instead, a remarkable, internal power relation is construed in 
between IWs. Whist Walt “manage[s] to take” cigarette from Jesse’s pack, 
Huell appears merely as a proverbial arm extension202, a ‘depleted’ agency on 
robust ‘loan,’ as it were. Going further, B r i a n  acknowledges how “other possi-
bilities abound” but doesn’t necessarily dwell on them. It is however unne-
cessary to inquire “why” for this becomes clear once his narrception glides 
wholly into a TMW. Namely, he “trusts” these writers. He knows that Breaking 
Bad is yet to—whilst “regularly stret[ching] plausibility“—veer off-tracks, with 
“writers [pushing] nonsense.” Put differently, clearly opposing e.g., Dave I203 
and many others, B r i a n  forgoes worrying and enjoys the proverbial ride. 
Others, by contrast, would consider him uncritical, however; in part, perhaps, due 
to their own apparent inability to “give [the writers] the benefit of the doubt.”  
Therefore, further illuminations on how Walt’s involvement (i.e., 1st gist) 
makes sense can be derived from Spent’s204 and Freddo’s205 narrceptive 
dialogue, but also from Eric’s206 narrcepts almost a week post-“End Times” and 
shortly after “Face-Off,” respectively. All of these originate from commentary 
environments of Hollywood Reporter and Hitfix. Spent, though from  
another environment, builds on the previously considered narrception of 
IreneInIdaho, confirming and echoing (strikingly down to vernacular) 
latter’s narrceptive thinking of how Walt could’ve achieved the poisoning 
even—receding herewith even further from narrative motif CIGARETTE as the 
‘centerpiece’—without the cigarette for “[Walt] knows how to make ricin.” 
Thereafter, all the necessary ‘pieces’ are organized into a coherent linearity and 
hypothesized with salient exactitude. Though not being upfront—or, perhaps, 
remaining intentionally vague—on the exact plant207, Spent surmises that the 
gun conferring upon “his [Walt’s] backyard garden” is sufficient to contend that 
                                                            
202  Which also lends a “literal” connotation for it is, after all, the magician-like skillful work 
of hands—Huell’s hands as an allegedly experienced pickpocket—that swap cigarette pack 
for a new one, sans the “ricin cig.“ 
203  See, one-participant centered discourse world-within-discourse world considered in 3.5. 
204  See, Appendix I, Example 6. 
205  See, Appendix I, Example 7. 
206  See, Appendix I, Examples 8-9. 
207  Where other participants went as far as photographing/screencaping the plant, thereafter 
’scouraging’ for precise information (plant’s name, etc.) on it from Wikipedia and elsewhere.  
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there exists some (non-descript) plant and “ricin is derived from [its] seeds.” 
Specifically, Spent lends credence to such claim by recalling “same plants” 
were utilized for the production of ricin “a couple seasons ago.” (Here we 
tersely impinge on the TMW, in the limited sense of acknowledging “seasons”; 
“terse” because similarly it is also retrospective of NPs’ ‘histories.’). By itself, 
notably, the latter claim is essentially fraudulent for disposing of Gus indeed 
wasn’t even on the “agenda” those “couple seasons ago.” However, this appears 
seemingly—one would, at least, presume—as one of those “white lies” 
(momentary yields in proving one’s “point”) to further solidify the claim’s 
footing, viz. Spent’s SW. That is, Spent’s SW becomes ever more lucid from 
the deep focal vigor enacted on Walt’s IW. It is his “very pensive look,” his 
“formulat[ion] [of] a plan.” His. All this organizes, necessarily, the very 
foundation onto which Spent’s SW is built. In fact, the two latent “worlds” can 
be perceived as collapsing onto a naturally mono-semantic, convoluted unity; an 
intertwinement from which “story” and “actors” ever more intricately elicit. The 
latter suggestion is minutely corroborated by Spent’s profound probing into 
Walt’s (still only passively) violent ‘history.’ Hence, Spent practically scolds 
any “doubters,” because Walt definitively has arrived at—if not altogether gone 
beyond—being “capable.” After all, Spent recalls with aplomb, wasn’t Walt 
the one who “watched an innocent girl [Jesse’s girlfriend] drown in her own 
vomit [overdosing],” all for the singular sake of her being “in his way.” 
(Namely, here, too, Jesse was central; for, taken from Walt’s IW, she became an 
"encumbrance," pulling Jesse “down” to addiction.) Herewith it can be argued 
that Spent’s narrcept resonates with phailcakez’ and others’ in evoking a 
similar “get Jesse [back] on his side” ‘out-branched’ sub-gist. Last, but not 
least, however, the conclusion proper of Spent’s narrcept is the tie-in—re-
maining deep in Walt’s IW—with latter being afraid, not necessarily for his life, 
but most certainly for the lives of his family. Hence, in a way elaborating on 
phailcakez’ take on the “threat,” Spent observes here “the extra incentive” 
indispensable in thrusting Walt “to the dark side,” of perhaps permanently 
substituting the meek milquetoast husband variety to his alter ego, the merciless 
Heisenberg.  
Herewith we can also observe how Nooyawk208 from AV Club, having first 
dispensed with the 2nd gist (see below), aligns with Spent’s angle of investi-
gation, likewise arguing for the potentiality of 1st gist (specifically over the 3rd). 
For this, s/he glides into Walt’s IW, following Spent in that, after all, Walt “in 
essence [did] kil[l] Jesse’s former girlfriend [Jane].” Herewith a comparison 
proceeds with 3rd gist (i.e., Gus’ involvement) which is effectively negated and 
instead narrceptivized that wouldn’t it be “bit more logical” for Walt having 
done this deed than, say, Gus—even though the latter had his own history of 
evil-doing.  This assumption is further reinforced for nooyawk by two 209
equally significant observations: (1) Walt’s claim of never being able to “kill a 
                                                            
208  See, Appendix I, Example 11.  
209  As participants recall many a time from past ’histories,’ Gus had Brock’s mother 
Andrea’s brother murdered for an unconnected reason.  
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kid” having “rung hollow” (and can, thus, facilitate doubts concerning his 
sincerity on the matter); and (2) that Walt could’ve had deployed his knowledge 
of Gus’ related history to calculatedly bait Jesse. Consequently, Gus’ 
involvement becomes discredited through the temporal interlacing of the IWs of 
either men, and, more specifically, through—as just highlighted—the “nega-
tion” of one through the other. For nooyawk, then, it just does “seem … a bit 
more logical” to corroborate the 1st gist, whereas the utilization of Walt’s 
knowledge of Gus’ murderous past further becomes on the sub-gist of Walt’s 
calculated manipulation, the “ruse,” on Jesse (a “precedent” to be used “with 
Jesse against Gus.”). Contrastively, dygitalninja’s210—many comments down 
the road from the same “distributed” thread as nooyawk—approach on Walt is 
not nearly as “soft.” Dygitalninja is adamant in maintaining Walt having 
“killed dozens of children through the drugs he makes in mass” and having 
watched “Jesse’s girlfriend be killed.” Still, “Gus and the Cartel” are held 
complicit in the similarly horrid crimes. However, even so, s/he’d be “shocked” 
if Walt, the “NOT a ’good’ person,” would’ve indeed plotted to murder the boy. 
Hence a distinction emerges: it is either the deadly poisoning (which would 
amount to some—note the intertextual connotation carrying a kind of genre-
specific knowledge developed as twistory—“Tony Soprano level sociopath” 
antics) or “slipping the kid something to make him sick [temporarily].” 
However, let us shortly return to why Brock having succumbed to some self-
induced accident doesn’t accord with nooyawk, however. In fact, 2nd gist is 
disregarded, though with an emphatically hesitant, capitalized “IF,” specifically 
by the overt reliance on what had been conveyed “according to a previous 
episode.” Here the issues on hand are broached through a kind of “impersonal” 
TMW built on two points: (i) impossibility for Brock “hav[ing] gotten his hands 
on the cigarettes,” (ii) and in conjunction with (i), not having gotten indisposed 
earlier, if information conveyed by the narrative is to believe (i.e., “just 
touching it [the vialed cigarette] within 24 hours could have made him sick”).211 
Meanwhile, Freddo’s response to Spent—wherein explicit addressing 
instigates what I would term ‘narrceptive dialogue’—worked up more speci-
fically from his preceding short narrcept212—(1) returns to Brian’s narrcept213, 
                                                            
210  See, Appendix I, Example 12. 
211  The theories of Brock (by his own accord) getting sick through either touching the 
cigarette, or stealthily having a smoke and “inhaling” ricin were popular—and indeed, 
convenient—up to the point where more precise information, such as ricin poisoning only 
possible through ingestion, started to emerge. Accordingly, both the cigarette as well as the 
vialled ricin lost in focality.  
212  See, Appendix I, Example 10. 
213  Which makes sense for Brian’s one of the first (4th to Freddo’s 27th) participants in one of 
Hollywood Reporter’s “distributed” thread. To give a generic definition, I would argue a 
“distributed thread” being a loose collection of narrcepts where one of the gists is prevalent. 
These kinds of loose “collaborations” within one particular locus also frequently overlie with 
and correspond to the “technical” meaning of the term: i.e., a singular commentary, 
accompanied with direct responses, developing into “sub-thread”—“child-thread” in 
Reddit’s parlance—that is, an “aside” from “primary” commentaries.   
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building on latter’s focus on Huell (or, rather, on Walt through Huell), but, pace 
Brian, Freddo strongly enforces Huell’s IW; and (2), elaborates in a more 
minute detail what his ‘dialogue interlocutor’ left unsaid—namely, the exact 
placement and name of the plant supposedly applied by Walt in producing a 
poison capable to induce ricin-like symptoms. Now, for (1), Freddo glides into 
TMWa (subscript a denoting ‘extra-narrative’ reflexion wherein experience’s 
“artificiality” is acknowledged insofar as the latter being re-producible via 
technical aids.) Subsequently drawing on the possibility of re-“watch,” then, 
Freddo implores (and indeed, many a participant do) to closely observe the 
“frisking [scene],” for—in organizing his SW now through TMWa gliding into 
Huell’s IW—“the big dude definitely” pockets something. The (2) observation, 
however, Freddo considers the “most important[t],” and indeed it can be, were 
we to, for a moment, think in terms of the overarching, becoming DW. Where 
Spent narrceptivized of non-descript plants, Freddo, contrariwise, doesn’t 
withhold. He directly connects Walt “spin[ing] the gun” with the latter on its 
“third try” pointing to somewhere very specific. Namely, “to a flowering potted 
plant.” And either through his own above average knowledge of botany (cf., 
twistory), or due to this precise information having been mentioned previously 
by others, Freddo doesn’t shy away from being as exact as possible—“[i]t is 
Lilly of the Valley, a poisonous plant! Case closed!” 
Indeed, such unperturbed conclusion at the time might have satisfied 
Freddo—and confirmed his suspicions the week later, to boot—but for his co-
participants, gaps and contradictions in actions and events weren’t depleted and 
were, indeed, revisited post-“Face-Off.” Hence, Eric from Hitfix, whilst fully 
acknowledging Huell’s involvement, remains wary in other areas. Although 
embracing the “swa[p] out” of Jesse’s cigarette back as “the easy part,” and 
thus tying his observation of Huell having frisked “so roughly and ostenta-
tiously” with Freddo’s clarification of Huell having “put something in his 
pocket with his left hand,” both participants ultimately corroborate on the ‘out-
branched’ sub of the 1st gist—i.e., cigarette as “ruse”—on the one hand; 
whereas, on the other, for Eric—even after “official” reveal—the “poisoning” 
itself persists as “bigger question mark.” Now, even after the plant widely 
speculated about being explicitly disclosed as poison’s source, participants 
nevertheless reverted to this key “scene” of “swapping,” for they couldn’t 
comprehend how someone like Huell (ordinarily observable as a slow, sleepy, 
big-boned guy) could’ve managed it; or, for that matter, how could’ve Walt had 
done it—for, as we recall—already phailcakez emphasized the house arrest 
imposed on him. Hence, in both of his narrcepts (9/10, 10/10), straight after 
“Face-Off” had aired, Eric soothes (or, rather, aims to convince?) any 
“doubters” by arguing—at length in his second narrcept the next day—, having 
now “re-watch[ed] the scene,” for Huell’s “clear” complicity. What is of special 
interest here is how Eric organizes his SW by gliding in between TMWa (and 
perhaps even TMW proper) and Huell’s IW. On the one hand, it is Huell who 
“appears to reach,” with his “left hand” whilst “right hand was clearly empty”; 
Huell who “palm[ed] something” and thereafter “clearly pu[t] that same left 
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hand in his pocket.” On the other, however, it is “the actor [who was] 
instructed” (glide into TMW proper as consisting of “makers” enforcing their 
“intentions”) to “leave options open, at the very least,”; actor who “makes a 
semi-lunge.” Similarly, there are also notations on editing and filming, observed 
to evince deliberate ‘rhythms of deception,’ as it were, not in the sense of 
narrative’s “artifice,” to be sure, but rather in putting implicit accents on the 
intentional trickery of the “textmakers.” Nevertheless, ultimately the conclusion 
recalls Eric’s prior (then still hypothetical) “[C]ase closed!” We are back to 
Huell’s IW, him having “picked Jesse’s pocket” and in the process, “swapped 
out the pack.” Indeed, it organizes as a rather coherent SW and across these two 
successive narrcepts, it might have cohered for Eric.  
However it has to be noted that earlier participants, post-“End Times,” have 
found Huell, suddenly having “made the A team,” as “untenable,” closely 
evaluated key events fixated on Huell’s agency and his IW under scrutiny, 
notwithstanding. Beaulingpin214 from Reddit construes Huell as a “bumbler,” 
with predisposed incapability in “manag[ing] to take” the pack, let alone (i) 
“identifying the ricin cigarette,” (ii) “replacing” it. Moreover, to do all this 
without—and here we glide into Jesse’s IW—latter “noticing,” of him being 
totally oblivious whilst “directly watching Huell and Huell’s hands” and being 
absolutely cognizant of the significance the pack entailed. Hence, by distinctly 
focusing on Huell’s IW (and Jesse’s, for good measure), beaulingpin goes to 
“prove” the seeming nonsensicalness of Huell’s involvement vis-à-vis a 
complex string of carefully monitored events and organizes it all together with 
the summary judgment of Huell being a “bumbler,” not even worth theorizing 
about; of indeed, only enabling an “untenable [theory],” to boot. 
Potatogun215, from an earlier time point of the same “distributed” thread 
from Reddit, elaborates on beaulingpin’s construed omission of Huell’s 
involvement by noting that—implying latter’s size and him being slow in 
motion—Huell lacks “dexterity to do it cleanly.” Potatogun’s narrcept corres-
ponds to beaulingpin’s also in reducing the ambivalence vis-à-vis “identifying 
the ricin cigarette” and “replacing” the pack. Potatogun effectively omits the 
former, suggesting instead that—at best—Huell could’ve managed “switch[ing] 
the whole pack.”  
Beaulingpin’s narrcept is also seconded by two narrcepts by nointernal-
censor216, shortly following former’s. Same participant also preceded 
potatogun’s narrceptive thinking (see below217). Given the widest span, 
however, nointernalcensor’s narrcepts conveying a “distributed” thread with 
beaulingpin’s belong in addition (or “primarily”) to a protracted thread traced 
back to pauker.   Now, were we to take 218 closest Censor’s narrcept in relation 
                                                            
214  See, Appendix I, Example 13. 
215  See, Appendix I, Example 14. 
216  See, Appendix I, Examples 22-23. 
217  See, Appendix I, Examples 31-32. 
218  Not elaborated on here, but see, Appendix I, Example 24. Cf., Examples 25-26 
(s in is ters i lkmerchant ); Example 27 (Shappie); Example 28 (SupremeFuzzler ); 
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to beaulingpin’s, i.e., its consecutive twice over, we could observe that even 
though, strictly speaking, responding within pauker’s thread, Censor also 
fine-tunes beaulingpin’s criticism vis-à-vis Huell abruptly being “made [one 
of] the A team.” The core the argument organizing Censor’s SW across the two 
narrcepts, then, becomes articulated as a tremendously tense inquiry: “Wouldn’t 
huel [sic] have to have xray vision in order to swipe the single ricin containg 
[sic] cig out of the pack, even if he was capable of being that smooth in the first 
place?” Whilst concurring with beaulingpin’s doubt of “untenab[ility],” 
Censor further complements it with veering into fantasy genre (which in turn 
can again be treated as a ‘terse’ gliding into TMWa), suggesting slim possibility 
of any of the above having happened unless Huell possesses “xray vision.” And 
indeed, latter notwithstanding, what about Huell’s “smooth[ness]” in the act, 
given what a “bumbler” he was? Incidentally, this accentuation of “smooth” is 
something Censor reverts to, given its centrality also in their earlier narrcept 
that preceded potatogun’s. Similarly to the latter’s reliance on the emphasis on 
Huell’s lack of dexterity which ultimately, at best, granted him the “capability” 
to get as far as “switch[ing] the whole pack,” Censor is highly doubtful—
gliding here into Jesse’s IW—whether it is possible to “pull [it] off without 
Jesse noticing.” Hence, Censor notes both the enormously calibrated 
juggler’s219 act of removing “a cigarette” and reinstating the pack “back into the 
pocket” as well as the very tight time window Huell had to actually do so. Now, 
in switching back to Censor’s elaboration on beaulingpin’s SW, an articula-
tion commences to also tie Walt’s IW to the matters on hand (something 
beaulingpin’s SW didn’t explicitly do). Even if Huell somehow did it—that 
is, were we to assume they (viz., Walt/Saul/Huell) had some sort of elaborate 
plan hatched beforehand—how indeed “did he [Walt] manage to slip the poison 
to the kid?” As can be seen, and as occurred many a time throughout, sooner or 
later this impediment of becoming ‘locked in’ at the complicated 1st gist takes 
precedent (but see below). Now, Censor’s later narrcept is, perhaps, the most 
fascinating. In fact, it becomes apparent that s/he had just viewed the then 
circled clip (which begot diverse “formats” by way of screen captures, 
decelerated video, and zoom-ins, to boot) re-playing the precise moment when 
the alleged “swap” occurred. Whilst having previously opted for rather clear-cut 
skepticism with regards to Huell’s involvement in her/is narrcept, now, after an 
apparent frame-by-frame scrutinizing, Censor might be getting back around to 
actually—pace beaulingpin and potatogun—to actually embrace the 
reverse position. “Might” though, is indeed the operative word for Censor 
doesn’t take anything for granted and postscripts their later narrcept by, in 
effect, professing of doubting their own eyes. This absolutely seamless merger 
of Huell’s IW and TMWa, however, has to be highlighted in how skillfully 
                                                                                                                                                 
Example 29 (deleted*); and, Example 30 (deleted). *- In Reddit, when users delete their 
account, posts remain, though unassigned, as it were.  
219  Or a “magician’s act,” given how Huell’s potentially beyond advanced pickpocketing 
skill was entertained by some of the participants. 
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Censor organizes their merger into a rather coherently perceived SW, building 
towards such aim throughout all three of her/is narrcepts. 
Nevertheless, even if we were to grant, post-“End-Times,” that everything 
indeed happened due to Huell’s extremely proficient actions, wouldn’t perhaps 
intractable discrepancies vis-à-vis Jesse’s IW appear to propose further ambi-
valence? For one, how couldn’t Jesse later tell he’s carrying a completely 
different pack? After all, Huell/Walt/Saul couldn’t have known in advance how 
many cigarettes Jesse had left? In fact, it is these irregularities that give 
precedent to participants’ twistories for they start to convey their own experien-
ce with (excessive) smoking, which had necessitated—during those periods—
exact knowledge how many cigarettes they currently had left. All this, justifiab-
ly, turns question back to Jesse—wouldn’t he?  
Post-“Face-Off,” Sean220 from Hitfix broached this predicament by 
initiating narrceptive dialogues with Ronaldo221, and by corroborating and 
elaborating on Ji l l  Chin's222 narrcept in the previous commentary (without 
explicit addressing and/or quoting, as with Ronaldo, however).223 (In turn, 
Anonymous picked up Sean’s “distributed” thinking a little less than thirty 
comments down the road, see below.) As far as Ji l l  goes, latter doesn’t share 
Reddit’s beaulingpin’s harsh criticisms on the “[un]tenability” of Huell’s 
“theory.” In fact, relying on Jesse’s IW, she proposes a “simple explanation” of 
how “bumbl[ing]” Huell could’ve “manage[d]” it. Namely, all it could’ve taken 
was “lift[ing] the pack during the ‘frisk’,” extracting “the ricin cig” thereafter. 
Now, once Jesse parted company with Saul and Huell, he indeed was noticeably 
distraught, “preoccupied[, ] carrying a heavy bag of money,” as Ji l l  puts it 
drawing on Ronaldo’s preceding narrcept. Consequently, it “would have been 
easy” for Huell to “slip” the SAME pack “back into Jesse’s pocket” (sans the 
“ricin cig”); and indeed, it does make sense for this act to go unnoticed, were 
we to consider Jesse’s mental state at the time. Though short and concise, then, 
Ji l l’s narrcept manages in a graceful and nuanced, yet powerful fashion to 
overturn many ‘dogmas’ persisting throughout post-“End-Times” discussions 
and continuing to have significant appeal post-“Face-Off” also, as we will see. 
At first, Sean goes directly to elaborate on Ji l l’s SW. However, it can arti-
culated as such only insofar as Sean emphatically corroborates (“[e]specially 
if”) Ji l l’s SW vis-à-vis Huell’s “theory,” retaining implicitly the assumption of 
the “same pack.” In effect, the latter’s a necessary particle (or, indeed, an 
                                                            
220  See, Appendix I, Example 15. 
221  See, Appendix I, Example 16. 
222  See, Appendix I, Example 17. 
223  It serves here to note as a perhaps useful refresher that inter-participant relations within 
one “site of engagement” (SoE) are tracked with “unique signifiers” (see previous sub-
chapter), whereas cigarette’s (as narrative motif) relevance corresponds to TAS4 “relevance 
rank” (RR) and transcends any one locus, i.e., is a value non-exclusive to any one SoE. 
Where the former is locus-situated, the latter is situated in “distributed” thought, producing 
in union a more or less “technical” illustration for beacon’s dialectic nature. Accordingly, 
then, J i l l ’s focus on cigarette is considerably more emphatic than Sean’s and Ronaldo’s, a 
fact reflected in RR—98 versus 22/9, respectively. 
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instigating force) for Sean’s becoming SW to organize coherently, to “make 
sense.” Hence, Sean goes deep into Jesse’s IW, and, in the process, also hints at 
a kind of twistory. Namely, what is at central issue here for Sean is Jesse’s 
smoking habits juxtaposed with those of “real life” smokers. But let’s unpack. 
Sean first maintains that, given how “incredibly nervous and fidgety and likely 
to smoke a lot” Jesse already was in the interim period after frisking, but prior 
to Andrea’s phone call (noting Brock being in the hospital with a suspicion of 
having been poisoned). From here follows, going by Sean’s SW, that it 
would’ve made sense for Jesse to definitely spot something being askew with 
the pack, had it, in fact, been—to re-utilize Ji l l’s sentiment, the opposite of 
“same.” To further fine-tune his contentions for the becoming SW, Sean next 
capitalizes on Ronaldo’s quote, who—ahead of both the former and Ji l l—
suggested that had the pack been left “anywhere near three quarters full,” Jesse 
wouldn’t have “questioned how many smokes he has left.” Sean’s criticisms to 
such (naïve?) line of thinking, however, are plentiful. He opens with a question: 
how could they’ve have known “when he bought his latest pack”? Sean’s 
implication is that absent such key knowledge, it is impossible to surmise the 
“state,” as it were, of Jesse’s pack, even if all of these three NPs (Saul, Huell, 
Walt) indeed had been diligently observant over Jesse’s smoking habits. Sean 
does grant that if, indeed, Jesse “had a roughly ¾ of a pack left” and got one 
that “was ¾ full,” the disparity—for him—would be negligible, pure semantics, 
as upheld by Sean’s phrasing of choice. However, the meaningfulness of such 
“plan” rests, Sean insists, on its potentiality irrespective of Jesse’s cigarette 
count. Sean’s underlying point is—hereby elaborating on and solidifying Ji l l’s 
SW—that the “pack swap” makes no sense, for—being “a nicotine addict”—
Jesse would know “exactly how many [cigarettes] he had left,” down to precise 
numerals. Where does Sean’s adamant confidence about this particular issue 
spring from, however? This is revealed by his concluding statement noting a 
correlation between the paucity of the cigarettes and “smoker’s exac[t]” 
knowledge of “how many he has.” Put differently, Sean, as finalizing organi-
zing ‘step’ for his SW, glides into “real life” ‘knowledge frames’ and construes 
therewith a twistory with Jesse, further substantiated by the pronoun of “he” 
which would implicitly denote Sean himself—or someone he knows, etc.—
whereas explicitly serving as the “twi” (viz. twine) in the twistory affiliating 
Jesse’s IW and that of the participant’s (Sean’s) own. To now attempt to 
collapse Sean’s (and Jil l’s) SWs onto the becoming DW (discourse world), it 
can be argued that both acknowledge the “authorial” solution but only insofar as 
Jesse’s pack of cigarettes having focal bearing contravenes on latter’s “swap,” 
which, in the final analysis, is estimated as nonsensical. To put afore-described 
in a more prosaic jargon—especially allowing for Ronaldo’s approach 
below—Sean and Ji l l  might have managed to “de-cheat” the “sanctioned” 
conclusion.   
Ronaldo, meanwhile—the major brunt of Sean’s previous criticism—
doesn’t “feel cheated” at all. Accepting, on face value, the principal assumption 
that the “only way” subsequent string of events was “possible” was “Huell’s 
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swap of the pack,” he doesn’t appear to contest it nearly as much as others and, 
indeed, calls to mind Brian from Hollywood Reporter from above in doing so. 
Nonetheless, even Ronaldo is not devoid of justification on what, in particular, 
founds his “lax” stance, itself a reversal on the narrceptive thinking of majority 
of his co-participants. He goes about it, interestingly, by concentrating on 
Jesse’s IW and capitalizing on his “mind [being] occupied.” From here, 
Ronaldo construes a conjecture that, after all, Jesse had to “switch the Ricin 
[sic] out of all his packs” every other time he had procured a fresh one, and 
thus—as was quoted by Sean—he is far less likely to jump into conclusions, 
being “occupied,” on the one hand; and it having become a kind of “auto-
mated,” going through the motion act to begin with, on the other. Now, it is here 
that Ronaldo’s SW gains prominence because it basically implies Jesse’s 
deteriorating state of mind—another of those ‘branched out’ sub-gists partici-
pants were keen on. As Opie224 from Hollywood Reporter succinctly put it back 
post-“End Times”—whilst staying thereby firmly in the course of 2nd gist (i.e., 
Brock’s accidental self-poisoning)—“Jesse is too upset to really know for sure 
the last time he saw it [the vialed cigarette] in his pack, even though he thinks it 
was that morning.”    
Now, what occurs down the road in the “distributed” thread of narrceptive 
thinking in Hitfix, as shared by Sean, Ji l l  Chin and Ronaldo, is Anony-
mous’s response, addressed to Sean (viz. narrceptive dialogue). Anonymous 
goes to fine-tune Sean’s SW in very significant ways whilst, in process, 
developing he/is own and remaining firmly in the “still dumb and a cheat” 
camp, to boot. Specifically, Anon is ironclad in postulating Saul’s involve-
ment. The method of how Huell “stole Jesse’s cigarettes” notwithstanding 
(Anon doesn’t appear exactly partial to either camp previously examined), a 
deep glide into Saul’s IW occurs and latter’s utilized to make maximum sense 
of the most pressing issues even subsequent to the “sanctioned” solution, as 
proposed in “Face-Off.” As insisted on by Anon, Saul “had to have been the 
one,” the actual perpetrator, and also “only one who could’ve gotten away with 
it.” On the one hand, it was well-known (and constantly observed) how Saul 
mediated Jesse’s funds to Andrea, and, following this, it wouldn’t be far-fetched 
to presume that in one of those visitations, Saul also had “got a snack [for 
Brock].” However, Anon argues, there persists the problem of “Walt knowing 
who Brock is and [Walt] knowing Saul knew him [Brock].” Consequently we 
finally glide into TMW for Anon is hopeful for “some flashback” where Saul-
Walt prior plotting could be circumscribed, even if later on, during Breaking 
Bad’s final season.225 Otherwise, though, as noted, Anon remains unimpressed. 
Ironically, Anon concludes by neglecting perhaps the leading disparity. When it 
indeed was a previously hatched plan by Walt and Saul with the latter bearing 
the brunt of agency, how does the final shot of the Lily of the Valley match, for 
does it not completely dismantle any such “theory” as articulated above?  
                                                            
224  See, Appendix I, Example 18. 
225  Nothing exactly like this ever realizes, although in 5th season’s episode “Confessions,” 
the much-discussed “pack swap” incident gets resolved through Jesse’s IW.  
169 
By the looks of it, we therefore cannot escape building on one crucial, 
finalizing “detail”: how did Walt “slip” Brock the poison—or, alternatively, 
were we to take ricin cigarette “stealing” or “pack swapping” as an elaborate 
ruse, how precisely does Walt’s agency play into all this? Hence we are circling 
back to the 1st gist and echoing Freddo’s inquiry for the poisoning, by and 
large, being the “bigger question mark.” 
Herewith, Reddit’s Puddy1's226 narrcept—building on a narrceptive 
dialogue with Velveteenmage—might prove instructive. First off, Puddy1’s 
yet “undecided” whether s/he opts to interlocutor’s “theory” (one accentuating 
the 3rd gist; see below). Conversely, Puddy1 expounds on a “counter theory” 
of his/er own. Thus, in organizing his/her SW, Puddy1 goes for 1st gist, 
although by rather unconventional means. Arguably, Walt had “descended into 
madness” and “snapped,” however with the caveat (and one we can recall also 
from previous discussions that whatever else, Walt would still, “at any cost,” 
strive to shield his family from any potential harm. How would he do it, 
though? Here Puddy1, by gliding from Walt’s IW to Saul’s IW further fine-
tunes Saul’s involvement vis-à-vis what we’ve considered thus far, by 
contending that Walt “got” him “call in Jesse,” with Huell subsequently “pick-
pocket[ing] the cigarette” for (echoing others) “[y]ou can see” him 
“pocket[ing]” something. It is a revealingly organized SW indeed, as it (i) also 
suggests auxiliary fine-tuning for the previous contention (and sub-gist, one can 
say) of how no “pack swapping” occurred, only “stealing,” “pickpocket[ing]” 
the singular (key) cigarette (or, then, alternatively: the snapping the of pack, the 
taking of the cigarette; and “slip[ing]” the pack back into Jesse’s pocket once he 
leaves, “preoccupied”); and (ii) how it can be readily acknowledged by staying 
firm on Huell’s IW without having to fall back to TMWa measures considered 
beforehand (cf., “scene re-plays” versus “[y]ou can see Huell...”). 
What kind of insights can be drawn from Velveteenmage’s227 narrcept, 
however? To grasp the acute implications it presents on a wider scale of 
narrceptive thought, it is—I would contend—necessary to backtrack some 
hundred commentaries within the same “distributed” thread on Reddit and pick 
up on NeededANewName’s228 narrcept. Specifically, the terminus of 
Needed’s narrcept grows out of the precondition of Gus having had “bugs” 
Jesse’s house. Here the narrcept becomes by interleaving the IWs of all three 
primary NPs. Not only does Gus eavesdrop, Needed argues building on Gus’ 
IW, but he could’ve also installed a “hidden camera,” hence possessing real-
time video/audio footage of the so-called cigarette ploy as it unfolded (“talk[s],” 
“checking[s]”.) This construal of Gus’ IW also links with and elaborates on the 
overarching perception pertaining to his distrustful nature. Needed’s reminder 
of Walt’s words—gliding here into latter’s IW—“Gus always [being] 10 steps 
ahead of him,” also resonate here with antecedent knowledge—Walt’s, 
specifically—of how Gus has “had houses bug[ed] before on the show,” namely 
                                                            
226  See, Appendix I, Example 19. 
227  See, Appendix I, Example 20. 
228  See, Appendix I, Example 21. 
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in Walt’s own house, as planted by Gus’ (and Saul’s) loyal goon, Mike. Here we 
subsequently have not least but three “worlds” being organized into a meaning-
ful merger to scaffold the eventual collapse into SW: (i) Gus’ IW—ordering his 
enforcer-type of subordinates to “bug” ‘workers’; (ii) Walt’s IW—evoking his 
one-to-one with Mike several episodes ago in his home; and ultimately, (iii) 
TMWa/TMW fusion—one the one hand, conveying hesitancy whether “they’ve 
[writers] acknowledged it [Gus having more wherewithal than Walt]”; and, on 
the other, turning latter’s uncertainty into (at least more coherent) certainty by, 
again, drawing on Gus’ IW: “[he] has had,” even though “on the show” (in 
order to retain the TMWa  association as uninterrupted).  
Now, Velveteenmage, for his/her part, preserves Needed’s firm belief of 
Gus’ complicity (viz., 3rd gist). However, the crux of Mage’s SW—an extre-
mely direct, physical agency subscribed to Gus—makes it stand out amongst 
peers. That is to say, Mage goes as far as attaching “pretty obvious” to a 
seemingly unearthly idea that it was “indeed, Gus” who “lift[ed]” the “ricin 
cigarette” from Jesse’s jacket (hanging near the door), when he was on the 
ground floor cooking meth. For Mage, this is the “if anything” option, to boot. 
Moreover, both Jesse’s and Walt’s IWs “ti[e] in with”—to adapt Mage’s 
vocabulary—Gus’ IW very thoroughly indeed. Firstly, Jesse had said he had just 
swapped the cigarette into a “new pack the morning the episode takes place” 
(here also a snappy swerve into TMWa), increasing the potentiality of Gus 
having “lifted” the key cigarette insofar as Jesse later not bothering to re-check 
(also latent here, again, the sub-gist of Jesse being “preoccupied” at the time). 
Secondly, Mage all but paraphrases phailcakez’ stance from the beginning of 
present analysis, noting that—as opposed to Gus’ ability to actively roam 
around apparently—the former “ha[d] been at home awaiting imminent doom 
all day.” Consequently, Walt would’ve been incapable of doing anything. It has 
to be noted, at this point, however, that bulk of Mage’s SW builds towards a 
very deep-going negation of the 1st gist, that is, by construing a countenance to 
“the argument [as if] Walter would [e]ver poison a child even for the sake of his 
own family, who is under DEA protection and is overall safe.” Although the 
point about Walt’s family being protected and relatively beyond harm (though it 
was never wholly certain) is well made, as Mage’s co-participants—post-“End 
Times” (as Mage writes) and post-“Face-Off,” respectively—have made 
relatively clear, Walt would’ve definitely (and ultimately did) go to exactly such 
lengths to keep his family safe. Put differently, then, Mage’s narrcept con-
cludes by “hitching” their SW nevertheless the ‘positive’ take on 1st gist, by 
going a considerable length to beforehand negate the 3rd, which has to be treated 
as a secondary ‘theme’ of this SW due to being utilized as means to an end, the 
“all in all” towards which Mage’s each carefully nuanced storytelling ‘step’ 
ultimately aspires. Analytically speaking we should not, in good conscience, 
omit these proverbial steps, however. Hence, let’s return to observe how Mage 
necessarily ‘spreads out’ their SW. The focal center for Mage’s narrceptive 
thinking is one of the most popular subs of the 3rd gist, namely how to make 
sense of Gus not returning to his vehicle once he had visited Jesse at the 
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hospital. What made Gus stop mere steps prior to opening his car door? What 
made him turn back and entertain some other exit strategy? All this, of course, 
is concurrently predicated on Walt, observing Gus’ actions from neighboring 
roof top, waiting for the former to sit into the car which Walt had rigged with 
explosives whilst Gus conversed with Jesse.229 Now, with this it also becomes 
clearer what “tie in with” precisely means; that is, Gus being the original 
perpetrator who “lifted” the cigarette but was then ‘figured out’ and made 
‘transparent’ (by Walt, to Jesse). This is not only the primary way to excuse 
Walt’s blame but also to, in a fittingly complementary fashion, to make sense of 
(to make coherent) one very telling, but altogether ambivalent gesture of Gus—
him somehow “[knowing] the car [being] not safe.” In other words, “had his 
plan worked,” that is, had Jesse being promptly suspecting of Walt having been 
the culprit, Jesse would have told Gus not only that Walt murdered Brock, but 
that he had killed him for it, to boot. (And we have to grant Mage, that this, 
indeed, was Jesse’s first impulse as observed in the narrative.) However, Mage 
contends, Jesse’s articulation of the events (doctors, poisoning, sans Walter) 
“led Gus to suspect” the former “ha[ving] formed an alliance” against him. On 
the one hand, as Mage maintains, Gus’ is a “[warranted] suspicion” for all 
Gus’ prior attempts (rather friendly and “homey” gestures, even) had been for 
naught—Jesse nevertheless remained steadfast to Walt. On the other, Mage 
sees their core argument corroborated by Jesse articulating “unwillingness to 
work” in his dialogue with Gus, leading, in turn, the latter to think that “get[ing] 
him to the Hospital [sic]” was a “ploy” for—crucially—Walt would then also 
know of him being there (cf. suspicion about the car.) Last but definitely not the 
least, conceivably drawing in part on preceding narrcept by NeededANew-
Name, Mage also builds on the sub-gist of “Gus had bugs installed every-
where,” as it were, associating this directly with how he would know Jesse-Walt 
being after him. As such, as is revealed by the final analysis, Mage’s SW once 
fully become is not so much a negation of 3rd gist, but one thoroughly 
discrediting it. In other words, for Mage, neither 1st nor 3rd gist are acceptable, 
leaving the unfortunately unanswered question whether the middle option (2nd gist, 
i.e., Brock’s self-poisoning) is embraced implicitly, or whether the eliminations—as 
given—just didn’t portend any “deeper meaning” by themselves.       
 
3.5 Participant Dave I’s co-elaborative sense-making from 
“End Times” to “Face-Off” as a discourse world-within-
discourse world  
Meanwhile, a fascinating individual “case study” precisely in returning to 3rd 
gist can be observed by the multiple narrcept spread by participant Dave I 
from Hitfix. Due to its concisely specified nature, I think such case should be 
                                                            
229  You see, that was their “last ditch” plan to get rid of him, being as Walt convinces Jesse 
that it was Gus who was behind the poisoning. 
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examined more thoroughly.  In his 1 of six commentary texts (230 st viz. narrcepts), 
Dave I  begins by quoting another participant’s, Justin 's231, question implying 
a “mistake” being at the core of all these horrid events (see, Schema 4). Dave I  
seemingly buys into this idea of “accidental poisoning,” but maintains—by 
gliding into TMW—it being the likeliest “scenario” because “they [the 
writers]” having had “thr[own] in” suspicions with regards to Walt/Gus. The 
participation of either men, though, is deemed incomprehensible in any 
“obvious” fashion. By Dave I’s evaluation, such a “convoluted plan” for 
poisoning must’ve required thorough elaboration (which is something neither 
men really had lots of opportunities for at the time). However, Dave I  doesn’t 
leave 2nd gist entirely off the hook either. Hence he further argues that though 
Brock’s involvement is “most likely,” one can also put forth “two reasons” why 
the boy’s focality in the unfolding events might not have been the “logical 
choice.“ 
 
 
 
Schema 4: Hitfix’s Dave I  (3.10.11, 1st). Following schema 3, “shadow” emanating 
from the “Justin” image is supposed to convey how the beacon ‘glides’ between two 
discourse participants, with its ‘blinking’ thus circumscribing the co-elaborative 
development of common sense. For Brock’s IW and the TMW take clear precedent over 
others, respective “thought bubbles,” they are marked with stronger outlines. With both 
discharging into (or, simultaneously, originating from) Just in’s “mistake,” the green 
long dash dot dot arrow highlights the explicit narrceptive content linking the two.  
 
                                                            
230  See, Appendix I, Examples 33-38 (3.10.11, 4.10.11; 5.10.11 – 10.10.11x3). 
231  See, Appendix I, Example 39.  
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A bit later, at the dawn of a new day (4.10.11), Dave I  moves to reinforce the 
accentuation of the TMW. “The writers left [the poisoning] ambiguous for a 
reason,” he writes. He concludes that while apparently no absolutes exist in 
these matters, all the thus far introduced possibilities could be “equally 
plausible.” Finally, two days later (5.10.11)—while still on the subject of “End 
Times“—Dave I  builds on a kind of soft disagreement with a participant 
Fred232 (via narrceptive dialogue) and focuses in more detail on three inter-
related elements: 
 
(a)  his utter disbelief in Huell’s capacity to pass as a Houdini-like “quick-
fingered” pickpocket (Huell’s IW) (cf., the narrcepts as being organizing in 
3.4), 
(b)  even if (a) is revealed as having indeed occurred, Dave I considers it 
utterly impossible unless “they [the writers] show how it was possible” 
(i.e., glide into TMW), 
and finally (c) Dave I  sees it fit to also introduce—as did Puddy1 and others 
in 3.4—Saul’s IW into the proceedings at hand, maintaining the scheme 
wouldn’t (1) work without latter’s knowledge, and (2) that “there’s no way” 
he’d agree to participate (see, Schema 5, for the visual summary). Speaking of 
Saul’s IW, however, a fascinating and presently beneficially supplementary read 
is proposed by participant sinistersi lkmerchant over two narrcepts 
following a “distributed” thread initiated by pauker233 (see, 3.4). Namely, 
Sinister  asserts that—given Saul’s exigency to take flight234—Walt could’ve 
“come up with a lie,” coaxing Saul to play his part (and, by extension, arranging 
Huell to deploy his skill).  
 
                                                            
232  See, Appendix I, Example 40.  
233  Cf., Examples 25-26; Also see, Appendix I, Example 24. 
234  He assumed Gus would take revenge on him given his close work relationship with 
Walt/Jesse. 
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Schema 5: The development of Dave I’s narrception throughout the post-“End Times” 
period, i.e., 3.10.11–5.10.11 (3.10, 1st reduced for reasons of size), off of the 
engagement with the narrcepts by Just in  and Fred, thus introducing a kind of 
discourse-within-a-discourse world (based on one episode; see, Schema 6, for second, 
“Face-Off.” Conceivably, both schemas could thereafter also be ‘overlaid’ in order to 
highlight distributed aspects, becoming co-elaborated over the two-week stretch.).   
 
 
From here, we should navigate to Dave I’s comments post-“Face-Off,” the 
revelatory season’s finale that aired a week later. In the first—and very 
lengthy—of the three texts posted (10/10/11), Dave I  again narrceptivizes by 
co-elaborating the observations of his co-participants. This time, it is Adam235 
and Tizzielish236 (see, Schema 6 for illustration). Evidently, the swap did 
occur, thus necessitating the inquiry as to how it transpired. Hence, Adam had 
just emphasized how the swap of the cigarette packs could’ve gone “un-
noticed,” based on similarities in packs’ outward appearance. Simultaneously, 
                                                            
235  See, Appendix I, Example 41. Also see, Example 42 (Sean). 
236  See, Appendix I, Example 43. 
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Adam shakes off the potential significance of the number of cigarettes inside, 
based on his “real world” belief that prolonged smokers “rarely kn[ow]” the 
quantity by heart. (Note how Adam’s suggestion runs in total counter to what 
other such twistories have previously maintained) Meanwhile, Dave I  quotes 
Tizzielish’s observation that “real life” pickpockets can be “unbelievably 
skilled.” Significantly, here Tizzielish’s understanding of Huell’s IW ‘splits,’ 
former’s own “real life” experience flows in and thus, yet another twistory 
emerges. 
In principle, Dave I  agrees with his sense-making compatriots. On the one 
hand, he reckons, Walt could’ve known what brand Jesse smokes; and on the 
other, Huell being an extremely skilled pickpocket in disguise may “sort of 
make sense.“ 
Dave I is not without his own subjective quibbles, however. On the first 
issue, he’s willing to take a non-committal position by gliding into the TMW 
and “suspecting” that these matters shall be revisited. The second issue, 
however, is more laborious to make peace with. While, as noted, Dave I  does 
in principle acquiesce to Tizziel ish’s read, his primary point is that—yet 
again, gliding into the TMW—should it indeed be so (i.e., Huell as an “un-
believably skilled” pickpocket), writers had “brought it out of nowhere.” Con-
sequently, this is why such portrayal doesn’t “gel with [Huell’s] character [in a 
particular kind of person sense]” thus far presented. In such an analysis, heavy 
on TMW, and penetrating the examination of Huell’s IW deeper than “End 
Times“’ narrative ever afforded, Dave I argues that the participation in this key 
event makes Huell’s IW (and even Huell as NP) incoherent—someone hitherto 
seemingly ineffective, a frequently sleeping-while-at-work “hunk” is, as if by 
deus ex machina, depicted as a “masterful pickpocket.” However, even here 
Dave I  ultimately accedes. What remains to bug him (and not only him as we 
now well know), though, is the fact that for the entirety of the pat-down, Jesse 
was aware and actively attending to Huell’s actions. Thus, Dave I  concludes 
that whilst the “lifting a single cigarette” theory is without merit full stop, even 
a swap of packs, due to this seemingly unnoticeable narrative information, 
spells at least for him a “bit harder [of] a sell.” Essentially, it is the long way of 
gliding back to the TMW and confirming what many a user felt after the final 
scene of “Face-Off” aired—the feeling of being “cheated.“ 
In his second commentary for “Face-Off,” Dave I further elaborates on this 
assumption of “cheat,” whilst also opening up yet more interrelated aspects. 
First, drawing on his previous narrcepts, he grants having been “full-on riding 
on the fence,” i.e., vacillating between, as we recall him noting, “equally 
plausible” options. By his view, though, the “authorial” solution didn’t exactly 
restore the equanimity for—even post-“fact,”—every possibility, the one 
actually proposed (by the script-writers) included, “seem[s] like a stretch.” Con-
sequently, he concurs with participant Lionel  Mandrake 237, quoting the latter 
                                                            
237  See, Appendix I, Examples 44–45. 
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maintaining two significant and closely interrelated assumptions which both 
link with 1st gist: 
 
(1)  Lionel is quoted as challenging the rather widespread belief as if the swap 
of the cigarette packs is some kind of high degree magician’s act, 
(2)  Lionel draws attention to the fact that Walt’s being (literally) occupied in 
his home doesn’t equal attentive viewing participants actually knowing 
what he could’ve been up to during these “several hours.”  
 
Now, Dave I  leaves (2) untouched, whilst, in turn, challenging (1). In doing so, 
he ends up further developing two points he had introduced previously: (i) 
Jesse’s attention at the time and (i) the “convenience” of such a useful, sudden 
“trait” in Huell appearing at the most “critical point.” In essence, then, what 
Dave I  manages here is juggling the active construction of two (or perhaps 
even three) IWs (Huell’s/Walt’s/Jesse’s) not only in sync, but in a rather 
carefully orchestrated fashion. On top of all that, Dave I  appears to glide for 
such a result in and out of the TMW, asserting that even for a clever show like 
Breaking Bad, this “twist” was tad too “contrived.“ 
It is indeed specificially the TMW thus far developed that Dave I ultimately 
revisits in his last narrcept for “Face-Off,” again co-elaborating Lionel’s 
previous thoughts. Namely, Dave I argues that the choices inculcated upon the 
show by the creator/showrunner Vince Gilligan go against the grain of 
elementary writing “norms.” Yet, though Dave I  even glides to his likely 
‘personal IW’ (hence developing a rudimentary twistory to get his point across), 
“in the grand scheme of things” he rather takes pack-swapping issue as “minor.” 
What he actually tries to get at, then, is that all of these events—taken 
together—are too much of a “stretch” to be plausible. The main focality here 
lies obviously on Huell. Why was this NP, thus far billed only as Saul’s hunky/ 
sleepy bodyguard, now suddenly permitted such a key skill? And, even if one 
attempts to make peace with such an ‘incoherent’ portrayal, how come, then, 
was he able to make the swap all the while Jesse being aware of it?  
These are the questions that give Dave I  no peace whatsoever. He admits 
that the “pieces fit,” but his argument is that everything seemingly unravels at 
the seams. The job of the seamster, as it were, could’ve be done with far more 
finesse, and with “only a little more effort” by, e.g., revealing flashbacks (cf., 
some participants from 3.4) either revealing Huell’s background or focusing on 
Walt plotting with Saul. Ultimately, Dave I’s bottom line is that details matter. 
Especially in a show like Breaking Bad where previous adherences to “details” 
established acute expectations going forward.  
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Schema 6 (reduced to fit): The successive co-elaboration of Dave I’s narrception 
following the authorial revelations in Breaking Bad’s 4th season finale “Face Off,” off of 
Adam’s, Tizziel ish’s and Lionel  Mandrake’s. Dashed and dash-dotted arrows of 
varying weigh illustrate the more explicit links between three variations of Dave I’s 
becoming storyworld, itself (by co-elaborating on the SWs and IWs of other partici-
pants) demarcating a kind of discourse world within a discourse world (esp. when taken 
in tandem with developments depicted and analyzed previously, cf., schema 5). For the 
clarification of the visual “shadow” metaphor, cf., schema 4. 
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CONCLUSION 
“The hypothesis I mean, is, [t]hat nothing is perceived but what is in the 
mind which perceives it: [t]hat we do not really perceive things that are 
external, but only certain images and pictures of them imprinted upon the 
mind, which are called impressions and ideas. 
If this be true; supposing certain impressions and ideas to exist in my 
mind, I cannot, from their existence, infer the existence of any thing else: 
my impressions and ideas are the only existences of which I can have any 
knowledge or conception; and they are such fleeting and transitory 
beings, that they can have no existence at all, any longer than I am 
conscious of them. So that, upon this hypothesis, the whole universe 
around me, bodies and spirits, sun, moon, stars, and earth, friends and 
relations, all things without exception, which I imagined to have a per-
manent existence, whether I thought of them or not, vanish at once […] I 
THOUGHT it [such hypothesis] unreasonable[.]” 
– Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind, on the Principles of 
Common Sense (1819), pp. xiii–ix; emphasis and capitalization in original 
 
“Everyone reads it,” I was once insisted upon with regard to conclusions, stres-
sing their indisputable paramouncy. Such a statement left me somewhat aghast 
and on the fence. Not necessarily the reading part—in an ideal world, “every-
one” would read everything. Rather, I am hesitant to treat the act of concluding 
as a closure, full stop. Intuitively, at least, such approach appears counterpro-
ductive, at best, and reductionist, at worst. It is far more reasonable to presume 
that ends should write new beginnings, no? Paradoxically, though, for that to 
happen, some standing issues nevertheless have to be “wrapped up.” The 
question is how to go about it?  
The other day, whilst scrolling my Tumblr feed I spotted a poetic rhetorical 
so haunting that it is tempting to pull it out of its context for the present 
discussion’s sake: “Do I harvest all of my beginnings?” Indeed, at least some of 
what was instigated has to be allowed to mature, to gain further depth, and 
others still permitted to germinate more wholesomely, perhaps; whereas in 
either case, this can only occur through future projects I am going to sketch later 
on (see, vii). However, as the subtitled quotation implies, there are still polemics 
the Introduction promised the Conclusion shall persist on. Note, however, that 
given quotation serves as an illustration of a symptom only and the intent of the 
present Conclusion, and, to be fair, of the entire preceding work thus far, has not 
been to delve emphatically into the grand philosophical debates, but rather use 
these disagreements as potentially fruitful “devices” to further underscore the 
core points the present work gesticulates at, but to do so perhaps within the 
wider scale of scholarly thinking. Hence, building on the original terminology 
established throughout chapters 1 and 2, this “concluding” persistence shall be 
my final objective. 
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v Cross-section of potential criticisms and  
common interests 
TheTVDB blurbs a Japanese anime serial, airing on Tokyo MX network, as 
follows: 
 
Humans have created many stories. Joy, sadness, anger, deep emotion. Stories 
shake our emotions, and fascinate us. However, these are only the thoughts of 
bystanders. But what if the characters in the story have “intentions”? To them, 
are we god-like existences for bringing their story into the world? Our world is 
changed. Mete out punishment upon the realm of gods. In Re:CREATORS [sic], 
everyone becomes a Creator.238 (emphases added) 
 
Yet, although “complex narratives” do insist upon “their stor[ies],” and al-
though, as illustrated above, even storytelling itself appears to start insisting 
upon this point, as Introduction intimated, it is fairly complicated to change the 
models of thinking. In fact, even humble modifications can ruffle feathers. 
Clearly, then, one dissertation is insufficient to revolutionize… anything, really. 
After all, recalling the wise words of a professor whose “academic writing” 
course I once frequented: all the “bright ideas” are better left explored in the 
future. What I have tried to establish, then, is merely an outline, an invitational 
prolegomenon for a potentially rewarding theoretical framework. Indeed, pro-
positions entertained and clarified throughout this work, finding their ultimate, 
though illustrative—and, by design, unfinished, “running”—appliance in the 
Analysis, have just recently received an almost surprising quantitative backing 
(see, Alderson-Day and Bernini and Fernyhough 2017). This, in its turn, 
suggests—though presently a different kind of data pertaining to another 
medium has been investigated—that a boldly (direct) realist model of character 
engagement is not a mere academical folly, but, at least to some extent, 
qualifiable not only by establishing “alternative” theoretical frameworks, but 
even by conventional quantitative means. After all, 77 cases (19%) surveyed by 
Alderson-Day and colleagues perceived of their experientiality vis-à-vis narra-
tive characters (note: literary characters) as the latter enacting an “experiential 
crossing of voices” into readers’ life, of them “continu[ing] [their] life between 
bouts of reading” (ibid.:105; emphases in original). Now, it has to be noted for 
clarity that Alderson-Day et al.’s findings seemingly foreground psychopatho-
logical leanings (the “hearing of voices”). 
However, it nonetheless remains a significant quantifiable backdrop—an 
assumption at least partially vindicated by overlapping literature utilized in the 
latter case, e.g., the Vygotskyian paradigm—especially if transposed into tele-
visual audiences where given effects, taken broadly, could conceivably even 
increase, given a more “direct,” long-term interactional engagement. 
                                                            
238  http://thetvdb.com/?tab=series&id=321869&lid=7 (Accessed: 20.04.2017). Also cf., 
HBO’s Westworld (2016–...). 
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Hence, it may appear as if almost unproblematic to argue, as the present 
dissertation vehemently has, that in our “engagement with characters,” too, the 
commonsensical, “everyday” approach, emerging by way of our ordinary lan-
guage use (frequently, if not always, with materialist underpinnings) is extre-
mely subtle and substantial, and, as such, a far cry from the pigeonholing 
“naiveté” doctrine. 
Were we to consider John L. Caughey’s propositions in Imaginary Social 
Worlds. A Cultural Approach, what is at stake here are communal assemblages 
of “extensive information,” obtained through “intimate involve[ment]” with 
“media figures” (Caughey 1984:32–33), e.g., Breaking Bad’s narrative persons. 
Now, if the proverbial skeleton key unlocking such tangibility paradox lies in 
the paramounce of social relationships (ibid.:40) that endure in both variations 
of “the real” (“pseudo” or objective notwithstanding), question nonetheless re-
mains how actual people naturally express the experience of such relationship 
(especially if longitudinal conversations, e.g., in blog commentary sections or 
forums threads, are taken in contradistinction to results extrapolated from tests 
in lab settings).  
Therefore, the Introduction of the present dissertation outlined how the 
significance of language’s socializing quality—its “power” to realitize, to 
develop an active “crossing of [sovereign] experiences” (cf., Alderson-Day et 
al. 2017)—i.e., the creative vernacular, increases in relevance. Creative verna-
cular, then, in my treatment, has been seen throughout communicating, im-
parting agency (cf., see, 1.4, 1.5.1). Following Craig Batty’s observation, the 
centrality of character, of actively “experiencing someone’s story” (Batty 
2014:36) can indeed also operate bidirectionally. In the final analysis, then, it is 
the strength of stories, and moreover, how viewers weave their own variations 
off of initial authorial narratives, that ends up flattening the objective gradation 
insisting on Breaking Bad’s Walter White being somehow less of a person than, 
say, Trading Spouses’ Marguerite Perrin. 
Hence, the present work can be looked at as a contribution shining doubt at 
(i) the “naiveté” doctrine, as well as objecting to (ii) the “mentalistic” con-
ception of representation in the context observed. As for (i), reading Margrit 
Schreier’s quantitative study, drawing on the responses to The Blair Witch 
Project (an infamous “pseudodocumentary,” spawning later television iterations 
of “docu-reality shows”); and especially her notation of how “[r]elating ‘fact’ 
and ‘fiction’ is … perfectly ordinary part of the reception process,” one is left 
with a sense that “those recipients … who actually confused the two by forming 
search parties for the fictional characters who had gone missing” end up treated 
as “unfit,” as the extraordinaries on the margins (Schreier 2004:307). Further-
more, Schreier’s later discussion anticipates Murray Smith’s (see, 1.6 for 
discussion; Smith 2011; Sorokin n.d.) in arguing that, vis-à-vis “fiction,” 
recipients’ everyday “fact convention is suspended” and displaced by specific 
instructions pertaining to some “literary-aesthetic system” (Schreier 2004:309–
310).  
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It has proven complicated, however, to exactly correlate these types of 
theorizing accounts with the “creative vernacular” of Breaking Bad’s discus-
sants. For quite clearly both “everyday” and “narrative” conventions are on 
display and drawn upon simultaneously. If anything, as I have argued, the 
‘folding’ of correspondence of multiple agencies introduces a ‘leveling’ quality. 
What is meant here is that not only what I have been referencing as narrative 
persons are “carrying over” as discussive Klatch-Objekte, but real life authors 
and television script writers become scrutinized by measures in kind to those 
afforded for formally “fictive” persons. Hence, my contention has been that in 
explicating narrative experience (like permitted by, but not exclusive to, 
Breaking Bad) the commonsense reasoning becomes sought after. Here, the 
logical upshot is that “common sense” becomes communalized, that is, sense 
making ’produces’ popular insight, predicated on “vernacular creativity” of a 
particular sort. Insofar as narrative persons are concerned, aforementioned 
ideas gain relevance in counterpoising our conventional mysticism in becoming 
“absorbed” in ”characters” with becoming absorbed by them; that is, by deve-
loping a third-person perspective about them (as potentially other people) (cf., 
Sorokin 2016b, 2017a, b).   
As observed in the Introduction, however, this presupposed fact/fiction 
binary echoes far and wide. Hence, in turning to (ii), we are both told that our 
experientiality of narrative is actually our “mental construct” that we “run” 
(Oatley 1994, 1999) as well as that imaginative experience ends up “trans-
porting” us (Gerrig), or that we somehow “get lost” in it (Nell), or “hypnotized” 
and led into a “trance” even (cf., Oatley 2002:41,50). In speaking of what he 
calls “literary emotions” with regard to such mythical phantasmagoria, then, 
literary psychologist Keith Oatley adapts Bruner’s and Bartlett’s work in 
arguing strictly that although the proposition of “narrative as a mode [to] 
understand the actions of people” is fitting for our experience of narrative (and 
the people presented therewith), the contrast with “paradigmatic mode … used 
to reason about scientific and technical matters” is evidently as clear-cut as the 
“fact” that, allowing the argument, there are emotions “proper” and “literary 
emotions” (ibid.:39–40,65; emphases added). Likewise, here, too, a contra-
diction transpires. Namely, if “narrative” can be utilized to understand why 
“protagonists” act the way they do (i.e., the foundational necessity implicated in 
the present dissertation), how can it also be that “as we assimilate a story, our 
emotions are our own, not those of the character,”; and that we, as Oatley later 
puts it, “become one with the character in a story,” i.e., we self-identify 
(ibid.:43,61ff.; emphasis added)? Justified question arises thus: what is it, really, 
that we are are supposed to “understand” with the help of the narrative mode? Is 
it always, already and only ourselves?  
Seemingly implied in Oatley’s treatment is the latter, for he conceives of a 
spectrum: “transportation” on one side, “transformation” on another (ibid.:43; 
cf., Polichak and Gerrig 2002:89ff.). You “plunge” in and, if luck has it, dis-
engage as a changed person. Indeed, the thesis of “self-implication” with regard 
to media consumption, on the one hand (e.g., Kuiken et al. 2004), and with 
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regard to human development (Vygotsky’s dictums “through others we become 
ourselves” and “art is the social within us”), on the other, is certainly persuasive 
enough. However, presently at issue is that Oatley’s radical constructivist 
account, building upon Machian tradition of Piaget and von Glaserfeld, appears 
to hereby wholesale foreclose observable “Others” acting for their own sove-
reign intentions (regardless of, and notwithstanding the existence with(in), any 
medium) as perceived during such evidently “transformative” (fictional) expe-
rience. Again, then, such self-perspective (the “first personal”) postulates sche-
matic processing of re-presentations—the Dennettian “Cartesian Theatre”—
where, ultimately, the author and the narrative are largely taken as a unison 
entity with potential existences posited as nothing but mere flights of receptual 
fancy, as “materials offered by the story” (Oatley 2002:43); merely populating 
the ”space in between” that relates the ”real author” with the “real reader” (cf., 
Oatley 2002:47ff.,64; cf., Introduction). Yet, it could be argued, at least to some 
degree, that this is an “ego-centered element ... atypical of our experience of 
fiction” (Meskin and Weinberg 2003:18) 
To be fair, some potential openings and common ground in overcoming the 
views described above, insofar as psychological literature suggests, are impli-
cated, though still from the mentalistic-representationalist “information pro-
cessing” angle, such as Polichak’s and Gerrig’s account of viewers (or readers) 
as “side-participants.” However, their approach to these matters also happens to 
be indebted to research on real life conversational interactions (see, Polichak 
and Gerrig 2002:72ff.). Nonetheless though, key characters whose life events 
are “side-participated” still remain all but readerly “mental representations” 
(ibid.:78), devoid of any sovereignity as narrative persons with lived lives, and 
the viewer or the reader as a onlooker (Zillmann) in third person trying to make 
sense of, to explain directly, as opposed to utilizing re-presented ‘mental figuri-
nes’ as proxy.  
This controversy is not unfamiliar for the field of narratology, either. Hence, 
responding to Alan Palmer’s thesis of “social mind,” Manfred Jahn is quick to 
distinguish between “real other minds” and “fictional other minds” (Jahn 2011: 
249; see also, e.g., Margolin 1990; Eder 2010; Caracciolo 2014, and critical 
discussion, in chapter I, 1.5.3). (I will revisit Palmer’s ideas noted in the Intro-
duction shortly in the present sub-section.) And although at first glance sym-
pathetic to the core arguments presented in current dissertation, literary-
theoretical approaches also, e.g., Lars-Åke Skalin’s fascinating article in the 
edited volume Disputable Core Concepts of Narrative Theory, also revert to the 
conventional wisdom that “[characters] are not existents, i.e., particulars, in a 
world. In character-talk there is no knowing the dancer from the dance” (Skalin 
2012:127–128). Would the field of folkloristics perhaps suggest diverging views 
or some valid compromises, at least? Perhaps seemingly so, though not, unfor-
tunately, wholesomely. 
In his examination of oral tellings of folk legends, relying hereby (not 
insignificantly for the present work) on archived legend collections, exhibiting 
the “dual quality of being at the same time collective and individual,” Ulf 
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Palmenfelt sketches out an intriguing notion of “identificand.” Betokening an 
extratextual relation, it is “understood as an agreement between narrator and 
audience in the course of narration” (Palmenfelt 1993:143,157,166). That is, 
listeners are ‘contracted’ for role-presumption where they “identify with,” say, 
story’s named character (possibly distraught, hence requiring attention) pace 
“an impersonal crowd … [an] army.” Furthermore, once so positioned, listeners 
“enter the universe of the legend” and utilize character’s eyes, as it were, to 
“watch” the events unfold (ibid.). Bracketing the qualms vis-à-vis listeners 
supposedly preemptively taking on the “role” of nobility (as in the present 
case), instead of, more logically, “identifying” themselves with the masses of 
farmers, Palmenfelt’s notion can provide some reasonable correctives, though 
straightforward reliance to it remains questionable, at best. Most significant, I 
would say, is that this notion of “identificand” readily acknowledges the inver-
sion of the character-recipient (power) relation. Put differently, the former 
ceases to be a mere vehicle for latter’s “I.” Instead, a storytelling occasion 
affords this named character to operate as sovereign guide with the presented 
world (contra “in”). This allows the consideration of a third personal perspec-
tive whereby such character becomes a “reasoning agent,” acknowledged 
distinctly separate of listener’s “I,” yet crucial par excellence for how listeners 
experience the tale. For it is his potential explanations that have to be followed 
for accurate bearings—something not intervened with, but being routed by, as 
opposed to settling “in” simulatively, i.e., as part of “make-belief” (for there’s 
nothing imaginary for this king to be frightful over persecution, as it were).  
Consequently, the role of the “identificand,” conceived of as such, bequeaths 
the very impossibility to do any “model” off of oneself (especially given the 
context of listening and the social conditioning of the listeners, the former of 
which might have consisted of real life farmers, instead of “noblemen,” or 
unlikeliest of all, of “kings”). In fact, a further argument can also be advanced 
to delineate clear distinction on the author/character axis; a differential, indeed, 
explicitly denoted by storyteller her/himself. Reading “identificand” as 
‘inverting’ conventional view of approaching how real people engage with 
“fictional” ones could be a strenuous assertion to undertake, to be sure, but, one 
would think, quite insightful at present. Moreover, Palmenfelt’s own inter-
pretation seemingly vindicates prior assumptions: “[i]n the Gotlandic legends, 
the farmer [as a ‘textual’ role—S.S.] often equals ‘the man, the Gotlander … 
[the] I” (see, ibid.:148–149; emphasis in original, underlining added). That is, 
for argument’s sake, Palmenfelt appears to imply that listeners intuitively opt 
for “roles” unlike themselves; which, obviously, doesn’t exclude cases where it 
would be more urgent to “watch” with farmer’s “eyes”—the underlying point 
being: no “vicarious” living of the “self” through the “Other” occurs here, but a 
sort of distanced and impartial “transportation,” shall we say; one acknow-
ledging the latter for it is the only way the storytelling would function.  
Now, lastly, though Palmenfelt omits inspiration for his notion, its origin 
presumably dates to early developmental literature (of the “effects theory” 
variety). Eleanor E. Maccoby, in her “Effects of the Mass Media” (Review of 
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Child Development Research, Vol 1, 1964[1974]), writes: “[w]e assume that in 
stories which present more than one leading character, a viewer makes a choice 
of a character who will be his primary “identificand,” and experiences the 
actions vicariously through this character” (Maccoby 1964[1974]:326). Evi-
dently, although correlating in spirit with Palmenfelt’s elaboration, modified 
dynamic here is of critical import. The focality of Maccoby’s “identificand” lies 
elsewhere, in how characters affect, say, adolescent boys. As such, obviously the 
quality of inversion cleverly eked out by Palmenfelt disappears at once and is 
yet again replaced with “fictional” persons as being mere means to an end. 
More over, it has to be clarified that Maccoby’s and others’ early ideas on the 
significance of “leading character” cut against contemporary ideas concerning 
media “effects,” strongly critical of the still prevalent single “measure” strategy 
(see, Giles 2010:447; chaper 1, 1.4).   
Now, having established a baseline with regard to criticism vis-à-vis the 
prevailing mental-representationalist (viz. internalist) models of character 
engagement, it is imperative—prior to summarizing the terminological frame-
work the present dissertation established and proposing some potential advances 
forward—to speak of studies in narrative research (taken broadly) perhaps more 
explicitly sympathetic to current work or, at the very least, enlarging on 
partially the same literature presently utilized.  In his Social Minds in the Novel, 
narratologist Alan Palmer go to maintain: 
 
[Statements foregrounding characters’ immediate consciousness] often fulfill a 
pivotal role in guiding the direction of the narrative by showing that a particular 
mental event is a manifestation of a disposition and that the disposition is a 
causal factor in the event ... It is by interpreting episodes of consciousness within 
a context of dispositions that the reader builds up a convincing and coherent 
sense of character. (Palmer 2010:28;27–34) 
 
Without necessarily delving here into the intricacies concerning notion of 
“disposition” (and its psychological connotations), the important proviso worth 
preserving from Palmer’s inspiring “externalist perspective on the mind” thesis 
(Palmer 2014) is that what literary narratives ordinarily “do” in writing, visual 
art forms (e.g., televisual narrative; but also narrative art, cf., Skalin from 
above, and Casebier, from chapter 1) generally achieve with subtle hints by way 
of actors’ body language and/or fleeting phrases, both of which might not mean 
much to casual viewers (i.e., in the case of serialized narratives); as well as 
through the cueing of various filmic (’narrational’) devices (close-ups, pans, 
shot/reverse-shot editing, etc.). Note herewith my intentional exclusion of the 
device of voice-over for it essentially violates the “show, don’t tell!” rule 
complex narratives are so famous for.  
Given such storytelling tendencies, one can claim that “dispositions” in tele-
visual narrative wholly insist on a particular kind of sense-making exigency of 
the viewer, predicated on the “creative vernacular” and grounded on the tacit 
acknowledgement of realitization (see below, for overview discussion on 
terminology and illustrative Table 1).  
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In order to further emphasize the key point that the present Conclusion aims 
to flesh out, however, it is useful to contrast here Palmer’s examination of 
Middlemarch with one done by literature philosopher Gregory Currie. Currie—
though acknowledging narrative’s “intention-driven coherence” (Currie 
2009:64)—reveals concisely and early on the kind of widespread, chiasmic way 
of thinking Palmer observes at the very outset of his work. As Currie puts it, 
“George Eliot’s interventions allow us to read off [character’s] Character traits 
for the people in Middlemarch.” As such, Currie further amplifies the ideas of 
the addressees of previous criticisms. That is, both for Currie and them, 
characters can be intentional persons only insofar as the (presupposed) reasons 
of an “overarching intelligence,” as Currie puts it, make them so (viz., a “real” 
authorial mind); and even so, they are “fixed” within the representation (Currie 
2009:63–66; see also, Oatley 2011). In other words, as James Phelan and Peter 
J. Rabinowitz put it in Narrative Theory Core Concepts and Critical Debates, 
“the art of realistic fiction consists of conveying the illusion that characters are 
acting autonomously even as their actions serve the implied author’s overall 
purpose” (Phelan and Rabinowitz 2012:113; emphasis added). 
Brilliantly contrasting with the discussion thus far is David Herman’s posi-
tion of characters as “members of the category of ‘persons’ … a special class of 
entities” (Herman 2012:125; cf., chapter 2). Although Herman preserves some 
constructivist underpinnings, he nonetheless goes to maintain that “[o]ther 
minds are not a problem to be solved but instead built into the very concept of a 
person. Hence the idea of person … entails that mental predicates will be self-
ascribable in one’s own case and other-ascribable in the case of others ... readers 
make sense of .. characters’ minds insofar as they situate those individuals in the 
domain of persons” (op. cit.:126; emphasis in original, underlining added). Or, 
if to put similar ideas with additional clarity, it is worth to reiterate film theorist 
Michael Z. Newman’s succinct observation: “[c]haracters are not real people, 
granted, but this does not mean that they are not people ... their traits are not 
them; they are descriptions of them” (Newman 2006b:53). Scathing summary 
criticism is echoed in literary theorist Richard Walsh, however, noting that 
above criticized approaches tend to “devalue involvement in proportion as they 
devalue fictional being” (Walsh 2007:154). 
To wit, I would assert that taken in unison, (i) Alderson-Day’s and collea-
gues brand new quantitative findings, (ii) Herman’s, Palmer’s, and others’ path 
breaking narratological work on the literary medium and “social mind,” and, 
last but not least, (iii) Palmenfelt’s fascinating treatment of the notion of 
“identificand” in relation to storytelling in folk legends, serve as an extremely 
fruitful, if perhaps overtly general, interdisciplinary ”springboard” for the trans-
disciplinary terminological framework the present work foregrounded. More 
over, the ideas of the noted scholars, if not always in agreement with my own, 
nonetheless validate, if to borrow the phrasing of renowned television critic 
Alan Sepinwall, the re-consideration of especially televisual character engage-
ment as predicated on onlooking to them as “lived-in human beings” (Sepinwall 
2015), i.e., quite simply characters who are experientially humanly. Incidentally, 
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here the word choice of “lived-in” can, under the auspices of the present disser-
tation, also be taken to doubly connote such familiarity aspect—they are 
narrative persons in their own right, but they also become so by long-term 
interactional engagement, i.e., through the interaction-in-development. Con-
sequently, I believe that previous rough outline of criticisms and potential 
sympathies bodes reasonably well in moving on to summarize the terminological 
contributions the present work proposes (for the visualization, see Table 1 below) 
as well as what has to be, or at the very least, what can be done, going forward.  
 
 
vi Synopsis of the dissertation’s theoretical(-analytical) 
contributive value 
Schema 1 
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The theoretical framework expounded upon in the present dissertation was 
designed to (i) introduce necessary original notions, (ii) introduce derivations 
seen as appropriate for the occasion, and (iii) to fine-tune and re-incorporate 
eminent terms with a cross-disciplinary pedigree. For brevity’s sake, the 
subsequent concluding synopsis is largely grounded on the Table 1 presented 
above, illustrating the noted principles. As such, we can commence with the 
interlocked notions of co-elaboration (as the ‘motor’ for vernacular creati-
vity) and realitization, reproduced as Table 1’s bottom-most layer, as it were. 
The quality of such relationship is conveyed through two entangled arrows 
pointing back onto themselves with ‘entanglement’ discerning the interlock. On 
the one hand, co-elaboration signifies socio-individualism and eschews the 
primacy of collectivisms and individualisms. For its shared objective (viz. 
getting narrative persons’ life-reasonings “just right”) is always already being 
non-reducible to some collectively created “product.” On the other, co-elabora-
tive activity is distributed, that is, analyst’s narrativist-editorial role can high-
light individual storyworlds (indicated by SW in Table 1, also see below) 
interconnected and ‘chained’ together by altering, challenging and disputing 
each other not only in, but, crucially, across simultaneous discussional environ-
ments. Put differently, the inherently relational quality betokens ‘living stories’ 
which can be seen as advancing beyond the subject/loci axis. At the same time, 
however, co-elaboration also implies the defying of “the canon”—such as 
Breaking Bad’s “official” narrative—thus providing insight into ‘interstices of 
narrations” that carve out a particular “history of a community” (Smorti 2008: 
231), scaffolded on narrative experientiality. 
The notion of realitization, for its part, is inspired by an English neologism 
explained as an act of bringing someone to the ‘state’ of “reality.” My work 
built upon it by maintaining that co-elaborative vernacular creativity rests on the 
tacit act of realitization of narrative characters. I insisted upon a contingency of 
the social bond viewers cultivate with narrative persons (NPs), being under-
pinned by interaction-in-development and so conveyed through common-
sensical, everyday pithiness of practical language use in circumscribing specific 
spheres of interest (the tangible “thinking of” and “talking about” another) 
(aforementioned ideas are illustrated in the Schema 1 by the solid two-way 
arrow, leading from narrcepts to NPs and back; see also brief clarification 
added). 
To wit, as per the contention that the present dissertation entertained, such 
‘pithiness’ expresses a ‘secondary materiality,’ bolstered by participants’ direct-
perceptional proclivities, hence in effect consolidating real social interaction 
and the engagement with “fictive characters” (but also with real authors) into an 
“alternative” mode of thinking scaffolded on time exhibition of popular sense-
making attested to by overlapping discussion archives. Furthermore, suggested 
by the dashed two-way arrow in the Table 1, this becoming of a social bond can 
arguably be validated by ‘guided’ practice concerning the uptake of narrative 
information. Hence, the significance of narrative motifs was seen to correlate 
with the perception of the relevance they might have had on/for the NPs. Hence, 
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in contraposition to wide-spread views, these “elementary units” in “authorial 
storytelling” were taken to specifically scaffold the acknowledgement of NPs as 
“reasoning agents,” i.e., of them being with their world (‘inhabitating’ it as 
sovereign potential persons), pace being “in” it (cf., see the with/in scale, from 
chapter I). (Note: “inhabitate,” derived from “inhabitance,” was chosen to 
counter the ordinary etymology of “inhabit” and reinforcing the claims vis-à-vis 
NPs’ sovereignty (the principle of with over the principle of (passive) in), whilst 
simultaneously opposing the viewerly-interventionalist “transportation into.”). 
Consequently, the conventional envisioning of “transportation” was hence-
forth inverted by the “carry over” model, viz. CO-Model/COM, wherein the act 
of realitization was consigned a base-level operating principle (cf., Table 1, the 
thick two-way arrow pointing from interlocked base-level upwards). COM 
established that narrative characters—by example of the televisual serial 
Breaking Bad—“carry over” (on)to discussional participants’ experiential plane 
for the discursive act “levels” the ontological disparity. Such a transposition 
arguably (i) imbues NPs with idiomatic sovereignty and individuality within the 
confines of the co-elaborative space of creative vernacular, whilst also (ii) 
preserving the high relevance of narrative “proper” as the ‘inhabitat’ for them. 
More over, due to the assumption of the “carry over,” the present dissertation 
saw fit to also distinguish the notion of twistory. Twistory (entwining+story) is 
meant to convey such moments where viewer/participants’ real world 
experiences/memories ‘collide’ with certain aspects from the NPs’ “social 
field,” in making sense of the latter. Though absent from the Table 1 clarity’s 
sake, it can be argued that, dependant on individual narrcept, twistory may 
become a key ingredient in making sense of NP’s intend-world (IW, also see 
below; cf., chapter 1, for twistory, chapter 2, for IW).  
In an attempt to compress aforementioned dynamics into a maximally 
comprehensive concept, the original notion of narrcept was proposed in 
order to bridge popular vernacular’s inherent narrativist impulses (the “narr” of 
the narrative), on the one hand, and the leanings toward commonsensical “direct 
perception,” on the other (the “cept” of the percept). For the notion of narrcept 
is conceptualized as conveying strictly Other-related sense-making, it diffe-
rentiates itself from (though, perhaps to a degree, enabling to further specify) 
comparable terms in the field of narrative research, taken broadly, e.g., Internet 
scholar Ananda Mitra’s notion of “narbs.”   
Whereas previous notions and their contribution to the overall framework 
was the focus of chapter 1, chapter 2 enlarged upon this by proposing another 
original notion, that of the beacon. Beacon was argued to have necessary 
‘mobility,’ abstractly speaking, to distinguish “worlds” latent in narrcepts, viz. in 
narrceptive thinking. That is, the beacon decomposes (differentiates into fluid 
“pockets” of experiential sense-making) and composes (into storyworld, mani-
fested “in process” as an individual narrcept, viz. commentary text). Hence, in 
the Table 1 above, the beacon’s sun-like image is obviously intentional. En-
visioned as a dialectical mechanism with multiple stress points, it engages with 
processes of and within “popular” and “academic” interpretations; that is, it 
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“blinks at,” “throws light at” for both the reciprocal dimension—i.e., intend-
world (IW) ‘feeding’ into text makers’ world (TMW) ‘feeding’ into storyworld 
(SW)—suggesting it being an “implicit” composition, an ‘unsolicited’ effect ac-
companying the storyworld composition; as well as for the methodological-
analytical dimension (see chapter 2, 2.0, for further reference). This unstated 
quality scaffolding the fluid development of narrcepts with storyworlds as their 
“substance” is conveyed in the Table 1 by dashed two-way arrows connecting 
“worlds” with the reciprocal ‘branches’ of the beacon, as it were. For an interim 
summary, aforementioned “worlds” specified as follows: 
 
 intend-worlds (IW): IWs primarily focus on NPs, but also highlight emer-
gent shared and distributed spaces which suggest intersecting “inter-
party” relations such as the case of twistory. More over, for narrcepts 
necessarily communicate intending from without (i.e., third personal 
perspective), they convey attempts to comprehend realitized NPs and 
their “social field.” Hence, former’s sovereignty with their AW (“actual 
world”) is recognized, kept intact and un-encroached (see, chapter 2, 
2.3.1), 
 text makers’ world (TMW): emphasizing the narrceptive principle under-
girding the organization of SW, script writers and “creators” (such as 
Breaking Bad’s Vince Gilligan) also become “actors,” “doers,” viz. 
“reasoning agents.” Their (potential) intentions necessitate elucidation in 
the format of criticism, evaluation and contesting (see, chapter 2, 2.3.1), 
 storyworld (SW): envisioned as a subjective “calibration” (with socio-
individual undertones) which becomes enacted through narrcept—the 
“expressive form” of beacon’s “reciprocal dimension”—and conveying 
narratively situated events and their (potential, revealed, and rejected) 
consequences “at the person level,” thereby collapsing into itself, on the 
principle of non-hierarchal array any potential IWs and or TMWs. In 
other words, in SW, all the intentionally significant “persons” ‘meet’ for 
they are perceived to act for reasons. Hence, the minimalist “format” of 
such predisposition is established in by (individual) narrcepts. The maxi-
malist form, thereafter, formulates all SWs in the sampled “anticipatory” 
and “distributed” discourse to facilitate a becoming discourse world 
(ibid.), 
  discourse world (DW): characterizes the analyst consistently decom-
posing and composing the aforementioned “worlds.” The latter are deve-
loped in making sense of the NPs by taking given narrative (Breaking 
Bad) as former’s “intentional field.” Consequently, DW is the becoming 
of analyst’s “narration of narrations,” of the “running” circumscription of 
the joint venture of sense-making and experiencing, hence subsuming and 
negotiating the labels of “popular” and “academic.” Put differently, DW 
subscribes the analyst also with a necessarily editorial “narrativist” 
proclivity; one becomes subsequently a “worlder” for/of viewers’ 
story(telling) (see, 2.3.2). 
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As the last bullet point stresses, then, beacon also critically subsumes into itself 
the “academical,” i.e., the analytical-methodological dimension (becoming 
hence the applied method for analysis). This dimension expounds on the 
“macro” tendency of storytelling, the co-elaborative vernacular creativity writ 
large. Hereby, scholar’s analytical methodology preserves similar kind of 
contextualizing and interpretative impulse because the discourse world is 
becoming from the moment beacon is considered in practical terms—as the 
dialectical “structurer” of (for) the macro-level. Thus, the objective of the 
beacon’s analytical-methodological dimension is, as chapter 2 asserted, to 
distinguish these covert reciprocal “pockets” as overt “worlds,” viz. ingredients 
of the overall ‘story matter’ for the narrceptive storyworlds. Hence, by way of 
the beacon, it becomes possible, on the one hand, to observe how NPs’ and 
NP’s-participants’ intend-worlds and twistories and or the text makers’ worlds 
are all ultimately the general storyworld ‘consistence’ expressed as a singular 
narrcept. On the other hand, the beacon affords the proposition of a discourse 
world—as a becoming of storyworlds at large through analyst’s narrativist 
editorial agency—but only one potential and necessarily incomplete construal 
of such. Consequently, in beacon’s analytical-methodological dimension, the 
“decomposition” and “composition” are interleaved: an analyst at once decom-
poses many a narrceptive “worlds” (viz. makes sense of them in an “overt” 
fashion), whilst, simultaneously, composing them anew from the perspective of 
the “running” discourse world, latter being the distributed “macro” tendency 
characteristic to the co-elaborative vernacular creativity utilized by the viewers/ 
participants across several digital discussion environments and frequently, 
though not exclusively, in simultaneous fashion. For its part, (a potential) 
discourse world, so conceived, can possess “parameters” one can restrict or 
widen (e.g., narrowing or expanding the data quantity), but which is quintes-
sentially impossible to be comprehended as “complete(d).” For it is a becoming, 
a ‘living eventness.’ Thereby, some other scholar, having analyzed currently 
examined material for their part, and, perhaps, holding an in-depth knowledge 
on Breaking Bad, might develop their own explanatory “narratives,” henceforth 
disputing and or querying the proficiency of my framework. However, that 
wouldn’t in any way alter the probability of the latter for it never professes to be 
anything other than one of the potentialities out of unremitting movement and 
influx. In fact, it might be appropriate to ‘close’ with Charles H. Kahn’s evo-
cation in The art and thought of Heraclitus: “[i]f we do not deliberately 
construct or select our own interpretive framework, we become unconscious 
and hence uncritical prisoners of whatever hermeneutical assumptions happen 
to be ‘in the air’” (Kahn 1979[2001]:88). Even decades later, I would consider it 
a strikingly honest assessment on the measure and limits of scholarship and 
have attempted to, for good and for ill, to ‘carve out’ my own “ecological 
niche,” as it were. 
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vii What is to be done next 
As I vaguely hinted in the previous sub-section, the fascinating notion of 
“narb,” coined and developed by Ananda Mitra (Mitra 2010, 2013; Mitra and 
Mamani 2014), integrating the fields of narrative research and technical 
affordances of “data mining,” is characteristically all-encompassing, an 
umbrella term for essentially any digital ‘breadcrumb’ one leaves behind in 
social media underwriting our age. I would suggest that my coinage of narrcept 
would potentially provide a necessary restraint by turning its investigative 
‘power’ on a seemingly very commonplace, prosaic practice—that of how 
people talk about other people. Keeping that specification in mind, the potential 
contribution of narrcept wouldn’t at all be exclusively in the research area of 
“character engagement” with regard to “fictional” narratives. If we would allow 
that the central issue is the development of reality through language, or, to put 
the same point differently, the “leakage” (Grishakova and Sorokin 2016) of the 
multiplicity of discourses of the material reality into the experientiality of 
“fiction,” then, one could for instance argue that the rise of online misogynist 
“discourse” directed to Breaking Bad’s Anna Gunn (phenomenon I have 
passingly referenced as “contestable slices in ‘social realities’” in chapter 1) 
conveys an interdependency—potentially further clarified through narrcepts and 
less on the real/unreal axis, as Gunn herself points out (see, Gunn 2013)—with 
prejudicial ‘configurations of sentiment’ in real life. On top of concentrating on 
such ‘slices’ with regard to popular engagement with “fictional chararcters,” a 
prospective enlargement—implicit in the core characteristics of narrcept—can 
be conceived of with regard to volatile and “controversial” subjects covering 
variety of issues and also making increasing headway in the sphere of digi-
talized discussions. Although by no means an uncharted territory across a 
number of disciplines, the conceptual weight carried by the notion of narrcept 
could reveal re-calibrated ‘fenestrations’ into approaching wrought topics of 
control, empowerment, oppression, and subaltern “Othering” (cf., e.g., Said 
1978[2001]; Gramsci 1985; Fuchs and Dyer-Witheford 2013; Dyer-Witheford 
2015; Galloway 2004).  
However, this is not to say as if the notion of the narrcept and the established 
framework as a whole couldn’t further contribute to nor be additionally fine-
tuned in the process of investigating the engagement with narrative persons 
more thoroughly. Herewith I am not only speaking of a critical revisit of 
previous argumentation and analysis on a greater scale vis-a-vis Breaking Bad 
(note the available data set consisting of 1009 texts across three interconnected 
episodes over a two year period), but also—crucially—the comparative aspect, 
that is, by rebuttals, challenges, or modifications to the existing framework 
through, e.g., a consideration of a similarly sized data set for one very different 
serial narrative, that of Lost (cf., Sorokin 2013a, 2015). Consequently, such 
comparative tactic can, in its turn, also be expanded further, to include pre-
liminary data collection and later three-way comparative analysis which would 
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include, say, digital discussions focusing on feature film franchises (the Harry 
Potter series, et al.) on Internet Movie Database forums, and elsewhere.  
It goes without saying all the aforementioned suggestions carry necessary 
‘germs’ that would enable to flesh out even further what I believe is an 
important distinction of distributed co-elaborative narrative practices on the 
Internet, in general, and what I have coined as narrceptive expression (and 
thinking), in particular.    
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Appendix I: Sample Commentary Texts (unedited) 
Example 1 
I think Walt was too busy in the last few days to do something like that. He has spent his 
time basically flipping his shit and chasing his own tail. I doubt he went through the 
trouble to find out where those people lived (who he didn't even know), took Jesse's 
cigarette and dumped ricin on the kids cheerios or whatever. If the kid is poisoned with 
ricin (which still has not been 100% proven), I think it’s because he got hold of it 
himself, not because of Walt. I truly don’t think Walt had the time or motivation to 
poison Brock with ricin. 
phailcakez (Reddit, “End Times239,” 3.10.11, 03:10:09UTC), 56a–55a 
 
Example 2 
If Walt wanted to poison Brock with ricin, he wouldn’t need Jesse’s cigarette – he could 
just make more ricin. So if Brock did get sick from the ricin in the cig, it must have 
been either an accident or done by someone else. 
IreneInIdaho (Uproxx/Hitfix, ibid.240, 3.10.11, 7:20PM), b49 
 
Example 3 
Two things about this episode: 1.) Brock didn’t have to smoke the Ricin to get poisoned 
by it. That wasn’t how they were going to poison Gus. The cigarette was just used to 
hold the ricin in for safe keeping. In reality there was just a tube of it inside the cigarette 
Jesse could dump out into Gus’ food or something. 2.) Does anyone think it’s possible 
that Walt actually DID poison Brock so that he could blame Gus to get Jesse back on his 
side? I’m not sure when he could have done it. But I could see the writers doing this. 
We’llwill be so focused on Walt & Jesse vs. Gus and at the end of the episode, they’ll 
spring it on us. If anyone has mentioned these two things, I apologize. It’s hard to scroll 
through 450 comments. Meaning that people probably won’t see this...but oh well. 
EDIT: I actually just realized that #2 would be unlikely because Walt went to Jesse’s 
house BEFORE being dragged out to the desert by Tyrus. I’m not sure if Walt would 
have thought of poisoning Brock before that. 
wutisareddit (Reddit, ibid., 3.10.11, 03:09:25UTC), 59a 
 
Example 4 
I see a bunch of people on here saying “BROCK SMOKES?!??!” which is why I 
mentioned it. And another note about my theory is that it’s impossible (unless there’s 
something we don’t know) due to the fact that Jesse saw the ricin in his pocket the 
morning of the day this episode takes place. Kind of jumped the gun on posting that 
theory, although I see a lot of people have it. 
wutisareddit (Reddit, ibid., ibid., 03:22:37UTC), 63a–59a 
 
Example 5 
You might be jumping to conclusions that Brock was poisoned by ricin, Tim. That’s not 
at all obvious at this point.   It’s also possible that Walt masterminded the whole thing, 
                                                            
239  https://www.reddit.com/r/breakingbad/comments/kyw1d/episode_discussion_s04e12_ 
end_times_spoilers/?sort=old (Accessed: 18.08.2014). 
240  http://uproxx.com/sepinwall/breaking-bad-end-times-an-appropriate-reponse/ (Accessed: 
21.08.2014). 
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but used a more mild poison than ricin...he just managed to take the ricin cigarette from 
Jesse’s pack, perhaps via Huell, in order to get Jesse on his side?  Other possibilities 
abound as well...hopefully we’ll find out next week. I trust these writers.  It’s a pulpy, 
genre-busting, surrealist show that regularly stretches plausibility...but these writers 
have never pushed nonsense in the past.  Let’s give them the benefit of the doubt this 
time. 
Brian Beeghly (The Hollywood Reporter, ibid.241, 3.10.11, 23:40:58), 4c 
 
Example 6 
I firmly believe that we will find out that Walt poisoned the kid. Remember that Walt 
doesn’t even need to get the cigarette. He knows how to make ricin. I just keep 
rewatching the scene with Walt by the pool with the gun. He spins it three times. Twice 
it points to him, but on third points to his backyard garden. Ricin is derived from plant 
seeds. The same plants he used to make the ricin a couple seasons ago. When the gun 
points at the plants, Walt gets a very pensive look on his face. Like he’s formulating a 
plan. Long story, short. I’m thinking it was Walt. As far as him “not being there yet”. 
This is a guy who watched an innocent girl drown in her own vomit. Simply because 
she was getting in his way. I do not think it is anywhere outside of the ballpark to 
believe Walt capable of poisoning the kid to get Jesse on his side. His family is being 
threatened after all. If anything would give him the extra incentive to turn even further 
to the dark side it would be that. 
Spent (The Hollywood Reporter, ibid., 4.10.11, 01:41:47), 23c 
 
Example 7 
Watch the scene where Jesse gets frisked very closely.  The big dude puts something in 
his pocket with his left hand.   
Freddo (The Hollywood Reporter, ibid., 6.10.11, 04:15:37), 27c 
 
Example 8  
The cigarette is the easy part - Huell swapped out Jesse’s pack when he was patting him 
down so roughly and ostentatiously. The poisoning is the bigger question mark. 
Eric (Uproxx/Hitfix, ”Face-Off242,” 10.10.11, 3:38AM), a12 
 
Example 9 
Re-watching the scene, I think it’s clear that Huell made the switch (or that they 
instructed the actor to do some things to leave their options open, at the very least). 
Watch it here: http://cliqueclack.com/tv/2011/10/07/who-took-jesses-cigarette/ There 
are a few key points of interest in this scene, to my mind:  
– Huell appears to reach for something with his left hand right as Jesse walks in. Maybe 
a replacement pack of cigarettes sitting on a table? The actor makes a semi-lunge to his 
left just as the scene starts. - As the patdown occurs, we don’t see Huell’s left hand for at 
least the first half of it. It is deliberately kept low and out of frame. There’s no telling if 
he was empty-handed on the left, though his right hand was clearly empty. When his left 
hand does appear in the shot, you only see the back of it – if he was palming something 
it would be hidden from the camera.– And finally, just after he steps away from Jesse, 
                                                            
241  https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/bastard-machine/breaking-bad-spoiled-bastard-ep-
243218#comment-325950910 (Accessed: 23.08.2014). 
242  http://uproxx.com/sepinwall/breaking-bad-face-off-say-uncle/ (Accessed: 8.09.2014) 
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he clearly puts that same left hand in his pocket. Ta da: Huell picked Jesse’s pocket and 
swapped out the pack for a different one. 
Eric (ibid., ibid., 10.10.11, 2:14PM), b13 
 
Example 10 
Spent, you are spot on.  First, if you watch the scene where Jesse gets frisked, the big 
dude definitely puts something in his pocket with his left hand.  Second, and most 
importantly, Walt spins the gun in the backyard and the third time it points to a 
flowering potted plant.  What is that plant? It is Lilly of the Valley, a poisonous plant! 
 Case Closed!   
Freddo (The Hollywood Reporter, ”End Times,” 6.10.11, 03:15:48), 27c 
 
Example 11 
IF it is impossible for the kid to have gotten his hands on the cigarettes (and just 
touching it at some point within 24 hours could have made him sick according to a 
previous episode), then it seems like Walt is more likely to have poisoned the kid than 
Gus. Most people seem to have forgotten that Walt in essence killed Jesse’s former 
girlfriend, so when he claims he was not the sort of person to ’kill a kid’, that rung 
somewhat hollow. His knowledge that Gus killed a kid in the past was a precedent that 
Walt could use with Jesse against Gus. Not that Gus is a ’nice guy’, but it seems to me 
its a bit more logical for Walt to have poisoned the kid than Gus. 
Nooyawk (The A. V. Club, ibid.243, 4.10.11, 2:57am), 15b 
 
Example 12  
I’m pretty sure Walt has killed dozens of children through the drugs he makes in mass. 
His actions have lined the pockets of Gus and the Cartel which have no problem killing 
kids (he fucking watched Jesse’s girlfriend be killed). That said, I’d be shocked to see 
him really be behind the poisoning. I could see him slipping the kid something to make 
him sick to later turn Jesse to his side, but not actually murdering the kid. Walt is NOT a 
“good” person (he crossed the line at the EXACT moment he decided selling drugs was 
a good idea) but he hasn’t become a Tony Soprano level sociopath yet. 
Dygitalninja (ibid., ibid., 3.10.11, 11:48am), 44b 
 
Example 13 
so, Huell managed to take the pack of cigarettes, identify the ricin cigarette, and replace 
the pack of cigarettes in Jesse’s pocket, without Jesse noticing? And all of this while 
Jesse was directly watching Huell and Huell’s hands? And while Jesse knew his smokes 
carried important cargo? Also, Huell? That bumbler? I don’t know how that guy made 
the A team. Pardon me if I reject this theory as untenable. 
Beaulingpin (Reddit, ibid., n.d./~2 years ago (based on live timestamp, accessed: 
18.08.2014244), 84a 
 
Example 14 
I don’t think Huell has the dexterity to do it cleanly. Unless it just switched the whole 
pack... 
Potatogun (Reddit, ibid., 3.10.11, 05:45:16UTC), 15a 
 
                                                            
243  https://tv.avclub.com/breaking-bad-end-times-1798169832 (Accessed: 25.08.2014). 
244  Appears deleted (Accessed: 6.01.2018).  
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Example 15 
Especially if his mind is occupied. It isn’t that he would think of it in the moment when 
he saw the ricin cigarette was gone when he was already freaking out. It’s that he would 
notice in the time between being frisked and when Andrea called him, when he was 
incredibly nervous and fidgety and likely to smoke a lot. “I assume if you leave it 
anywhere near three quarters full Pinkman isn’t questioning how many smokes he has 
left.” But how would they know when he bought his latest pack? If Jesse had roughly 
3/4 of a pack left, and got a pack that was 3/4 full, I agree, he wouldn’t notice the 
difference. But, for the plan to make sense, it has to be possible no matter how many 
cigarettes Jesse had – if Jesse had, say, five cigarettes left, he’d know exactly how many 
he had left, ʻcause he’s a nicotine addict. The less cigarettes in the pack, the more likely 
the smoker knows exactly how many he has. 
Sean (Uproxx/Hitfix, “Face Off,” 10.10.11, 5:42AM), b6 
 
Example 16 
Don’t feal cheated. Assuming the only way this is possible is Huell’s swap of the pack. 
Who cares how many are left in the pack? He’d have to switch the Ricin out of all his 
packs each time he gets a new one. I assume if you leave it anywhere near three quarters 
full Pinkman isn’t questioning how many smokes he has left. Especially if his mind is 
occupied. 
Ronaldo (ibid., ibid., 10.10.11, 5:14AM), b4 
 
Example 17 
There is a simple explanation for how Huell got the ricin cig. He lifted the pack during 
the ’frisk’, took out the ricin cig and when Jesse left Saul’s office preoccupied and 
carrying a heavy bag of money, it would have been easy for Huell to slip the same pack 
back into Jesse’s pocket.  
Jill Chin (ibid., ibid., 10.10.11, 5:34AM), b5 
 
Example 18 
Exactly. I didn’t think Walt or Gus had anything to do with it, it just doesn’t make sense. 
It’s more likely that Brock lifted the cigarette (if it is ricin poisoning) and Jesse is too 
upset to really know for sure the last time he saw it in his pack, even though he thinks it 
was that morning. Realizing he is to blame for this might be more than he could take, so 
he jumped on Walt. 
Opie (The Hollywood Reporter, “End Times,” n.d., n.d.), 12c 
 
Example 19  
I’m undecided if I agree with your theory or not. The counter theory I have is that, at the 
end of last episode Walt snapped and descended into madness. He still wishes to protect 
his family, at any cost. He gets Saul to call in Jesse into his office and have Huell frisk 
Jesse and pickpocket the cigarette. You can see Huell possibly putting something in his 
pocket. 
Puddy1 (Reddit, ibid., 3.10.11, 05:36:53UTC), 178a-177a 
 
Example 20 
Honestly it seems pretty obvious to me that it was, indeed, Gus who lifted the ricin 
cigarette from Jesse at the lab if anything. Jesse says he put it in a new pack the morning 
the episode takes place, Walter has been at home awaiting imminent doom all day. This 
ties in with how Gus knew that the car was not safe. Had his plan worked, Jesse would 
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have told him that he killed Walter for poisoning Brock. Instead, Jesse said the Doctors 
said it was poison and yet nothing about Walter. This led Gus to suspect that the two had 
formed an alliance. This suspicion is warranted by how loyal Jesse has been to Walter 
despite Gus trying to turn Jesse against Walter. Hence Gus figures out that Jesse’s 
unwillingness to work was a ploy to get him to the Hospital, where Walter knew he 
would be. Since Gus now knows about the ricin, he knows Jesse has been trying to kill 
him with Walt’s help. All in all, this is to support the argument that Walter would never 
poison a child even for the sake of his own family, who is under DEA protection and is 
overall safe. 
Velveteenmage (ibid., ibid., 3.10.11, 04:46:06UTC), 177a 
 
Example 21 
Bugs in Jesses house. There’s no way Gus let him go around being as reckless as he was 
without knowing what’s going on inside that house, and Jesse and Walt have talked 
about it in there (not directly, but I think in ways obvious enough to clue him in to 
investigate further.. and if there’s a hidden camera they’d have seen him check that 
cigarette countless times). I don’t think they’ve acknowledged it in the show directly, 
but as Walt said this episode Gus is always 10 steps ahead of him. Plus Gus has had 
Mike bug houses before on the show (Walt’s a while back). 
NeededANewName (ibid., ibid., ibid., 03:33:40UTC), 51a-49a 
 
Example 22 
Wouldn’t huel have to have xray vision in order to swipe the single ricin containg cig 
out of the pack, even if he was capable of being that smooth in the first place? Even if 
Walt is guilty of it, how did he manage to slip the poison to the kid? 
Nointernalcensor (ibid., ibid., 3.10.11, 04:25:26UTC), 86a-79a 
 
Example 23 
I’veI have gotta check this out! edit: whoa, he definitely put his left hand in his pocket 
immediately after he is done frisking Jesse. a couple of frames it even looks like there 
might be a cigarette pack shaped black box there. I might just be trying to see things 
that aren’t there though. 
Nointernalcensor (ibid., ibid., ibid., 22:42:07UTC), 93a-79a 
 
Example 24 
but HOW? jesse had the cigarette that morning when he went to work. he did not 
encounter walt until after he had discovered that brock was poisoned. walt did not have 
an opportunity to get the cigarette. sure, he could have poisoned brock with a new batch 
of ricin, but the missing cigarette is the crucial piece of evidence. 
Pauker (ibid., ibid., 3.10.11, 03:30:45UTC), 79a 
 
Example 25 
Huel did it during the patdown. Saul’s purpose in calling Jesse so urgently (6 times!), of 
insisting he get to his office, was really to get the cigarettes. Walt could have told Saul 
any old story of why it was important for him to swap the pack out and Saul would have 
gone along with it. I mean, why else introduce Jesse into Saul’s exit scene? Having a 
character like Saul Goodman decide to ’disappear’ leaves so much potential for creative 
comic relief, but instead we got this silly patdown (why invite Jesse over if you are 
scared he’s coming to kill you?), and a mundane conversation (“here, er... let me give 
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you all your cash...”) Clearly, the scene happened the way it did so later we can all 
realize Walt paid Saul to swap Jesse’s cigs. 
Sinistersilkmerchant (ibid., ibid., ibid., 04:08:45UTC), 85a-79a 
 
Example 26 
No, he swapped one pack for another. Why is it so hard to imagine this happening? 
Magicians perform slight-of-hand tricks that are way more complicated in front of 
audiences who are actually looking and expecting it. Pick-pocketers have similar skill. 
And as we know, Saul Goodman likes to employ people of diverse and practical talents. 
And while on the subject of Huel, I doubt Saul Goodman’s “bodyguard” is an idiot. I 
think Saul finds Huel extremely useful exactly because people underestimate the guy. 
He seems dimwitted, clumsy and lethargic. In reality, he’s probably none of those 
things. Also, as a plot device it was unnecessary for Saul to bring Jesse “up to speed.” 
Jesse received Walt’s side of the story in detail when he went over to his house to kill 
him. 
Sinistersilkmerchant (ibid., ibid., ibid., 04:35:18UTC), 96a-79a 
 
Example 27 
I just pulled up that scene and rewatched it a couple times. He definitely put something 
in his pocket right at the end of him frisking Jesse.. 
Shappie (ibid., ibid., ibid., 07:21:20UTC), 92a-79a 
 
Example 28 
If the packs were switched at Walt’s order he would have made sure there was an upside 
down cig. Jesse by now has gotten used to avoiding that one like the poison it is, so it’s 
not too hard to believe that he wouldn’t have noticed. And his first action upon 
suspecting the ricin was missing was to shred all his cigarettes looking for it, so it’s not 
like he was taking the time to count them then. I just went through and rewatched the 
Huel scene and the scene where Jesse first learns about Brock’s poisoning. At first I 
thought it was impossible that Walt could have done it, because I misheard Jesse’s 
girlfriend say that he got sick in the morning. On second viewing, she clearly says he 
was fine in the morning. Several hours elapsed between Jesse’s patdown (during which 
Huel’s hands go off-frame and after which he definitely puts a hand in his pocket as if to 
stash something) and Brock’s symptoms. So it is possible Walt could have orchestrated 
everything, and we’ve learned by now that he’ll do pretty much anything to save his 
own ass.  When Walt spun the gun for the third time and it didn’t point to him, you 
could see a look of determination, as if it had occurred to him that he might be able to 
do something about his situation after all, to take some offensive action. But when we 
see him later he’s got the door braced with a table and is hiding in the darkness, waiting 
to die. If there was some offensive move it happened off-camera and there’s really only 
one thing it could have been. I’m holding out hope that Walt didn’t actually give the kid 
ricin, but another non-fatal poison that would trigger Jesse’s suspicion without killing a 
kid. This fucking show. <shiver> 
SupremeFuzzler (ibid., ibid., ibid., 12:01:23UTC), 89a-79a 
 
Example 29 
How would he steal a single cigarette out of a pack and put it back within that ten 
second search?  I see exactly what you’re saying, but it’s very, very far-fetched. Saul 
wasn’t scared Jesse was trying to kill him. Huel searched Jesse because Huel’s an idiot. 
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That whole scene just set-up Saul leaving and also allowed Saul to bring Jesse up to 
speed in terms of what is going on 
(deleted) (ibid., ibid., ibid., 04:29:20UTC), 95a-79a 
 
Example 30 
Swapping them is possible. However, he’s definitely a pretty big guy...swapping a pack 
of smokes like that would be pretty tricky. Anyway, good point...never thought of the 
possibility of swapping packs. 
(deleted) (ibid., ibid.. ibid., 04:36:51UTC), 97a-79a 
 
Example 31 
I don’t think Huell is smooth enough to pull that off without Jesse noticing. Taking 
something out of a pocket is one thing, but removing a cigarette from the pack, and 
putting it back in the pocket in the brief period he was frisking him.. 
Nointernalcensor (ibid., ibid., 3.10.11, 04:18:58UTC), 10a 
 
Example 32 
Well, shit. That makes sense. I still don’t think Huell is capable of it. I think Saul was 
just being paranoid about him wearing a wire. 
Nointernalcensor (ibid., ibid., ibid., 04:32:50UTC), 11a 
 
Example 33 
Justin “Is it possible that this whole thing could be a mistake?” Yep. That was my first 
thought (it being an accidental poisoning) until they threw in it being a likely poisoning 
by Gus or Walt. And that almost seems like the most likely scenario. The more I think 
about it, the more I question Gus poisoning Brock. It seems like too much would have 
to happen in a short for that to be the case. Walt had no realistic way to get at both the 
ricin AND Brock either. Either way, I’m just not totally buying either Gus OR Walt 
being able to work such a seemingly convoluted plan, although you could certainly 
think of scenarios that would fit (e.g. somebody poisons Brock with SOMETHING, and 
then steals the cigarette so Jesse thinks it was ricin when it was something else, or who 
knows). The two reasons why Brock smoking the cigarette might NOT be a logical 
choice would be that first, Brock would have to find the cigarette AND smoke it (one 
would hope somebody might notice that, but it’s not impossible), and second if it fit into 
the timeframe (would Brock and the cigarette have been in the same room between the 
time Jesse last saw his “lucky cigarette” and when he realized it was missing outside the 
hospital?). Those seemed to indicate it was NOT Brock mimicing Jesse and smoking 
one of his cigarettes (with presumably the upside down one standing out and being the 
reason he’d grab that one). 
Dave I (Uproxx/Hitfix, ibid., 3.10.11, 3:07PM), b46 
 
Example 34 
First, I don’t think anything is absolute. The writers left if ambiguous for a reason. 
Second, there was no obvious way for ANYBODY to get the cigarette. Does anybody 
think Huell is REALLY that dextrous to have snatched the cigarette from Jesse 
(somehow grabbing the one upside-down poisonous cigarette yet leaving the rest of the 
pack) during that fumbling 5-second pat down? I don’t. There is also no obvious way 
for Gus to have known about the cigarette, much less have gotten it from Jesse and to 
Brock. Nor was there any obvious way for Walt to have gotten the cigarette from Jesse 
and then to Brock. I think that’s the point. We’ll find out, but at this point either or 
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neither could have done it and almost any of the basic theories contained in those 
possibilities are equally plausible. I think that is kind of the point 
Dave I (ibid., ibid., 4.10.11, 1:04AM), b54 
 
Example 35 
Fred, maybe you’re right. As of now though, until/unless they show how it was 
possible, I’m not buying Huell was able to dig out the ricin cigarette, and either NOT 
take the whole pack or take it and somehow slip it back into Jesse’s pocket without him 
noticing. That would be a pretty neat trick for Houdini. The “A-Team” is flat-out NOT 
that capable. Plus, there’s no way Saul would do that. At least not if he knew the plan, 
and I’m reasonably sure he’d ask questions before agreeing to a pickpocket pat-down 
for when Jesse came to get his money. Saul’s already jumping ship. Is he really going to 
risk getting Gus upset with him either by trying to steal from his main cook OR much 
less by taking part in a plan to ultimately coerce Jesse into being complicit in killing 
Gus? His main priority is survival. Even the indirect things he’s done just to help Walt 
& Jesse stay alive have put him on edge. No, if Walt did this, I have to believe it was 
without Saul and I definitely do not believe Huell was quick-fingered enough to slip one 
upside down cigarette out of Jesse’s pocket in that haphazard pat down 
Dave I (ibid., ibid., 5.10.11, 5:35PM), c2 
 
Example 36 
– Adam “As someone who smoked for years, I rarely knew how many I had in a pack. I 
always smoked the same kind. Any swap of packs would have been un-noticed if they 
were at all similar (IE One out vs 18 out)” I suppose I could buy them switching packs, 
as Walt would probably know what kind of cigarettes Jesse showed. However . . .*  – 
Tizzielish “But I don’t think it’s a cheat, not if we believe Huell once was an expert 
pickpocket. Pickpockets can be unbelievably skilled: it’s not just a movie/fiction fantasy 
that pickpockets can be very good. [snip] I did not feel a thing. So if Huell was an 
expert picker . .” O.k., that sort of makes sense. However . . .** * First, the cigarettes. 
Yeah, they could have swapped the packs if they knew what Jesse smoked. Really, Jesse 
was eventually going to figure out the cigarette was gone and that a switch had 
occurred. I suspect that element will pop up next season (he may have some lingering 
suspicions about Walt). All that a similar brand a/o # of cigarettes gains the cigarette-
snatcher is time between when they lift the cigarettes and when Jesse notices.** Good 
point. There is no reason to suspect Huell ISN’T a skilled pickpocket. The main 
problem I have is they just brought that out of nowhere. It just does not gel with their 
character portrayal. Not that they can’t change Huell from bumbling strong-arm of the 
“A-Team” or anything. However, it feels like a bit of a cheat to just show him largely 
ineffective other than to look tough, only to have him be a masterful pickpocket. Even 
that I would not have had a problem with if he hadn’t pulled that off while Jesse was 
watching him pat him down during a half-mauling search. Slipping a wallet when you 
know what you are doing while somebody is not paying attention or otherwise 
distracted? Sure. Swapping packs of cigarettes (because I REALLY don’t buy him 
lifting the single upside-down cigarette) while somebody is actively aware of you 
patting them down and half-fighting you off? That seems a bit harder of a sell. 
Dave I (ibid., “Face Off,” 10.10.11, 1:48PM), b11 
 
Example 37 
Hey, at least you took a side. I was full-on riding the fence. I’m pretty much on-board 
with Filaphresh’s assessment. Every possibility seemed (and still does seem) like a 
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stretch. Including what actually happened. And Lionel . . . “I’ve seen sleight of hand far 
more impressive than what would be required to switch out a pack of cigarettes, and we 
had no idea what Walt was doing for several hours of the previous episode, leaving him 
ample time to devise some means of delivering the poison to Brock.” True. And I 
suppose you could argue the mauling of Jesse was intentional to take his attention away 
from the switch. It just seems like a cheat since they never really showed that side of 
Huell, and it’s terribly convenient to have that trait just happen to show up at that 
particular critical point in the story. It’s just not their most believable twist. I still love 
the show, however it all seems a bit too contrived 
Dave I (ibid., ibid., ibid., 2:03PM), b21 
 
Example 38 
Hey Lionel Mandrake, sure that all makes sense. From a writing standpoint, I tend to 
think it’s usually the norm to clue readers (and in TV/movies, viewers) into your 
characters’ pasts & skills before throwing stuff like that out there. That is something an 
undergrad Creative Writing Prof. literally used in a story where it was first person 
omniscient and then for a brief time went to first-person limited so he could slip in the 
twist, and he admitted it was a bit of a cheat. Still, it’s pretty minor in the grand scheme 
of things. What still bothers me is how much of a stretch the whole plan was. First, 
Huell has this skill none of the viewers knew about. In fact, NOTHING much has been 
established about Huell’s character except he’s one of Saul’s employees and has been 
used as the tough-looking guy on some of his jobs. Second, he had to execute it while 
Jesse was aware of the pat down. I suppose the pieces all fit, it just seems like they 
could have been made to fit a lot more seamlessly with only a little more effort. 
Something as simple as a flashback showing Huell’s background and a bit more depth, 
or Walt discussing the plan with Saul to both swipe the cigarette (perhaps mentioning 
although he might not look it Huell is a slight-of-hand/pickpocket type) AND somehow 
poison Brock with non-lethal berries. Then it’s just a bit of a long-shot that Jesse doesn’t 
blame Walt and shoot him, I guess, but you can still makes much more sense to me. 
Maybe it’s petty, but those sort of details matter to me, and I can’t help but think that 
expectation has been set by the past attention to details this show has had. 
Dave I (ibid., ibid., ibid., 2:59PM), b23 
 
Example 39 
Is it possible that this whole thing could be a mistake? What if the kid went into Jesse’s 
pocket and smoked the cigarette, and Walt, noticing Jesse’s irrational state, used that to 
turn him back on his side (similar to the way he’s got Jesse to go along with his plans in 
the past). I’ll need to listen to Jesse talking about how he kept track of the ricin (that 
part seemed a little confusing), but that was my initial takeaway. 
Justin (ibid., “End Times,” 3.10.11, 3:27AM), a22 
 
Example 40 
I think that it was Walt that poisoned Brock. Not directly but through Saul. When Huell 
inspects Jesse or something Saul could have access to the cigarette. Saul visits him 
every week or so and he is in the middle of the hell too, and wants to go out of it. In the 
beginning, in the pistol scene, the last thing it points is a plant and I think Walt tried to 
reach Jesse through Brock to turn him against Gus (as Gus did with Jesse). I don’t know 
if Saul (or the “A-Team” is capable of such a thing). And how Gus spoke with Jesse in 
the hospital... it seems that he hasn’t nothing to do with it. Maybe Walt (remembering 
the gun pointing to the plant) created a new poison out of it that is not fatal, the ricin is 
202 
still in the cigarette but as of now we don’t know where it is. Thus leading to make Jesse 
believe that Walter poisoned Brock (that was Walt’s intention) and then explaining that 
wasn’t him but Gus. But we only know in the next episode (if it reveals something).. 
Fred (ibid., ibid., 5.10.11, 2:20 PM), c1 
 
Example 41 
As someone who smoked for years, I rarely knew how many I had in a pack. I always 
smoked the same kind. Any swap of packs would have been un-noticed if they were at 
all similar (IE One out vs 18 out)  
Adam (ibid., “Face Off,” 10.10.11, 3:38AM), a4 
 
Example 42 
Yeah, I don’t know much Adam used to smoke, but I always know how many I have, 
and I don’t smoke as much as Jesse does. When he checked for the ricin cigarette, he 
had half a pack left -- hours after it was lifted. This would put it at about 3/4 of a pack 
when Huell took it [if we’re assuming he smokes roughly the same amount over the 
course of a day]. 
Sean (ibid., ibid., 10.10.11, 3:52AM), a6 
 
Example 43 
I understand the skepticism about Huell switching cigarette packs. I re-watched the 
scene with Huell frisking Jesse repeating to see if I could see Huell do it, just in case it 
was Huell who took the ricin cig. . . . I couldn’t see it. But I don’t think it’s a cheat, not 
if we believe Huell once was an expert pickpocket. Pickpockets can be unbelievably 
skilled: it’s not just a movie/fiction fantasy that pickpockets can be very good. I lived in 
Bogota, Colombia for one year in 1973–74. AT the time, it was said every city in the 
world has a school of pickpockets trained in Bogota. I have had pickpockets slide their 
hand into my tight college girl jeans -- and not feel them but just once I happened to 
glance down and see the guy sliding something out of my pocket. I did not feel a thing. 
So if Huell was an expert picker . . . 
Tizzielish (ibid., ibid., 10.10.11, 7:32AM), b8 
 
Example 44 
I’ve seen sleight of hand far more impressive than what would be required to switch out 
a pack of cigarettes, and we had no idea what Walt was doing for several hours of the 
previous episode, leaving him ample time to devise some means of delivering the 
poison to Brock. 
Lionel Mandrake (ibid., ibid., ibid., 4:40AM), b18 
 
Example 45 
No, pickpocketing is not something that’s been established in Huell’s character, but he’s 
not exactly someone with whom we’ve spent a great deal of time. Presumably, there’s a 
lot we don’t know about Huell, and pickpocketing is not such a rare skill. Bearing those 
things in mind, it didn’t feel like a cheat to me.  
Lionel Mandrake (ibid., ibid., ibid., 2:39PM), b22 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Karakteritega suhestumine ja digikogukondlik praktika: 
“Halvale teele” multidistsiplinaarne uurimus 
Pean silmas hüpoteesi, et tajutav [perceptible] on üksnes see, mis asub 
meeles, mis tajutavat tajub: et tegelikult ei taju me väliseid asju, vaid 
üksnes meelele jäljendunud [imprinted upon the mind] kujutisi ja pilte, 
mida kutsutakse muljenditeks [impression] ja ideedeks.  
Kui see tõsi oleks: eeldusel, et teatavad muljendid ja ideed mu meeles 
eksisteerivad, ei saa ma nende olemasolu põhjal järeldada mitte ühtegi 
muud asja [any thing else]: minu muljendid ja ideed on ainsateks eksis-
tentsideks, millest minul on teadmine ja kontseptsioon: ja nad on säärased 
põgusad ja ajutised olemasolud, et neil ei saa olemasolu ollagi, kuna nad 
püsivad ainult senikaua, kuniks mina neist teadlik olen. Seega, sellise 
hüpoteesi kohaselt, kogu universum minu ümber, kehad ja hinged, päike, 
kuu, tähed, ja maa, sõbrad ja tuttavad, eranditult kõik, mille eeldasin 
olevat alaliseselt olemasoleva, mõelgu ma siis neist või mitte, haihtuvad 
jalamaid […] Ma ARVASIN, et [selline hüpotees] on mõistusevastane[.] 
– Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind, on the Principles of 
Common Sense (1819), pp. xiii–ix; rõhutused ja suurtähestus originaalis; 
minu tõlge 
 
Inimesed on loonud palju lugusid. [Lugusid] rõõmust, kurbusest, vihast, 
sügavatest tunnetest. Lood raputavad meid emotsionaalselt, need 
paeluvad meid. Kuid ometi on lood üksnes kõrvalseisjate mõtted. Mis 
oleks siis, kui tegelaskujud loos omaksid “kavatsusi”? Oleksime me 
nende jaoks jumalalaadsed olendid, kes nende lugu maailmale näitavad? 
Meie maailm on muutunud. Mõõda välja karistust jumalateilma vastu. 
Taas:Loojates [sic] saab igaühest Looja.  
– Televisiooniportaal TheTVDB, reklaam Jaapani telekanalil Tokio MX  
näidatavale animeseriaalile; rõhutused lisatud; minu tõlge 
 
 
Kaasaegse kunsti filosoof Nöel Carroll kirjeldab oma artiklis “Sympathy for the 
Devil” (Carroll 2004) Ameerika teleseriaali “Sopranod” (The Sopranos) pea-
tegelase, julma maffiapealiku Tony Soprano teraapiaseanssi järgnevalt: “Tony 
poolt algatatavad kavatsusliku hämamise kihistused, alateadlikud enesepettused, 
meioosid, keerdsõlmed, silmakirjalikkus, ja eksitavad kirjeldused mõjuvad 
järjekindlalt haaravalt; sa võrdled alatasa seda, mida ta ütleb ja millest ta teadlik 
on, tema tegeliku olukorraga (nii nagu [sa] tead seda olevat) (ibid.:89–90; rõhu-
tus lisatud). Keskendudes aga päriselulisele Teise-mõistmisele, märgib teadvus-
filosoof Shaun Gallagher: “ainult sel juhul, kui ma selgitan välja tema loo 
[story], olen ma võimeline liikuma empaatilise mõistmise tasandile ... lugu, 
narratiiv, aitab [tema] olukorras lünki täita, ja empaatilist laadi mõistmine 
[understanding] nõuab olukorra mõistmist (Gallagher 2012b:17). Käesolevas 
doktoritöös käsitasin vaataja suhestumist narratiivse karakteriga digitaalses 
kogukondlikus suhtlusruumis välja eenduvate pikaajaliste väljendusprotsesside 
näitel, eesmärgiga osundada, et vaataja mina-keskne (s.o. esimeses isikus kirjel-
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datav) karakterimõistmine ei pruugi alati ja igas olukorras (nt kogukondlik vest-
lus internetis) olla optimaalseimaks lahendiks. Teisisõnu, saaksime siinkohal 
küsida üheskoos Shaun Gallagheriga: “kuidas võimaldaks teadmine, mida meie 
teeks, aidata meil mõista, mida keegi teine teeks?” (Gallagher 2012a:363). Sellele 
vaatamata on käsitlused narratiivse tegelaskujuga “samastumisest” ja narratiiv-
sesse maailma “sukeldumisest” ning “transporteerumisest” mõjukad niihästi kir-
jandusteaduses, folkloristikas, narratoloogias, psühholoogias ja meediauuringutes 
laiemaltki. Antud doktorikirja eesmärgiks oli tagasihoidlik polemiseerimine nime-
tatud akadeemiliste käibetõdedega ja siit tõukuv “alternatiividele” osundamine.  
Ehkki kaasaegse televisioonikultuuri “keerukad narratiivid” küll näikse 
rõhutavat kavatsuslikult toimivate tegelaskujude “lugusid”; ja kuigi—nagu teine 
ülaltoodud tsitaatidest ka näitlikustab—isegi jutuvestmine kui selline justkui 
asuks sellist seisukohta kinnitama, võib välja kujunenud mõtlemismallide muut-
mine osutuda esialgu loodetust keerulisemaks. Tõepoolest, isegi tagasihoidlikud 
teisendused ja muudatused süsteemis võivad, figuratiivselt, takistustega silmitsi 
seista. Mööndavasti ongi doktoridissertatsiooni formaat sellisel juhul millegi 
tegelikuks “revolutsioneerimiseks” üldse ebapiisav. Kohased oleksid siinkohal 
ühe elukogenud professori sõnad “akadeemilise kirjutamise” kursuselt: kõik 
“kirkad ideed” jäetagu parem tulevikku, keskne olgu õpiülesanne, teatava etapi 
läbimine. Tuleb tõdeda, et kuigi käesolev väitekiri ei järginud seda nõuannet 
sõna-sõnalt, oleks ehk paslik, kui lugeja näeks tehtud töös eeskätt kutset arutelu 
avamiseks. Sai ju etableeritud üksnes potentsiaalselt väärtusliku teoreetilise 
raamistu kontuur. Teisalt, vahest on äsjanimetatud hirmud hoopis ülemäära 
ennatlikud. Tuleks ju märkida, et dissertatsiooni jooksul käsitletud ja selgitatud 
väited, leidnuna oma viimse, olgugi et illustratiivse ja ettekavatsetult lõpetamata, 
“jooksva,” praktilise seadistuse töö analüüsiosas (vt peatükk 3, 3.4–3.5), leidsid 
alles äsja peaaegu et üllatavat kvantitatiivset toetust (vt Alderson-Day, Bernini, 
Fernyhough 2017). Ehkki Alderson-Day ja kolleegide uurimus tegeles empiirilise 
materjaliga teisest meediumist (s.o. kirjanduskogemus), näikse autorite leiud 
toestavat väidet, et otseselt realistliku (direct realist) tegelaskujuga suhestumise 
mudeli välja töötamine ehk polekski pelk akadeemiline sõge liialdus, mille laeks 
on üksnes “alternatiivse” mõistevõrgustiku loomine, vaid peegeldub tagasi, 
vähemalt mõningal määral, ka tavapärastest kvantitatiivsetest küsitlusvalimitest. 
Üheksateistkümnel protsendil Alderson-Day ja kolleegide poolt dokumen-
teeritud koguvalimist, s.o. seitsmekümneseitsmel juhul, väljendus kogemuslik 
suhestumus narratiivsete (käesoleval juhul kirjanduslike) karakteritega järg-
miselt: lugejad tajusid karakterite hääli “kogemuslikult” nende eludesse “üle 
tulevat [crossing]” ja nii omi elusid lugejate elude “sees,” “lugemispuhangute 
vahepeal,” otsekui jätkavat (ibid.:105; rõhutused originaalis). Ometi tasub siin-
kohal selguse huvides märkida, et Alderson-Day ja kolleegide leiud näikse 
vähemalt pealnäha esile tõstvat “normist” eristuvaid psühhopatoloogilisi kaldu-
vusi (s.o. “häälte kuulmine”). Sellegipoolest pakub antud uurimus käesolevale 
doktoriväitekirjale märkimisväärset kvantitatiivset fooni, kuna (a) tuleb möönda 
kattuvust kasutatud teaduskirjanduses (iseäranis tuleks välja tuua Alderson-Day 
ja kolleegide rõhuasetust Võgotskiaanlikule paradigmale); ja (b) kui antud 
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uurimus hüpoteetiliselt televisuaalse publiku sfääri ümber paigutada, võiks 
eeldada dokumenteeritud tajueffektide suurenemist, kuna tegemist oleks “otse-
sema,” ja eeskätt just pikajalisema interaktsioonilise suhestumisega.   
Käesoleva väitekirja kandvaks väiteks on niisiis olnud, et, sarnaselt iga-
päevaeluga, tõukub vastuvõtja ka “tegelaskujuga suhestudes” argimõistuslikust 
lähenemisest, mille üheks kvalitatiivseks “mõõdikuks” võiks olla ülimalt peene-
koeline, detailiküllane ja paljuski materialistlik tavakeelekasutus, mis jääb selli-
sena üpris kaugele kitsast “naiivse vastuvõtja” doktriinist. Kui lähtuda John L. 
Caughey soovitustest raamatus Imaginary Social Worlds. A Cultural Approach 
(Caughey 1984), on kaalul kogukondlikud “ulatusliku informatsiooni” assamb-
laažid, milleni on jõutud läbi “lähedase seotuse [intimate involvement]” 
“meediafiguuridega” (ibid.:32–33), s.o. käesolevalt uuritud juhul, narratiivsete 
persoonidega (narrative persons) teleseriaalist Halvale Teele. Kui aga eeldada, 
et niiöelda võluvõtmeks selliselt väljenduvale “kombatavuse” paradoksile just 
ongi keskendatus sotsiaalsetele suhetele (ibid.:40), mis on kestvad mõlemas 
“tõelisuse” variatsioonis (olenemata “pseudo-” ja/või objektiivsest reaalsusest), 
kinnistub küsimus: kuidas tegelikud inimesed sellise suhtestatusega kaasnevat 
kogemust loomulikult väljendavad (iseäranis juhtudel, kus pikaajalised vestlu-
sed, s.o. blogide kommentaariumites ja foorumilõimudes, on vastandavalt 
kõrvutatavad tulemustele, mida tavapäraselt saavutatakse “kinnise” eksperimen-
taallabori tingimustes). 
Eelöeldut silmas pidades piiritlesin käesoleva väitekirja sissejuhatuses keele 
sotsialiseeriva kvaliteedi tähtsuse—keele “potentsi” pärisustada, realitiseeri-
da, s.t. arendada välja aktiivne “suveräänsete [sovereign] kogemuste ületule-
mine” (vrd Alderson-Day jt 2017)—või teisisõnu: loomingulise rahvakeele 
[creative vernacular] osatähtsuse tõus ʻfiktsionaalsete’ tegelaskujudega suhestu-
mise artikulatsiooniprotessi juures. Seega, loominguline rahvakeel, minu käes-
olevas käsitluses, võimaldab suveräännsete toimijate kui selliste avaldumist 
(vrd. vt. 1.4, 1.5.1). Järgides Craig Batty tähelepankut võib siinkohal karakteri-
kesksus, ehk siis “kellegi teise loo kogemine” (Batty 2014:36), rakenduda ka 
kahesuunaliselt. Lõppkokkuvõttes oleks siinkohal objektiivse gradatsiooni 
“lamendamisel” kandvateks teguriteks (i) lugude potents, või täpsemini, (ii) see, 
kuidas vaatajad-kommenteerijad algsetest autorinarratiividest omi variatsioone 
“punuvad” (vrd nt Grinder 1981). Järelikult, niihästi küllastumus lugudest kui 
ka lugu kui tööriist seavad kahtluse alla vaikimisi nõude, nagu oleks Breaking 
Bad’i Walter White justkui “vähem” persoon kui, ütleme, nn reality-šõu Trading 
Spouses’i Marguerite Perrin (Batty ibid.).  
Niisiis võiks seniöeldule tuginedes öelda, et käesolev väitekiri on käsitletav 
ühelt poolt (i) ülalmainitud “naiivse vastuvõtja” doktriini kriitikana, teisalt aga 
(ii) laiendatud vastuväitena representatsiooni kui sellise “mentalistlikule” kont-
septualiseerimisele, eeskätt mis puutub uuritavat konteksti kõige laiemalt võe-
tuna, s.o. tegelaskujuga suhestumist (character engagement). Margrit Schreieri 
kvantitatiivne uurimus The Blair Witch Project’i onlain vaatajareaktsioonidest 
(kurikuulus “pseudodokumentaal” ja tänaste “doku-reality” telesarjade inspirat-
sioon) võtab ehk kõige konkreetsemalt kokku “naiivse vastuvõtja” doktriini 
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peamise iva. Schreier küll möönab, et “‘fakti’ ja ‘fiktsiooni’ suhestamine on … 
täiesti tavapärane osa retseptsiooniprotsessist,” ent kasvõi implitsiitselt jääb 
kajama mõte, et “ne[id] retsipien[te] … kes tõepoolest need kaks [‘fakt’ ja ‘fikt-
sioon’] omavahel segamini ajavad ja moodustavad kaduma läinud fiktsio-
naalsetele tegelaskujudele otsingurühmi” käsitletakse “ebasobivaina,” kui mar-
ginaaliasse paigutuvate “tavatutena” (Schreier 2004:307). Veel enamgi, Schreie-
ri arutelu sekundeerib filmiteoreetik Murray Smithi põhiväidetele (diskus-
siooniks vt 1.6; Smith 2011; Sorokin n.d.), sh arendades edasi viimase üht 
peamist argumenti sellest, et "fiktsooni" kogedes on retsipientide igapäevane 
“faktikonventsioon ajutiselt peatatud.” Seda asendavat spetsiifilised juhised, mis 
tõukuvad teatavast “kirjanduslik-esteetilisest [literary-aesthetic] süsteemist” 
(Schreier 2004:309–310).  
Oleks siis üldse võimalik korrelatsioon äsja osundatud teoreetiliste selgituste 
ning teleseriaali Halvale teele diskussantide “loomingulise rahvakeele” vahel? 
Kui tõukuda käesolevas väitekirjas pakutud illustratiivsest lähianalüüsist, mis 
hõlmab kogukondlikku tähendusloomet kahe järjestikuse nädala lõikes, näib 
olevat ilmne, et esil on niihästi “igapäevased” kui ka “narratiivsed” konvent-
sioonid. Mis veelgi olulisem—diskussandid rakendavad mõlemat väidetavat 
“äärmust” üheaegselt. Vahest kõige paremini karakteriseerib nimetatud väidet 
väitekirja üks argumentidest, et paljude erinevate toimijalikkuste kooskõla, 
(omavaheliste) vastavuste (correspondence) ‘kokkuvolditavus’ (folding) evib 
nivelleerivat kvaliteeti. S.t., sugugi mitte üksnes narratiivsed persoonid ei 
“kandu üle” diskussiooni keskendavate nö klatšiobjektidena, vaid et samaväär-
selt toimub see ka päriseluliste autorite ja telestsenaristidega. Ka viimaste 
loomingulist tegevust (s.o. kirjutatud episoodiliste stsenaariumite koherentsust 
pikemas perspektiivis; kavatsuslikke valikuid seoses süžeepööretega jms) haka-
takse üksikasjalikult uurima, ja ‘mõõdupuu’ selleks on sealjuures sarnastatav 
sellega, mida rakendatakse formaalselt “fiktiivsete” persoonide (elu)tegevuse 
mõtestamiseks. Niisiis saab võimalikuks väita, et narratiivse kogemuse lahti 
seletamise juures (nagu seda lubab teleseriaal Halvale teele, välistamata seal-
juures teisigi samalaadseid) muutub argimõistuslik (commonsense) arutlemine 
fundamentaalseks komponendiks. Loogiliseks lõpptulemuseks on siinkohal, et 
argine, jagatud tähendusloome (common sense vs commonsense) muutub kogu-
kondlikuks (communalized); s.t. tähendusloome hakkab ‘produtseerima’ rahva-
pärast kaemust, mille predikaadiks on teatavat laadi “rahvakeelne loomingu-
lisus.” Mis puutub narratiivsetesse persoonidesse, siis eelnevalt visandatud 
ideede relevantsus võimendub momendil kui meie konventsionaalne müstitsism 
“karakterist haaratud” olemisest saab tasakaalustatud väitega olla haaratud 
nende poolt (by them vs in); s.t. arendades välja kolmandas isikus perspektiivi 
nende kohta; ehk siis, neist kui potentsiaalselt teistest inimestest (vrd Sorokin 
2016b, 2017a, b).  
Kui nüüd aga liikuda punkti (ii) juurde, tuleb märkida, nagu käesoleva väite-
kirja sissejuhatuses ka tegin, et vaikimisi eeldatava “fakti” ja “fiktsiooni” 
binaarsuse kaja võib kohata laialdaselt. Seega saab kokkuvõtlikult osundada ja 
käsitada vaid valitud näiteid. Nii öeldakse meile, et meie narratiivne kogemus-
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likkus on tegelikult ‘mentaalne konstrukt,’ mida me “jooksutame” (run) (Oatley 
1994, 1999); et kujuteldav kogemus “transporteerib” meid (Gerrig); et me 
minevat kuidagimoodi selle kogemuse “sees kaotsi” (lost in) (Nell); või et meid 
“hüponotiseeritakse” ja viiakse lausa “transsi” (vrd Oatley 2002:41,50). Pidades 
silmas just selliseid müstifitseerivaid miraaže, räägib kirjanduspsühholoog 
Keith Oatley “kirjanduslikest emotsioonidest” (literary emotions) ning tõukudes 
Brunerist ja Bartlettist väidab rangelt: ehkki küll propositsioon “narratiivist kui 
inimeste tegevuse mõistmise laadist” sobituvat sellega, kuidas me narratiivi ja 
selles esitatud inimesi kogeme, on olemas selge kontrast “paradigmaatilise 
laadiga [mida] kasutatakse teaduslike ja tehniliste küsimuste üle arutlemiseks”; 
et see eristus olla samavõrd ühemõtteline nagu “fakt,” et olemas olevat “tõe-
lised” ja “kirjanduslikud” emotsioonid (ibid.:39–40,65; rõhutused lisatud). Kuid 
siingi ilmneb vasturääkivus. Nimelt, kui “narratiivi” on võimalik utiliseerida, 
mõistmaks, mispärast “protagonistid” just teataval moel käituvad (s.o. alus-
vajadus, millest käesolev väitekiri juhindub), siis kuidas saab ühtlasi olla nii, et 
“lugu assimileerides on meie emotsioonid meie eneste, mitte tegelaskujude 
omad”; ja et me “saame tegelaskujuga loos üheks”; s.t. me identifitseerime end 
temaga (ibid.:43,61jj.; rõhutused lisatud)? Seega tõstatub õigustatud küsimus: 
mis see tegelikult on, mida me narratiivse laadi abiga “mõistma” peaksime? 
Aiva, juba, ja ainult meid endit? 
Oatley käsitlusest oleks võimalik välja lugeda viimast. Sest ta visandab 
teatava spektri, mille ühes mõttelises otsas on “transportatsioon,” teises aga 
“transformatsioon” (ibid.:43; vrd Polichak and Gerrig 2002:89jj.). Sa “sukeldud 
sisse” ja, kui läheb õnneks, pääsed valla muutunud inimesena. Ja tõesti, mis 
puutub ühelt poolt meediatarbimisse ja teisalt inimarenguteadusse, siis vastavalt 
teesid “eneseimplikeerimisest” (self-implication) (nt Kuiken jt 2004) ja “läbi 
teiste endaks saamisest” (Võgotskij) mõjuvad kaheldamatult üsnagi veenvalt. 
Täpsemalt olekski antud juhul vaidluskohaks pigem just Oatley radikaal-
konstruktivistlik lähenemine. Rajatud Piaget’ ja von Glaserfeldi poolt edasi 
arendatud Machianlikul mõttetraditsioonil, välistab see täiel määral jälgitavate 
“Teiste” toimimise nende enda suveräännsetest kavatsustest johtuvalt (olene-
mata esitlusmeediumist ja hoolimata nende olemasolust koos sellega) nagu seda 
sääraste, väidetavalt “transformatiivsete” (fiktsionaalsete) kogemuste jooksul 
võidatakse tajuda. Seega saab siinkohal taas postuleeritud mina-perspektiiv 
(narratiivsele teisele lähenemine nö esimeses isikus), mis ‘töötleb’ (process) re-
presentatsioone nn Dennettlikus Karteaanlikus Teatris. Siit johtuvalt on aga 
lõppkokkuvõttes autor ja narratiiv võetavad suuresti ühehäälse entiteedina, 
samas kui potentsiaalseid eksistentse viimases postuleeritakse ei enama kui 
retseptiivse kujutlusvõime viljana, kui “loo poolt pakutavate materjalidena” 
(Oatley 2002:43; rõhutus lisatud); kui “materjalidena,” mis asustavad üksnes sel 
määral, et moodustavad teatava “vaheruumi,” suhestamaks omavahel “tõelist 
autorit” ja “tõelist lugejat” kui ainsaid eksistentse (vrd ibid.:47jj.,64; vt ka sisse-
juhatus). Siit tulenevalt saakski väita, vähemalt teatava piirini, et eelkirjeldatud 
teoretiseerimise keskmes on “ego-kesk[ne] elemen[t] … mis [aga] on meie 
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lugemiskogemuse [ja iseäranis just vaatamiskogemuse] suhtes atüüpiline” 
(Meskin ja Weinberg 2003:18).  
Õigluse huvides olgu märgitud, et teatavaid potentsiaalseid vakantse ning 
ühisosi, mis ülalkirjeldatud vaateid ehk vaidlustada aitaks, küll leidub—vähe-
malt mis käesolevalt puutub psühholoogiaalasesse kirjandusse—, kuid, tõsi küll, 
needki on endiselt pakutud mentalistlik-representatsioonilises “informatsiooni 
töötlemise” võtmes. Ühe sellisena võiks ära märkida Polichaki ja Gerrigi käsit-
luse vaatajatest ja lugejatest kui “kõrvalt-osalistest” (side-participants). Antud 
seoses oleks oluline täheldada, et autorite käsitlus tõukub siin just päriseluliste 
vestluste uurimisest (vt Polichak ja Gerrig 2002:72jj.). Kummatigi jäävad 
võtmekarakterid, kelle eludes “kõrvalt-osaletakse,” aga ikka vaid lugejalikeks 
“mentaalseteks representatsioonideks” (ibid.:78). Neil puudub igasugune suve-
räännsus narratiivsete persoonidena, kellele on omistatavad elatavad elud, 
mida vaataja või lugeja kui kõrvaltvaataja (Zillmanni onlooker) püüab tähen-
dustada kolmandas isikus, proovib selgitada otseselt, selmet rakendada re-
presenteeritud, vahendavaid ’figuriine vaimusilmas.’  
Kõnealusel poleemikal on mõistagi oma koht ka narratoloogias. Nii on Man-
fred Jahn oma vastulauses Alan Palmeri käsitlusele “sotsiaalsest teadvusest” 
kiire eritlema “tõelisi teisi teadvusi” (real other minds) ja “fiktsionaalseid teisi 
teadvusi” (fictional other minds) (Jahn 2011:249; vt ka nt Margolin 1990; Eder 
2010; Caracciolo 2014, kriitiliseks aruteluks, vt 1. peatükk, 1.5.3). (Palmeri 
ideede juurde ma varsti naasen.) Sama lugu on ka kirjandusteoreetiliste lähene-
mistega, mis küll pealiskaudsel pilgul võiksid käesoleva dissertatsiooni tuum-
argumente pigem soosida. Ent näiteks ka Lars-Åke Skalini paeluv artikkel 
toimetatud kogumikus Disputable Core Concepts of Narrative Theory pöördub 
tagasi konventsiooni juurde, märkides: “[T]egelaskujud pole eksistentsid, s.o. 
[nad pole] [loo]maailmas eraldiseisvad [particulars, in a world]. Tegelaskuju-
jutus [character-talk] pole võimalik eristada tantsijat tantsust” (Skalin 2012: 
127–128). Nüüd võiks vahest folkloristika siinkohal pakkuda lahknevaid vaa-
teid, või vähemasti, kaalukaid kompromisse? Mingil määral, ehkki kahjuks, 
mitte küll täielikult.  
Analüüsides muistendite pajatusi, tuginedes sealjuures arhiveeritud muistendi-
kogudele ning osundades siinkohal nende “kaheti[sele] kvalitee[dile] … ühtaegu 
kollektiivse[le] ja individuaalse[le],” skitseerib Ulf Palmenfelt intrigeeriva 
käsitluse “identifikandist” (identificand). Identifikand, kirjutab Palmenfelt, 
annab märku ekstratekstilisest suhtest ja on “mõistetav kokkuleppena jutustaja 
ja publiku vahel jutustamise jooksul” (Palmenfelt 1993:143,157,166). Teisi-
sõnu, kuulajad on “kontraheeritud” (contracted) eeldama teatavat rolli, mille 
jooksul “identifitseeritakse end” näiteks mõne loo nimelise tegelaskujuga 
(millegipärast häiritud, ülesköetud, seega vajab tähelepanu) pace “ebaisikulise 
rahvamassi …armeega.” Veel enam, olles kord selliselt positsioneeritud, kuu-
lajad “sisenevad muistendi universumisse” ja rakendavad tegelaskuju silmi, üle-
kantud tähenduses, “vaatamaks” lahtirullivaid sündmusi (ibid.). Kui momendil 
sulustada võimalikud vastuväiteid vis-à-vis et kuulajad võtvat ennetavalt aadli 
“rolli” (nagu Palmenfelti poolt analüüsitus), selmet—loogilisemalt—“identi-
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fitseerida end” talunikehulgaga, võib Palmenfeldi mõistekäsitlus pakkuda seni-
räägitule mõningaid põhjendatud korrektiive, ehkki täielik sõltuvus Palmenfeldi 
mudelist on parimal juhul küsitav. Sellegipoolest ütleksin, et mõiste “identifi-
kand” teeb ehk märkimisväärseks asjaolu, et see osundab tegelaskuju-vastuvõtja 
(jõu)suhte ümberpööravusele. Ehk siis: tegelaskuju lakkab olemast sõiduk 
vastuvõtja “minale.” Vastupidi, Palmenfeldi poolt käsiteldav jutustussituatsioon 
võimaldab sel nimelisel tegelaskujul opereerida suveräännse ‘giidina’ koos 
esitatud maailmaga (contra selle “sees”). See eritlus omakorda lubab vaagida 
kolmanda isiku perspektiivi, mille alusel antud tegelaskujust saaks “arutlev 
toimija” (reasoning agent), keda tunnistatakse kui kedagi kuulaja “minast” 
selgelt eraldiolevat, ehkki ühtaegu kriitiline par excellence selles suhtes, kuidas 
kuulajad lugu kogevad. Sest tema potentsiaalsed selgitused on täpse kursi järgi-
miseks vajalikud—selgitused, millesse ei sekkuta, vaid mis kehtestavad (kuu-
laja jaoks) marsruudi; selmet jääda simulatiivselt “paikseks” ja “sisse,” s.o. 
võtmaks osa “teesklusest” (kuna see konkreetne kuningas üldsegi mitte ei kujuta 
ette, vaid tõesti kardab enese tagakiusamist).   
Nii on võimalik järeldada, et “identifikandi” roll täielikult välistab igasuguse 
iseendal põhineva “mudeli” loomise, eriti kui arvesse võtta kuulamissituatsiooni 
konteksti ja kuulajate sotsiaalset konditsioneeritust, st kuulajateks võisid just 
olla päriselulised talunikud, mitte “aadikud,” ja veel kõige ebatõenäolisemalt, 
“kuningad.” Samuti saab siinkohal võimalikuks selgelt eritleda autorit ja 
tegelaskuju; differentsiaali, mida jutuvestja eksplitsiitselt märgib. Ehkki võib 
kujuneda nähtavasti raskeks täie kindlusega väita, et “identifikand” ‘pöörab 
ümber’ selle, kuidas päris inimesed suhestuvad “fiktsionaalsete” inimestega, on 
säärasele väitele kasvõi osundamine siiski käesolevas diskussioonis kasulik. 
Enamgi veel, Palmenfeldi enda tõlgendus näib käesolevas kokkuvõttes senini 
esitatud oletusi kaitsvat: “Gotlandi muistendites on talunik [kui ‘tekstuaalne’ 
roll] sageli võrdväärne ‘inimese, Gotlanderi … minaga [I]” (ibid.:148–149; 
rõhutus originaalis; allajoonitus lisatud). Seega näib Palmenfelt vihjavat, et kuu-
lajad otsustavad sääraste “rollide” kasuks, mis eristuvad neist endist; ehkki seal-
juures ei saa välistada juhtusid, kus tõepoolest ka on pakilisem “vaadata” 
taluniku “silmadega”—iva on siin selles, et “asendavat” oma mina elamist läbi 
teise siin ei toimu; pigem leiab aset teatav distantseeritud ja erapooletu “trans-
portatsioon”; “transportatsioon,” mis just nimelt tunnistab teist, kuna üksnes nii 
jutuvestmissitatsioon töötaks ja saavutaks soovitud mõju.  
Viimaks tuleks ära märkida ka folklorist Ulf Palmenfeldi mõiste “identifi-
kand” üks võimalikke inspiratsiooniallikaid. Ühe eeldusena tuleksid kõne alla 
varased arenguteooria käsitlused (nt efektiteooria). Oma 1964. aasta artiklis 
“Massimeedia effektid” (“Effects of the Mass Media,” Review of Child 
Development Research, Vol. 1, 1964[1974]) kirjutab Eleanor E. Maccoby: 
“eeldatavasti sellistes lugudes, mis esitavad rohkem kui ühe juhtiva tegelaskuju, 
valib vaataja ühe neist oma esmaseks ‘identifikandiks’ kogedes mõjusid 
[actions] läbi selle tegelaskuju [nö asendavalt; vicariously]” (Maccoby 1964 
[1974]:326). Ilmselgelt, ehkki Palmenfeldi edasiarendusega teataval määral 
korreleeruv, on siinkohal kriitiliselt oluline märkida modifitseerunud dünaami-
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kat. Maccoby “identifikandi” fokaalsus paikneb mujal, nimelt selles, kuidas 
tegelaskujud avaldavad mõju (affect) nt teismelistele poistele. Palmenfeldi poolt 
kõnekalt sktiseeritud ümberpöörduvuse kvaliteet seega haihtub siin koheselt—
“fiktsionaalsed” persoonid on taas üksnes pelkadeks “toenditeks” teesklus-
mängus (Walton). 
Nüüd, olles etableerinud teatava alusjoone seoses valdatavalt mentalistlik-
representatsioonilist (viz. internalistlikku) tegelaskujuga suhestumise mudelit 
soosijate kriitikaga, on hädavajalik—enne kui asuda käesolevas väitekirjas välja 
töötatud mõisteraamistikku kokku võtma ja edasistest plaanidest ja võimalustest 
rääkima—teha juttu teatavaist narratiiviuuringutest, mis näikse olevat rohkem 
avatud ka antud doktoriväitekirja kandvatele ideedele. Oma raamatus Social 
Minds in the Novel, väidab narratoloog Alan Palmer järgmist: 
 
“[Seisukohad, mis tõstavad esiplaanile tegelaskujude vahetu teadvuse] täidavad 
sageli pöördelist rolli, suunates narratiivi läbi osunduse, et teatav mentaalne 
sündmus on dispositsiooni manifestatsioon ja et dispositsioon on sündmuses 
põhjuslik tegur … Teadvuse episoode just dispositsioonide kontekstis tõlgen-
dades ehitab lugeja üles veenva ja koherentse taju [viz. tähenduse; sense] 
tegelaskujust” (Palmer 2010:28,27–34) 
 
Süvenemata siinkohal mõiste “dispositsioon” keerukusse (iseäranis seoses psü-
hooloogiliste konnotatsioonidega) saab Palmeri inspireerivat “välispidisest per-
spektiivist teadvusele” (externalist perspective on the mind) teesi (vt Palmer 
2014) edasi arendada järgnevalt: see, mida kirjanduslikud narratiivid harilikult 
“teevad” kirjalikult, saab visuaalsete kunstivormide (nt televisuaalse narratiivi) 
poolt saavutatud läbi peenekoelise vihjeaparatuuri (näitejate kehakeel ja või 
põgusad dialoogifraasid, mis ei pruugi pealiskaudsetele või juhuslikele vaata-
jatele eriti midagi tähendadagi, nagu see juhtub olema serialiseeritud narra-
tiivide puhul); ja ühtlasi läbi mitmekesise filmiliste (‘narratoloogiliste’) seadete 
(lähivõtted, erinevad montaažitehnikad jne.) Siinkohal tasub märkida, et välis-
tasin kavatsuslikult levinud võtte “peale lugemisest” (voice-over), kuna, vähe-
masti seoses ‘keerukate’ narratiividega, rikub see printsipiaalselt “näita, ära 
jutusta!” (show, don’t tell!) vaikimisi reeglit. Äsjanimetatud jutustuslikke ten-
dentse silmas pidades võiks seega järgnevalt väita, et “dispositsioonid” televi-
suaalses narratiivis tekitavad lausa tungiva vajaduse säärase vaatajapoolse 
tähendusloome (sense-making) järele, mille predikaadiks oleks “loominguline 
rahvakeelsus” (creative vernacular) ja mis oleks motiveeritud vaikimisi tunnis-
tamisest, et narratiivsed persoonid on kui inimesed; ehk siis, mis oleks moti-
veeritud pärisustamise (realitization) aktist (vt alt ülevaatlikku terminoloogia-
arutelu ja illustratiivset joonist 1).  
Et veel enamgi rõhutada keskset ideed, mille detailiseerimine on käesoleva 
kokkuvõte üheks eesmärgiks, oleks kasulik kõrvutada Palmeri Middlemarchi 
analüüs kirjandusfilosoofi Gregory Currie omaga. Kuigi Currie tunnistab 
narratiivi “kavatsustest kantud koherentsust” (intention-driven coherence) (Cur-
rie 2009:64), paistab juba varakult ja lakooniliselt silma just säärane laialt 
levinud, kiasmlik mõtteviis, millele Palmer kohe oma töö sissejuhatuses ka 
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osundab. “George Elioti poolsed sekkumised” Middlemarchis, kirjutab Currie, 
“võimaldavad meil lugeda maha [tegelaskuju] Karakterijooni.” Nii võimendab 
Currie senise kriitika adressaatide peamisi seisukohti. Kuna ka Currie jaoks 
saavad tegelaskujud olla kavatsuslikult toimivad persoonid üksnes sedavõrd, 
kuivõrd “kõige üle kõrguva intellgentsi” (overarching intelligence) (eeldatavad) 
põhjused neid nii kavatsema paneb (viz. “tõeline” autoriteadvus); ja isegi 
päramisel juhul on nad representatsiooni “kinnistatud” (Currie 2009:63–66; vt 
ka Oatley 2011). Teisisõnu, nagu ütlevad James Phelan ja Peter J. Rabinowitz 
kogumikus Narrative Theory Core Concepts and Critical Debates: “realistliku 
fiktsiooni kunst seisneb illusiooni edastamises, et tegelaskujud toimivad auto-
noomselt isegi kui nende tegevus teenib implikeeritud autori üleüldist eesmärki” 
(Phelan and Rabinowitz 2012:113; rõhutus lisatud).  
Väga märkimisväärselt kontrasteerub senise aruteluga narratoloog David 
Hermani positsioon, mille kohaselt on tegelaskujud “erilise entiteetide klassi … 
kategooria ‘persoonid’ liikmed” (Herman 2012:125; vt ka 2. peatükk). Ehkki 
Hermani käsitluses säilivad teatavad konstruktivistlikud põhjendused, tuleb 
sellegipoolest pidada silmas tema väidet, et “[t]eised teadvused pole mitte prob-
leemiks, mida lahendada, vaid hoopis persooni kui sellise kontseptsiooni sisse 
ehitatud. Seega ideega persoonist … kaasub, et mentaalsed predikaadid on ise-
enda suhtes iseendaleomistavad ja teiseleomistatavad teise puhul … lugejad 
tähendustavad tegelaskujude teadvusi sedavõrd, kuivõrd nad neid individuaale 
persoonidomeenis situeerivad” (op. cit.:126; rõhuasetus originaalis, allajoonitus 
lisatud). Või, kui väljendada sarnaseid ideid veel läbipaistvamalt, ei teeks paha 
tsiteerida filmiteoreetik Michael Z. Newsmani: “Selle arvesse võtmine, et 
tegelaskujud pole päris inimesed, ei tähenda, et nad poleks inimesed … nende 
iseloomujooned pole nemad ise, [vaid] kirjeldused nende kohta” (Newman 
2006b:53). Veel salvavam on kirjandusteoreetik Richard Walsh, kes märgib, et 
senini kritiseeritud lähenemistel on kalduvus “devalveerida kaasahaaratust ja 
fiktsionaalset olevust proportsioonis” (Walsh 2007:154).  
Nimelt, väidaksin, et võetuna ühe tervikuna on (i) Alderson-Day jt värsked 
kvantitatiivsed leiud; (ii) Hermani, Palmeri jt teedmurdvad narratoloogilised 
käsitlused seoses kirjandusliku meediumi ja “sotsiaalse teadvusega,” ja viimaks, 
ja mitte vähem olulisena, (iii) Palmenfeldi paeluv käsitlus “identifikandist” seo-
ses muistendi pajatustega ülimalt viljakaks distsipliinide vaheliseks “hüppe-
lauaks,” millest edasi saab juba mõelda distsipliinide ülesele mõisteraamisti-
kule, mida käesolev doktoriväitekiri just püüdiski välja arendada ja esile tõsta. 
Kuigi ma ei pruugi ülalmainitud teadlaste käsitlustega alati täielikult nõus-
tuda, on vaieldamatu, et nende ideed toestavad käesoleva doktoriväitekirja kesk-
set seisukohta: et eeskätt just televisuaalse tegelaskujuga suhestumise predi-
kaadiks on nende kui “sisseelatud inimeste” (Sepinwall 2015) kõrvaltvaata-
mine—st tegelaskujud lihtsalt on kogemuslikult inimlikud. Siinkohal oleks 
ühtlasi kohane märkida sedagi, et fraas “sisseelatud” kõnetab meid käesoleva 
doktoriväitekirja valguses kahetise konnotatsiooniga. Ühelt poolt on narratiiv-
sete persoonide puhul tegemist suveräännsete persoonidega; teisalt aga on nad 
sellistena saamises (becoming) läbi pikaajalise interaktsioonilise suhestatuse, 
218 
s.o. läbi arenemises-oleva-interaktsiooni (interaction-in-development). Järgne-
valt liigun ma edasi käesoleva doktoriväitekirja poolt välja pakutud termino-
loogilise panuse kokkuvõttega (vt ka joonist 1), arutledes seejärel selle üle, 
mida peaks, või vähemasti, mida saaks, antud seoses veel edasi teha. 
 
Ülevaade käesoleva doktoriväitekirja teoreetilis-analüütilisest panusest 
 
 
Joonis 1 
 
 
Käesolevas doktoriväitekirjas kavandatud teoreetilise raamistu eesmärgiks oli 
(i) tutvustada niihästi tarvilikke originaalmõisteid kui ka (ii) tuletada kohaseid 
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alternatiive olemasolevast mõistestikust, selleks et viimaseid seejärel (iii) täpse-
malt ‘välja timmida’ ning seejärel uude raamistusse inkorporeerida.  
Alustada võiks sünkroonsete mõistetega ühistoimeliselt kaasarendumine 
(co-elaboration) (kui loomingulise rahvakeelsuse (vernacular creativity) 
‘mootor’) ja pärisustamine (realitization), mis on visualiseeritud joonis 1-e 
kõige alumisel astmel. Antud mõistesuhte kvaliteeti annavad edasi kaks teine-
teisse mässitud, enesele tagasiosundavat noolt, kus ‘sissemässimine’ kui selline 
osundabki sünkroonsusele. Ühelt poolt märgib ühistoimelisus sotsio-indivi-
dualismi, sealjuures aga vältides individualismi (kuid ka kollektivismi) primaar-
sust. Kuna ühistoimelisuse jagatud siht (viz. narratiivsete persoonide elu-arut-
luste ‘õigesti’ tähendustamine) on alati ja juba mingile kollektiivselt loodud 
‘saadusele’ taandamatu. Teisalt on seesugune ühistoimeline tegevus hajusalt 
jaotatud (distributed), st uurija narrativistlik-toimetajalik roll tõstab esile indivi-
duaalseid looilmu (vt märget LI joonisel 1, ülal), mis, vastastikuses seoses ole-
vaina modifitseerivad, vaidlustavad ning seavad teineteist kahtluse alla mitte 
üksnes ühe diskussioonikeskkonna lõikes, vaid üle mitme samaaegse. Teisisõnu, 
kirjeldatud relatsiooniline kvaliteet annab märku “elavatest lugudest,” mille 
edendumine on subjekti-lookuse telje suhtes transendentne. Samaaegselt on 
ühistoimelisuse mõistes implikeeritud ka “kaanonile,” nagu nt teleseriaali “Hal-
vale teele” ‘ametlikule’ narratiivile, väljakutse esitamine, millest tulenevalt joo-
nistuvad välja “jutustamiste [ajalised] vahemikud” (interstices of narrations), 
mis rajavad teatava “kogukonna ajaloo” (Smorti 2008:231), mida omakorda 
toestab narratiivne kogemuslikkus.  
Pärisustamise mõiste on inspireeritud inglise keelsest neologismist, mida on 
selgitatud kui kellegi ‘reaalsusse’ toomise ‘seisundit.’ Narratiivsete persoonide 
vaikimisi pärisustamise aktis, netisuhtluse kontekstis, nägi käesolev doktori-
väitekiri ühistoimelise loomingulise rahvakeelsuse põhialust. Nii rõhutasin ma 
sotsiaalse sideme kontingentsust, mida vaatajad narratiivsete persoonidega 
kultiveerivad; seda kontingentsust toestab arenemises-olev-interaktsioon ja seda 
edastatakse läbi argitarkusliku praktilise keelekasutuse igapäevase väljendus-
rikkuse, mis piiritleb konkreetsed huvisfäärid (nö katsutav kellestki teisest 
‘mõtlemine’ ja ‘rääkimine’). Äsjakirjeldatud ideid illustreerib joonisel 1 kahe-
suunaline, täidlane nool, mis juhib narrtseptide juurest narratiivsete persooni-
deni ja tagasi; vt ka lühikest lisatud selgitust.  
Nimelt, käesoleva doktoriväitekirja keskset väitest tõukuvalt kannab säher-
dune ‘väljendusrikkus’ (pithiness) ‘teisese materiaalsuse’ (secondary materia-
lity) kvaliteeti, mida polsterdavad netivestlejate otse-tajuvuslikud (direct-per-
ceptional) kalduvused; siit tulenevalt saab tõelise sotsiaalse interaktsiooni ja 
‘fiktiivsete tegelaskujudega’ (aga ka päris autoritega) suhestumise (engagement) 
konsolideerida ‘alternatiivseks’ mõttelaadiks, mida toestab rahvaliku tähendus-
loome ajaline esitus (aruteluarhiivid, mis ulatuvad üle mitme suhtluskesk-
konna). Enamgi veel, nagu osundab katkendjoonega kahesuunaline nool 
joonisel 1, säärast sotsiaalse sideme saamist (becoming) väidetavalt valideerib 
‘juhitud’ praktika seoses narratiivse informatsiooni mõtestamisega. Narratiiv-
sed motiivid opereerisid siinkohal kui narratiivsete persoonide tajurelevantsi 
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(perception of relevance) korrelaadid; oluliseks sai see, millist mõju võis üks 
või teine narratiivne motiiv neile avaldada. Ehk teisisõnu: netivestlejad 
käsitlesid neid “autorijutuste” “elementaarüksuseid” (nt kaotsiläinud ritsiini-
sigarett, noore lapse mürgitamine), põhistamaks tõika, et narratiivseid persoone 
tunnistatakse (acknowledge) kui “arutlevaid toimijaid” (reasoning agents); kui 
oma maailmaga koos olevaid (‘asustades’ seda suveräännsete potentsiaalsete 
persoonidena) pace et olla selle maailma “sees,” sellesse kinnistunud (vrd. 
koos/sees skaala, with/in scale; vt 1. peatükk).  
Niisiis, konventsionaalne ettekujutus “transportatsioonist” järgnevalt “üle-
kandemudelis” (viz. Carry-Over Model, COM, CO-Model) inverteerub ning 
pärisustamise aktist sai baastasandi operatsiooniprintsiip (vrd joonis 1: jäme 
kahesuunaline nool osundab sünkroonselt baastasandilt ülespoole). Nimetatud 
ülekandemudel etableeris, et nt teleseriaali “Halvale teele” narratiivsed tegelas-
kujud “kanduvad üle” netivestlejate kogemuslik-diskussiivsele väljale, kuna 
diskursiivne akt (s.o. pikaajaline vestluspraktika) ‘nivelleerib’ (levels) ontoloo-
gilised erinevused. Käesoleva doktoriväitekirja väidete kohaselt säärane 
transpositsioon (i) ühistoimelise loomingulise rahvakeelsuse ruumi piires 
küllastab narratiivsed persoonid idiomaatilise suveräännsuse ja individuaal-
susega, ja ühtlasi ka (ii) säilitab ‘tõelise’ narratiivi kõrge relevantsuse, kuna 
tegemist on narratiivsete persoonide ‘asualaga’ (inhabitat). Enamgi veel, üle-
kandemudelist johtuvatest eeldustest tõukuvalt pidasin käesolevalt vajalikuks 
määratleda ka kontseptsiooni kokkukäändunud loostusest (twistory) Kokku-
käändunud loostusega (põimumine+lugu; twistory+story) püüdsin edasi anda 
neid momente, kus netivestjate/televaatajate päriselulised kogemused ja 
mälestused ‘põrkuvad’ (collide) narratiivsete persoonide “sotsiaalse välja” 
teatavate aspektidega, juhul kui nad püüavad viimaste toimimist tähendustada. 
Ehkki selguse huvides on jooniselt 1 äsjamainitud mõiste puudu, on võimalik 
väita, et sõltuvalt individuaalsest narrtseptist võib kokkukäändunud loostusest 
saada narratiivse persooni kavatsemisilma tähendustamise juures võtmeosis (KI; 
intend-world; kokkukäändunud loostuse jaoks, vt 1. peatükk; kavatsemisilma 
jaoks, vt 2. peatükk, ja alt). 
Püüdes koondada eelkirjeldatud dünaamikat maksimaalselt kõikehõlmavasse 
kontseptsiooni, pakkusin käesolevas doktoriväitekirjas välja originaalse 
narrtsepti mõiste. Narrtsept võiks olla mõtestatav sillastava kontseptsioonina, 
mis ühelt poolt osundab rahvakeele loomupärasele narrativistlikule impulsile 
(“narr” narratiivist), teisalt aga viimases sisalduvale argitarkuslikule “otsesele 
tajule” (direct perception) (“tsept” pretseptist). Kuna narrtsept keskendub 
spetsiifiliselt teisepõhisele tähendusloomele, eristub see võrreldavatest kontsep-
tualiseerimiskatsetest narratiiviuuringutes üleüldiselt, kuid lubab mõningaid 
neist samas ka viljakalt edasi arendada, nt internetiuurija Ananda Mitra 
mõisteleidu “narb” (antud seoses, vt käesoleva kokkuvõtte viimast alaosa). 
Eelkirjeldatud mõisted leidsid väljatöötamist ja üldises mõisteraamistus 
positsioneerimist käesoleva doktoriväitekirja 1. peatükis. Töö 2. peatükk 
laiendas eelnevat ning pakkus välja veel ühe originaalmõiste: majakas 
(beacon). Väitsin, et kui kõneleda abstraktselt, omab majakas vajalikku 
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‘mobiilsust’ eristamaks narrtseptides (viz. narrtseptiivses mõtlemises) peidus-
olevaid “ilmu.” St majakas liigendab (decompose) need ehk differentseerib 
fluiidseteks kogemusliku tähendusloome “taskuteks”; ja seejärel komponeerib 
(compose) need looilmadena—analüütilis-metodoloogiliste mõistmiskategoo-
riatena—mis manifesteeruvad “protsessis olevana” ühe individuaalse narrtsepti, 
s.o. kommentaariteksti või foorumilõimupostituse põhiselt. Seeläbi on joonisel 
1 esitatud majaka päikeselaadne kujutis ilmselgelt taotluslik. Olles mõtestatav 
arvukate rõhuasetustega dialektilise mehhanismina, tõukub majakas “rahva-
likest” ja “akadeemilistest” tõlgendusprotsessidest ja ka protsessidest viimaste 
sees; st majakas “blingib,” “heidab valgust” niihästi retseptiivsele dimensioonile 
(reciprocal dimension)—s.o. kavatsemis-ilmale (KI), mis ‘toidab’ tekstiloojate-
maailma (TLM), mis ‘toidab’ looilma (LI)—, andes nii mõista, et netivestjate 
individuaalsete narrtseptide kontekstis on tegemist on ‘implitsiitse’ komposit-
siooniga, looilma komponeerimist saatva nö vaikimisi effektiga; kui ka 
analüütilis-metodoloogilisele dimensioonile, millega seoses jõuame omakorda 
diskursuseilmani (discourse world) (laiemaks aruteluks, vt 2. peatükk, 2.0; 
lühiülevaateks, vt loetelu alt). Säärast äsjamainitud ‘vaikimisi’ kvaliteeti, mis 
narrtseptide ja looilmade “substantsina” toestab viimaste fluiidset edenemist 
(development) on joonisel 1 edasi antud katkendjooneliste kahesuunaliste nool-
tega, mis nö ühendavad “ilmu” majaka retseptiivsete ‘harudega.’ Vahepealse 
kokkuvõtte korras olgu mainitud ilmadekategooriad konkreetselt välja toodud: 
 kavatsemisilm (intend-world; IW/KI): Rõhutades narratiivsete persoonide 
kui suveräännsete, eraldiseisvate toimijate kavatsuslikkuse tähendustamist, 
eristub antud mõiste selgelt M.-L. Ryani “kavatsuseilmast” (intention-world) 
(vt 2. peatükk, 2.1, eriti 2.3.1, alaosa Worldying the intend-worlds). Kuna 
narrtseptid edastavad kavatsemist väljaspoolt (from without) (s.o. kolmanda 
isiku perspektiivilt), aimdub siit katse mõista narratiivseid persoone kui omal 
“sotsiaalsel väljal” pärisustatuid. Seega tunnistatakse narratiivsete persoo-
nide suveräännsust koos oma “aktuaalse maailmaga” (AW; actual world); 
see hoitakse puutumatu ja selle piiridesse ei tungita. Ühtlasi aitab antud 
kontseptsioon esile tuua aga ka selliseid tähendustamisjuhtumeid, kus neti-
vestlejad/televaatajad jõuavad teatavail tähendustamismomentidel ühildu-
miseni narratiivsete persoonide elukontekstide ja nende endi elukonteksti 
vahel. Nimetatud fenomeni olen käesolevalt määratlenud kui päris ja 
(tajutava) elukogemuse kokkukäändunud loostusena (twistory) (vt 1. 
peatükk, 1.4), 
 tekstiloojateilm (text makers’ world; TMW/TLI): rõhutades looilma (vt alt) 
organiseerimist põhistavat narrtseptiivset printsiipi, saavad ka stsenaristidest 
ja “loojatest” (nt teleseriaali “Halvale teele” Vince Gilligan) “osalejad” 
(actors), “tegijad” (doers), viz. “arutlevad toimijad” (reasoning agents). 
Nende (võimalikud) kavatsused vajavad (välja)selgitamist ning narrativi-
seeritud selgitused ilmnevad kriitika, hinnangu, vaidlustamise vms vormis 
(vt 2. peatükk, 2.3.1), 
 looilm (storyworld; SW/LI): sotsio-individuaalsete alltoonidega subjektiivne 
“kalibreering” (calibration), mis teostub läbi narrtsepti—st läbi majaka poolt 
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analüütilis-metodoloogiliselt piiritletud “retseptiivse dimensiooni” “väljen-
dusliku vormi” (expressive form)—edastades narratiivselt situeeritud sünd-
musi ja viimaste (potentsiaalseid, paljastatud, ja välja praagitud) tagajärgi 
“persooni tasandil.” Sisuliselt liidab looilm endaga—anti-hierarhialiku jada 
põhimõttel (on the principle of non-hierarchal array)—kõik potentsiaalsed 
kavatsemis- ja tekstiloojateilmad, olles viimaste narrativiseeritud mõtteline 
‘summa.’ Teisisõnu: looilmas “kohtuvad” kõik kavatsuslikult signifikantsed 
“persoonid,” kuna neid tajutakse toimivat teatud põhjustel. Niisiis on säärase 
kalduvuse minimaalne ‘formaat’ estableeritud individuaalsete narrtseptide 
näol. Nö maksimalistlik formaat formuleerib seejärel kõik looilmad 
analüüsitavas “hajutatult jaotatud” (distributed) diskursusevalimis osistena 
saavas (becoming) diskursuseilmas (vt 2. peatükk, 2.3.2), 
 diskursuseilm (discourse world; DW/DI): DI-d karakteriseerib uurijapoolne 
järjepidev ülalmainitud “ilmade” liigendamine (decomposition) ja DI-ks 
komponeerimine (composition). Need ilmad edenduvad (develop) narratiiv-
seid persoone tähendustades ja võttes antud narratiivi (s.o. teleseriaali 
“Halvale teele”) kui nende narratiivsete persoonide “kavatsuslikku välja” 
(intentionale Feld). Järelikult on diskursuseilma puhul tegemist uurijapoolse 
saava “jutustuste jutustusega” (narration of narrations), tähendusloome ja 
kogemise “jooksva” piiritlemisega, mis sellisena hõlmab, ent ka ümber 
mõtestab, sildistusi nagu “rahvalik” (popular) ja “akadeemiline” (academic). 
Teisisõnu: diskursuseilm võimaldab osundada tarvilikule uurijapoolsele 
toimetajalikule, kuid siiski ka “narrativistlikule” (narrativist) kalduvusele—
saab temast siinkohal ju televaatajate ja netivestjate jutuvestmise “ilmastaja” 
(worlder) (ibid.). 
Nagu viimane punkt viitab, hõlmab kontseptsioon majakast kui analüüsi 
rakenduslikust meetodist “akadeemilist,” s.o. analüütilis-metodoloogilist 
dimensiooni. See “dimension” aitab selgitada jutuvestmise “makrotasandi” ten-
dentsi, ehk siis, ühistoimelist loomingulist rahvakeelsust kui sellist. Siinkohal 
säilitab siis ka õpetlase analüütiline metodoloogia netivestjatega analoogse 
kontekstualiseeriva ja tõlgendava impulsi, kuna diskursuseilm on saav alates 
sellest momendist kui majakat käsitada praktiliselt—kui dialektilist makro-
tasandi(le) “struktureerijat” (structurer). Seega, majaka analüütilist-meto-
doloogilise dimensiooni sihiks, nagu väitsin 2. peatükis, on varjatud (covert) 
retseptiivsete “taskute” eritlemine eksplitsiitsete (overt) “ilmadena,” viz. kui 
koostisosiste, kui “looainesena” (story matter) narrtseptiivsete looilmade 
tarbeks. Ühelt poolt saab majaka kaudu nii võimalikuks jälgida, kuidas narra-
tiivsete persoonide kavatsemisilmad; nende ja netivestjate vahelises kokku-
käändunud loostumised; ning ka tekstiloojateilmad moodustavad lõppude 
lõpuks kõik looilma “konsistentsuse,” mis väljendub läbi üksiku narrtsepti. 
Teisalt võimaldab majakas diskursuseilma propositsiooni—s.o. looilmade 
saamist uurija narrativistliku-toimetajaliku agentsuse kaudu--,mis on sealjuures 
aga kaheldamatult vaid potentsiaalne ja kriitiliselt mittetäielik, lõpetamata 
analüütiline tõlgendus. Seega on eelöeldust johtuvalt majaka analüütilis-
metodoloogilises dimensioonis “liigendamine” ja “komponeerimine” esil 
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üheaegselt: uurija niihästi liigendab narrtseptiivseid “ilmu” (viz. tähendustab 
neid “eksplitsiitsel” moel), kui ka komponeerib neid uuesti “jooksva” dis-
kursuseilma perspektiivilt; milles omakorda heiastub hajusalt jagatud “makro-
tasandi” tendents, mis karakteriseerib televaatajate/netivestjate ühistoimelist 
loomingulist rahvakeelsust üle mitmesuguste arutluskeskkondade. Selline 
(potentsiaalne) diskursuseilm võib küll omada “parameetreid,” mida kitsendada 
või laiendada (nt piirates või suurendades kvantitatiivset andmemahtu), kuid 
seda on olemuslikult võimatu mõista “lõpetatuna.” Kuna see on saav, ‘elav 
sündmustus” (living eventness). Niisiis on igati tõenäoline, et mõni teine õpet-
lane, olles omalt poolt analüüsinud käesolevas doktoriväitekirjas analüüsitud 
materjali, võib, omades sealjuures ehk ka põhjalikku teadmist teleseriaalist 
“Halvale teele,” arendada välja hoopis omasugused selgituslikud “narratiivid,” 
mis kas vaidlustaks ja või seaks kahtluse alla minu poolt pakutava mõiste-
raamistu asjakohasuse. Tõsi, isegi sellisel juhul mu mõisteraamistu sobilikkuse 
tõenäosusaste ei kahane, kuna see ei väidagi kunagi olevat midagi muud, kui 
just nimelt üks potentsiaalsustest vaibumatus liikumises ja sissevoolus. Vahest 
oleks isegi paslik käesolev alapeatükk lõpetada Charles H. Kahni sõnadega 
raamatust The art and thought of Heraclitus: “kui me just nimelt tahtlikult ei 
konstrueeri ega vali tõlgendavat raamistikku, saavad meist mitteteadlikud ja 
seeläbi kriitikameeleta vangid mis tahes hermeneutilistele eeldustele, mis 
juhtuvad “õhus olema” (Kahn 1979[2001]:88).  
 
Mida teha edasi? 
Eelmises alaosas sai ähmaselt viidatud Ananda Mitra paeluvale mõistele “narb” 
(vt Mitra 2010, 2013; Mitra ja Mamani 2014). “Narbi” kontseptsioon inte-
greerib niihästi narratiiviuuringud kui ka “andmekaevanduse” tehnilised võima-
lused, misläbi on tegemist katusterminiga põhimõtteliselt igasugusele digi-
taalsele “leivapurule,” mida me tänapäevasel sotsiaalmeedia ajastul endast maha 
jätame. Ütleksin, et minu poolt vermitud narrtsepti mõiste võiks siinkohal 
pakkuda vajalikku kitsendust, mis suunaks “narbi” uurimusliku “jõu” pealnäha 
väga tavapärasele praktikale—sellele, kuidas inimesed räägivad teistest ini-
mestest. Antud täpsustust meeles pidades ei pruugi aga narrtsepti kontseptsiooni 
võimalik panus sugugi mitte piirduda üksnes “tegelaskujuga suhestumise” ja 
“fiktsionaalsete” narratiivide uurimisega. Kui möönda, et keskse küsimusena 
saaks võtta reaalsuse edendamist läbi keele; või, mõnevõrra teisiti sõnastades, 
kui fookuses oleks materiaalse reaalsuse mitmesuguste diskursuste “lekkimine” 
(Grishakova ja Sorokin 2016) “fiktsiooni” kogemisse; võiks näiteks väita, et 
teleseriaali “Halvale teele” näitlejanna Anna Gunni vastu suunatud onlain 
misogüünlik “diskursus” (fenomen, millele 1. peatükis viitasin möödaminnes 
kui “vaieldavatele viiludele ‘sotsiaalsetes reaalsustes’) viitab sõltuvussuhtele 
eelarvamuslike ‘sentimendi konfiguratsioonidega’ päriselus. Võimalik, et äsja-
kirjeldatud probleemistik leiaks täielikumat selgitamist läbi narrtsepti kont-
septsiooni, erinevalt tavapärasest toetumisest päris/mittepäris teljele (vt ka Gunn 
2013). Lisaks sellistele “viiludele” seoses “fiktsionaalsete tegelaskujude” 
rahvaliku suhestumisega, tuleks eeldatava laiendusena kõne alla ka narrtsepti 
224 
seos muutlike ja “poleemiliste” teemadega, mis baseeruvad mitmesugustel 
küsimustel, leides järjest enam kõlapinda ka digitaliseeritud aruteludes. Kuigi 
kaugeltki mitte uurimata ‘territoorium’ nii mõnegi distsipliini poolt, võiks narr-
tsepti kontseptuaalne kaal paljastada ja kalibreerida teatud ‘avausi’ sellistes 
teemades nagu kontroll, jõutamine, rõhumine, ja “teisestamine” (vt nt Said 
1978[2001]; Gramsci 1985: Fuchs ja Dyer-Witherford 2013; Dyer-Witheford 
2015; Galloway 2004).  
Eelöeldu aga mõistagi ei tähenda, nagu niihästi narrtsepti mõiste kui ka käes-
olevalt piiritletud teoreetiline raamistu tervikuna ei saaks veel põhjalikumalt 
panustada narratiivsete persoonidega suhestumise uurimisse, ja et selle käigus 
antud raamistik lisaviimistlust leiaks. Siinkohal ei pea ma silmas mitte eelneva 
argumentatsiooni ja analüüsi kriitilist taaskäsitlemist laiemal skaalal seoses 
teleseriaaliga “Halvale teele” (terviklik empiiriline aines koosnes tuhande 
üheksast kommentaaritekstist üle kolme, omavahel sisuliselt seotud, episoodi 
kahe aasta lõikes), vaid pigem võrdlevat aspekti, näiteks seoses ühe väga 
erineva teleseriaaliga, s.o. Lost (empiiriline materjal oleks siinkohal kvani-
tatiivselt võrreldav) (vrd vt Sorokin 2013a, 2015). Võrdlusmoment avaks 
siinkohal tee mitte üksnes käesoleva raamistu modifitseerimiseks, vaid kasvõi 
selle kummutamisekski. Enamgi veel, taolist võrdlevat taktikat saaks veelgi 
laiendada, hõlmates esmast andmekogumist ja hilisemat kolme-suunalist 
võrdlevat analüüsi, mis võiks kaasata nt digitaalseid arutelusid seoses menukate 
filmisarjadega (nt Harry Potter) Internet Movie Database foorumis ja mujal.  
Ja viimaks: kõik ülalmainitud uurimisvõimalused kannavad endas vajalikke 
“eoseid,” mis võimaldavad veel enamgi detailiseerida seda, mis käesolevalt on 
üldisel tasandil eritlenud hajusalt jaotatud (distributed) ühistoimelise narratiivse 
praktikana internetis, ja täpsemalt, mida käesolevas doktoriväitekirjas käsitasin 
narrtseptiivse väljendus- ja mõttelaadina.   
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at CEES annual conference/61. Scientific conference on Kreutzwald 
“Variation in language, literature, folklore and music” 
2016, August: presentation “The Lives of Characters: Affective World-Building 
in the Internet Discussions of Breaking Bad” at the international con-
ference “The Stories of Hope and Fear: Mapping Emotions and Affects in 
Life, Arts, and Literature.” Executive Manager Prof. Dr. Marina Grisha-
kova (in collaboration with the University of Tampere School of Literary 
and Translation Studies, and University of Helsinki Department of 
Finnish Studies) in the Palmse Manor 
2016, April: lecture “The Reception of Film and Television” under the auspices 
of course FLKU.05.229 Reception Theory and Sociology of Art (6 EAP) 
2014, June: “Narrative Matters 2014: Narrative Knowing/ Récit et Savoir” con-
ference (American University of Paris, France), presenter in panel 
“Narrative and Complexity II” (with M. Grishakova and M. Poulaki; 
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moderator: R. Walsh); presentation: “Collaborative sense-making 
complexities of Lost and Breaking Bad” 
2014, April: Cognitive Futures in the Humanities 2nd International Conference 
(University of Durham, UK), invited presenter (presentation: “Finding 
the Ties, Minding the Minds: Collaborative sense-making complexities of 
Lost and Breaking Bad”) 
2013, December: invited presenter at the 57. Scientific conference on Kreutz-
wald, entitled “Transmedial transitions” with presentation “Coherent cha-
racter intentions, non-plausible stories? Emergent collective thinking of 
thinking in the Internet reception of “Breaking Bad” 
2013, April-May: lector, refresher course “The Analysis of Film Work” for the 
teachers of Estonian Language and Literature 
2013,  August: participation in the Summer Course in Narrative Studies 
(SINS2013), University of Aarhus (PhD course certificate) 
2012, October: presentation “Correlations of Form and Response: Free and Re-
stricted Plays of Sense-Making” at the international conference “Nar-
ration and Narratives as an Interdisciplinary Field of Study” (Örebro 
University, research group “Narration, Life, and Meaning” in History and 
Literary Studies) 
2012, June: presentation “(In)determinacies of Comprehension: Making Sense 
of Television Serials as Joint World-Construction” (co-author M. Grisha-
kova) at the StoryNet intensive seminar “Narratives and entertainment: 
The use of stories to make communication more entertaining and effec-
tive” (University of Amsterdam, School of Communication Research) 
2011, November-December: Review of two research items (BA) under the 
auspices of SA Archimedes research contest of 2011 
2011, May: presentation: “Open Texts, Open Interpretations: Narrative Dy-
namics of Continuous Viewer Participation” at the international Nordic 
Network of Narrative Studies (NNNS) conference “Teaching Narrative 
and Teaching Through Narrative” (University of Tampere) 
2011, May: participation in Doctoral Course as part of NNNS international con-
ference “Teaching Narrative and Teaching Through Narrative” (Uni-
versity of Tampere) 
2010, October: participation in the intensive seminar “Narrative Interactions: 
Stories, Identities and Voices”, Institute of Cultural Research and Fine 
Arts, University of Tartu (certificate) 
 
Public and social activities 
Sorokin, Siim (2015). Me peame rääkime rassismist Eestis: pagulasteema sõna-
vägivald. Müürileht, 47, 20−21 
Sorokin, Siim (trans.) (interview by: Sobtšuk, O) (2014). Humanitaarteaduski 
võib olla praktiline ja rakenduslik. Interview with Prof. A. Nünning. Valle-
Sten Maiste (Toim.). 26−27 
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ELULOOKIRJELDUS 
Nimi:  Siim Sorokin 
Sünniaeg:  18. mai, 1984 
Kodakondsus: eesti 
Telefon:  +372 5400 5618 
e-mail:  alde66_64@hotmail.com 
 
Haridus: 
2010–2018     Doktorantuur Tartu Ülikooli Kultuuriteaduste instituudi eesti ja 
võrdleva rahvaluule osakonna juures (kirjanduse ja 
kultuuriteaduste õppekava) 
2007–2010     Kirjanduse ja rahvaluule magistriõpe Tartu Ülikoolis; omandatud 
Humanitaarteaduste magistri kaad (eesti ja võrdlev rahvaluule) 
(cum laude)  
Siim Sorokin, magistrikraad, 2010, (juhendaja) Ülo Valk, 
Jutustaja – kas hääle andja või hääle kandja?, Tartu Ülikool, 
Filosoofiateaduskond, Kultuuriuuringute ja kunstide instituut, 
Eesti ja võrdleva rahvaluule osakond 
2003–2007     Kirjanduse ja rahvaluule bakalaureuseõpe Tartu Ülikoolis; 
omandatud Humanitaarteaduste bakalaureusekraad (eesti ja 
võrdlev rahvaluule)  
2000–2003   Hugo Treffneri Gümnaasium (humanitaarsuunitlusega klass) 
Keelteoskus: eesti, inglise – C2; saksa – B2; vene – A1 
 
Teenistuskäik 
 Tartu Ülikool, Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond, 
Kultuuriteaduste instituut, Kultuuriteaduste nooremteadur (0,85) 
2010–2018  Tartu Ülikool, Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond, 
Kultuuriteaduste instituut, Eesti ja võrdleva rahvaluule osakond, 
doktorant (1,00) 
 
Teaduslik ja arendustegevus 
Peamised uurimisvaldkonnad: 
 2. Ühiskonnateadused ja kultuur; 2.4 Kultuuriuuringud; CERCS ERIALA: 
H400 Folkloristika; PÕHISUUND: Televisuaalse teksti sotsio-kognitiivne 
retseptsioon internetipõhise (blogid) dünaamilise interaktsiooni/loomingu-
liste kogukondade näitel. 
 
Publikatsioonide üldloetelu: 
Grishakova, Marina; Sorokin, Siim (2016). Notes on Narrative, Cognition, and 
Cultural Evolution. Sign Systems Studies, 44 (4), 542–561. http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.12697/SSS.2016.44.4.04 
Sorokin, Siim (2016). Televaatajate ja karakterite intersubjektiivne ja konteks-
tuaalne lõimumine teleseriaali “Halvale teele” internetiretseptsioonis. Eesti 
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Kirjandusmuuseumi aastaraamat. Tartu: EKM Teaduskirjastus. (Paar 
sammukest Eesti Kirjandusmuuseumi Aastaraamat 2012–2013) 125–152 
Sorokin, Siim (2013). Televaatajate ühistoimeline tähendusloome. Acta Semio-
tica Estica, 10, 11–39 
Sorokin, Siim (2010). Die Zeit und die Erfahrungswelt des Menschen – der 
literarische Text und das Gedächtnis. Liimets, Airi. Denkkulturen. Selbst-
werdung des Menschen. Erziehungskulturen: Festschrift für Professor Dr. 
Dr. h. c. Dr. h. c. Heino Liimets. Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Bern, Bruxelles, 
New York, Oxford, Wien: Peter Lang, Internationaler Verlag der Wissen-
schaften (Baltische Studien zur Erziehungs- und Sozialwissenschaft; 18) 
225–237 
Sorokin, Siim (2015). Collaborative sense-making complexities of (for?) Lost 
and Breaking Bad. Proceedings of the 7th Narrative Matters Conference, 
2014; Narrative Knowing/Récit et Savoir: Narrative Matters Conference, 
2014; Pariis, Prantsusmaa, 23.–27. juuni, 2014. hal-univ-diderot.archives-
ouvertes.fr/NARRATIVE_MATTERS/search/index/q/authFullName_t%3A
%28Sorokin+Siim%29/1-11 
Sorokin, Siim (2017). Pärisustamise paradoksid: narratiivsed persoonid, 
“Halvale teele” ja argitarkus netisuhtluses. Ostrak, Anne; Voolaid, Piret 
(Toim.). Annual conference of Centre of Excellence in Estonian Studies and 
annual 61st Kreutzwald Days conference. Variation in Language, Literature, 
Folklore, and Music. December 7–8, 2017. Programme and Abstracts. 
Annual conference of Centre of Excellence in Estonian Studies and annual 
61st Kreutzwald Days conference, 7–8. December, 2017. Tartu: ELM 
Scholarly Press, Tartu. 112–114 
Sorokin, Siim (2014). Finding the Ties, Minding the Minds: Collaborative 
Sense-Making Complexities of Lost and Breaking Bad. Cognitive Futures in 
the Humanities 2nd International Conference University of Durham, 24.–26. 
April 2014 Book of Abstracts: Cognitive Futures in the Humanities 2nd 
International Conference University of Durham, 24.–26. April 2014. Ed. 
Garratt, Peter. Durham University, UK. 21–22  
Sorokin, Siim (2013). Sidusad karakterikavatsused, ebausutavad lood? Kollek-
tiivselt esilduv mõtlemisest mõtlemine teleseriaali “Breaking Bad” inter-
netiretseptsioonis. Labi, Kanni (Toim.). 57. Kreutzwaldi päevade teaduslik 
konverents “Transmeedialised siirded”. “Transmeedialised siirded”, 17.–18. 
detsember, 2013. Tartu: Eesti Kirjandusmuuseumi Teaduskirjastus. 8–10 
Sorokin, Siim (2015). Me peame rääkima rassismist Eestis: pagulasteema 
sõnavägivald. Müürileht, 47, 20–21 
Sorokin, Siim (tõlk.) (intervjueeris Sobtšuk, O.) (2014). Humanitaarteaduski 
võib olla praktiline ja rakenduslik. Interview with Prof. A. Nünning. Valle-
Sten Maiste (Toim.). 26−27 
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Teaduslikud artiklid rahvusvahelise levikuga väljaannetes: 
Grishakova, Marina; Sorokin, Siim (2016). Notes on Narrative, Cognition, and 
Cultural Evolution. Sign Systems Studies, 44 (4), 542–561. http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.12697/SSS.2016.44.4.04 
Sorokin, Siim (2010). Die Zeit und die Erfahrungswelt des Menschen – der 
literarische Text und das Gedächtnis. Liimets, Airi. Denkkulturen. Selbst-
werdung des Menschen. Erziehungskulturen: Festschrift für Professor Dr. 
Dr. h. c. Dr. h. c. Heino Liimets. Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Bern, Bruxelles, 
New York, Oxford, Wien: Peter Lang, Internationaler Verlag der Wissen-
schaften (Baltische Studien zur Erziehungs- und Sozialwissenschaft; 18). 
225–237 
 
Saadud uurimistoetused: 
PUT1481 “Imaginaarsete narratiivsete stsenaariumite roll kultuuridünaamikas 
(1.01.2017−31.12.2020)”, Marina Grišakova, Tartu Ülikool, Humanitaar-
teaduste ja kunstide valdkond, kultuuriteaduste instituut; Täitja. 
IUT2-43 “Traditsioon, loovus ja ühiskond: vähemused ja alternatiivsed 
diskursused (1.01.2013−31.12.2018)”, Ülo Valk, Tartu Ülikool, Humanitaar-
teaduste ja kunstide valdkond, kultuuriteaduste instituut; Täitja. 
 
Lõppenud projektid 
PUT192 “Esilduvad lood: jutustamine ja ühine tähendusloome narratiivses 
keskkonnas (1.01.2013−31.12.2016)”, Marina Grišakova, Tartu Ülikool, 
Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond, kultuuriteaduste instituut. 
ETF8874 “Narratiivi vormid ja funktsioonid tänapäeva kultuuris: narratiiv kui 
kognitsiooni, kommunikatsiooni ning tähendusloome viis (1.01.2011− 31.12. 
2015)”, Marina Grišakova, Tartu Ülikool, Filosoofiateaduskond. 
SF0180139s08 “Folkloor ja ühiskond: pärimusmälu, loovus, rakendused 
(1.01.2008−31.12.2012)”, Ülo Valk, Tartu Ülikool, Filosoofiateaduskond. 
ETF7166 “Narratiivi semiootika ja kultuuri interdistsiplinaarne analüüs 
(1.01.2007−31.12.2010)”, Marina Grišakova, Tartu Ülikool, Filosoofia-
teaduskond. 
 
Muu teaduslik organisatsiooniline ja erialane tegevus: 
august, 2017–jaanuar, 2018: LACE Talvekooli „Uses of Narrative“ korraldus-
komitee liige 
2011–… Põhjamaade Narratiiviuurijate Koostöövõrgustiku (Nordic Network of 
Narrative Studies) veebimeister 
2010–… Põhjamaade Narratiiviuurijate Koostöövõrgustiku (Nordic Network of 
Narrative Studies) liige 
 
Õppetöö 
Andmed kõrgkoolis tehtud auditoorse õppetöö kohta: 
aprill, 2016: loeng “Filmi ja televisiooni retseptsioon” ainekursuse FLKU. 
05.229 Retseptsiooniteooria ja kunstisotsioloogia (6 EAP) raames 
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aprill-mai, 2013: eesti keele ja kirjandusõpetajate täienduskoolitus “Filmiteose 
analüüs” (FLKU.TK.081), lektor 
 
Juhendamine: 
november-detsember, 2011: Kahe teadustöö (BA) retsenseerimine 2011. Aasta 
SA Archimedese teadustööde konkursi raames 
Laura Mägi: Lapsetapu ja libahundi motiivid eesti õuduskirjanduses. Juhendaja: 
Siim Sorokin (MA); oponent: teadur Merili Metsvahi (1.06.2011) 
 
Administratiivtöö ja muud kohustused 
august, 2017–jaanuar, 2018: LACE Talvekooli “Uses of Narrative” korraldus-
komitee liige 
2011–… Põhjamaade Narratiiviuurijate Koostöövõrgustiku (Nordic Network of 
Narrative Studies) veebimeister 
2010–… Põhjamaade Narratiiviuurijate Koostöövõrgustiku (Nordic Network of 
Narrative Studies) liige 
 
Erialane enesetäiendus 
5.–6. aprill, 2018: ettekanne “Digital Enclaves as Leakage Spaces for Societal 
Realities: Reciprocal Misogyny of Skyler White" (algne pealkiri) 
konverentsil “Real Fictions” (Tampere Ülikool; korraldajad – Narrare: 
Centre for Interdisciplinary Narrative Studies, The Academy of Finland 
project “The Literary in Life: Exploring the Boundaries between 
Literature and the Everyday”, Doctoral Programme in Literary Studies) 
22.-26. jaanuar, 2018: LACE Talvekooli “Uses of Narrative” korralduskomitee 
liige 
7.–8. detsember, 2017: ettekanne “Pärisustamise paradoksid: narratiivsed 
persoonid, “Halvale teele” ja argitarkus netisuhtluses” Eesti-uuringute 
tippkeskuse (CEES) aastakonverentsil/61. Kreutzwaldi päevade konve-
rentsil 
august, 2016: ettekanne “The Lives of Characters: Affective World-Building in 
the Internet Discussions of Breaking Bad” rahvusvahelisel konverentsil 
“The Stories of Hope and Fear: Mapping Emotions and Affects in Life, 
Arts, and Literature.” Peakorraldaja prof. dr. Marina Grishakova 
(kaaskorraldajad Tampere Ülikooli School of Literary and Translation 
Studies, Helsingi Ülikooli Department of Finnish Studies) Palmse mõisas 
aprill, 2016: loeng “Filmi ja televisiooni retseptsioon” ainekursuse FLKU. 
05.229 Retseptsiooniteooria ja kunstisotsioloogia (6 EAP) raames 
juuni, 2014: konverentsi “Narrative Matters 2014: Narrative Knowing/ Récit et 
Savoir” (American University of Paris, Prantsusmaa), paneeli “Narrative 
and Complexity II” esineja (koos M. Grishakova ja M. Poulaki; 
moderaator: R. Walsh); ettekanne: “Collaborative sense-making comple-
xities of Lost and Breaking Bad” 
aprill, 2014: Cognitive Futures in the Humanities 2nd International Conference 
(University of Durham, UK), kutsutud esineja (ettekanne: “Finding the 
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Ties, Minding the Minds: Collaborative sense-making complexities of 
Lost and Breaking Bad”) 
detsember, 2013: 57. Kreutzwaldi päevade teadusliku konverentsi “Trans-
mediaalsed siirded” kutsutud esineja, ettekanne “Sidusad karakteri-
kavatsused, ebausutavad lood? Kollektiivselt esilduv mõtlemisest mõtle-
mine teleseriaali “Halvale teele” internetiretseptsioonis” 
aprill-mai, 2013: eesti keele ja kirjandusõpetajate täienduskoolitus “Filmiteose 
analüüs“ (FLKU.TK.081), lektor 
august, 2013: osavõtt Suumer Course in Narrative Studies (SINS2013) suve-
koolist Aarhusi Ülikoolis (PhD course certificate) 
oktoober, 2012: ettekanne “Correlations of Form and Response: Free and Re-
stricted Plays of Sense-Making” rahvusvahelisel konverentsil “Narration 
and Narratives as an Interdisciplinary Field of Study” (Örebro Ülikool, 
research group “Narration, Life, and Meaning” in History and Literary 
Studies) 
juuni, 2012: ettekanne: “(In)determinacies of Comprehension: Making Sense of 
Television Serials as Joint World-Construction” (kaasautor M. Grisha-
kova) StoryNeti intensiivseminaril “Narratives and entertainment: The 
use of stories to make communication more entertaining and effective” 
(Amsterdami Ülikool, School of Communication Research) 
november-detsember, 2011: Kahe teadustöö (BA) retsenseerimine 2011. Aasta 
SA Archimedese teadustööde konkursi raames 
mai, 2011: ettekanne “Open Texts, Open Interpretations: Narrative Dynamics of 
Continuous Viewer Participation” NNNS-i rahvusvahelisel konverentsil 
“Teaching Narrative and Teaching Through Narrative” (Tampere Ülikool) 
mai, 2011: osavõtt doktorikursusest NNNS-i rahvusvahelise konverentsi 
“Teaching Narrative and Teaching Through Narrative” raames (Tampere) 
oktoober, 2010: osavõtt Tartu Ülikooli Kultuuriteaduste ja kunstide instituudi 
intensiivseminarist “Narrative Interactions: Stories, Identities and 
Voices” (täienduskoolituse tunnistus) 
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